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
Office of the General Counsel

December 1992

# **Principles of Federal Appropriations Law**

Second Edition

Volume II



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
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# Foreword

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This is Volume 11 of Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, second edition. Publication of this **volume** continues our process of revising and updating the first (1982) edition of the “Red Book” and reissuing it in what will ultimately be a **4-volume** looseleaf set. Volumes I and 11 supersede **all** of the completed chapters of the first edition except Chapters 11 and 12, which will be renumbered and covered in Volume III. The fourth and final volume will cover material not included in the first edition.

As we noted in our first volume, our objective in Principles is to present a basic reference work covering those areas of law in which the Comptroller General renders decisions and which are not covered in other GAO publications. We measure our success in this endeavor by Principles’ day-to-day utility to its federal and nonfederal audience. In this regard, we appreciate the many comments and suggestions we have received to date, and hope that our publication will continue to serve as a useful reference.



James F. Hinchman  
General Counsel

December 1992



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“I was gratified to be able to answer promptly, and I did. I said I didn’t know.”

Mark Twain

Life on the Mississippi

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## Abbreviations

<b>C.F.R.</b>	Code of Federal Regulations
<b>EDA</b>	Economic Development Administration
<b>FAR</b>	Federal Acquisition Regulation
<b>FCRA</b>	Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
<b>FFB</b>	Federal Financing Bank
<b>FHA</b>	<b>Federal</b> Housing Administration
<b>FY</b>	Fiscal Year
<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting <b>Office</b>
<b>GSA</b>	General Services Administration
<b>HUD</b>	Department of Housing and Urban Development
<b>OMB</b>	Office of Management and Budget
<b>REA</b>	Rural Electrification Administration
<b>SBA</b>	Small Business Administration
<b>SBIC</b>	Small Business Investment Company
<b>TFM</b>	Treasury Financial Manual
<b>U.S.C.</b>	United States Code
<b>VA</b>	Department of Veterans Affairs



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# Availability of Appropriations: Amount

## A. Introduction

The two preceding chapters have discussed the purposes for which appropriated funds may be used and the time **limits** within which they may be obligated and expended. This chapter **will** discuss the third **major** element of the concept of the “legal availability” of appropriations—restrictions relating to amount. It is not enough to know what you can spend appropriated funds for and when you can spend them. You must also know how much you have available for a particular object.

In this respect, the legal restrictions on government expenditures are different from those governing your spending as a private individual. For example, as an individual, you **can** buy a house and finance it with a mortgage that may run for 25 or 30 years. Of course you don’t have enough money to cover your full legal obligation under the mortgage. You sign the papers on the hope and assumption that you **will** continue to have an income. If your income stops and you can’t make the payments, you lose the house. The government cannot operate this way. The main reason why is the **Antideficiency** Act, discussed in Section C.

Under the “separation of powers” doctrine established by the Constitution, Congress makes the **laws** and provides the money to implement them; the executive branch carries out the laws with the money Congress provides. Under this system, Congress must have the “final word” as to how much money can be spent by a given agency or on a given program. In exercising this power, Congress may give the executive branch considerable discretion within broad limits, but it is ultimately up to Congress to determine how much the executive branch can spend. In applying this theory to the day-to-day operations of the federal government, it should be readily apparent that restrictions on purpose, time, and amount are very closely related. Again, the **Antideficiency** Act is one of the primary “enforcement devices.” Its importance is underscored by the fact that it is the only one of the funding statutes to include both civil and **criminal** penalties for **violation**.

If the **Antideficiency** Act’s prohibition against **overobligating** or overspending an appropriation is to be at all meaningful, agencies must be restricted to the appropriations Congress provides. The rule prohibiting the unauthorized “augmentation” of appropriations, covered in Section E, is thus a crucial complement to the **Antideficiency** Act.

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## B. Types of Appropriation Language and the Concept of Earmarking

While Congress retains, as it must, ultimate control over how much an agency can spend, it does not attempt to control the disposition of every dollar. We began our general discussion of **administrative** discretion in Chapter 3 by quoting Justice Holmes' statement that "some play must be allowed to the joints if the machine is to work." This is fully applicable to the expenditure of appropriated funds. An agency's discretion under a lump-sum appropriation is discussed in Section F.

Congress has been making appropriations since the beginning of the Republic. Over the course of this time, certain forms of appropriation language have become standard. This section will point out the more commonly used language with respect to amount.

Congress may wish to **specifically** designate, or "earmark," part of a more general lump-sum appropriation for a particular object, as either a maximum, a minimum, or both.<sup>1</sup> For simplicity of illustration, let us assume that we have a lump-sum appropriation of \$1,000 for "smoking materials" and a particular object within that appropriation is "Cuban cigars."

If the appropriation **specifies** "not to exceed" \$100 for Cuban cigars or "not more than" \$100 for Cuban cigars, then \$100 is the maximum available for **Cuban** cigars. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 263 (1985).<sup>2</sup> A **specifically** earmarked maximum may not be augmented with funds from the general appropriation.

Statutory transfer authority will permit the augmentation of a "not to exceed" earmark in many, but not all, cases. In 12 **Comp. Gen.** 168 (1932), it was held that general transfer authority could be used to increase **maximum** earmarks for personal services, subject to the percentage limitations specified in the transfer statute. The decision pointed out that if the personal services **earmark** had been a separate

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<sup>1</sup>We "use" the term "earmarking" here to mean a specific statutory designation of a portion of a lump-sum appropriation or authorization. The term is also used to refer to the statutory designation of revenues for particular uses. For a brief but nevertheless useful discussion of earmarking in this latter sense, see GAO report entitled Budget Issues: Earmarking in the Federal Government, GAO/AFMD-90-8FS (January 1990).

<sup>2</sup>A "not to exceed" earmark was held not to constitute a maximum in 19 **Comp. Gen.** 61 (1939), where the earmarking language was inconsistent with other language in the general appropriation.

line-item appropriation, the transfer authority would clearly apply. Id. at 170. Also, the transfer authority was remedial legislation **designed** to mitigate the impact of reduced appropriations. Somewhat similarly, in 36 **Comp. Gen.** 607 (1957), funds transferred to an operating appropriation from a civil defense appropriation **could** be used to exceed an administrative expense limitation in the former which had been calculated without including the increased administrative expenses the added civil defense functions would entail. However, in 33 **Comp. Gen.** 214 (1953), the Comptroller General held that general transfer authority could not be used to exceed a maximum earmark on an emergency assistance program where it was clear that Congress, aware of the emergency, intended that the program be funded only from the earmark. See also 18 **Comp. Gen.** 211 (1938).

Under a “not to exceed” earmark, the agency is not required to spend the entire amount on the object specified, See, e.g., Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 **F. Supp.** 258,266 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (“the phrase ‘not to exceed’ connotes limitation, not disbursement”). **If**, in our hypothetical, the entire \$100 is not used for Cuban cigars, unobligated balances may—within the time limits for obligation—be applied to other unrestricted objects of the appropriation. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 578,579 (1952); 15 **Comp. Dec.** 660 (1909); **B-4568**, June 27, 1939.

If later in the **fiscal** year a supplemental appropriation is made for “smoking materials,” the funds provided in the supplemental may not be used to increase the \$100 maximum for Cuban cigars unless the supplemental appropriation act so specifies. See Section D of this chapter.

Words like “not to exceed” are not the only way to establish a maximum limitation. If the appropriation includes a specific amount for a particular object (such as “For Cuban cigars, \$100”), then the appropriation is a maximum which may not be exceeded. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 526 (1957); 19 **Comp. Gen.** 892 (1940); 16 **Comp. Gen.** 282 (1936).

Another device Congress has used to designate earmarks as maximum limitations is the following general provision:

Whenever in this Act, an amount is specified within an appropriation for particular purposes or objects of expenditure, such amount, unless otherwise **specified**, shall be

considered **as** the maximum amount that maybe expended for said purpose or object rather than an amount set apart exclusively **therefor**.<sup>3</sup>

**By** virtue of the “unless otherwise **specified**” clause, the provision does not apply to amounts within an appropriation which have their own **specific** earmarking “words of limitation” such as “exclusively.” 31 **Comp. Gen.** 578 (1952).

If a lump-sum appropriation includes several particular objects and provides further that the appropriation “is to be accounted for as one fund” or “shall constitute one fund,” then the individual amounts are not limitations, the only limitation being that the total amount of the lump-sum appropriation cannot be exceeded. However, individual items within that lump-sum appropriation that include the “not to exceed” language will still constitute maximum limitations. 22 **Comp. Dec.** 461 (1916); 3 **Comp. Dec.** 604 (1897); **A-79741**, August 7, 1936. The “one fund” language is still occasionally encountered, but has become uncommon.

If Congress wishes to **specify** a minimum for the particular object but not a maximum, the appropriation act may provide “Smoking materials, \$1,000, of which not less than \$100 shall be available for Cuban cigars.” **B-137353**, December 3, 1959. See also 64 **Comp. Gen.** 388 (1985); **B-131935**, March 17, 1986. If the phrase “not less than” is used, in contrast with the “not to exceed” language, portions of the \$100 not obligated for Cuban cigars may not be applied to the other objects of the appropriation. 64 **Comp. Gen.** at 394–95; **B-128943**, September 27, 1956.

Another phrase Congress often uses to earmark a portion of a lump-sum appropriation is “**shall** be available.” There are variations. For example, our hypothetical \$1,000 “smoking materials” appropriation may provide that, out of the \$1,000, \$100 “**shall** be available” or “shall be available only” or “shall be available exclusively” for Cuban cigars. Still another variation is “\$ 1,000, including \$100 for Cuban cigars.”

If the “shall be available” phrase is combined with the maximum or minimum language noted above (“**not** to exceed,” “not less than,”

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<sup>3</sup>District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-111, §103, 105 **Stat.** 559,567 (1991).



etc.), then the above rules apply and the phrase “shall be available” adds little. See, *e.g.*, **B-137353**, December 3, 1959. However, if the earmarking phrase “shall be available” is used without the “not to exceed” or “not less than” modifiers, the rules are not quite as **firm**.

Cases interpreting the “shall be available” and “shall be available only” earmarks are somewhat less than consistent. The earlier decisions proclaimed “shall be available” to constitute a maximum but not a minimum (**B-5526**, September 14, 1939), although it could be a minimum if Congress clearly expressed that intent (**B-128943**, September 27, 1956). Later cases held the earmark to constitute both a maximum and a minimum which could neither be augmented nor diverted to other objects within the appropriation. **B-137353**, December 3, 1959; **B-137353-O.M.**, October 14, 1958. Another early decision held summarily that “shall be available only” results in a maximum which cannot be augmented. 18 **Comp. Gen.** 1013 (1939). More recent decisions, however, have expressed the view that the effect of “shall be available only” —whether it is a maximum or a minimum—depends on the underlying congressional intent. 53 **Comp. Gen.** 695 (1974); **B-142190**, March 23, 1960. Applying this test, the earmark in 53 **Comp. Gen.** 695 was found to be a maximum; similar language was found to be a minimum which could be exceeded in **B-142190** and in **B-70933**, March 1, 1948.

Thus, if the phrase “shall be available” maybe said to contain an element of ambiguity, addition of the word “only” does not produce a plain meaning. The Claims Court, reviewing an authorization earmark for a Navy project known as RACER, commented:

“[I]t is not apparent from the language of the authorization (\$45 million ‘is available only for’) that Congress necessarily mandated the Navy to spend all \$45 million on the RACER system. Rather, Congress may have merely intended to preclude the Navy from spending that \$45 million on any other activities, i.e., the money would be forfeited if not spent on the RACER system.”

Sol&r Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142,158 (1991).

Use of the word “exclusively” is somewhat more precise. The earmark “shall be available exclusively” is both a maximum which cannot be augmented from the general appropriation, and a minimum which cannot be diverted to other objects within the appropriation. **B-102971**, August 24, 1951. Once again, however, clearly expressed congressional intent can produce a different result. **B-113272-O.M.**,

May 21, 1953; **B-111392-O**. M., October 17, 1952 (**earmark** held to be a minimum only in both cases).

Similarly, the term “including” has been held to establish both a maximum and a minimum. **A-99732**, January 13, 1939. As such, it cannot be augmented from a more general appropriation (19 **Comp. Gen.** 892 (1940)), nor can it be diverted to other uses within the appropriation (67 **Comp. Gen.** 401 (1988)).

To sum up, the most effective way to establish a maximum (but not minimum) earmark is by the words “not **to** exceed” or “not more than.” The words “not less than” most effectively establish a minimum (but not maximum). These are all phrases with well-settled plain meanings. The “**shall** be available” family of earmarking language presumptively “fences in” the **earmarked sum (both maximum and minimum)**, but is more subject to variation based upon underlying congressional intent.

Our discussion thus far has centered on the use of earmarking language to prescribe the amount available for a particular object. **Earmarking** language may also be used **to** vary the period of availability for obligation. An illustrative case is **B-23** 1711, March 28, 1989 (appropriation provision earmarked portion of lump sum to remain available for an additional **fiscal** year, but was neither maximum nor minimum limitation on amount available for particular object).

**Finally**, earmarking language maybe found in authorization acts as well as appropriation acts. The same meanings apply. Several of the cases cited above involve authorization **acts, e.g.,** 64 **Comp. Gen.** 388 (1985) and **B-131935**, March 17, 1986.

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## C. The Antideficiency Act

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### 1. Introduction and Overview

The so-called **Antideficiency Act** is one of the **major** laws in the statutory pattern by which Congress exercises its constitutional control of the public purse. It has been termed “the cornerstone of **Congressional** efforts to bind the Executive branch of government to the limits on expenditure of appropriated **funds**.”<sup>4</sup>

As with the series of funding statutes as a whole, the **Antideficiency Act** did not hatch fully grown but evolved over a period of time in response to various abuses. As we noted in Chapter 1, as late as the post-Civil War period, it **was** not uncommon for agencies to incur obligations in excess of or in advance of appropriations. Perhaps most egregious of all, some agencies would spend their entire appropriations during the **first** few months of the fiscal year, continue to incur obligations, and then return to Congress for appropriations to fund these “coercive **deficiencies**.”<sup>5</sup> These were obligations to others who had fulfilled their part of the bargain with the United States and who now had at least a moral-and in some cases also a legal-right to be paid. Congress felt it had no choice but to **fulfill** these commitments, but the frequency of deficiency appropriations played havoc with the United States budget.

The congressional response to abuses of this nature was the **Antideficiency Act**. Its history is **summarized** in the following paragraphs:<sup>6</sup>

‘Control in the execution of the Government’s budgetary **and financial** programs is based on the provisions of section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended. . . . commonly referred to as the **Antideficiency Act**. **As** the name. . . implies, one of the **principal** purposes of the legislation was to provide effective control over the use of appropriations so as to prevent the incurring of obligations at a rate which will lead to deficiency (or supplemental) appropriations and to **fix** responsibility on those

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<sup>4</sup>Hopkins & Nutt, *The Anti-Deficiency Act (Revised Statutes 3679) and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis*, 80 Mil. L. Rev. 51,56 (1978).

<sup>5</sup>*Id.* at 57–58; Louis Fisher, *Presidential Spending Power* 232 (1975).

<sup>6</sup>Source: Senate Committee on Government Operations, *Financial Management in the Federal Government*, S. Dec. No. 11, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1961). The statute is cited as “section 3679 of the Revised Statutes,” a designation that is now obsolete.

officials of Government who incur deficiencies or obligate appropriations without proper authorization or at an excessive rate.

“The **original** section 3679.. . was derived from legislation **enacted in 1870 [16 Stat. 251 ] and was** designed solely to prevent expenditures in excess of amounts appropriated. In 1905 [33 Stat. 1257] and 1906 [34 Stat. 48], section 3679 . . . was amended to provide specific prohibitions regarding the obligation of appropriations **and** required that certain types of appropriations be so apportioned over a **fiscal** year as to ‘prevent expenditures in one portion of the year which may necessitate deficiency or additional appropriations to complete the service of the **fiscal** year for which **said** appropriations are made.’ Under the amended section, the authority to make, waive, or modify apportionments was vested in the head of the department or agency concerned. By Executive Order 6166 of June 10, 1933, this authority was transferred to the Director of the [Office of Management and Budget]. . . .

“During and following World War II, with the expansion of Government functions and the increase in size and complexities of budgetary and operational problems, situations arose highlighting the need for more effective control and conservation of funds. In order to effectively cope with these conditions it was necessary to seek Legislation clarifying certain **technical** aspects of section **3679** of the Revised Statutes, and strengthening the apportionment procedures, particularly as regards to agency control systems. Section 1211 of the General Appropriation Act, 1951 [64 Stat. 765], amended section 3679. . . to provide a basis for more effective control and economical use of appropriations. Following a recommendation of the **second** Hoover Commission that agency allotment systems should be **simplified**, Congress passed legislation in 1956 [70 Stat. 783] further amending section 3679 to provide that each agency work toward the objective of financing each operating unit, at the highest practical level, from not more than one administrative subdivision for each appropriation or fund affecting such unit. In 1957 [71 Stat. 440] section 3679 was further amended, adding a prohibition against the requesting of apportionments or reapportionments which indicate the necessity for a deficiency or supplemental estimate except on the determination of the agency head that such action is within the exceptions expressly set out in the law. The revised **Antideficiency** Act serves as the primary foundation for the Government’s administrative control of funds systems.”

In its current form, the law prohibits

1. Making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or fund unless authorized by law;
2. Involving the government in any contractor other obligation for the payment of money for any purpose in advance of appropriations made for such purpose, unless the contract or obligation is authorized by law;

3. Accepting voluntary services for **the** United States, or employing personal services in excess of that authorized by law, except in cases of emergency involving the safety of human life or the protection of property; and

4. Making obligations or expenditures in excess of art apportionment or reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by agency **regulations.**<sup>7</sup>

Subsequent sections of this chapter **will** explore these concepts in detail. However, the **fiscal** principles inherent in the **Antideficiency Act** are really quite simple. The idea is to “pay as you go.” Government **officials** are warned not to make payments-or to commit the United States to make payments at some future time-for goods or services unless there is enough money in the “bank” **to** cover the cost in full. The “bank,” of course, is the available appropriation.

The combined effect of the **Antideficiency Act**, in conjunction with the other funding statutes discussed throughout this publication, was summarized in a 1962 decision. The summary has been quoted in numerous later **Antideficiency Act** cases and bears repeating here:

“These **statutes** evidence a plain intent on the part of the Congress to prohibit executive **officers**, unless otherwise authorized by law, from making contracts involving the Government in obligations for expenditures or liabilities beyond those contemplated and authorized for the period of availability of and within the amount of **the** appropriation under which they are made; to keep **all** the departments of the Government, in the matter of incurring obligations for expenditures, within the **limits** and purposes of appropriations annually provided for conducting their **lawful** functions, and to prohibit any **officer** or employee of the Government from involving the Government in any contractor other obligation for the payment of money for any purpose, in advance of appropriations made for such purpose; and to restrict the use of annual appropriations to expenditures required for the service of the particular **fiscal** year for which they are made.” 42 **Comp. Gen.** 272,275 (1962).

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<sup>7</sup>Id. at 48; B-131361, May 9, 1957. Further discussion from varying **perspectives will** be found in the following sources: Efros, Rollee H., **Statutory Restrictions on Funding of Government Contracts**, 10 **Public Contract Law Journal** 254 (Dec. 1978); Feaster, Herbert H., and Christian Volz, **The Antideficiency Act: Constitutional Control Gone Astray**, 11 **Public Contract Law Journal** 155 (No. 1, Nov. 1979); Frazier, John R., Col., **Use of Annual Funds with Conditional, Option, or Indefinite Delivery Contracts**, 8 **A.F. JAG L. Rev.** 50 (No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1966); Hopkins, Gary L., Major, and Lt. Col. Robert M. Nutt, **The Anti-Deficiency Act (Revised Statutes 3679) and Funding Federal Contracts: An **Ans**is**, 80 **Mil. L. Rev.** 51 (1978); Spriggs, William J., **The Anti-Deficiency Act Comes to Life in U.S. Government Contracting**, 10 **National Contract Management Journal** 33 (Winter 1976-77).

To the extent it is possible to **summarize** appropriations law in a single paragraph, this is it. Viewed in the aggregate, the **Antideficiency Act** **and** related funding statutes “[restrict] in every possible way the expenditures and expenses and liabilities of the government, so far as executive offices are concerned, to the **specific** appropriations for each **fiscal** year.” **Wilder’s Case**, 16 Ct. Cl. 528,543 (1880).

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## 2. Obligation/Expenditure in Excess or **Advance** of Appropriations

The key provision of the **Antideficiency Act** is 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(1):<sup>8</sup>

“(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of ~~the~~ District of Columbia government may **not**—

“(A) make or **authorize** an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or

“(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of **money** before an appropriation **is** made **unless** authorized by law.”

Not only is section **1341(a)(1)** the key provision of the Act, it was originally the only provision, the others being added to ensure enforcement of the basic prohibitions of section 1341.

The law is not limited to the executive branch, but applies to any “officer or employee of the United States Government” and thus extends to all branches. Examples of legislative branch applications are **B-107279**, January 9, 1952 (**Office** of Legislative Counsel, House of Representatives); **B-78217**, July 21, 1948 (appropriations to Senate for expenses of Office of Vice President); 27 Op. **Att’y Gen.** 584 (1909) (Government Printing Office). Within the judicial branch, it applies to the Administrative **Office** of the United States Courts. **E.g.**, 50 **Comp. Gen.** 589 (1971). However, whether a federal judge is an officer or employee for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § **1341(a)(1)** appears to remain an open question, at least in some contexts. See *Arrester v. United States District Court*, 792 **F.2d** 1423, 1427 **n.7** (9th Cir. 1986).

Some government corporations are also classified as agencies of the United States Government, and their **officials** are therefore “officers

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<sup>8</sup>Prior to the 1982 recodification of title 31 of the United States Code, the **Antideficiency Act** consisted of 9 lettered subsections of what was then 31 U.S.C. § 665. The **recodification** scattered the law among several new sections. To **better** show the relationship of the material, our organization in this chapter retains the sequence of the former subsections.

and employees of the United States.” To the extent they operate with funds which are regarded as appropriated funds, they too are subject to 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). E.g., B-223857, February 27, 1987 (Commodity Credit Corporation); B-135075-O.M., February 14, 1975 (Inter-American Foundation). It follows that section 1341(a)(1) does not apply to a government corporation which is not an agency of the United States Government. E.g., B-175155, July 26, 1976 (Amtrak). These principles are, of course, subject to variation if and to the extent provided in the relevant organic legislation.

There are two distinct prohibitions in section 1341(a)(1). Unless otherwise authorized bylaw, no officer or employee of the United States may make (or authorize the making of) an expenditure, or create or involve (or authorize the creation or involvement of) the United States in any contractor obligation to make future expenditures, in the absence of **sufficient** funds in the account to cover the payment or the obligation at the time it is made or incurred. Put another way, the two sets of prohibitions are concerned with

- Making expenditures or incurring obligations in excess of available appropriations; and
- Making expenditures or incurring obligations in advance of appropriations.

The distinction between obligating in excess of an appropriation and obligating in advance of an appropriation is clear **in the majority** of cases, but can occasionally become blurred. For example, an agency which tries to meet a current shortfall by “borrowing” from (i.e., obligating against) the **unenacted** appropriation for the next **fiscal** year is clearly obligating in advance of an appropriation. E.g., B-236667, January 26, 1990. However, it is also obligating in excess of the currently available appropriation. Since both are equally illegal, determining precisely which subsection of 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) has been violated is of secondary importance. In any event, the point to be stressed here is that the law is violated not only if there are insufficient funds in an account when a payment becomes due. The very act of obligating the United States to make a payment when the necessary funds are not already in the account is also a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a).

Note that the statute refers to overspending the amount available in an “appropriation or fund.” OMB Circular No. **A-34** specifies:

“As **used in this Circular**, the phrase ‘appropriation or fund accounts’ refers to **general fund expenditure accounts**, special fund expenditure accounts, public enterprise revolving funds, intragovernmental revolving funds, management funds, trust fund expenditure accounts, and trust revolving fund accounts. . . .”<sup>9</sup>

Thus, for example, the **Antideficiency** Act applies to Indian trust funds managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. However, the investment of these funds in certificates of deposit with federally insured banks under authority of 25 U.S.C. § 162a does not, in GAO’s opinion, constitute an obligation or expenditure for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Accordingly, overinvested trust funds do not violate the **Antideficiency** Act unless the overinvested funds, or any attributable interest income, are obligated or expended by the Bureau. **B-207047-O. M.**, June 17, 1983. GAO also views the Act as applicable to presidential and vice-presidential “**unvouchered** expenditure” accounts. **B-239854**, June 21, 1990 (internal memorandum),

**a. Exhaustion of an Appropriation**

When we talk about an appropriation being “exhausted,” we are really alluding to any of several different but related situations:

- Depletion of appropriation account (i.e., fully obligated **and/or** expended).
- Similar depletion of a maximum amount specifically earmarked in a more general lump-sum appropriation.
- Depletion of an amount subject to a monetary ceiling imposed by some other statute (usually, but not always, the relevant program legislation).

(1) Making further payments

In simple terms, once an appropriation is exhausted, the making of any further payments, apart from using unexpended balances to liquidate valid obligations recorded against that appropriation, violates 31 U.S.C. § 1341. When the appropriation is fully expended, no further payments may be made in any case. If an agency finds **itself** in this position, unless it has transfer authority or other clear statutory basis for making further payments, it has little choice but to seek deficiency or supplemental appropriations from Congress, and to **adjust or curtail** operations as may be necessary. **E.g.**, 61 **Comp. Gen.**

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<sup>9</sup>OMB Circular No. A-34, Instructions on Budget Execution, Part II, § 21.1 (August 1985).



661 (1982); 38 **Comp. Gen.** 501 (1959). If the appropriation account has expired but has not yet been closed, the agency has the alternative of asking Congress for authority to use current appropriations to liquidate the obligations, an option which may enable more prompt liquidation. **B-123964**, November 27, 1956.

In many ways, the prohibitions in the Adequacy of Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 11, parallel those of 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a). For example, a contract **in** excess of the available appropriation violates both statutes. **E.g.**, 9 **Comp. Dec.** 423 (1903). However, a contract in compliance with 41 U.S.C. § 11 can still result in a violation of the **Antideficiency** Act. Presumably, **if a** contract is entered into and there are sufficient funds available when the contract is signed, there is no violation of 41 U.S.C. § 11. The **Antideficiency** Act, however, **anticipates** a further development. Suppose there are sufficient funds available when a particular contract is signed, but during the period before payment becomes due, the agency makes a number of payments to other contractors or incurs a number of other obligations, all charged to the same appropriation account, and finds it has nothing left to pay the contract in question. The **Antideficiency** Act is violated when the contract payment becomes due even though there was no violation when the contract was signed.

To restate the point, the fact that the incurring of an obligation passes **Antideficiency** Act muster is no guarantee against future violations with respect **to** that obligation. Assessment of **Antideficiency** Act violations is not frozen at the point when the obligation is incurred. Certainly the Act is violated if there are insufficient unobligated balances to support the obligation at the time it is incurred. However, even if the initial obligation was well within available funds, the Act can still be violated if insufficient funds remain to liquidate the obligation when actual payment is due or if upward **adjustments** cause the obligation to exceed available funds. **E.g.**, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812, 826 (1976).

What one authority termed the “**granddaddy** of all violations” occurred when the Navy **overobligated** and overspent nearly \$110 million from **its** “Military Personnel, **Navy**” appropriation during the years 1969-1972, initially discovered in an internal audit, GAO summarized the violation in a letter report, **B-177631**, June 7, 1973. While there may have been some concealment, GAO concluded that the violation was not the result of some evil scheme; rather, the “basic cause of the violation was the separation of the authority to create obligations from the responsibility to control them.” The authority to create obligations had been decentralized while control was centralized in the Bureau of Naval Personnel,

**Granddaddy** was soon to lose his place of honor on the totem pole. Around November of 1975, the Department of the Army discovered that, for a variety of reasons, it had **overobligated** four procurement appropriations in the aggregate amount of more than \$160 million and consequently had to halt payments to some 900 contractors. The Army asked and received the Comptroller General’s advice on a number of potential courses of action it was considering. The resulting decision was 55 **Comp. Gen.** 768 (1976). The Army acknowledged that there were adequate funds available when all the contracts were signed and therefore the contractors generally had valid, enforceable obligations. However, the Army also recognized its duty to mitigate the **Antideficiency** Act violation.<sup>11</sup> It was clear that without a deficiency appropriation, all the contractors could not be paid. One option—to use current appropriations to pay the deficiencies—had to be rejected because there is no authority to apply current funds to pay off debts incurred in a previous **year**.<sup>12</sup> An option GAO sanctioned was to reduce the amount of the deficiencies by terminating some of the contracts for convenience, although the termination costs would still have to come from a deficiency appropriation unless there **was** enough left in the appropriation accounts to cover them.

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<sup>10</sup>Fisher, **Presidential Spending Power** 236 (1975).

<sup>11</sup>“We believe it is obvious that, once an Antideficiency Act violation has been discovered, the agency concerned must take all reasonable steps to **mitigate** the effects of the **violation** insofar as it remains executory.” 55 **Comp. Gen.** at 772.

<sup>12</sup><sup>This</sup> \*@merit applies to appropriation accounts which have expired but have not Yet been closed. 71 **Comp. Gen.** — (B-245856.7, August 11, 1992). Once an account has been closed, typically 5 **fiscal** years after expiration, obligations chargeable to that account must, within certain **limits**, be charged to current appropriations. 31 U.S.C. § 1553(b).

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(2) Status of contracts

If the **Antideficiency** Act prohibits any further payments when the appropriation is exhausted, where does this leave the contractor? Is the contractor expected to know how and at what rate the agency is spending **its** money? There is a small body of **judicial** case law which discusses the effect of the exhaustion of appropriations on government obligations. The fate of the contractor seems to depend on the type of appropriation involved and the presence or absence of notice, actual or constructive, to the contractor on the limitations of the appropriation.

Where a contractor is but one party out of several to be paid from a general appropriation, the contractor is under no obligation to know the status or condition of the appropriation account **on** the government's books. If the appropriation becomes exhausted, the **Antideficiency** Act may prevent the agency from making any further payments, but valid obligations will remain enforceable in the courts. For example, in Ferris v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542 (1892), the plaintiff had a contract with the government to dredge a channel in the Delaware River. The Corps of Engineers made him stop work halfway through the job because it had run out of money. **In** discussing the contractor's rights in a breach of contract suit, the **court** said:

"A contractor who is one of several persons to be paid out of an appropriation is not chargeable with knowledge of **its** administration, nor can his legal **rights** be affected or impaired by its maladministration or by its diversion, whether legal or illegal, to other objects. An appropriation= merely imposes limitations upon the Government's own agents; it is a definite amount of money **intrusted** to them for distribution; but its **insufficiency** does not pay the Government's debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat the rights of other parties." **Id.** at 546.

The rationale for this rule is that "a contractor cannot justly be expected to keep track of appropriations where he is but one of several being paid from the fund." Ross Construction Corp. v. United States, 392 F.2d 984,987 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Other illustrative cases are Dougherty ex rel. Slavens v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 496 (1883), and

Joplin v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 345 (1939). The **Antideficiency Act** may “apply to the official, but [does] not affect the rights in this court of the citizen honestly contracting with the Government.” Dougherty, 18 Ct. Cl. at 503. Thus, it is settled that contractors paid from a general appropriation are not barred from recovering for breach of contract even though the appropriation is exhausted.

However, under a specific line-item appropriation, the answer is different. The contractor in this situation is deemed to have notice of the limits on the spending power of the government official with whom he contracts. A contract under these circumstances is valid only up to the amount of the available appropriation. Exhaustion of the appropriation will generally bar any further recovery beyond that limit. **E.g.**, Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921); Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910); Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 138 (1883); Dougherty, 18 Ct. Cl. at 503.

The distinction between the Ferris and Sutton lines of cases follows logically from the old maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. If Congress appropriates a specific dollar amount for a particular contract, that amount is specified in the appropriation act and the contractor is deemed to know it. It is certainly not difficult to locate. If, on the other hand, a contract is but one activity under a larger appropriation, it is not reasonable to expect the contractor to know how much of that appropriation remains available for it at any given time. A requirement to obtain this information would place an unreasonable burden on the contractor, not to mention a nuisance for the government as well.

In two cases in the 1960s, the Court of Claims permitted **recovery** on contractor claims in excess of a specific monetary ceiling. See Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 475 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (claim by **Capehart** Housing Act contractor), and Ross Construction Corp. v. United States, 392 F.2d 984 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (claim by contractor for “off-site” construction ancillary to **Capehart** Act housing). The court distinguished between matters not the fault or responsibility of the contractor (for example, defective plans or specifications or changed conditions under the “changed conditions” clause), in which case above-ceiling claims are allowable, and excess costs resulting from what it termed “simple extras,” in which case they are not. Without attempting to detail the fairly complex **Capehart** legislation here, we note merely that Ross is more closely analogous

to the Ferris situation (392 **F.2d** at 986), while Anthony P. Miller is more closely analogous to the Sutton situation (392 **F.2d** at 987). The extent **to** which the approach reflected in these cases will be applied to the more traditional form of exhaustion of appropriations remains to be developed, although the Ross court intimated that it saw no real distinction for these **purposes between** a specific appropriation and a specific monetary ceiling imposed by other legislation (**id.**).

b. Contracts or Other  
Obligations **in** Excess or  
Advance of Appropriations

It **is** easy enough to say that the **Antideficiency** Act prohibits you from obligating a million dollars when you have only half a million left in the account, or that it prohibits you from entering into a contract in September purporting to obligate funds for the next **fiscal** year that have not yet been appropriated. Many of the situations that actually arise from day to day, however, are not quite that simple. A useful starting point is the relationship of the **Antideficiency** Act to the recording of obligations under 31 U.S.C. §1501.

(1) Recording obligations

Proper recording practices are essential to sound fund control. However, it should be apparent that, if the **Antideficiency** Act is to mean anything, the actual recording of obligations cannot by **itself** provide **a sufficient** basis on which to assess potential violations. Reliance solely on the recording of obligations can produce error in two directions. It can suggest violations which in fact do not exist, and it can overlook violations which do exist.

If it appears that the total amount of recorded obligations exceeds the available appropriation, there may be several reasons for this other than an **Antideficiency** Act violation. Excessively high estimates may have been recorded, through either error or an excess of caution, which subsequent liquidation reveals can be reduced. Items may have been incorrectly posted or improperly recorded as obligations. Or, **accounts** receivable that should be credited to the appropriation may not have been properly **identified** and taken into consideration.

For these reasons, an amount of recorded obligations in excess of the available appropriation **is prima facie** evidence of a violation of the **Antideficiency** Act, but is not conclusive. **B-134474-O.M.**, December 18, 1957. **Similarly**, GAO has cautioned that an **Antideficiency** Act violation should not be determined solely on the basis of year-end

reports prior to reconciliation and **adjustment. B-1 14841 .2-O. M., January 23, 1986.**

If an examination of recorded obligations can be misleading in the sense of indicating violations which in fact do not exist, the converse is **also** true. Violations may exist which recorded obligations alone will not disclose. Again, there are several reasons. One important principle is stated in the following passage:

“[T]he recording of obligations under 31 U.S.C. § [1501] is not the sole consideration in determining violations of 31 U.S.C. § [1341] . . . . We believe that the words ‘any contract or other obligation’ as used in [the predecessor of 31 U.S.C. § 1341] encompass not merely recorded obligations but other actions which give rise to Government liability and will ultimately require the expenditure of appropriated funds.”

55 **Comp. Gen.** 812,824 (1976). See also 42 **Comp. Gen.** 272,277 (1962) (Act forbids not only the incurring of obligations beyond the period of availability but also “any other obligation or liability which may arise thereunder and ultimately require the expenditure of funds”); **B-163058**, March 17, 1975; **B-133170**, January 29, 1975. An example of action of this type might be conduct by an agency which, under a clear line of administrative or judicial precedent, would result in government liability to a contractor through claims proceedings. 55 **Comp. Gen.** at 824; **B-163058**, March 17, 1975.

Also, in many situations, the amount of the government’s liability is not definitely fixed at the time the obligation is incurred. An example is a contract with price escalation provisions. In other situations, such as certain contingent liability cases, the government is not required to record any obligation unless and until the contingency materializes. Thus, while examining the actual recording of obligations is a **necessary** first step, it is also essential to look at what happens as the contract is performed.

Finally, the possibility exists that there are valid obligations which the agency has failed or neglected to record. The incurring of an obligation in excess or advance of appropriations violates the Act, and this is not affected by the agency’s failure to record the obligation. E.g., 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4,9 (1985); 62 **Comp. Gen.** 692,700 (1983); 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812,824 (1976).

In sum, for purposes of assessing violations of the **Antideficiency** Act, you must start **by** looking at the actual recording of obligations, but you cannot end there.

(2) Obligation in excess of appropriation

Incurring an obligation in excess of the available appropriation violates 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(1).<sup>13</sup> As the Comptroller of the Treasury advised an agency head many years ago, “your authority in the matter was strictly limited by the amount of the appropriation. . . ; otherwise there **would** be no limit to your power to incur expenses for the service of a particular fiscal year. . . .” 9 **Comp.** Dec. 423, 425 (1903). If you want higher authority, the Supreme Court has stated that, absent statutory authorization, “it is clear that the head of the department cannot involve the government **in** an obligation to pay any thing in excess of the appropriation.” Bradley v. United States, 98 U.S. 104, 114 (1878).

To take a fairly simple illustration, the statute was violated by an agency’s acceptance of an offer to install automatic telephone equipment for \$40,000 when the unobligated balance in the relevant appropriation was only \$20,000.<sup>35</sup> **Comp. Gen.** 356 (1955).

In a 1969 case, the Air Force wanted to purchase computer equipment but did not have sufficient funds available. It attempted an arrangement whereby it made an initial down payment, with the balance of the purchase price to be paid in installments over a period of years, the contract to continue unless the government took **affirmative** action to terminate. This was nothing more than a sale on credit, and since the contract constituted an obligation in excess of available funds, it violated the **Antideficiency** Act. 48 **Comp. Gen.** 494 (1969).

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<sup>13</sup>Determining the amount of available budgetary resources against which obligations maybe incurred is covered later in this chapter under the heading ‘Amount of Available Appropriation or Fund.’

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(3) Variable quantity contracts

A leading case discussing the **Antideficiency Act** ramifications of “variable quantity” contracts (requirements contracts, **indefinite** quantity contracts, and similar **arrangements**)<sup>14</sup> is 42 **Comp. Gen.** 272 (1962). That decision considered a three-year contract the Air Force had awarded to a firm to provide any service or maintenance work necessary for government aircraft landing on Wake Island. GAO questioned the legality of entering into the contract for more than one year, since the Air Force had only a one-year appropriation available. The Air Force argued that it was a “requirements” contract. No obligation would arise unless or until some maintenance work was ordered. The only obligation was a negative one—not to buy service from anyone else but the contractor should the services be needed. GAO disagreed. The services covered were “automatic incidents of the use of the air field.” There was no place for a true administrative determination that the services were or were not needed. There was no true “contingency” as the services would almost certainly be needed if the base were to remain operational. Accordingly, the contract was not a true requirements contract but amounted to a firm obligation for the needs of future years, and was therefore an unauthorized multi-year contract. As such, it violated the **Antideficiency Act**. GAO recognized that the rules in this area could create difficult problems, especially in remote spots like Wake Island, but felt that the only solution was to ask Congress for multi-year procurement authority. <sup>15</sup>

The Wake Island decision noted that the contract contained no provision permitting the Air Force to reduce or eliminate requirements short of a termination for convenience. *Id.* at 277. If the contract had included such a provision—and in the **unlikely** event that, given the nature of the contract, such a provision could have been meaningful—a somewhat different analysis might have resulted. Compare, for example, the situation in 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812 (1976). The exercise of a contract option required the Navy to furnish various items of government-furnished property (**GFP**), but another contract clause authorized the Navy to unilaterally delete items of **GFP**. If the entire quantity of **GFP** had to be treated as a firm obligation at the

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<sup>14</sup>We cover the obligational treatment of contracts of this type in Chapter 7, Section B.1.e, which should be read in conjunction with this section.

<sup>15</sup>The authority was subsequently sought and granted, and is found at 10 U.S.C. § 2306(g).



time the option was exercised, the obligation would have exceeded available appropriations, resulting in an **Antideficiency** Act violation. However, since the Navy was not absolutely obligated to furnish all the **GFP** items at the time the option was exercised, it was inappropriate to use the full value of all **GFP** items under the contract to assess a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1341 at that time. The Navy could avert a violation if it were able to delete enough **GFP** to stay within the available appropriation; if it found that it could not do so, the violation would then exist.<sup>16</sup> See also **B-134474-O**. M., December 18, 1957,

In 47 **Comp. Gen.** 155 (1967), GAO considered an Air Force contract for mobile generator sets which specified minimum and maximum quantities to be purchased over a 12-month period. Since the contract committed the Air Force to purchase only the minimum quantity, it was necessary to obligate only sufficient funds to cover that minimum. Subsequent orders for additional quantities up to the maximum were not legally objectionable as long as the Air Force had **sufficient** funds to cover the cost when it placed those orders. See also 19 **Comp. Gen.** 980 (1940). The fact that the Air Force did not, at the time it entered into the contract, have sufficient funds available to cover the maximum quantity was, for **Antideficiency** Act purposes, irrelevant. The decision distinguished the Wake Island case on the basis that nothing in the mobile generator contract purported to commit the Air Force to obtain any requirements over and above the specified minimum from the contractor.

In a more recent case, GAO found no **Antideficiency** Act problems with a General Services Administration ‘Multiple Award Schedule’ contract under which no minimum purchases were guaranteed and no binding obligation would arise unless and until a using agency made an administrative determination that it had a requirement for a scheduled item. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 129 (1983).

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<sup>16</sup>The rationale worked in that case because the Navy could stay within the appropriation by deleting a relatively small percentage of **GFP**. If the numbers had been different, such that the amount of **GFP** to be deleted were so large as to effectively preclude contractor performance, the analysis might well have been different. In a 1964 report, for example, GAO found the **Antideficiency** Act violated where the Air Force, to keep within a “minor military construction” ceiling, deleted needed plumbing, heating, and lighting from a building alteration contract, resulting in an incomplete facility, and subsequently charged the deleted items to Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Continuing Inadequate Control Over Programming and Financing of Construction, **B-133316**, July 23, 1964, at 12-15.

Regardless of whether we are dealing with a requirements contract, indefinite quantity contract, or some variation, two points apply as far as the **Antideficiency** Act is concerned:

- Whether or not there is a **violation** at the time the contracts entered into depends on exactly what the government is obligated to do under the contract.
- Even if there is no violation at the time the contract is entered into, a violation may occur later if the government subsequently incurs an obligation under the contract in excess of available funds, for example, by electing to order a **maximum** quantity without **sufficient** funds to cover the quantity ordered.

A conceptually related situation is a contract which gives the government the option of two performances at different prices. The government can enter into such a contract without violating the **Antideficiency** Act as long as it has **sufficient** appropriations available at the time the contract is entered into to pay the lesser amount. For example, the Defense Production Act of 1950 authorizes the President to contract for synthetic fuels, but the contract must give the President the option to refuse delivery and instead pay the contractor the amount by which the contract price exceeds the prevalent market price at the time the delivery is made. Such a contract would not violate the **Antideficiency** Act at the time it is entered into **as** long as **sufficient** appropriations are available to pay any anticipated difference between the contract price and the estimated market price at the time of performance. 60 **Comp. Gen.** 86 (1980). Of course, the government could not choose to accept delivery unless there were **sufficient** appropriations available at that time to cover the full cost of the fuel under the contract.

#### (4) Multi-year or “continuing” contracts

A multi-year contract is a contract covering the needs or requirements of **more** than one fiscal year. Our discussion here presupposes a general familiarity with relevant portions of Chapter 5, primarily the nature of a **fixed-term** appropriation and the bona fide needs rule as it relates to multi-year contracts.

We start with some very basic propositions:

- A **fixed-term** appropriation (fiscal year or multiple-year) maybe obligated only during its period of availability.
- A **freed-term** appropriation maybe validly obligated only for the **bona fide** needs of that freed term.
- The **Antideficiency** Act prohibits the making of **contracts** which exceed currently available appropriations or which purport to obligate appropriations not yet made.

As we have seen in Chapter 5, performance may extend into a subsequent fiscal year in certain situations. Also, as long as a contract is properly obligated against funds for the year in which it was made, actual payment can extend into subsequent years. Apart from these situations, and unless the agency either has specific multi-year contracting authority (*e.g.*, 62 **Comp. Gen.** 569 (1983)) or is operating under a no-year appropriation (*e.g.*, 43 **Comp. Gen.** 657 (1964)), the **Antideficiency** Act, together with the **bona fide** needs rule, prohibits contracts purporting to bind the government beyond the obligational duration of the **appropriation**.<sup>17</sup> This is because the current appropriation is not available for future needs, and appropriations for those future needs have not yet been made. Citations to support this proposition are **numerous**.<sup>18</sup> The rule applies to any attempt to obligate the government beyond the end of the **fiscal** year, even where the contract covers a period of only a few months. 24 **Comp. Gen.** 195 (1944).

The guiding principle still followed today stems from a 1925 decision of the United States Supreme Court. An agency had entered into a long-term lease for office space with one-year money, but its contract **specifically** provided that payment for periods after the **first** year was subject to the availability of future appropriations. In **Leiter v. United States**, 271 U.S. 204 (1925), the Supreme Court specifically rejected that theory. The Court held that the lease was binding on the government only for one fiscal year, and it ceased to exist at the end of the fiscal year in which the obligation was incurred. It takes

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<sup>17</sup>Every violation of the **bona fide** needs rule does not necessarily violate the **Antideficiency** Act as well. Determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. B-235086.2, January 22, 1992 (non-decision letter).

<sup>18</sup>*E.g.*, 67 **Comp. Gen.** 190 (1988); 66 **Comp. Gen.** 556 (1987); 61 **Comp. Gen.** 184,187 (1981); 48 **Comp. Gen.** 471,475 (1969); 42 **Comp. Gen.** 272 (1962); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 60 (1957); 36 **Comp. Gen.** 683 (1957); 33 **Comp. Gen.** 90 (1953); 29 **Comp. Gen.** 91 (1949); 27 *Op. Att'y Gen.* 584 (1909).

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**affirmative** action to bring the obligation back to life. The Court stated **its** position as follows:

“It is not **alleged** or claimed that these leases were made under any **specific** authority of law. And since at the time they were made there was no appropriation available for the payment of rent after the first **fiscal** year, it is clear that in so far as their terms extended beyond that year they were in violation of the express provisions of the [Antideficiency Act]; and, being to that extent executed without authority of law, they created no binding obligation against the United States after the **first** year. [Citations omitted. ] A lease to the Government for a term of years, when entered into under an appropriation available for but one fiscal year, is binding on the Government only for that year. [Citations omitted. ] **And** it is plain that, to make it **binding** for any subsequent year, it is **necessary**, not only that an appropriation be made available for the payment of the rent, but that the Government, by its duly authorized officers, **affirmatively** continue the lease for such subsequent year; thereby, in effect, by the adoption of the original lease, making a new lease under the authority of such appropriation for the subsequent year.” **Id.** at 206–07.

GAO has relied heavily on **Leiter** in subsequent decisions. For example, GAO refused to approve an automatic, annual renewal of a contract for repair and storage of automotive equipment, even though the contract provided that the government had a right to terminate. The reservation of a right to **terminate** does not save the contract from the prohibition against binding the government in advance of appropriations. 28 **Comp. Gen.** 553 (1949).

The Post Office wanted to enter into a contract for services and storage of government-owned highway vehicles for periods up to four years because **it** could obtain a more favorable flat rate per **mile** of operations instead of an item by item charge required if the contract was for one year only. GAO held that any contract for continuous maintenance and storage of the vehicles would be prohibited by 31 U.S.C. § 1341 because it would obligate the government beyond the extent of the existing appropriation. However, there **would** be no legal objection to including a provision which gave the government an affirmative option to renew the contract from year to year, not to exceed four years. 29 **Comp. Gen.** 451 (1950).<sup>19</sup>

Where a contract gives the government a renewal option, it may not be exercised until appropriations for the subsequent **fiscal** year

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<sup>19</sup>Some additional cases are 67 **Comp. Gen.** 190 (1988); 66 **Comp. Gen.** 556 (1987); 42 **Comp. Gen.** 272,276 (1962); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 155,160 (1957); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 60,62 (1957); 36 **Comp. Gen.** 683 (1957); 9 **Comp. Gen.** 6 (1929); B-1 16427, September 27, 1955. See also B-97718, October 9, 1950 (similar point but **Leiter** not cited).

actually become available. 61 **Comp.Gen.** 184, 187 (1981). Under a one-year contract with renewal options, the fact that funds become available in subsequent years does not place the government under an obligation to exercise the renewal option. Government Systems Advisors, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 470 (1987), **aff'd**, 847 **F.2d** 811 (Fed. **Cir.** 1988).<sup>20</sup>

Note that, in Leiter, the inclusion of a contract provision conditioning the government's obligation on the subsequent availability of funds was to no avail. In this connection, see **also** 67 **Comp.Gen.** 190, 194 (1988); 42 **Comp.Gen.** 272,276 (1962); 36 **Comp.Gen.** 683 (1957). If a "subject to availability" clause were sufficient to permit multi-year contracting, the effect would be automatic continuation from year to year unless the government terminated. If funds were not available and the government nevertheless permitted or acquiesced in the continuation of performance, the contractor would obviously be performing in the expectation of being **paid**.<sup>21</sup> Apart from questions of legal liability, the failure by Congress to appropriate the money would be a serious breach of faith. Congress would, as a practical, if not a **legal** matter, have little real choice. This is another example of a **type** of "coercive deficiency" the **Antideficiency Act** **was** intended to prohibit. Thus, it is not enough for the government to retain the option to terminate at any time if sufficient funds are not available. Under Leiter and its progeny, the contract "**dies**" at the end of the fiscal year, and may be revived only by affirmative action by the government. This "new" contract is then chargeable to appropriations for the subsequent year.

This is not to say that "subject to availability" clauses are not important. They are, and are in fact required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation in several situations: (1) contract actions initiated prior to the availability of **funds**;<sup>22</sup> (2) certain requirements

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<sup>20</sup>The Claims Court based its conclusion in part on Leiter and the **Antideficiency Act**; the Federal Circuit relied on the language of the contract.

<sup>21</sup>The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that encouraging a contractor to continue performance in the absence of funds violates the **Antideficiency Act**. 48 C.F.R. § 32.704(c).

<sup>22</sup>Availability of Funds, 48 C.F.R. §52.232-18.

and indefinite-quantity **contracts**;<sup>23</sup> (3) fully funded cost-reimbursement **contracts**;<sup>24</sup> (4) facilities acquisition and **use**;<sup>25</sup> and (5) incrementally funded cost-reimbursement **contracts**.<sup>26</sup> FAR, 48 C.F.R. Subpart 32.7. While the prescribed contract clauses vary in complexity, they **all** have one thing in common—each requires the contracting officer to specifically notify the contractor of the availability of funds and to confirm the notification in writing. The objective of these clauses is compliance with the **Antideficiency Act** and other funding **statutes**. See **ITT Federal Laboratories, ASBCA No. 12987, 69-2 BCA 117,849 (1969)**. What is not **sufficient** is a simple “subject to availability” **clause** which would permit automatic continuation subject to the government’s right to terminate.

It may be useful at this point to reiterate the basic principle that compliance with the **Antideficiency Act** is determined on the basis of when an obligation occurs, not when actual payment is scheduled to be made. In the renewal option situation, for example, as long as sufficient funds are available to cover the first year’s obligations, there is no violation at the time the contract is made, and this is not affected by the fact that payment may not be made until the **following** year or later. Of course, a violation would occur when payment becomes due if the appropriation has become exhausted by that time.

Termination charges under renewal option contracts may also present **Antideficiency Act** complications. As a general proposition, the government has the right to terminate a contract “for the convenience of the government” if that action is determined to be in the government’s best interests. The Federal Acquisition Regulation

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<sup>23</sup>Availability of Funds for the Next Fiscal Year, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-19.

<sup>24</sup>Limitation of Cost, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20.

<sup>25</sup>Limitation of Cost (Facilities), 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-21.

<sup>26</sup>Limitation of Funds, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-22.

prescribes the required contract clauses. 48 C.F.R. Subpart 49.5 (1991).<sup>27</sup> Under a termination for convenience, the contractor is entitled to be compensated, including a reasonable profit, for the performed portion of the contract, but may not recover anticipatory profits on the terminated portion. *E.g.*, 48 C.F.R. §§49.201, 49.202. Total **recovery** may not exceed the contract price. *Id.* § 49.207. In a renewal option situation, the government may **also simply** decline to exercise the option.

In the typical fiscal-year contract, termination does not pose a problem because the basic contract obligation will be sufficient to cover potential termination costs. Under a renewal option contract, however, the situation may differ. A contractor who must incur substantial capital costs at the outset has a legitimate concern over recovering these costs if the government does not renew. A device used to address this problem is a clause requiring the government to pay termination charges or “separate charges” upon early termination. As discussed in Chapter 5, separate charges have been found to violate the *bona fide* needs rule to the extent they do not reasonably relate to the value of current fiscal year requirements. *E.g.*, 36 Comp. Gen. 683 (1957), *aff’d*, 37 Comp. Gen. 155 (1957). As such, whether we regard them as obligations against funds not yet appropriated or obligations against current funds for the needs of future years, they also violate the **Antideficiency Act**.

The leading case in this area is 56 Comp. Gen. 142 (1976), *aff’d*, 56 Comp. Gen. 505 (1977). The Burroughs Corporation protested the award of a contract to the Honeywell Corporation to provide automatic data processing (ADP) equipment to the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration. If all renewal options were exercised, the contract would run for 60 months after equipment installation. The contract included a “separate charges” provision under which, if the government failed to exercise any renewal option or otherwise terminated prior to the end of the **60-month** systems life, the government would pay a percentage of all future years’ rentals based on Honeywell’s “list prices” at the time of discontinuance or termination. This provision violated the **Antideficiency Act** for two reasons. **First**, it would amount to an obligation of fiscal-year funds for the requirements of future years. And second, it would commit the

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<sup>27</sup>Where a Termination for Convenience clause is required by regulation, it will be read into the contract whether expressly included or not. *G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States*, 312 F.2d 418 and 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. CL 1963), *cert. denied*, 375 U.S. 954.

government to indeterminate liability because the contractor could raise **its** list or catalog prices at any time. The government had **no** way of knowing the amount of **its** commitment. Similar **cases** involving separate charges are 56 **Comp. Gen.** 167 (1976), **B-216718.2**, November 14, 1984, and **B-190659**, October 23, 1978.

The Burroughs decision also offers guidance on when separate charges may be acceptable. One instance is where it is the only way the government can obtain its needs. Cited in this regard was 8 **Comp. Gen.** 654 (1929), a case invoking the installation of equipment and the procurement of a water supply from a town. There, however, the town was the only source of a water supply, a situation clearly inapplicable to a competitive industry like **ADP**. 56 **Comp. Gen.** at 157. In addition, separate charges are permissible if they, together with payments already made, reasonably represent the value of requirements actually performed. Thus, where the contractor has discounted its price based on the government's stated intent to exercise all renewal options, separate charges may be based on the "reasonable value (e.g., **ADP** schedule price) of the actually performed work at termination based upon the shortened term." *Id.* at 158. However, termination charges may not be inconsistent **with the** Termination for Convenience clause remedy; for example, they may not exceed the value of the contractor include costs not cognizable under a "T for C." *Id.* at 157.

Where termination charges are otherwise proper, the **Antideficiency** Act also requires that the agency have sufficient funds available to pay them if and when the contingency materializes. **E.g.**, 62 **Comp. Gen.** 143 (1983). See also 8 **Comp. Gen.** 654,657 (1929) (same point but **Antideficiency** Act not cited). This requirement is sometimes specified in multi-year contracting legislation. An example is 40 U.S.C. §757(c)(1), the Information Technology Fund. Congress may also, of course, provide exceptions. **E.g.**, **B-174839**, March 20, 1984.

### c. Indemnification

#### (1) Prohibition against unlimited liability

Under an indemnification agreement, one party promises, in effect, to cover another party's losses. It is no surprise that the government is often asked to enter into indemnification agreements. The rule is that, absent express statutory authority, the government may not enter into an agreement to **indemnify** where the amount of the government's liability is indefinite, indeterminate, or potentially unlimited. Such an



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agreement would violate both the **Antideficiency Act**, 31 U.S.C. § 1341, and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 11, since it can never be said that sufficient funds have been appropriated to cover the contingency. In plain English, you cannot purport to bind the government to unlimited liability. The rule is not some arcane **GAO** concoction. The Court of Claims stated in **California-Pacific Utilities Co. v. United States**, 194 Ct. Cl. 703,715 (1971):

“The United States Supreme Court, the Court of Claims, and the Comptroller General have consistently held that absent an express provision in an appropriation for reimbursement adequate to make such payment, [the **Antideficiency Act**] proscribes **indemnification** on the grounds that it would constitute the obligation of **funds** not yet appropriated. [Citations omitted, ]“

For example, in an early case, the Interior Department, as licensee, entered into an agreement with the Southern Pacific Company under which the Department was to lay telephone and telegraph wires on property owned by the **licensor** in New Mexico. The agreement included a provision that the **Department** was to **indemnify** the Company against any **liability resulting** from the operation. Upon reviewing the indemnity provision, the Comptroller General found that it purported to impose indeterminate contingent liability on the government. By including the indemnity provision, the contracting officer had exceeded his authority, and the provision was held void. 16 **Comp. Gen.** 803 (1937).

Similarly, an indefinite and unlimited **indemnification** provision in a lease entered into by the General Services Administration without **statutory** authority was **held** to impose no legal liability on the government. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 85 (1955).

More recently, in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 369 (1980), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration desired to undertake a series of hurricane seeding experiments off the coast of Australia in cooperation with its Australian counterpart. The State Department, as negotiator, sought **GAO’s** opinion on an Australian proposal under which the United States would agree to **indemnify** Australia against all damages arising from the activities. State recognized that an unlimited agreement would violate the **Antideficiency Act** and asked whether the proposal would be acceptable if it specified that the government’s liability would be subject to the appropriation of funds by Congress for that purpose. **GAO** conceded that an agreement expressly providing that the United States would not be obligated unless

Congress chooses to appropriate the funds would not violate the letter of the law. However, it would violate the spirit of the law because, even though it would impose no legal obligation, it would impose a moral obligation on the United States to make good on its promise. This is still another example of the so-called “coercive deficiency.” There was a way out, however, **GAO** concluded that the government’s policy of self-insurance did not apply here. **NOAA** could therefore purchase private insurance, with the premiums hopefully to be shared by the government of Australia. **NOAA**’s share of the insurance premium would simply be a necessary expense of the project.

Another decision applying the general rule held that the Federal Emergency Management Agency could not agree to provide indeterminate indemnification to agents and brokers under the National Flood Insurance Act, **B-201394**, April 23, 1981. If **FEMA** considered indemnification necessary to the success of its program, it could either insert a provision limiting the government’s liability to available appropriations or seek broader authority from Congress.

In **B-201072**, May 3, 1982, the Department of Health and Human Services questioned the use of a contract clause entitled “Insurance–Liability to Third Persons,” found in the Federal Procurement Regulations (predecessor to the Federal Acquisition Regulation). The clause purported to permit federal agencies to agree to reimburse contractors, without limit, for liabilities to third persons for death, personal **injury**, or property damage, arising out of performance of the contract and not compensated by insurance, whether or not caused by the contractor’s negligence. Since the clause purported to commit the government to an indefinite liability which could exceed available appropriations, the Comptroller **General** found it in violation of the **Antideficiency** Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act. This decision was affirmed upon reconsideration in 62 **Comp. Gen.** 361 (1983), one of **GAO**’s more comprehensive discussions of the indemnification problem.

For other cases applying or discussing the general rule, see 20 **Comp. Gen.** 95, 100 (1940); 7 **Comp. Gen.** 507 (1928); 15 **Comp. Dec.** 405 (1909); **B-1** 17057, December 27, 1957; **A-95749**, October 14, 1938; 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 219, 223–24 (1978). A brief letter report making the same point is Agreements Describing Liability in Undercover Operations Should Limit the Government’s Liability, **GGD-83-53** (March 15, 1983).

Some court cases are Frank v. United States, 797 F.2d 724,727 (9th Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Johns Manville, 649 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re All Asbestos Cases, 603 F. Supp. 599 (D. Hawaii 1984); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17,29 (1992); Hercules Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616 (1992); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 1 (1987). (Several of these are asbestos cases in which the courts rejected claims of an implied agreement to indemnify.) In Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, the court stated:

“Contractual agreements that create contingent liabilities for the Government serve to create obligations of funds just as much as do agreements creating definite or certain liabilities. The contingent nature of the liability created by an indemnity agreement does not so lessen its effect on appropriations as to make it immune to the limitations of [the Antideficiency Act].” 12 CL Ct. at 25.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority has also applied the anti-indemnity rule. National Federation of Federal Employees and U.S. Department of the Interior, 35 F. L.R.A. 1034 (No. 113, 1990) (proposal to indemnify union against judgments and litigation expenses resulting from drug testing program held contrary to law and therefore nonnegotiable); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and U.S. Department of Justice, 42 F. L.R.A. 412, 515–17 (No. 33, 1991) (same).

In some of the earlier cases—for example, 7 **Comp. Gen.** 507 (1928) and 16 **Comp. Gen.** 803 (1937)—GAO noted as further support for the prohibition the then-existing principle that the United States was not **liable** for the **tortious** conduct of its employees. Of course, since the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, this is no longer true. Thus, the reader should disregard any discussion of the government’s lack of tort liability appearing in the earlier cases. The thrust of those cases, namely, the prohibition against open-ended liability, remains valid.

A limited exception to the rule was recognized in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1980). In that **case**, the Comptroller General held that the General Services Administration could agree to certain indemnity provisions in procuring public utility services for government agencies under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act.

The extent of the exception carved out by 59 **Comp. Gen.** 705 was discussed in a later decision, **B-197583**, January 19, 1981. There, GAO

once again applied the general rule and held that the Architect of the Capitol **could** not agree to indemnify the Potomac Electric Power Company for loss or damages resulting from **PEPCO's** performance of tests on equipment installed in government buildings or from certain other equipment owned by **PEPCO** which could be installed in government buildings to monitor electricity use for conservation purposes. GAO pointed to two distinguishing factors that **justified—and limited—the** exception in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 705. First, in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 705, there was no other source from which the government could obtain the needed utility services. Here, the testing and monitoring could be performed by government employees. The second factor is summarized in the following excerpt from **B-197583**:

“An even more important distinction, though, is that unlike the situation in the GSA case [59 **Comp. Gen.** 705], the Architect has not previously been accepting the testing services or using the impulse device from **PEPCO** and has therefore not previously agreed to the liability represented by the proposed indemnity agreements. In the GSA case, GSA merely sought to enter a contract accepting the same service and attendant liability, previously secured under a non-negotiable tariff, at a rate more advantageous to the Government. Here, however, the Government has other **means** available to provide the testing and monitoring desired.”

Thus, the case did not fall within the “narrow exception created by the GSA decision,” and the proposed indemnity agreement was improper. Citing 59 **Comp. Gen.** 369 (the hurricane seeding case previously discussed), however, GAO suggested that the Architect consider the possibility of obtaining private insurance.

The prohibition against incurring indefinite contingent liabilities is not limited to indemnification agreements. It applies as **well** to other types of contingent liabilities such as contract termination charges. The cases are included in our preceding discussion of multi-year contracting.

## (2) When indemnification may be authorized

**Indemnification** agreements maybe proper if they are limited to available appropriations and are otherwise authorized. Before ever getting to the question of amount, for an indemnity agreement to be permissible in the first place, it must **be** authorized either expressly or under a necessary expense theory. For example, in 1958, the National Gallery of Art asked if it could enter into an agreement to **indemnify** a corporation which was providing air conditioning equipment maintenance training to members of the Gallery’s engineering staff.

Under the proposal, the Gallery would **indemnify** the corporation for losses resulting from death or **injury** to Gallery employees caused by the negligence of the corporation or its employees. **In** reviewing the proposal, GAO did not find it necessary **to** address the definite vs. indefinite issue. There was simply no authority for the Gallery to use appropriated funds to pay claims of this **type**, nor could they be considered authorized training expenses under the Government Employees Training Act. **B-137976**, December 4, 1958. See also 63 **Comp. Gen.** 145, 150 (1984); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 369 (1980); **B-201394**, April 23, 1981.

Once you cross the purpose hurdle—that is, once you determine that the indemnification proposal you are considering is a legitimate object on which to spend your appropriations—you are ready to grapple with the unlimited liability issue.

One way to deal with this issue is, of course, to specifically **limit** the amount of the liability assumed to available appropriations. Such a limitation of an indemnity agreement may come about in either of two ways: it may follow necessarily from the nature of the agreement itself, coupled with an appropriate obligation or administrative reservation of funds, or it may be expressly written **into** the agreement. The latter alternative is the only acceptable one where the government's liability would otherwise be potentially unlimited.

For example, where the government rented buses to transport Selective Service registrants for physical examination or induction, there was no objection to the inclusion of an indemnity provision which was a standard provision in the applicable motor carrier charter coach tariff. 48 **Comp. Gen.** 361 (1968). Potential liability was not **indefinite** since it **was** necessarily limited to the value of the motor carrier's equipment.

Similarly, under a contract for the lease of aircraft, the Federal **Aviation** Administration could agree to **indemnify** the owner for loss or damage to the aircraft in order to eliminate the need to reimburse the owner for the cost of "hull insurance" and thereby secure a lower rental rate. The liability **could** properly be viewed as a necessary expense incident to hiring the aircraft, FAA had no-year appropriations available to pay for any such liability, and, **as** in the Selective Service case, the agreement was not indefinite because maximum liability was measurable by the fair market value of the

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aircraft. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 708 (1963), See **also** 22 **Comp. Gen.** 892 (1943) (Maritime Commission could amend contract **to** agree to indemnify contractor against **liability** to third parties, in lieu of reimbursing contractor for cost of liability insurance premiums, to the extent of available appropriations and provided liability was limited **to** coverage of existing insurance **policies**).<sup>28</sup>

In **B-114860**, December 19, 1979, the Farmers Home Administration asked whether it could purchase surety bonds or enter into an indemnity agreement in order to obtain the release of deeds of trust for borrowers in Colorado where the original promissory notes had been lost while in **FmHA's** custody. Colorado law required one or the other where the canceled original note could not be delivered to the Colorado public trustee. GAO concluded that the indemnity agreement was permissible **as** long as it was limited to an amount not to exceed the original principal amount of the trust deed. The decision further advised that **FmHA** should administratively reserve **sufficient** funds to cover its potential liability. This aspect of the decision was reconsidered in **B-198161**, November 25, 1980, Reviewing the particular circumstances involved, GAO was unable to foresee situations in which the government might be required to **indemnify** the public trustee, and accordingly advised **FmHA** that the administrative reservation of funds would not be necessary.

In 63 **Comp. Gen.** 145 (1984), certain indemnification provisions in a ship-chartering agreement were found not to impose indefinite or potentially unlimited contingent liability because liability could be avoided by certain separate actions solely under the government's control.

In cases like the Selective Service bus case (48 **Comp. Gen.** 361) and the FAA **aircraft** case (42 **Comp. Gen.** 708), even though the government's potential liability is limited and determinable, this fact alone does not guarantee that the agency will have **sufficient** funds available should the contingency ripen into an obligation. This concern is met in one of two ways. The **first** is the obligation or administrative reservation of sufficient funds to cover the potential **liability**. In particular cases, reservation maybe determined

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<sup>28</sup>22 **Comp. Gen.** 892 is discussed in 62 **Comp. Gen.** 361,362-63 (1983), and *Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States*, 12 Cl. Ct. 1,23 (1987). The Claims Court noted the "significant deficiency" of 22 **Comp. Gen.** 892 in that it nowhere mentions the **Antideficiency Act**.

unnecessary, as in **B-198161**, above. Also, naturally, a specific directive from Congress will render reservation of funds unnecessary. See **B-159141**, August 18, 1967. The second way is for the agreement to expressly limit the government's liability to appropriations available at the time of the loss with no implication that Congress will appropriate funds to makeup any deficiency.

This second device-the express limitation of the government's liability to available appropriations-is sufficient to cure **an** otherwise fatally defective (i.e., unlimited) indemnity proposal. GAO **has** considered this type of provision in several contexts.

For example, the government may in limited circumstances assume the risk of loss to contractor-owned property. While the maximum potential liability would be determinable, it could be very large and the "administrative reservation" of funds is not feasible. Thus, without some form of limitation, such an agreement could result in obligations in excess of available appropriations. The rules concerning the government's assumption of risk on property owned by contractors and used in the performance of their contracts are set forth in 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824 (1975), modifying **B-168106**, July 3, 1974. The rules are summarized **below**:<sup>29</sup>

- If administratively determined to be in the best interest of the government, the government may assume the risk for contractor-owned property which is used solely in the performance of government contracts.
- The government may not assume the risk for contractor-owned property which is used solely for **nongovernment** work. If the property is used for both government and **nongovernment** work and the **nongovernment** portion is separable, the government may not assume the risk relating to the **nongovernment** work.
- Where the amount of a contractor's commercial work is so insignificant when compared to the amount of the contractor's government work that the government is effectively bearing the entire risk of loss by in essence paying the full insurance premiums, the government may assume the risk if administratively determined to be in the best interest of the government.

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<sup>29</sup>54 **Comp. Gen.** 824 overruled a portion of 42 **Comp. Gen.** 708, discussed in the text, to the extent it held that there was no need to either obligate or reserve funds. Thus, in a situation like 42 **Comp. Gen.** 708, the agency would presumably have to either obligate or **administratively** reserve funds or include a provision like the one described in 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824.

- Any agreement for the assumption of risk by the government under the above rules must clearly provide that, in the event the government has **to** pay for losses, payments may not exceed appropriations available at the time of the losses, and that nothing in the contract may be considered as implying that Congress **will** at a later date appropriate funds sufficient to **meet deficiencies**.

A somewhat different situation was discussed in 60 **Comp. Gen.** 584 (1981), involving an “installment purchase plan” for automatic data processing equipment. Under the plan, the General Services Administration would make monthly payments until the entire purchase price was paid, at which time **GSA** would acquire unencumbered ownership of the equipment. **GSA**’s obligation was conditioned on its exercising an option at the end of each fiscal year to continue payments for the next year. The contract contained a risk of loss provision under which **GSA** would be required to pay the full price for any equipment lost or damaged during the term. **GAO** concluded that the equipment should be treated as contractor-owned property for purposes of the risk of loss provision, and that the provision would be improper unless one of the following conditions were met:

1. The contract must include the provisions specified in 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824 limiting **GSA**’s liability to appropriations available at the time of the loss and expressly precluding any inference that Congress would appropriate sufficient funds to meet any deficiency; or
2. If the contract does not include these provisions, then **GSA** must obligate sufficient funds to cover its possible liability under the risk of loss provision.

If neither of these conditions are met, the assumption of risk clause **could** potentially violate the **Antideficiency** Act by creating an obligation in excess of available appropriations if the contingency occurs.

In a 1982 case, the Defense Department and the state of New York entered into a contract for New York to provide certain support functions for the **1980** Winter Olympic Games at Lake Placid, New York. The contract provided for federal reimbursement of any disability benefits which New York might be required **to** pay in case of death or **injury** of persons participating in the operation. The contract



**specified** that the government's liability could not exceed appropriations for assistance to the Games available at the time of a disabling event, and that the contract did not imply that Congress would appropriate funds **sufficient** to meet any deficiencies. Since these provisions satisfied the test of 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824, the indemnity agreement was not legally objectionable. **B-2025** 18, January 8, 1982. Under this type of arrangement, the time to record an obligation would be when the agency is **notified** that a disabling event has occurred. The initial recording of course would have to be based on an estimate.

Also, the decision in the National Flood Insurance Act case mentioned above (**B-201394**, April 23, 1981) noted that the defect could have been cured by inserting a clause along the **lines** of 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824. The same point was made in **B-201072**, May 3, 1982, also discussed earlier. See **also** *National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. United States*, 3 Cl. Ct. 516,521 (1983) (**indemnification** agreement between Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak did not violate **Antideficiency Act** where liability was limited to amount of appropriation).

When we first stated the anti-indemnity rule at the outset of this discussion, we noted that the rule applies in the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary. Naturally, an **indemnification** agreement, however open-ended it maybe, will be "legal" if it is authorized by some express provision of law.

One statutory exception to the indemnification rules exists for certain defense-related contracts by virtue of 50 U.S.C. §1431, often referred to by its Public Law designation, **Public** Law 85-804. The statute evolved from a temporary wartime measure, section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 838,839. The implementing details **on** indemnification are found in Executive Order No. 10789, as **amended**.<sup>30</sup>

Another statutory exception **is** 42 U.S.C. §2210, the Price-Anderson Act, which authorizes indemnification agreements with Nuclear

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<sup>30</sup> A decision approving an indemnity agreement under authority Of the First War Powers Act **is** **B-33801**, April 19, 1943. A later related decision **is** **B-33801**, October 27, 1943. Both of **these** decisions involved the famed "Manhattan Project," although that fact **is well-concealed**. The decisions had been **classified**, but **were** declassified in 1986.

Regulatory Commission licensees and Department of Energy contractors **to pay** claims resulting from nuclear accidents.

Some of the more recent cases have expressed the view that indemnity agreements, even with limiting language, should not be entered into without congressional approval in view of their potentially disruptive fiscal consequences **to the agency**.<sup>31</sup> 63 **Comp. Gen.** 145,147 (1984); 62 **Comp. Gen.** 361,368 (1983); **B-242146**, August 16, 1991. Precisely what form this approval should take in cases where the contractual language is sufficient to minimally **satisfy** the **Antideficiency** Act is not entirely clear.

In 1986, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, in connection with proposed Price-Anderson amendments the committee was considering, asked GAO **to** identify possible funding options for a statutory **indemnification** provision. GAO's response, **B-197742**, August 1, 1986, lists several options and notes the benefits and drawbacks of each from the perspective of congressional flexibility. The options range from creating a statutory entitlement with a permanent indefinite appropriation for payment (indemnity guaranteed but no congressional flexibility), to making payment fully dependent on the appropriations process (full congressional flexibility but no guarantee of payment). In between are various other devices such as contract authority, use of contract provisions such as those in 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824, and various forms of limited funding authority.

The discussion in **B-197742** highlights the essence of the **indemnification** funding problem:

“An indemnity statute should generally include two **features—the indemnification** provisions and a funding mechanism. **Indemnification** provisions can range from a legally binding guarantee to a mere authorization. Funding mechanisms can similarly vary in terms of the degree of congressional control and flexibility retained. It is impossible to maximize both the assurance of payment and congressional flexibility. Either objective is enhanced only at the expense of the other. . . .

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<sup>31</sup>To illustrate the potential fiscal consequences, an authorized indemnity **agreement** entered into in 1950 produced liability of over \$64 million plus interest more than four decades later. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 635 (1991).

“If payment is to be assured, Congress must yield control over funding, either in whole or up to specified ceilings. . . . Conversely, if Congress is to **retain funding** control, payment cannot be assured in any legally binding form and the **indemnification** becomes less than an entitlement.”

GAO’s bottom line: Whatever funding approach Congress may deem desirable in a particular situation should be spelled out in the legislation. Funding should never occur by default.

### (3) Summary

Absent specific statutory authority, the government may generally not enter into an indemnification agreement which would impose an indefinite or potentially unlimited liability on the government. Since the obligation or administrative **reservation** of funds is not a feasible option in the indefinite liability situation, the only cure is for the agreement to expressly limit the government’s liability to available appropriations with no implication that Congress will appropriate the money to meet any deficiencies. If the government’s potential liability is limited and determinable, an agreement to indemnify will be acceptable if it is otherwise authorized and if appropriate safeguards are taken to protect against violation of the **Antideficiency** Act. These safeguards may be either the obligation or administrative reservation of sufficient funds to cover the potential liability, or the inclusion in the agreement of a clause expressly limiting the government’s liability to available appropriations.

While the preceding discussion reflects the relevant case law as of **the** date of this publication, GAO is aware that the guidance provided does not solve **all** problems. For example, limiting an indemnification agreement to appropriations available at the time of the loss, as in **B-202518** (the New York Winter Olympics case), may remove the “unlimited liability” objection, but it remains entirely possible that liabilities incurred under such an agreement could exhaust the agency’s appropriation and produce further **Antideficiency** Act complications. Also, from the standpoint of the contractor or other “beneficiary,” indemnification under these **circumstances** can prove largely illusory, as it **will** obviously make a big difference whether the incident giving rise to the claim occurs at the beginning or the end of a fiscal year.

The indemnification area is concealedly a troublesome one. While there are devices that may be employed to structure indemnification

agreements in such a **way** as to make them legally acceptable, they are no substitute for **clear** legislative authority. If an agency thinks that indemnification agreements in a particular context are sufficiently in the government's interests, the preferable approach is for the agency to go to Congress and seek specific statutory **authority**.

d. **Specific** Appropriation  
Limitations/Purpose Violations

In Chapter 4 we covered in some detail 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), which **prohibits** the use of appropriations **for purposes** other than **those** for **which** they were appropriated. As seen in that chapter, violations of purpose availability can arise in a wide variety of contexts—charging an obligation or expenditure to the wrong appropriation, making an obligation or expenditure for an unauthorized purpose, violating a statutory prohibition or restriction, etc. The question we explore **in** this section is the relationship of purpose availability to the **Antideficiency Act**. **In** other words, when and to what extent does a purpose violation also violate the **Antideficiency Act**?

Why does it matter whether you have violated one statute or two statutes? To our knowledge, nobody is keeping score. The reason here is that, if the second statute is the **Antideficiency Act**, there are reporting requirements and potential **penalties** to consider.

A useful starting point is the following excerpt from 63 **Comp. Gen.** 422,424 (1984):

“Not every violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) also constitutes a violation of the **Antideficiency Act**. . . . Even though an expenditure may have been charged to an improper source, the **Antideficiency Act**’s prohibition against incurring obligations in excess or in advance of available appropriations is not also violated unless no other funds were available for that expenditure. Where, however, no other funds were authorized to be used for the purpose in question (or where those authorized were already obligated), both 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) and § 1341(a) have been violated. In addition, we would consider an **Antideficiency Act** violation to have occurred where an expenditure was improperly charged and the appropriate fund source, although available at the time, was subsequently obligated, making **readjustment** of accounts impossible.”

First, suppose **an** agency charges an obligation or expenditure to the wrong appropriation account. This can involve either charging the wrong appropriation for the same time period, or charging the wrong **fiscal year**. The answer is found in the above passage from 63 **Comp. Gen.** 422. If the appropriation that should have been charged in the first place has **sufficient** available funds to **enable** the **adjustment** of

accounts, there is no **Antideficiency** Act violation. A violation exists if the proper account does not have enough money to permit the adjustment, and this includes cases where sufficient funds existed at the time of the error but have since been obligated or expended. See also 70 **Comp. Gen.** 592 (1991); **B-222048**, February 10, 1987; **B-95136**, August 8, 1979.

Other cases illustrating or applying this principle are 57 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1978) (grant funds charged to wrong fiscal year); **B-224702**, August 5, 1987 (contract modifications charged to expired accounts rather than current appropriations); **B-208697**, September 28, 1983 (items charged to General Services Administration Working Capital Fund which should have been charged to other operating appropriations). Actually, the concept of “curing” a violation by making an appropriate **adjustment** of accounts is not new. See, e.g., 16 **Comp. Dec.** 750 (1910); 4 **Comp. Dec.** 314,317 (1897). The Armed **Services** Board of Contract Appeals has also followed this principle. New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire, Inc., ASBCA No. 26474, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,395 (1987).<sup>32</sup>

The next situation to consider is an obligation or expenditure in excess of a statutory ceiling. This maybe an earmarked maximum in a more general appropriation or a monetary ceiling imposed by some other legislation. An obligation or expenditure in excess of the ceiling violates 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a). See, for example, the following:

- Monetary ceilings on minor military construction (10 U.S.C. § 2805): 63 **Comp. Gen.** 422 (1984); Continuing Inadequate Control Over Programing [sic] and Financing of Construction, **B-133316**, July 23, 1964; Review of Programing [sic] and Financing of Selected Facilities Constructed at Army, Navy, and Air Force Installations, **B-133316**, January 24, 1961. (The latter two items are audit reports.)<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Although the Board's decision was vacated and remanded on other grounds by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire v. United States, 861 F.2d 685 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court noted its agreement with the Board's Antideficiency Act conclusions. Id. at 692 n.15.

<sup>33</sup>Another report in this series, making similar findings under a different statutory ceiling, is illegal Use of Operation and Maintenance Funds for Rehabilitation and Construction of Family Housing and Construction of a Related Facility, **B-133102**, August 30, 1963.

- Monetary ceiling on lease payments for family housing units in foreign countries (10 U.S.C. § 2828(e)); report entitled Leased Military Housing Costs in Europe Can Be Reduced by Improving Acquisition Practices and Using Purchase Contracts, GAO/NSIAD-85-113 (July 24, 1985), at 7-8; 66 **Comp. Gen.** 176 (1986); B-227527/B-227325, October 21, 1987 (non-decision) letter.
- Ceiling in supplemental appropriation: B-204270, October 13, 1981 (dollar limit on Standard Level User Charge payable by agency to General Services Administration).<sup>34</sup>
- Ceiling in authorizing legislation: 64 **Comp. Gen.** 282 (1985) (dollar limit on two Small Business Administration direct loan programs).

In a statutory ceiling case, the account **adjustment** concept described above may or may not come into play. If the ceiling represents a limit on the amount available for a particular object, then there generally will be no other funds available for that object and hence no “correct” funding source from which to reimburse the account charged. If, however, the ceiling represents only a **limit** on the amount available from a particular appropriation and not an absolute limit on expenditures for the object, as in the minor military construction cases, for example, then it maybe possible to cure violations by an appropriate **adjustment**. 63 **Comp. Gen.** at 424.

The final situation—and from this point on, the law gets a bit murky—is an obligation or expenditure for an object which **is** prohibited or simply unauthorized. In 60 **Comp. Gen.** 440 (1981), a proviso in the Customs Service’s 1980 appropriation expressly prohibited the use of the appropriation for administrative expenses to pay any employee overtime pay in an amount in excess of \$20,000. By allowing employees to earn overtime pay in excess of that amount, the Customs Service violated 31 U.S.C. § 1341. The Comptroller **General explained** the violation as follows:

“When an appropriation act **specifies** that an agency’s appropriation is not available for a designated purpose, and the agency has no other funds for that purpose, any **officer** of the agency who authorizes an obligation or expenditure of agency funds for that purpose violates the **Antideficiency Act**. Since the **Congress** has not appropriated funds for the designated purpose, the obligation may be viewed either **as** being in excess of the amount (zero) available for that purpose or as in advance of

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<sup>34</sup>This case also illustrates that the Antideficiency Act applies to interagency **transactions** the same as any other obligations or expenditures.

appropriations made for that purpose. In either case the **Antideficiency** Act is violated.” *Id.* at 441.

In **B-201260**, September 11, 1984, the Comptroller General advised that expenditures in contravention of the **Boland** Amendment would violate the **Antideficiency** Act (although none were found in that case). The **Boland** Amendment, an appropriation rider, provided that “[n]one of the funds provided in this Act may be used” for certain activities in Central America. In **B-229732**, December 22, 1988, GAO found the **Antideficiency** Act violated when the Department of Housing and Urban Development used its funds for commercial trade promotion activities in the Soviet Union, an **activity** beyond its statutory authority. Similarly, a **nonreimbursable** interagency detail of an employee, contrary to a specific statutory prohibition, produced a violation in **B-247348**, June 22, 1992 (letter to Public Printer). All three cases also involved purpose violations and are consistent with 60 **Comp. Gen.** 440, the rationale being that expenditures would be in excess of available appropriations, which were **zero**.<sup>35</sup>

However, one court has reached a result which may interpret the **Antideficiency** Act somewhat differently. In Southern Packaging and Storage Co. v. United States, 588 F. **Supp.** 532 (D.S.C. 1984), the court found that the Defense Department had purchased certain combat meal products (“**MRE**”) in violation of a “Buy American” appropriation rider, which provided that “[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this Act. . . shall be available” to procure items not grown or produced in the United States. The court **rejected** the contention that the violation also contravened the **Antideficiency** Act, stating:

“There is no evidence in this case to show that [the Defense Personnel Supply Center] authorized expenditures beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the procurement of the **MRE** rations and the component foods thereof.” *Id.* at 550.

Given the sparse discussion in the decision and the fact that Congress does not make specific appropriations for **MRE** rations, it is **difficult** to discern precisely how the Southern Packaging court would apply the **Antideficiency** Act. While it is possible to reconcile Southern

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<sup>35</sup>There are also a few older cases finding violations of both statutes, but they are of little help in attempting to formulate a reasoned approach. Examples are 39 **Comp. Gen.** 388 (1959), which does not discuss the relationship, and 22 **Comp. Gen.** 772 (1943), which includes a rationale, now obsolete, based on the then-existing lack of authority to include interest stipulations in contracts.

Packaging with the GAO cases, it is **also** possible to find an element of inconsistency. In the opinion of the editors, this area requires further careful thought. On the one hand, every expenditure for an unauthorized purpose should not also violate the **Antideficiency** Act. It does not seem to have been the intent of Congress that every unauthorized entertainment expenditure or every payment for an unauthorized long-distance telephone call be reported to Congress and the President as an **Antideficiency** Act violation, a result that could be reached by a broad application of the language of 60 **Comp. Gen.** 440. Yet on the other hand, where Congress has expressly prohibited the use of appropriated funds for some particular expenditure, it seems clear that the “available appropriation” for that item is zero. Further refinement in this area appears necessary.

e. Amount of Available  
Appropriation or Fund

Questions occasionally arise over precisely what assets an agency may count for purposes of determining the amount of available resources against which it may incur obligations.

The starting point, of course, is the unobligated balance of the relevant appropriation. In Section F of this chapter, we discuss the rule that subdivisions of a lump-sum appropriation appearing in legislative history are not legally binding on the agency. They are binding only if carried into the appropriation act itself, or are made binding by some other statute. Thus, the entire unobligated balance of an unrestricted lump-sum appropriation is theoretically available for **Antideficiency** Act purposes. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812 (1976).<sup>36</sup>

Where an agency is authorized to retain certain receipts or collections for credit to an appropriation or fund under that agency’s control, those receipts are treated the same as direct appropriations for purposes of obligation and the **Antideficiency** Act, subject to any applicable statutory restrictions. E.g., 71 **Comp. Gen.** 224 (1992) (National Technical Information Service may use subscription **payments** to defray its operating expenses but, under governing legislation, may use customer advances only for costs directly related to firm orders).

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<sup>36</sup>We say “theoretically available” because matching an obligation **against** the entire unobligated balance will in many cases do little more than postpone the violation until later in the fiscal year.



In addition, certain other assets maybe “counted,” that is, obligated against. For example, OMB Circular No. A-34 includes certain accounts receivable (also referred to as a form of “offsetting collection”) as a “budgetary resource.”<sup>37</sup> See also B-134474 -O. M., December 18, 1957. This does not mean anticipated receipts from transactions that have not yet occurred or orders that have not yet been placed. Obligations cannot be charged against anticipated proceeds from an anticipated sale of property. 35 Comp. Gen. 356 (1955) (sale of old telephone equipment to be replaced with new equipment); B-209758 -O.M., September 29, 1983 (sale of assets seized from embezzler). Thus, the Customs Service violated the Antideficiency Act by obligating against anticipated receipts from future sales of seized property unless it had sufficient funds available from other sources to cover the obligation. B-237135, December 21, 1989. Similarly, the Comptroller General found that the Air Force violated the Antideficiency Act by overobligating its Industrial Fund based on estimated or anticipated customer orders. See report entitled The Air Force Has Incurred Numerous Overobligations in its Industrial Fund, AFMD-81-53 (August 14, 1981); 62 Comp. Gen. 143, 147 (1983). Even where receivables are properly included as budgetary resources, an agency may not incur obligations against receipts expected to be received after the end of the current fiscal year without specific statutory authority. 51 Comp. Gen. 598,605 (1972).

GAO considered another aspect of the question in 60 Comp. Gen. 520 (1981). The General Services Administration buys furniture and other equipment for other agencies through the General Supply Fund, a revolving fund established by statute. Agencies pay GSA either in advance or by reimbursement. For reasons of economy, GSA normally makes consolidated and bulk purchases of commonly used items. Concern over the application of the Antideficiency Act arose when, for several reasons, the Fund began experiencing cash flow problems. GSA wanted to obligate against the value of inventory in the Fund. In other words, GSA wanted to consider the amount of the available appropriation as the cash assets, including advances, in the Fund, plus inventory.

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<sup>37</sup> Budgetary resources include (a) orders from other government accounts that represent valid obligations of the ordering account, and (b) orders from the public, including state and local governments, but only to the extent accompanied by an advance. OMB Circular No. A-34, §31.4

The Comptroller General held that inventory in the General Supply Fund did not constitute a “budgetary resource” against which obligations could be incurred. The items in the inventory had already been purchased with appropriated funds and could not be counted again as a new budgetary resource. This was in accord with OMB Circular No. A-34, which does not include inventory as a “budgetary resource” for budget execution purposes. Thus, a violation of the Antideficiency Act would occur at the moment GSA incurs obligations in excess of available “budgetary resources.”

Supplemental appropriations, requested but not yet enacted, may not be counted as a budgetary resource. B-230117-0. M., February 8, 1989. See also OMB Circular No. A-34, §31.4.

f. Intent/Factors Beyond  
Agency Control

A violation of the Antideficiency Act does not depend on intent or lack of good faith on the part of contracting or other officials who obligate or pay in advance or in excess of appropriations. Although these factors may influence the applicable penalty, they do not affect the basic determination of whether a violation has occurred. 64 Comp. Gen. 282, 289 (1985). The Comptroller General once expressed the principle in the following passage which, although stated in a slightly different context, is equally applicable here:

Where a payment is prohibited by law, the utmost good faith on the part of the officer, either in ignorance of the facts or in disregard of the facts, in purporting to authorize the incurring of an obligation the payment of which is so prohibited, cannot take the case out of the statute, otherwise the purported good faith of an officer could be used to nullify the law.” A-86742, June 17, 1937.

To illustrate, a contracting officer at the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization accepted an offer for installation of automatic telephone equipment at twice the amount of the unobligated balance remaining in the applicable account. The Department of State explained that the contracting officer had misinterpreted General Accounting Office regulations and implementing State Department procedures. But for this misinterpretation, additional funds could have been placed in the account. State therefore felt that the transaction should not be considered in violation of the Act. GAO did not agree and held that the overobligation must be immediately reported as required by 31 U.S.C. §1517(b). The official’s state of mind was not relevant in deciding whether a violation had occurred. 35 Comp. Gen. 356 (1955).

An **overobligation** may result from external factors beyond the agency's control. Whether this will produce an **Antideficiency** Act violation depends on the particular circumstances.

In 58 **Comp. Gen.** 46 (1978), the Army asked whether it **could** make payments to a contractor under a contract requiring payment in local (foreign) currency where the original dollar obligation was well within applicable funding limitations but, due to subsequent exchange rate fluctuations, payment would exceed those limitations. The Army argued that a payment under these circumstances should not be considered a violation of the Act because currency fluctuations are totally beyond the control of the contracting **officer** or any other agency official. GAO disagreed. The fact that the contracting **officer** was a victim of circumstances does not make a payment in excess of available appropriations any less illegal. (It is, of course, as with state of mind, relevant in assessing penalties for the violation.) See also 38 **Comp. Gen.** 501 (1959) (severe adverse weather conditions or prolonged employee strikes generally not sufficient to justify **overobligation** by former Post Office Department, but facts in particular case could **justify** deficiency apportionment).

In apparent contrast, the Comptroller General stated in 62 **Comp. Gen.** 692, 700 (1983) that an **overobligation** resulting from a judicial award of attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the Equal Access to Justice Act, would not violate the **Antideficiency** Act. See also 63 **Comp. Gen.** 308,312 (1984) (judgments or board of contract appeals awards under Contract Disputes Act, same answer); **B-227527/B-227325**, October 21, 1987 (non-decision letter) (amounts awarded by court judgment need not be counted in determining whether statutory ceiling on lease payments has been exceeded and **Antideficiency** Act thereby violated); **A-37316**, July 11, 1931 (land condemnation under Declaration of Taking Act which results in deficiency judgment would not violate **Antideficiency Act**).<sup>38</sup>

The distinction appears to be based on the extent to which the agency can act to avoid the **overobligation** even though it is imposed by some external force beyond its control. Thus, the currency fluctuation decision stated:

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<sup>38</sup>In apparent contradiction to **A-37316** is 54 **Comp. Gen.** 799 (1975).

“[W]hen a contracting officer finds that the dollars required to continue or make final payment on a contract will exceed a statutory limitation he may terminate the contract, provided the termination costs will not exceed the statutory limitations. Alternatively, the contracting officer may issue a stop work order and the agency may ask Congress for a deficiency appropriation citing the currency fluctuation as the reason for its request.”

58 Comp. Gen. at 48. Similarly, the Postmaster General could curtail operations if necessary. 38 Comp. Gen. at 504. See also 66 Comp. Gen. 176 (1986) (Antideficiency Act would not preclude Air Force from entering into lease for overseas family housing without provision limiting annual payments to statutory ceiling, even though certain costs could conceivably escalate above ceiling, where good faith cost estimates were well below ceiling and lease included termination for convenience clause). Where the agency could have acted to avert the overobligation but did not, the violation will not be excused. In contrast, in the case of a payment ordered by a court, comparable options (apart from seeking a deficiency appropriation) are not available. (Curtailling activities after the overobligation has occurred to avoid compounding the violation is a separate question.)

g. Exceptions

An exception to the Antideficiency Act is built right into 31 U.S.C. §1341(a). The statute prohibits contracts or other obligations in advance or excess of available appropriations, “unless authorized by law.” This is nothing more than the recognition that Congress can authorize exceptions to the statutes it enacts.

(1) Contract authority

At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between “contract authority” and the “authority to enter into contracts.” A contract is simply a legal device employed by two or more parties to create binding and legally enforceable obligations in furtherance of some objective. The federal government uses contracts every day to procure a wide variety of goods and services. An agency does not need specific statutory authority to enter into contracts. It has long been established that a government agency has the inherent authority to enter into binding contracts in the execution of its duties. *Van Brocklin v. Tennessee*, 117 U.S. 151, 154 (1886); *United States v. Maurice*, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1216-17 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747). It should be apparent that these contracts, “authorized by law” though

they may be, cannot be **sufficient** to constitute exceptions to the **Antideficiency** Act, else the Act would be meaningless.

For purposes of the **Antideficiency** Act exception, a “contract authorized bylaw” requires not only authority to enter into a contract, but authority to do so without regard to the availability of appropriations. While the former may be inherent, the latter must be conferred by statute. The most common example of this is “contract authority” as that term is defined and described in Chapter 2—**statutory** authority which **specifically** authorizes an agency to enter into a contract in excess of, or prior to enactment of, the applicable appropriation.

In some cases, the “exception” language **will** be unmistakably explicit. An example is the Price-Anderson Act, which provides authority to “make contracts in advance of appropriations and incur obligations without regard to” the **Antideficiency** Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(j). Other examples of clear authority, although perhaps not as explicit as the Price-Anderson Act, maybe found in 27 **Comp. Gen.** 452 (1948) (long-term operating-differential subsidy agreements under the Merchant Marine Act); **B-211190**, April 5, 1983 (contracts with states under the Federal Boat Safety Act); **B-164497(3)**, June 6, 1979 (certain provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973); **B-168313**, November 21, 1969 (interest subsidy agreements with educational institutions under the Housing Act of 1950).

In an earlier case involving contract authority, GAO insisted that the Corps of Engineers had to include a “**no** liability unless funds are later made available” clause for any work done in excess of available funds. 2 **Comp. Gen.** 477 (1923). The Corps had trouble with this clause because a Court of Claims decision, C.H. Leaven and Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1976), allowed the contractor an equitable **adjustment** for suspension of work due to a delay in enacting an appropriation to pay him, notwithstanding the “availability of funds” clause. In 56 **Comp. Gen.** 437 (1977), GAO overruled 2 **Comp. Gen.** 477, deciding that section 10 of the River and Harbor Act of 1922, by expressly authorizing the Corps to enter into large multi-year civil works projects without seeking a full appropriation in the first year, constituted the necessary exception to the **Antideficiency** Act and a “funds available” clause was not necessary. This applies as well to contracts financed from the Corps’

Civil Works Revolving Fund. **B-242974.6**, November 26, 1991 (interred memorandum).

The rationale of 56 **Comp. Gen.** 437 has also been applied to long-term fuel storage facilities contracts authorized by 10 **U.S.C.** § 2388. New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire, Inc., ASBCA No. 26474,88-1 BCA 1120,395 (1987), vacated on other grounds, New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire v. United States, 861 **F.2d** 685 (Fed. **Cir.** 1988).

In 28 **Comp. Gen.** 163 (1948), the Commissioner of Reclamation was authorized in an appropriation act to enter into certain contracts in advance of appropriations but subject to a monetary ceiling. Since the contract authority was explicit, with no language making it contingent on appropriations being made at some later date, the statute authorized the Commissioner to enter into a **firm** and binding contract.

Contract authority may be “transferred” from one agency to another in certain circumstances. The Bureau of Mines was authorized to enter into a contract (in advance of the appropriation) to construct and equip an anthracite research laboratory. The Bureau asked the General Services Administration to enter into the contract on its behalf pursuant to section 103 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, which provided that “**funds** appropriated to . . . other **Federal** agencies for the foregoing purposes [execution of contracts and supervision of construction] shall be available for transfer to and expenditure by the [General Services Administration].” GAO held that the transfer language merely authorized the transfer of funds appropriated to the various agencies to GSA. It did not, however, preclude GSA from entering into contracts before the funds were appropriated, in this instance, because GSA was acting for the Bureau of Mines which clearly did have the necessary authority, 29 **Comp. Gen.** 504 (1950).<sup>39</sup>

A somewhat different kind of contract authority is found in 41 **U.S.C.** § 11, the so-called Adequacy of Appropriations Act. An exception to the requirement to have adequate appropriations-or any appropriation at all-is made for procurements by the military

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<sup>39</sup>The provisions of the 1949 legislation discussed in 29 **Comp. Gen.** 504 have been superseded by the Public Buildings Act of 1959. The case is included here merely to illustrate the concept.

departments for “clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year.” By administrative interpretation, the Defense Department has limited this authority to emergency circumstances where immediate action is necessary. Department of Defense Directive No. 7220.8.

It should again be emphasized that to constitute an exception to 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a), the “contract authority” must be specific authority to incur the obligation in excess or advance of appropriations, not merely the general authority any agency **has** to enter into contracts to **carry out** its functions.

Congress may grant **authority** to contract beyond the fiscal year in terms which amount to considerably less than the type of “contract authority” described above. An example is 43 U.S.C. § 388, which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into certain contracts relating to reclamation projects “which may cover such periods of time **as** the **Secretary** may consider necessary but in which the liability of the United States shall be contingent upon appropriations being made **therefor**.” While this provision has been referred to as an exception to the **Antideficiency** Act (B-72020, January 9, 1948), it authorizes only “contingent contracts” under which there is no legal obligation to pay unless and until appropriations are provided. 28 **Comp. Gen.** 163 (1948). A similar example, discussed in B-239435, August 24, 1990, is 38 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. II 1990), which authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs to enter into certain leases for periods of up to 35 years but further provides that the government’s obligation to make payments is “subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose.”

(2) Other obligations “authorized by law”

The “authorized by law” exception in 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) applies to non-contractual obligations as well as to contracts. The basic approach is the same. The authority must be more than just authority to undertake the particular activity. In the broader sense, everything government officials do should be authorized bylaw, otherwise they shouldn’t be doing it. To constitute an **Antideficiency** Act exception, the authority must be authority to incur the obligation in excess or advance of appropriations.

For example, statutory authority to acquire land and to pay for it from a **specified** fund is not an exception to the **Antideficiency** Act. It merely authorizes acquisitions to the extent of funds available in the specified source at the time of purchase. 27 **Comp. Dec.** 662 (1921). **Similarly**, the authority to conduct hearings does not, without more, confer authority to do so without regard to available appropriations. 16 **Comp. Dec.** 750 (1910). Provisions in the District of Columbia Code requiring Saint Elizabeth's Hospital to treat **all** patients who meet admission eligibility requirements were held not to authorize the Hospital to operate beyond the level of its appropriations. If mandatory expenditures would cause a deficiency, the Hospital would have to reduce **nonmandatory** expenditures. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 661 (1982).

Several cases have considered the effect of various statutory salary or compensation increases. If a statutory increase is mandatory and does not give anyone discretion to determine the amount, or if it gives some administrative body discretion to determine the amount, payment of which then becomes mandatory, the obligation is deemed "authorized by law" for **Antideficiency** Act purposes. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 422 (1959) (salary increases for Wage Board employees); 22 **Comp. Gen.** 570 (1942); 21 **Comp. Gen.** 335 (1941); **B-168796**, February 2, 1970 (mandatory statutory increase in retired pay for Tax Court judges); **B-107279**, January 9, 1952 (mandatory increases for certain legislative personnel). GAO **has** not treated the granting of increases retroactively to correct past administrative errors as creating the same type of exception. See 24 **Comp. Gen.** 676 (1945). Increases which are discretionary do not permit the incurring of obligations in excess or advance of appropriations. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 238 (1951) (discretionary pension increases); 28 **Comp. Gen.** 300 (1948).<sup>40</sup>

Some other examples of obligations "authorized by law" for **Antideficiency** Act purposes are:

- **Mandatory pilot** program in Vermont under Farms for the Future Act of 1990 (loan guarantees and interest assistance). **B-244093**, July 19, 1991.

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<sup>40</sup>28 **Comp. Gen.** 300 concerned increases to Wage Board employees under legislation which is now obsolete (see 39 **Comp. Gen.** 422, cited in the text). However, it is still useful for the basic proposition, stated on page 302, that **nonmandatory** increases are not obligations "authorized by law" as that term is used in 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a).



- Mandatory entitlement programs administered by Department of Veterans Affairs. **B-226801**, March 2, 1988.
- Mandatory transfer from one appropriation account to **another** where “donor” account contained insufficient unobligated funds. 38 **Comp. Gen.** 93 (1958).
- Statute authorizing Interstate Commerce Commission to order a substitute rail carrier to service shippers abandoned by their primary carrier in emergency situations, and to reimburse certain costs of the substitute carrier, **B-196132**, October 11, 1979.
- Provision in Criminal Justice Act of 1964 imposing **mandatory** deadline on commencement of certain programs which would necessarily involve creation of financial obligations. **B-156932**, August 17, 1965.

What are perhaps the outer limits of the “authorized by law” exception are illustrated in **B-159141**, August 18, 1967. The Federal Aviation Administration had entered into long-term, **incrementally** funded contracts for the development of a civil supersonic aircraft (SST). To ensure compliance with the **Antideficiency Act**, the FM each year budgeted for, and obligated, **sufficient funds** to cover **potential** termination liability. The appropriations committees became concerned that unnecessarily large amounts were being tied up this way, especially in light of the highly remote possibility that the SST contracts would be terminated. In considering the FAA’s 1968 appropriation, the House Appropriations Committee reduced the FAA’s request by the amount of the termination reserve, and in its report directed the FAA not to obligate for potential **termination costs**. The Comptroller General advised that if the Senate Appropriations Committee did the same thing—a **specific** reduction tied to the amount requested for the reserve, coupled with clear direction in the legislative history—then an **overobligation** resulting from a termination would be regarded as “authorized bylaw” and not in violation of the **Antideficiency Act**.

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### 3. Voluntary Services Prohibition

#### a. Introduction

The next portion of the **Antideficiency Act** is 31 U.S.C. § 1342:

“An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government **may** not accept **voluntary** services for either government or

employ personal services exceeding that authorized bylaw except for emergencies involving the **safety** of human life or the protection of property, . . .“

This provision **first** appeared, in almost identical form, in a deficiency appropriation act enacted in 1884 (23 Stat. 17). Although the original prohibition read “hereafter, no department or officer of the United States shall accept. . . .“ it **was** included in an appropriation for the **(then) Indian Office** of the Interior Department, and the Court of Claims held that it was applicable only **to** the Indian **Office**. Glavey v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 242,256 (1900), reversed on other grounds, 182 U.S. 595 (1901). The Comptroller of the Treasury continued to apply it across the board. See, **e.g.**, 9 **Comp. Dec.** 181 (1902). In any event, the applicability of the 1884 statute soon became moot because Congress reenacted it as part of the **Antideficiency Act** in 1905 (33 Stat. 1257) and again in 1906 (34 Stat. 48).

Prior to the 1982 recodification of Title 31, section 1342 was subsection (b) of the **Antideficiency Act**, while the basic prohibitions of section 1341, previously discussed, constituted subsection (a). The proximity of the two provisions in the Code reflects their relationship, as section 1342 supplements and is **a** logical extension of section 1341. If an agency cannot directly obligate in excess or advance of **its** appropriations, it should not be able to accomplish the same thing indirectly by accepting ostensibly “voluntary” services and then presenting Congress with the bill, in the hope that Congress will recognize a “moral obligation” to pay for the benefits conferred-another example of the so-called “coercive deficiency.” In this connection, the chairman of the House committee responsible for what became the 1906 reenactment of the voluntary services prohibition stated:

“It is a hard matter to deal with. We give to Departments what we think is ample, but they come back with a deficiency. Under the law they **can** [not] make these deficiencies, and Congress can refuse to allow them; but after they are made it is very hard to refuse to allow them. . . .”<sup>41</sup>

In addition, as we have noted previously, the **Antideficiency Act** was intended to keep an agency’s level of operations within the amounts Congress appropriates for that purpose. The unrestricted ability to use voluntary services would permit circumvention of that objective. Thus, without section **1342**, section 1341 could not be **fully** effective.

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<sup>41</sup>39 Cong. Rec. 3687 (1906), quoted in 30 OP. Att’y Gen. 51,53-54 (1913).

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Note that 31 U.S.C. § 1342 contains two distinct although closely related prohibitions: It bans, **first**, the acceptance of any type of voluntary services for the United States, and second, the employment of personal services “exceeding that authorized by **law**.”

b. Appointment Without  
Compensation and Waiver of  
salary

(1) The **rules**—general discussion

One of the evils which the “personal services” prohibition was designed to correct was a practice which was controversial in 1884 but is much less so today. Lower-grade government employees were being asked to “volunteer” their services for overtime periods in excess of the periods allowed by law, thus enabling the agency to economize at the employees’ expense but nevertheless generating claims by the **employees**.<sup>42</sup> Although this practice appears to have receded, the applicability of 31 U.S.C. § 1342 remains relevant in a number of contexts involving **services** by government employees or services which would otherwise have to be performed by government employees.

One of the earliest questions to arise under 31 U.S.C. § 1342—and the issue that seems to have generated the greatest number of cases—was whether a government **officer** or employee, or an individual about to be appointed to a government position, could voluntarily work for nothing or for a reduced salary. Initially, the Comptroller of the Treasury ducked the question on the grounds that it did not involve a payment from the Treasury, and suggested that the question was appropriate to take to the Attorney **General**. 19 **Comp. Dec.** 160, 163 (1912).

The very next year, the Attorney General tackled the question when asked whether a retired Army officer could be employed as superintendent of an Indian school without additional compensation. In what has become the leading case construing 31 U.S.C. § 1342, the Attorney General replied that the appointment would not violate the voluntary services prohibition. 30 **Op. Att’y Gen.** 51 (1913). In reaching this conclusion, the Attorney General drew a distinction which the Comptroller of the Treasury thereafter adopted, and which GAO and the Justice Department continue to follow to this day—the distinction between “voluntary services” and “gratuitous services.”

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<sup>42</sup>15 **Cong. Rec.** 3410–11 (1884), quoted in 30 **Op. Att’y Gen.** 51, 54–55 (1913).

The key passages from the Attorney General's opinion **are** set forth below:

"[I]t seems plain that the words 'voluntary service' were not intended **to** be synonymous with 'gratuitous service' and were not intended to cover services rendered in an **official** capacity under regular appointment to an office otherwise permitted bylaw to be **nonsalaried**. in their ordinary and normal meaning **these words** refer to service intruded by a private person as a 'volunteer' and not **rendered pursuant to any prior** contractor obligation. . . . It would be stretching the language a good deal to extend it so far as to prohibit **official** services without compensation in those instances in which **Congress** has not required even a minimum salary for the office.

The context corroborates the view that the **ordinary** meaning of 'voluntary **services**' was intended. The very next words 'or employ personal service in excess of that authorized by law' deal with contractual services, thus making a balance between 'acceptance' of 'voluntary service' (i.e., the cases where there is no prior contract) and 'employment' of 'personal service' (i.e., the cases where there is such prior contract, though unauthorized bylaw).

....

"Thus it **is** evident that the evil at which Congress was aiming was not appointment or employment for authorized **services** without compensation, but the acceptance of unauthorized services not intended or agreed **to** be gratuitous and therefore likely to **afford a basis** for a future claim upon Congress. . . . **Id.** at 52-53, 55.

The Comptroller of the Treasury agreed with this interpretation:

"[The statute] was intended to guard against **claims** for compensation. A service offered clearly and distinctly as gratuitous with a proper record made of that fact does not violate this statute **against** acceptance of voluntary service. An appointment to serve without compensation which is accepted and properly recorded is not a violation of [31 U.S.C. § 1342], and is valid **if otherwise** lawful." 27 **Comp.** Dec. 131, 132-33 (1920).

Two **main** rules emerge from 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 51 and its progeny. First, if compensation for a position is freed by law, an appointee may not agree to serve without compensation or to waive that compensation in whole or in part (these are two different ways of saying the same thing). **Id.** at 56. This portion of the opinion did not

break any new ground. The courts had already held, based on public policy, that compensation **fixed** by law could not be **waived**.<sup>43</sup> Second, and this is really just a corollary **to** the rule just stated, if the level of compensation is discretionary, or if the relevant statute prescribes only a maximum (but not a minimum), the compensation can be set at zero, and an appointment without compensation or a waiver, entire or **partial**, is **permissible**. Id.; 27 Comp. Dec. at 133.

Both GAO and the Justice Department have had frequent occasion to address these issues, and there are numerous decisions illustrating and applying the **rules**.<sup>44</sup>

In a 1988 opinion, the Justice Department's Office of **Legal** Counsel considered whether the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel could appoint Professor **Laurence** Tribe as Special Counsel under an agreement to serve without compensation. Applying the rules set forth in 30 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 51, the **OLC** concluded that the appointment would not contravene the **Antideficiency** Act since the statute governing the appointment set a maximum salary but no minimum. Independent Counsel's Authority to Accept Voluntary Services – Appointment of Laurence H. Tribe, Op. Off. Legal Counsel, May 19, 1988.

Similarly, the Comptroller General held in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 383 (1979) that members of the United **States** Metric Board could waive their salaries since the relevant statute merely prescribed a maximum rate of pay. In addition, since the Board had statutory authority to accept gifts, a member who chose **to** do so could accept compensation and then return it to the Board as a gift. Both cases make the point that compensation is not "freed by law" for purposes of the "no waiver" rule where the statute merely sets a maximum limit for the salary.

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<sup>43</sup>Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595 (1901); Miller v. United States, 103 F. 413 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900). See also 9 Comp. Dec. 101 (1902). Later cases following Glavey are MacMath v. United States, 248 U.S. 151 (1918), and United States v. Andrews, 240 U.S. 90 (1916). The policy rationale is that to permit agencies to disregard compensation prescribed by statute could work to the disadvantage of those who cannot, or are **not willing to**, accept the position for less than the prescribed **salary**. See Miller, 103 F. at 415-16.

<sup>44</sup>Some cases in addition to those cited in the text are 32 **Comp. Gen.** 236 (1952); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 109, 112 (1943); 14 **Comp. Gen.** 193 (1934); 34 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 490 (1925); 30 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 129 (1913); 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 78 (1979).

A good illustration of the kind of situation 31 U.S.C. § 1342 is designed to prevent is 54 **Comp. Gen.** 393 (1974). Members of the Commission on **Marihuana** and Drug Abuse had, apparently at the chairman's urging, agreed to waive their statutory entitlement to \$100 per day while involved on **Commission** business. The year after the **Commission** ceased to exist, one of the former members changed his mind and **filed** a claim for a portion of the compensation he would have received but for the waiver. Since the \$100 per day had been a statutory entitlement, the purported waiver was invalid and the former commissioner was entitled to be paid. Similar claims by **any** or all of the other former members would also have **to** be allowed. If insufficient funds remained in the **Commission's** now-expired appropriation, a deficiency appropriation would be necessary.

A few earlier cases deal with fact situations similar to that considered in 30 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 51 –the acceptance by someone already on the federal payroll of additional duties without additional compensation. In 23 **Comp. Gen.** 272 (1943), for example, GAO concluded that a retired Army officer could serve, without additional compensation, as a courier for the State Department. The voluntary services prohibition, said the decision, does not preclude “the assignment of persons holding **office** under the Government to the **performance** of additional duties or the duties of another position without additional compensation.” *Id.* at 274. Another World War II decision held that American Red **Cross** Volunteer Nurses' Aides who also happened to be full-time federal employees could perform volunteer nursing services at Veterans Administration hospitals. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 900 (1944).

One thing the various cases discussed above have in common is that they involve the appointment of an individual to an official government position, permanent or temporary. Services rendered prior to appointment are considered purely voluntary and, by virtue of 31 U.S.C. § 1342, cannot be compensated. *Lee v. United States*, 45 Ct. Cl. 57,62 (1910); **B-181934**, October 7, 1974.<sup>45</sup> It also follows that post-retirement services, apart from appointment as a reemployed **annuitant**, are not compensable. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 21 (1985). In that case, an alleged agreement to the contrary by the individual's supervisor was held unauthorized and therefore invalid.

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<sup>45</sup>**B-181934** was overruled by 55 **Comp. Gen.** 109 (1975) because additional information showed that the individual was a “de facto employee” performing under color of appointment and with a claim of right to the position. A “voluntary” employee has no such “color of appointment” or *indicia* of lawful employment.

It has also been held that experts and consultants employed under authority of 5 U.S.C. § 3109 may serve without compensation without violating the **Antideficiency** Act as long as it is clearly understood and agreed that no compensation is to be expected. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 194 (1947); 6 **Op. Off. Legal Counsel** 160 (1982). Cf. **B-185952**, August 18, 1976 (uncompensated participation **in pre-bid** conference, on-site inspection, **and** bid opening by contractor engineer who had prepared **specifications** regarded as “technical violation” of 31 U.S.C. § 1342).

Several of the decisions note the requirement for a written record of the agreement to serve without compensation. Proper documentation is important for **evidentiary** purposes should a claim subsequently be attempted. E.g., 27 **Comp. Gen.** 194, 195 (1947); 26 **Comp. Gen.** 956, 958 (1947); 27 **Comp. Dec.** 131,132-33 (1920); 2 **Op. Off. Legal Counsel** 322,323 (1977).

The rule that compensation freed by statute may not be waived does not apply if the waiver or appointment without compensation is itself authorized by statute. The Comptroller General stated the principle as follows in 27 **Comp. Gen.** 194,195 (1947):

“[E]ven where the compensation for a particular position is freed by or pursuant to law, the occupant of the position may waive his ordinary right to the compensation fixed for the position and thereafter forever be estopped from claiming and receiving the salary previously waived, if there be some applicable provision of law authorizing the acceptance of services without compensation.” (Emphasis in original.)

In **B-139261**, June 26, 1959, GAO reiterated the above principle, and gave several examples of statutes **sufficient** for this purpose. Another example may be found in 2 **Op. Off. Legal Counsel** 322 (1977).

At this point a 1978 case, 57 **Comp. Gen.** 423, must be noted although its effect is not entirely clear. The decision held that a statute authorizing the Agency for International Development to accept gifts of “services of any kind” did not meet the test of 27 **Comp. Gen.** 194, and therefore did not permit waiver of salary by employees whose compensation is **fixed** by statute. While 57 **Comp. Gen.** 423 did not purport to overrule or **modify** any prior cases, it seems to say that statutory authority to accept gifts of personal service is no longer adequate to permit waiver of compensation freed by statute. However, in **B-139261**, June 26, 1959, not cited in 57 **Comp. Gen.** 423, one of the examples given of statutes that would authorize waiver of compensation fixed by law was a gift statute very similar to the AID

statute involved in 57 **Comp. Gen.** 423. If 57 **Comp. Gen.** 423 is in fact a modification of the prior case law, then an agency would need explicit authority to employ persons without compensation. For an example of such authority, see 32 **Comp. Gen.** 236 (1952).

The rules for waiver of salary or appointment without compensation may be summarized as follows:

- If compensation is not **fixed** by statute, i.e., if it is **fixed administratively** or if the statute merely prescribes a maximum but no minimum, it maybe waived as long as the waiver **qualifies** as “gratuitous.” There should be an advance written agreement waiving all claims.
- If compensation is freed by statute, it may not be waived, the voluntary vs. gratuitous distinction notwithstanding, without **specific** statutory **authority**. Unfortunately, the decisions are not consistent as to what form this authority must take, and the extent to which authority to accept donations of services (as opposed to explicit authority **to** employ persons without compensation) will suffice is not entirely clear.
- If the employing agency has statutory authority to accept **gifts**, the employee can accept the compensation and return it to the agency as a gift. Even if the agency has no such authority, the employee can still accept the compensation and donate it to the United States Treasury.

## (2) Student interns

In 26 **Comp. Gen.** 956 (1947), the (then) Civil **Service** Commission asked whether an agency could accept the uncompensated **services** of college students as part of a college’s internship program. The students “would be assigned to productive work, i.e., to the regular work of the agency in a position which would ordinarily fall in the competitive civil service.” The answer was no. Since the students would be used in positions the compensation for which was freed by law, **and** since compensation freed by law cannot be waived, the proposal **would** require legislative authority.

**Thirty** years later, the Justice Department’s **Office** of Legal Counsel considered another internship program and provided similar advice. Without statutory authority, uncompensated student **services** that furthered the agency’s mission, i.e., “productive work,” could not be accepted. 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1978).



In view of the long-standing rule, supported as we have seen by decisions of the Supreme Court, prohibiting the waiver of compensation for positions required by law to be salaried, GAO and Justice had **little** choice but to respond as they did. Clearly, however, this was not a very useful answer. It meant that uncompensated student interns could **be** used only for essentially “make-work” tasks, a result of benefit **to** neither the students nor the agencies.

The solution, apparent from both cases, was legislative authority, which Congress provided later in 1978 by the enactment of 5 U.S.C. § 3111. The statute authorizes agencies, subject to regulations of the Office of Personnel Management, to accept the uncompensated services of high **school** and college students, “[notwithstanding section 1342 **of** Title 31,” if the **services** are part of an agency program designed to provide educational experience for the student and will not be used to displace any employee.

In a **1981** decision, GAO held that 5 U.S.C. § 3111 does not authorize the payment of travel or subsistence expenses for the students. **60 Comp. Gen.** 456 (1981).

A paper entitled A Part-Time Clerkship Program in Federal Courts for Law Students **by** the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein and **William B. Bonvillian**, written in 1975 and printed at 68 **F.R.D.** 265, considered the use of **law** students as part-time law clerks, without pay, to mostly supplement the work **of** the regular law clerks **in** furtherance of the **official** duties of the **courts**. Based on the statute’s legislative history and 30 Op. **Att’y Gen.** 51, previously discussed, Judge Weinstein concluded that the program did not violate the **Antideficiency** Act. Although this aspect of the issue is not explicitly discussed in the paper, it appears that the compensation of regular law clerks is **fixed** administratively. See 28 U.S.C. § **604(a)(5)**. In any event, the Administrative Office of the United States **Courts** was given authority in 1978 to “accept and utilize voluntary and uncompensated (gratuitous) services.” 28 U.S.C. § **604(a)** (17).

### (3) Program beneficiaries

Programs are enacted from time to time to provide job training assistance to various classes of individuals. The training is intended to enable participants to enter the labor market at a higher level of skill and thereby avoid the need for public assistance. Also, in more recent

years, the concept of “**workfare**” (work as a requirement for the receipt of public assistance) has begun to evolve. Questions have arisen under programs of this nature as to the authority of federal agencies to serve as employers.

A 1944 case, 24 **Comp. Gen.** 314, considered a vocational rehabilitation program for disabled war veterans. GAO concluded that 31 U.S.C. § 1342 did not preclude federal agencies from providing on-the-job training, without payment of salary, to program participants. The decision is further discussed in 26 **Comp. Gen.** 956, 959 (1947).

In 51 **Comp. Gen.** 152 (1971), GAO concluded that 31 U.S.C. § 1342 precluded federal agencies from accepting work by persons hired by local government-s for **public** service employment under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. Four years **later**, GAO modified the 1971 decision, holding that a federal agency could provide work without payment of compensation to (i.e., accept the free services **of**) trainees sponsored and paid by nonfederal organizations from federal grant funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973.<sup>54</sup> **Comp. Gen.** 560 (1975). The decision stated:

“[Considering that the services in question will arise out of a program initiated by the Federal Government, it would be anomalous to conclude that such **services** are proscribed as being voluntary within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § [1342]. That is to say, it is our opinion that the utilization of enrollees or trainees by a Federal agency under the circumstances here involved need not be considered the acceptance of ‘**voluntary** services’ within the meaning of that phrase as used in 31 U.S.C. § [1342 ].” Id. at 561.

Several issues under a **workfare** program (Community Work Experience Program) are discussed in **B-211079.2**, January 2, 1987. The relevant program legislation expressly authorizes program participants to perform work for federal agencies “notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31 .” 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(4)(A). The decision seems to say that the statutory authority was **necessary** not because of the **Antideficiency** Act but to avoid an impermissible augmentation of appropriations. It is in any event consistent in result with 24 **Comp. Gen.** 314 and 54 **Comp. Gen.** 560. The relationship between voluntary service and the augmentation concept is **explored** later in this chapter in our discussion of augmentation of appropriations.

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(4) Applicability to legislative and judicial branches

The applicability of 31 U.S.C. § 1342 to the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government does not appear to have been seriously questioned.

The salary of a Member of Congress is **fixed** by statute and therefore cannot be waived without specific **statutory** authority. **B-159835**, April 22, 1975; **B-123424**, March 7, 1975; **B-123424**, April 15, 1955; **A-8427**, March 19, 1925; **B-206396.2**, November 15, 1988 (non-decision letter). However, as each of these cases points out, nothing prevents a Senator or Representative from accepting the salary and then, as several have done, donate part or all of it back to the United States Treasury.

In 1977, GAO was asked by a congressional committee chairman whether section 1342 applies to Members of Congress who use volunteers to perform official office functions. GAO responded **first** that section 1342 seems clearly to apply to the legislative branch. GAO then **summarized** the rules for appointment without compensation and advised that, to the extent that a particular employee's **salary** could be freed administratively by the Member in any amount he or she chooses to set, that employee's salary can be **fixed** at zero. (This once again was essentially an application of the rules set down decades earlier in 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 51 and 27 Comp. Dec. 131.) **B-69907**, February 11, 1977.

The salary of a federal judge is also "**fixed**" by law—even more so because of the constitutional prohibition against diminishing the compensation of a federal judge while in office. A case applying the standard "no waiver" rules to a federal judge is **B-157469**, July 24, 1974.

c. Other Voluntary **Services**

Before entering the mainstream of the modern case law, two very early decisions should be noted. In 12 Comp. Dec. 244 (1905), the Comptroller of the Treasury held that an offer by a meat-packing firm to pay the salaries of Department of **Agriculture** employees to conduct

a **pre-export** pork inspection could not be accepted because of the voluntary services **prohibition**.<sup>46</sup> Similar cases have since come up, but they have been decided under the augmentation theory without reference to 31 U.S.C. s 1342. See 59 **Comp. Gen.** 294 (1980) and 2 **Comp. Gen.** 775 (1923), discussed later in Section E of this chapter. To restate, apart from the 1905 decision, which has not been **followed** since, the voluntary services prohibition has not been applied to donations of money.

In another 1905 decision, a vendor asked permission to install an appliance on Navy property for trial purposes at no expense to the government. Presumably, if the Navy liked the appliance, it would then buy it. The Comptroller pointed out an easily overlooked phrase in the voluntary service prohibition—the **services** that are prohibited are voluntary services “for the United States.” Here, **temporary** installation by the vendor for trial purposes amounted to service for his own benefit and on his own behalf, “as an incident to or necessary concomitant of a proper exhibition of his appliance for sale.” Therefore, the Navy could grant **permission** without violating the **Antideficiency** Act as long as the vendor agreed **to** remove the appliance at his own expense if the Navy chose not to buy it. 11 **Comp. Dec.** 622 (1905). This case, although it has not been cited since, would appear to be still valid.

For the most part, the cases have been resolved by applying the “voluntary vs. gratuitous” distinction **first** enunciated by the Attorney General in 30 Op. **Att’y Gen.** 51, discussed above. The underlying philosophy is perhaps best conveyed in the following statement by the Justice Department’s Office of **Legal** Counsel:

“Although the interpretation of § [1342] has not been entirely consistent over the years, the weight of authority **does** support the view that the section was intended to eliminate subsequent claims against the United **States** for compensation of the ‘volunteer,’ rather than **to** deprive the government of the benefit of **truly** gratuitous **services**.” 6 Op. Off. **Legal Counsel** 160, 162 (1982).

In an early formulation that has often been quoted since, the Comptroller General noted that:

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<sup>46</sup>It would also contravene 18 U.S.C. § 209, which prohibits **payment of salaries** of **government** employees from **nongovernment** sources. This statute did not exist at the time of the 1905 decision.

“The **voluntary** service referred to in [31 U.S.C. § 1342] is not **necessarily** synonymous with gratuitous service, but contemplates service furnished on the initiative of the party rendering the same without request from, or agreement with, the United States **therefor**. Services **furnished** pursuant to a **formal contract are not** voluntary within the **meaning** of said section.” 7 **Comp. Gen. 810, 811** (1928).

In 7 **Comp. Gen. 810**, a contractor had agreed **to** prepare stenographic transcripts of Federal Trade **Commission** public proceedings and to furnish copies to the **FTC** without cost, **in** exchange for the exclusive right to report the proceedings and **to** sell transcripts to the public. **The** decision noted that consideration under a contract does not have to be monetary consideration, and **held** that the contract in question **was** supported by sufficient legal consideration. While the case is thus arguably not a true “voluntary services” case, it has often been cited since, not so much for the actual holding but for the above-quoted statement of the rule.

For example, in **B-13378**, November 20, 1940, the Comptroller General held that the Secretary of Commerce could accept gratuitous services from a private agency, created by various social science associations, which had offered to assist in the preparation of official monographs analyzing census data. The **services** were to be rendered under a cooperative agreement which **specified** that they would be free of cost to the government. The Commerce Department agreed to furnish space and equipment, but the monographs would not otherwise have been prepared.

Applying the same approach, **GAO** found no violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1342 for the Commerce Department to accept services by the Business Advisory Council, agreed in advance to be gratuitous. **B-125406**, November 4, 1955. Likewise, the Commission on Federal Paperwork could accept free services from the private sector as long as they were agreed in advance to be gratuitous. **B-182087-O. M.**, November 26, 1975.

In a 1982 decision, the American Association of Retired Persons wanted to volunteer services to assist in crime prevention activities (distribute literature, give lectures, etc.) on Army installations. **GAO** found no **Antideficiency** Act problem as long as the services were agreed in advance, and so documented, as gratuitous. **B-204326**, July 26, 1982.

In **B-177836**, April 24, 1973, the Army had entered into a contract with a landowner under which it acquired the right to remove trees and other shrubs from portions of the landowner's **property** incident to an easement. A subsequent purchaser of the property complained that some tree stumps had not been removed, and the Army proceeded to contract to have the work done. The landowner then submitted a claim for certain costs he had incurred incident to some preliminary work he had done prior to the Army's contract. Since the landowner's actions had been purely voluntary and had been taken without the knowledge or consent of the government, 31 U.S.C. § 1342 prohibited payment.

In 7 **Comp. Gen.** 167 (1927), a customs official had stored, in his own private boathouse, a boat which had been seized for smuggling whiskey. The customs **official** later **filed** a claim for storage charges. Noting that "the United States did not expressly or **impliedly** request the use of the premises and therefore did not by implication promise to pay **therefor**," GAO concluded that the storage had been purely a voluntary service, payment for which would violate 31 U.S.C. § 1342.

**As** if to prove the proverb that there is nothing new under the sun (**Ecclesiastes 1:9**), GAO considered another storage case over 50 years later, **B-194294**, July 12, 1979. There, an Agriculture Department employee had **an** accident while driving a government-owned vehicle assigned to him for his work. A Department official ordered the damaged vehicle towed to the employee's driveway, to be held there until it could be sold. Since the government did have a role in the employee's assumption of responsibility for the wreck, GAO found no violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1342 and allowed the employee's claim for reasonable storage charges on a quantum **meruit** basis.

Section 1342 covers any type of service which has the effect of creating a legal or moral obligation to pay the person rendering the service. Naturally, this includes government contractors. The prohibition includes arrangements in which government contracting **officers** solicit permit-tacitly or otherwise-a contractor to continue performance on a "temporarily unfunded" basis while the agency, which has exhausted its appropriations and can't pay the contractor immediately, seeks additional appropriations. This was one of the options considered in 55 **Comp. Gen.** 768 (1976), discussed previously in connection with 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a). The Army proposed a contract modification which would explicitly recognize the

government's obligation to pay for any work performed under the contract, possibly including reasonable interest, subject to subsequent availability of funds. The government would use **its** best efforts to obtain a deficiency appropriation, **Certificates** to this effect would be issued to the contractor, including a statement that any additional work performed would be done at the contractor's own risk. In return, the contractor would be asked to defer any action for breach of contract.

GAO found this proposal "of dubious validity at best." Although the **certificate** given to the contractor would say that continued **performance** was at the contractor's own risk, it was clear that both parties expected the contract to continue. The government expected to accept the benefits of the contractor's performance and the contractor expected to be paid—eventually—for it. This is certainly not an example of a clear written understanding that work for the government is to be performed gratuitously. Also, the proposal to pay interest was improper as it would compound the **Antideficiency Act** violation. Although 55 **Comp. Gen.** 768 does not **specifically** discuss 31 U.S.C. §1342, the relationship should be apparent.

d. Exceptions

**Two** kinds of exceptions to 31 U.S.C. § 1342 have already been discussed—where acceptance of services without compensation is specifically authorized bylaw, and where the government and the volunteer have a written agreement that the services are to be rendered gratuitously with no expectation of future payment.

There is a third exception, written into the statute itself: "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of **property**." As can be seen from the cases discussed, with very few exceptions, **GAO** has not been called upon to construe the scope of the safety of human life or protection of property exceptions in recent decades. However, the Attorney General in 1981 considered the exceptions in the context of funding gaps, and articulated a somewhat broader standard than that applied in the early **GAO** decisions. The opinion, published at 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (1981), and a 1990 amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 1342 designed to retrench somewhat from that broader view, are discussed in more detail later under the Funding Gaps heading.

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(1) Safety of human life

The services provided to protect human life must have been rendered in a true emergency situation. What constitutes an emergency is discussed in several decisions.

In 12 **Comp.** Dec. 155 (1905), a municipal health **officer** disinfected **several** government buildings to prevent the further spread of diphtheria. Several cases of diphtheria had already occurred at the government compound, including four deaths. The Comptroller of the **Treasury** found that the services had been rendered in an emergency involving the loss of human life, and held accordingly that the doctor could be reimbursed for the cost of materials used and the fair value of his services.

In another case, the **S.S. Rexmore**, a British vessel, deviated from **its** course to London to answer a **call** for help from an Army transport ship carrying over 1,000 troops. The ship had sprung a leak and appeared to be in danger of sinking. The Comptroller General **allowed** a claim for the vessel's actual operating costs plus lost profits attributable to the services performed. The **Rexmore** had rendered a tangible service to save the lives of the people aboard the Army transport, as well **as** the transport vessel itself. 2 **Comp. Gen.** 799 (1923).

On the other hand, GAO denied payment to a man who **was** boating in the Florida Keys and saw a Navy seaplane make a forced landing. He offered to tow the aircraft over two miles to the nearest island, and did so. His claim for expenses **was** denied. The aircraft had landed intact and the pilot was in no immediate danger. Rendering service to overcome mere inconvenience or even a potential future emergency is not enough to overcome the statutory prohibition. 10 **Comp. Gen.** 248 (1930).

(2) Protection of property

The main thing to remember here is that the property must be either government-owned property or property for which the government has some responsibility. The standard was established by the Comptroller of the Treasury in 9 **Comp.** Dec. 182, 185 (1902) as follows:



"I think **it is** clear that the statute does not **contemplate** property in which the Government has no **immediate** interest or concern; but I do not think it was intended to apply exclusively to property owned by the Government. The **term** 'property' is used in the statute without any **qualifying** words, but it **is** used in connection with the rendition of services for the Government. The implication is, therefore, **clear** that the property in contemplation is property in which the Government has an immediate interest or in connection with which it has some duty **to** perform."

In the cited decision, an individual had gathered up **mail** scattered in a train wreck **and** delivered it to a nearby town. The government did not "own" the mail but had a responsibility to deliver it. Therefore, the services came within the statutory exception and the individual **could** be paid for the value of his services.

Applying the approach of 9 **Comp. Dec.** 182, the Comptroller General held in **B-152554**, February 24, 1975, that section 1342 did not permit the Agency for International Development to make expenditures in excess of available funds for disaster relief in foreign countries.

A case clearly within the exception is 3 **Comp. Gen.** 979 (1924), allowing reimbursement **to** a municipality which had rendered **firefighting** assistance to prevent the destruction of federal property where the federal property was not within the territory for which the municipal **fire** department was responsible.

An exception was also recognized in 53 **Comp. Gen.** 71 (1973), where **a** government employee **brought** in food for other government employees in circumstances which would **justify** a determination that the expenditure was incidental to the protection of government property in an extreme emergency.

e. **Voluntary** Creditors

A related line of decisions are the so-called "voluntary creditor" cases. A voluntary creditor is an individual, government or **nongovernment**, who pays what he or she perceives **to** be a government obligation from personal funds. The rule is that the voluntary creditor cannot be reimbursed, although there are **significant** exceptions. For the most part, the decisions have not related the voluntary creditor prohibition to the **Antideficiency** Act, with the exception of one very early **case** (17 **Comp. Dec.** 353 (1910)) and two more recent ones (53 **Comp. Gen.** 71 (1973) and 42 **Comp. Gen.** 149 (1962)). The voluntary creditor cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 12.

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## 4. Apportionment of Appropriations

### a. Statutory Requirement for Apportionment

As a general proposition, an agency does not have the full amount of its appropriations available to it at the beginning of the **fiscal** year. This is because of what, prior to the 1982 **recodification** of Title 31, was subsection (c) of the **Antideficiency Act** and is now 31 U.S.C. §1512. Subsection (a) of section 1512 establishes the basic requirement:

“(a) Except as provided in this subchapter, an appropriation available for obligation for a **definite** period shall be apportioned to prevent obligation or expenditure at a rate that would indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation for the period. An appropriation for an **indefinite** period and authority to make obligations by contract before appropriations shall be apportioned to achieve the most effective and economical use. An apportionment maybe reapportioned under this section.”

Although apportionment was **first** required legislatively in 1905 (33 Stat. 1257), the current form of the statute derives from a revision enacted in 1950 as section 1211 of the General Appropriation Act, 1951. The 1950 revision was part of an overall effort by Congress to **amplify** and enforce the basic restrictions against incurring deficiencies in 31 U.S.C. §1341.

Section **1512(a)** requires that all appropriations be administratively apportioned so as to ensure their obligation and expenditure at a controlled rate which will prevent deficiencies from arising before the end of a **fiscal** year. Although section 1512 does not tell you who is to make the apportionment, section 1513, discussed later, specifies the President as the apportioning official for most executive branch agencies. The function was delegated to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1933,<sup>47</sup> and now reposes in the successor to that **office**, the Director, Office of Management and Budget (**OMB**).

The term “apportionment” may be defined **as—**

“A distribution made by the Office of Management and Budget of amounts available for obligation. . . in an appropriation or fund account. Apportionments divide amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (**usually** quarters), activities,

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<sup>47</sup>Executive Order No. 6166, § 16 (June 10, 1933).

projects, objects, or a combination thereof. The amounts so apportioned limit the amount of obligations that maybe **incurred**.<sup>48</sup>

Apportionment is required not only to prevent the need for deficiency or supplemental appropriations, but also to insure that there is no drastic curtailment of the activity for which the appropriation is made. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1957). See also 38 **Comp. Gen.** 501 (1959). In other words, the apportionment requirement is designed to prevent an agency from spending its entire appropriation before the end of the **fiscal** year and then putting the Congress in a position in which it must either grant an additional appropriation or allow the entire activity to come to a halt.

In 36 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1957), the Director of **OMB** reapportioned Post Office funds in such a way that the fourth quarter funds were substantially less than those for the third quarter. The Comptroller General stated:

‘A drastic curtailment toward the close of a **fiscal** year of operations carried on under a final year appropriation is a prima facie indication of a failure to so apportion an appropriation ‘as to prevent obligation or expenditure thereof in a manner which would indicate a necessity for deficiency or supplemental appropriations for such period.’ In our view, this is the very situation the amendment of the law in 1950 was intended to remedy.” 36 **Comp. Gen.** at 703.

Therefore, the very fact that a deficiency or supplemental appropriation is necessary or that services in the last quarter must be drastically cut suggests that the apportioning authority has violated 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a).

A more recent **case** involved the Department of Agriculture’s Food Stamp Program. The program was subject to certain spending ceilings which, it seemed certain, the Department was going to exceed if it continued its present rate of expenditures. The Department feared that, if it was bound by a formula in a different section of its authorizing act to pay the mandated amount to each eligible recipient, it would have to stop the whole program when the funds were exhausted. Based on both the **Antideficiency** Act and the program legislation, GAO concluded that there had to be an immediate pro rata reduction for all participants. Discontinuance of the program when

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<sup>48</sup>GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, PAD-81-27, at 34 (1981). See also **OMB** Circular No. A-34, ¶ 21.1; B-167034, September 1, 1976.

the funds ran out would violate the purpose of the apportionment requirement. **A-51604**, March 28, 1979.

This is not to say that every sub-activity or project must be carried out for the full fiscal year, on a reduced basis, if necessary. Section **1512(a)** applies to amounts made available in an appropriation or fund. Where, for example, the Veterans Administration nursing home program was funded from moneys made available in a general, lump-sum VA medical care appropriation, the agency was free to **discontinue** the nursing home program and reprogram the balance of its funds to other programs **also** funded under that heading. **B-167656**, June 18, 1971. (It would be different if the nursing home program had received a line-item appropriation.)

The requirement to apportion applies not only to “one year” appropriations and other appropriations limited to a **fixed** period of time, but also to “no-year” money and even to contract authority (authority to contract in advance of appropriations). 31 U.S.C. §§ **1511(a)**, **1512(a)**. In the case of indefinite appropriations and contract authority, the requirement states only that the apportionment is to be made in such a way as “to achieve the most effective and economical use” of the budget authority. **Id.** § **1512(a)**.

Prior to the 1982 recodification of Title 31, the apportionment requirement applied explicitly to government corporations which are instrumentalities of the United States.<sup>49</sup> While the applicability of the requirement has not changed, the recodification dropped the explicit language, viewing it as covered by the broad definition of “executive agency” in 31 U.S.C. §102.50 The authority of some government corporations to determine the necessity of their expenditures **and** the manner in which they shall be incurred is not sufficient to exempt a corporation from the apportionment requirement. 43 **Comp. Gen.** 759 (1964).

b. Establishing Reserves

Section **1512(c)** of 31 U.S.C. provides as follows:

“(c)(1) In apportioning or reapportioning an appropriation, a reserve may be established **only**—

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<sup>49</sup>31 U.S.C. § 665(d)(2) (1976 ed.).

<sup>50</sup>See codification note following 31 U.S.C. 51511.

that a reasonable reserve for contingencies was properly within the agency's discretion.

**c. Method of Apportionment**

The remaining portions of 31 U.S.C. § 1512 are subsections (b) and (d), set forth below:

“(b)(1) An appropriation subject to apportionment is apportioned by—

“(A) months, calendar quarters, operating seasons, or other time periods;

“(B) activities, functions, projects, or objects; or

“(C) a combination of the ways referred to in clauses (A) and (B) of this paragraph.”

“(d) An apportionment or reapportionment shall be reviewed at least 4 times a year by the official designated in section 1513 of this title to make apportionments.”

These two provisions are largely technical, implementing the basic apportionment requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a).

Section 1512(b) makes it clear that apportionments need not be made strictly on a monthly, quarterly, or other **fixed** time basis, nor must they be for equal amounts in each time period. The apportioning officer is free to take into account the “activities, functions, projects, or objects” of the program being funded and the usual pattern of spending for such programs in deciding how to apportion the funds. Absent some statutory provision to the contrary, **OMB’s** determination is controlling. Thus, for example, in Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 854 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1988), the court **upheld OMB’s** quarterly apportionment of social services block grant funds, rejecting the state’s contention that it should receive its entire annual allotment at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Section 1512(d) requires a minimum of four reviews each year to enable the apportioning officer to make reapportionments or other **adjustments** as necessary.

**d. Control of Apportionments**

The former subsection (d) of the **Antideficiency** Act, now 31 U.S.C. § 1513, deals with the mechanisms for making the apportionments or

economic, fiscal, or policy considerations which are extraneous to the individual appropriation or are in derogation of the appropriation's purpose. **B-125187**, September 11, 1973; **B-130515**, July 10, 1973. See also State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), which held that the right to reserve funds in order to "effect savings" or due to "subsequent events," etc., must be considered in the context of the applicable appropriation statute. *Id.* at 1118. If the apportioning authority goes beyond the authority delegated, section 1512(c) is violated.

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 amended section 1512(c) by eliminating the "other developments" clause and by prohibiting the establishment of appropriation reserves except as provided under the **Antideficiency** Act for contingencies or savings, or as provided in other specific statutory authority. The intent was to preclude reliance on section 1512(c) as authority for "policy impoundments." City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900,906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 453 (1974); **B-148898**, August 28, 1974.

Examples of permissible reserves were discussed in 51 **Comp. Gen.** 598 (1972) and 51 **Comp. Gen.** 251 (1971). The first case concerned the provisions of a long-term charter of several tankers for the Navy. The contract contained options to renew the charter for periods of 15 years. In the event that the Navy declined to renew the charter short of a full 15-year period, the vessels were to be sold by a Board of Trustees, acting for the owners and bondholders. Any shortfall in the proceeds over the termination value was to be unconditionally guaranteed by the Navy. GAO held that it would not violate the **Antideficiency** Act to cover this contingent liability by setting up a reserve. 51 **Comp. Gen.** 598 (1972). In 51 **Comp. Gen.** 251 (1971), GAO said that it was permissible to provide in regulations for a clause to be inserted in future contracts for payment of interest on delayed payments of a contractor's claim. Reserving sufficient funds from the appropriation used to support the contract to cover these potential interest costs would protect against potential **Antideficiency** Act violations.

In 1981, the Community Services Administration established a reserve as a cushion against **Antideficiency** Act violations while the agency was terminating its operations. Grantees argued that the reserve improperly reduced amounts available for discretionary grants. In Rogers v. United States, 14 CL Ct. 39, 46-47 (1987), the court held

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"[T]he apportionment power may not lawfully be used as a form of executive control or influence over agency functions. Rather, it may only be exercised by **OMB** in the manner and for the purposes prescribed in 31 U.S.C. § 1512]—i.e., to prevent obligation or expenditure in a manner which would give rise to a need for deficiency or supplemental appropriations, to achieve the most effective and economical use of **appropriations** and to establish reserves either to provide for contingencies or to effect savings which are in **furtherance** of or at least consistent with, the purposes of an appropriation.

"As thus limited, the apportionment process serves a necessary purpose—the promotion of economy and efficiency in the use of **appropriations**. . . .

....

"[S]ince a useful purpose is served by **OMB's** proper exercise of the apportionment power, we do not believe that the potential for abuse of the power **is sufficient** to justify removing it from **OMB**."

Thus, the appropriations of independent regulatory agencies like SEC are subject to apportionment by **OMB**, but **OMB** may not lawfully use its apportionment power to compromise the independence of those agencies. To use the example given in **B-163628**, if **OMB** tried to use apportionment to prevent the SEC from hiring personnel authorized by Congress, that would be an abuse of its apportionment powers. But this possibility does not justify denying **OMB's** basic apportionment authority altogether.

The Impoundment Control Act may permit **OMB**, in effect, to delay the apportionment deadlines prescribed in 31 U.S.C. § 1513(b). For example, when the President sends a rescission message to Congress, the budget **authority** proposed to be rescinded may be withheld for up to 45 days pending congressional action on a rescission bill. 2 U.S.C. §§ 682(3), 683(b). In **B-115398.33**, August 12, 1976, GAO responded to a congressional request to review a situation in which an apportionment had been withheld for more than 30 days after enactment of the appropriation act. The President had planned to submit a rescission message for some of the funds but was late in drafting and transmitting his message. If the full amount contained in the rescission message could be withheld for the entire **45-day** period, and Congress ultimately disallowed the full rescission, release of the funds for obligation would occur only a few days before the budget authority expired. The Comptroller General suggested that, where Congress has completed action on a rescission bill rescinding **only** a part of the amount proposed, **OMB** should immediately apportion the

reapportionments of appropriations which are required by section 1512.

Section **1513(a)** applies to appropriations of the legislative and **judicial** branches of the federal government, as well as appropriations of the International Trade Commission and the District of Columbia **government**.<sup>51</sup> The authority to apportion is given to the “**official** having administrative control” of the appropriation. Apportionment must be made no later than 30 days before the start of the **fiscal** year for which the appropriation is made, or within 30 days after the enactment of the appropriation, whichever is later. The apportionment must be in writing.

Section **1513(b)** deals with apportionments for the executive branch. The President is designated as the apportioning authority. As we have seen, the function has been delegated to the Director, **OMB**. Time limits are established, first for submission of information by the various agency heads to **OMB** to enable it to make reasonable apportionments. Although primary responsibility for a violation of section 1512 lies with the Director of **OMB**, the head of the agency concerned may also be found responsible if he or she fails to send the Director accurate information on which to base an apportionment. **Secondly**, the Director of **OMB** has up to 20 days before the start of the **fiscal** year or 30 days after enactment of the appropriation act, whichever is later, to make the actual apportionment and notify the agency of the action taken. Again, the apportionments must be in writing.

In **B-163628**, January 4, 1974, GAO responded to a question from the chairman of a congressional committee about the power of **OMB** to apportion the funds of independent **regulatory** agencies, such as **the** Securities and Exchange Commission. The Comptroller General agreed with the chairman that independent agencies should generally be free from executive control or interference. The response then stated:

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<sup>51</sup> A permanent provision of law included in the 1988 District of Columbia appropriation act states that appropriations for the D.C. government “shall not be subject to apportionment except to the extent specifically provided by statute.” Pub. L. No. 100-202, §135, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-102 (1987). Thus, the applicability of 31 U.S.C. §1513(a) to the D.C. government will be extremely limited.



submit immediately a detailed report of the facts to Congress. The report **shall be** referred to in submitting a proposed deficiency or supplemental appropriation.”

Section 1515 provides certain exceptions to the requirement of section 1512(a) that apportionments be made in such manner as to assure that the funds will **last** throughout the **fiscal** year and there will be no necessity for a deficiency appropriation. Under subsection 1515(a), deficiency apportionments are **permissible** if necessary to pay salary increases granted pursuant to law to federal civilian and military personnel. Under subsection 1515(b), apportionments can be made in an unbalanced manner (e.g., an entire appropriation could be obligated by the end of the second quarter) if the apportioning officer determines that (1) a law enacted subsequent to the transmission of budget estimates for the appropriation requires expenditures beyond administrative control, or (2) there is an emergency involving safety of human life, protection of property, or immediate welfare of individuals in cases where an appropriation for mandatory payments to those individuals is insufficient.

Prior to 1957, what is now subsection 1515(b) prohibited only the making of **an** apportionment indicating the need for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation, so the only person who could violate this subsection was the Director of **OMB**. An amendment in 1957 made it equally a violation for an agency to request such art apportionment. See 38 **Comp. Gen.** 501 (1959).

The exception for expenditures “beyond **administrative** control” required by a statute enacted after submission of the budget estimate may be illustrated by **statutory** increases in compensation, although many of the cases would now be covered by subsection (a). We noted several of the cases in our consideration of when an obligation or expenditure is “authorized by law” for purposes of 31 **U.S.C.** 51341. Those cases established the rule that a mandatory increase is regarded as “authorized by law” so as **to** permit **overobligation**, whereas a discretionary increase is not. The same rule applies in determining when an expenditure is “beyond administrative control” for purposes of 31 **U.S.C.** § 1515(b). Thus, statutory pay increases for Wage Board employees granted pursuant to a wage survey meet the test. 39 **Comp.**

amounts not included in the rescission bill without awaiting the expiration of the **45-day** period. See also **B-115398.33**, March 5, 1976.

e. Apportionments Requiring  
Deficiency Estimate

In our discussion of the basic requirement for apportionment, we quoted 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a) to the effect that appropriations must be apportioned “to prevent obligation or expenditure at a rate that would indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation.” Thus, GAO has held that the **Antideficiency** Act requires that freed-term appropriations be obligated and expended in such away as to avoid situations in which Congress must either make a deficiency or supplemental appropriation or face exhaustion of the appropriation and the consequent drastic curtailment of the activity the appropriation was intended to fund. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 728, 735 (1985); 36 **Comp. Gen.** 699,703 (1957). ‘

The requirement that appropriations be apportioned so as to avoid the need for deficiency or supplemental appropriations is fleshed out in 31 U.S.C. § 1515 (formerly subsection (e) of the **Antideficiency** Act):

“(a) An appropriation required to be apportioned under section 1512 of this title may be apportioned on a basis that indicates the need for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation to the extent necessary to permit payment of such pay increases as may be granted pursuant to law to civilian officers and employees (including prevailing rate employees whose pay is freed and **adjusted** under subchapter IV of chapter 53 of title 5) and to retired **and** active **military** personnel.

“(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, an official may make, and the head of an executive agency may request, an apportionment under section 1512 of this title that would indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation only when the **official** or agency head decides that the action is required because of—

“(A) a law enacted after submission to Congress of the estimates for an appropriation that requires an expenditure beyond **administrative** control; or

“(B) an emergency involving the safety of human life, the protection of property, or the immediate welfare of individuals when an appropriation that would allow the United States Government to pay, or contribute to, amounts required to be paid to individuals in **specific** amounts **fixed** by law or under formulas prescribed by law, is **insufficient**.

“(2) If an **official** making an apportionment decides that an apportionment **would** indicate a necessity for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation, the official shall

medical and hospital **supplies.**" It had been suggested that 41 U.S.C. § 11 was unnecessary in light of 31 U.S.C. § 1515(b). The question was whether, if 41 U.S.C. § 11 were repealed, the military departments would have essentially the same authority under section 1515(b).

The Defense Department expressed the view that section 1515(b) would not be an adequate substitute for the 41 U.S.C. § 11 exception which allows the incurring of obligations for limited purposes even though the applicable appropriation is **insufficient** to cover the expenses at the time the commitment is made. Defense commented as follows:

"The authority to apportion funds on a deficiency basis in [31 U.S.C. § 1515(b)] does not, as alleged, provide authority to incur a deficiency. It **merely authorizes obligating** funds at a deficiency rate under certain **circumstances**, e.g., a \$2,000,000 appropriation can be obligated in its entirety at the end of the third quarter, but it does not provide authority to obligate one dollar more than \$2,000,000." Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, House **Armed Services Committee**, April 2, 1976 (quoted in **B-167034**, September 1, 1976).

The Comptroller General agreed with the Deputy Secretary, stating:

"[Section 1515(b)] in no way authorizes an agency of the Government **actually to** incur obligations in excess of the total amount of money appropriated for a period. It only provides an exception to the general apportionment rule set out in [31 U.S.C. § 1512(a)] that an appropriation be allocated so as to insure that it is not exhausted prematurely. [Section 1515(b)] says nothing about increasing the total amount of the appropriation itself or authorizing the incurring of obligations in excess of the **total** amount appropriated. On the contrary, **as noted above, apportionment** only involves the subdivision of appropriations already enacted by **Congress**. It **necessarily** follows that the sum of the **parts**, as apportioned, could not exceed the **total** amount of the appropriations being apportioned.

"Any deficiency that an agency incurs where obligations exceed total amounts appropriated, including a deficiency that arises in a situation where it was determined that one of the exceptions set forth in [section 1515(b)] was applicable, would constitute a violation of 31 U.S.C. § [1341(a)] . . . ." **B-167034**, September 1, 1976.

f. Exemptions From  
Apportionment Requirement

A number of exemptions from the apportionment requirement, formerly found in subsection (f) of the **Antideficiency** Act, are now gathered in 31 U.S.C. § 1516:

"An official designated in section 1513 of this title to make apportionment may exempt from **apportionment**—

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**Gen.** 422 (1959); 38 **Comp. Gen.** 538,542 (1959). See also 45 **Comp. Gen.** 584,587 (1966) (severance pay in **fiscal year 1966**).<sup>52</sup>

Discretionary increases, just as they are not “authorized by law” for purposes of 31 U.S.C. §1341, are not “beyond administrative control” for purposes of section 1515(b). 44 **Comp. Gen.** 89 (1964) (salary increases to Central Intelligence Agency employees); 31 **Comp. Gen.** 238 (1951) (pension increases to retired District of Columbia police and **firefighters**).

The Wage Board exception was separately codified in 1957 and now appears at 31 U.S.C. §1515(a), quoted above, Subsection 1515(a) reached its present form in 1987 when Congress expanded it to include pay increases granted pursuant to law to non-Wage Board civilian officers and employees and to retired and active military **personnel**.<sup>53</sup>

The exceptions in subsection 1515(b)(1)(B) do not appear to have been discussed in any GAO decisions as of the date of this publication, although a 1989 internal memorandum suggested that the exception would apply to Forest Service appropriations for fighting forest **fires**. **B-230117-O.M.**, February 8, 1989. The exceptions for safety of human life and protection of property appear to be patterned after the identical exceptions under 31 U.S.C. §1342, so the case law under that section **should** be equally relevant for construing the scope of the exceptions under section 1515(b).

It is important to note that the exceptions in 31 U.S.C. §1515(b) are exceptions **only** to the prohibition against making or requesting apportionments requiring deficiency estimates; they are not exceptions to the basic prohibitions in 31 U.S.C. § 1341 against obligating or spending in excess or advance of appropriations. The point was discussed at some length in **B-167034**, September 1, 1976. Legislation had been proposed in the Senate to repeal 41 U.S.C. § 11, which prohibits the making of a contract, not otherwise authorized by law, **unless** there is an appropriation “adequate to its fulfillment,” except in the case of contracts made by a military department for “clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or

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<sup>52</sup>The law mandating payment of severance pay was enacted after the start of FY 1966, which is why the expenditures in that case would qualify under 31 U.S.C. §1515(b).

<sup>53</sup>Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 105, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-433 (1987) (1988 continuing resolution).

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g. **Administrative** Division of Apportionments

Thus far, we have reviewed the provisions of the **Antideficiency** Act directed at the appropriation **level** and the apportionment **level**. The law also addresses agency subdivisions.

The **first** provision to note is 31 U.S.C. §1513(d):

**“An** appropriation apportioned under this subchapter may be divided and subdivided **administratively** within the limits of the apportionment.”

Thus, administrative subdivisions are expressly authorized. The precise pattern of subdivisions will vary based on the nature and scope of activities funded under the apportionment and, to some extent, agency preference. The levels of subdivision below the apportionment level are, in descending order, allotment, **suballotment**, and allocation. OMB Circular No. **A-34**, §21.1. Additional subdivisions may exist with varying designations such as allowance, operating budget, etc. *Id.* § 32.2(7). **As** we will see later in our discussion of 31 U.S.C. §1517(a), there are definite **Antideficiency** Act implications flowing from how an agency structures its **fund** control system.

The next relevant statute is 31 U.S.C. §1514:<sup>54</sup>

“(a) The **official** having administrative control of an appropriation **available** to the legislative branch, the **judicial** branch, the United States international Trade **Commission**, or the District of Columbia government, and, subject to the **approval** of the President, the head of each executive agency (except the **Commission**) **shall** prescribe by regulation a system of administrative control not inconsistent with accounting procedures prescribed under law. The system **shall** be designed to—

“(1) restrict obligations or expenditures from each appropriation to the amount of apportionments or reapportionments of the appropriation; and

“(2) enable the **official** or the head of the executive agency to **fix** responsibility for an obligation or expenditure exceeding an apportionment or reapportionment.

“(b) To have a **simplified** system for **administratively** dividing appropriations, the head of each executive agency (except the **Commission**) **shall** work toward the objective of financing each operating unit, at the highest **practical** level, from not more than one **administrative** division for each appropriation affecting the **unit**.”

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<sup>54</sup>Prior to the 1982 recodification of Title 31, sections 1513(d) and 1514 had been combined as subsection (g) of the Antideficiency Act.

“(1) a trust fund or working fund if an expenditure from the fund has no **significant** effect on the financial operations of the United **States Government**;

“(2) a **working** capital fund or a **revolving** fund established for intragovernmental operations;

“(3) receipts from industrial and power **operations** available under law; and

“(4) appropriations made **specifically** for-

“(A) interest on, or retirement of, the public debt;

“(B) payment of claims, judgments, refunds, and drawbacks;

“(C) items the President decides are of a **confidential** nature;

“(D) payment under a law requiring payment of the **total** amount of the appropriation to a designated payee; and

“(E) grants to the States **under** the **Social Security Act** (42 **U.S.C. 301 et seq.**).”

Section 1516 is largely self-explanatory and the various enumerated exceptions appear to be readily **understood**. Note that the statute does not make the exemptions **mandatory**. It merely authorizes them, within the discretion of the apportioning authority (**OMB**). **OMB’s** implementing instructions, **OMB Circular No. A-34**, §41.1, have not adopted all of the exemptions permitted under the statute. In several cases—for example, trust funds and intragovernmental revolving **funds—the** funds are subject to apportionment unless **OMB** grants an exemption for a particular account. *Id.*

In addition, 10 **U.S.C. § 2201(a)** authorizes the President to exempt appropriations for military functions of the Defense Department from apportionment upon determining “such action to be necessary in the interest of national defense.”

Another exemption, this one **mandatory**, is contained in 31 **U.S.C. § 1511(b)(3)**, for “the Senate, the House of Representatives, a committee of Congress, a member, officer, employee, or office of either House of Congress, or the Office of the Architect of the Capitol or an officer or employee of that **Office**.” Apart from this specific exemption, the remainder of the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, are subject to apportionment. **31 U.S.C. § 1513(a)**.

prescribe precisely how this **is to** be done. Apart from subsection (b), the substance of section 1514 derives from a 1950 amendment to the **Antideficiency Act** (64 Stat. 765). In testimony on that legislation, the Director of the (then) Bureau of the Budget stated:

“At the present time, theoretically, I presume the agency head is about the only one that you could really hold responsible for exceeding [an] apportionment. The revised section provides for going down the line to the person who creates the obligation **against** the fund **and fixes** the responsibility on the bureau head or the division head, if he is the one who creates the **obligation**.”<sup>56</sup>

Thus, depending on the agency regulations and the level at which administrative responsibility is freed, the violating individual could be the person in charge of a major agency bureau or operating unit, or it could be a contracting officer or finance officer.

Identifying the person responsible for a violation will be easy in probably the majority of cases. However, where there are many individuals involved in a complex transaction, and particularly where the actions producing the violation occurred over a long period of time, the pinpointing of responsibility can be much more **difficult**. Hopkins and **Nutt**, in their study of the **Antideficiency Act**, present the following as a sensible approach:

“Generally, [the individual to be held responsible] will be the highest ranking **official** in the decision-making process who **had** knowledge, either actual or **constructive**, of (1) precisely what actions were taken and (2) the impropriety or at least **questionableness** of such actions. There **will** be officials who had knowledge of either factor. But the person in the best and perhaps only position to **prevent** the **ultimate** error-and thus the one who must be held accountable-is the highest one who **is aware of both**.”<sup>57</sup>

Thus, Hopkins and **Nutt** conclude, where multiple individuals are involved in a violation, the individual to be held responsible “**must** not be too remote from the cause of the **violation** and must be in a position to have prevented the violation from **occurring**.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Appropriations on H.R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950), quoted in Hopkins & Nutt, *The Anti-Deficiency Act* (Revised Statutes 3679) and *Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis*, 80 Mil. L. Rev. 51,128 (1978).

<sup>57</sup>Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary Of the Army (Financial Management), 1976, quoted in Hopkins & Nutt, *supra* note 56, at 130.

<sup>58</sup>*Id.*

Section 1514 is designed to ensure that the agencies in each **branch** of the government keep their obligations and expenditures within the bounds of each apportionment or reapportionment. The **official** in each agency who has administrative control of the apportioned funds is required to set up, by regulation, a system of administrative controls to implement this objective. The system must be consistent with any accounting procedures prescribed by or pursuant to law, and must be designed to (1) prevent obligations and expenditures in excess of apportionments or reapportionments, **and** (2) **fix** responsibility for any obligation or expenditure in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment. Agency fund control regulations in the executive branch must be approved by **OMB**. See **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, 8§31.3 and 31.5.

Subsection (b) of 31 U.S.C. § **1514** was added in 1956 (70 Stat. 783) and was intended to simplify agency allotment systems. Prior to 1956, it was not uncommon for agencies to divide and subdivide their apportionments into numerous “pockets” of obligational authority **called** “allowances.” Obligor or spending more than the amount of each allowance was a violation of the **Antideficiency** Act as it then existed. The Second Hoover Commission (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government) had recommended simplification in 1955. The Senate and House Committees on Government Operations agreed. Both committees reported as **follows**:

“The making of numerous allotments which are further divided and **suballotted** to lower levels leads to much confusion and inflexibility in the financial control of appropriations or funds as well as numerous minor violations of [the **Antideficiency** Act].”

S. Rep. No. 2265, **84th Cong., 2d Sess.** 9 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code **Cong. & Admin. News** 3794, 3802; **H.R. Rep. No. 2734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.** 7 (1956). The result was what is now 31 U.S.C. § **1514(b)**.<sup>55</sup>

As noted, one of the objectives of 31 U.S.C. § **1514** is to enable the agency head to **fix** responsibility for obligations or expenditures in excess of apportionments. The statute encourages agencies to **fix** responsibility at the highest practical level, but does not otherwise

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<sup>55</sup>The historical summary in this **paragraph** is taken largely from 37 Comp. Gen. 220 (1957).



apportionment level. The agency thus, under the statute, has a measure of discretion. If it chooses to elevate **overobligations** or **overexpenditures** of lower-tier subdivisions to the level of **Antideficiency** Act violations, it is free **to** do so in its fund control regulations.

At this point, it is important to return to **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**. Since agency fund control regulations must be approved by **OMB**, **OMB** has a role in determining what levels of **administrative** subdivision should constitute **Antideficiency** Act violations. Under **A-34**, **overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of an allotment or **suballotment** are **always** violations. **Overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of other administrative subdivisions are violations only if and **to** the extent specified in the agency's fund control regulations. **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, §§ **21.1** and **32.2**.

In 37 **Comp. Gen.** 220 (1957), **GAO** considered proposed fund control regulations of the Public Housing Administration. The regulations provided for allotments as the **first** subdivision below the apportionment level. They then authorized the further subdivision of allotments into "allowances," but retained **responsibility** at the allotment level. The "allowances" were intended as a means of meeting operational needs rather than an apportionment control device. **GAO** advised that this proposed structure conformed **to** the purposes of 31 U.S.C. §1514, particularly in light of the 1956 addition of section **1514(b)**, and that expenditures in excess of an "allowance" would not constitute **Antideficiency** Act violations.

For further illustration, see 35 **Comp. Gen.** 356 (1955) (**overobligation** of allotment stemming from misinterpretation of regulations); **B-95136**, August 8, 1979 (**overobligation** of regional allotments would constitute reportable violation **unless** sufficient unobligated balance existed at central account level to **adjust** the allotments); **B-179849**, December 31, 1974 (**overobligation** of allotment held a violation of section **1517(a)** where agency regulations specified that allotment process was the "principal means whereby responsibility is **fixed** for the conduct of program activities within the funds available"); **B-1** 14841 .2-0. M., January 23, 1986 (no violation in exceeding **allotment** subdivisions termed "work plans").

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h. Expenditures in Excess of Apportionment

The former subsection (h) of the **Antideficiency** Act, now 31 U.S.C. §1517(a), provides:

“(a) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding-

“(l) an apportionment; or

“(2) the amount permitted by regulations prescribed under section 1514(a) of this title.”

Section 1517(a) must be read in conjunction with sections 1341, 1512, and 1514, previously discussed.

Subsection (a)(1) is self-explanatory-it prohibits obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment. Thus, an **agency** must observe the limits of its apportionments just as it must observe the limits of **its** appropriations.

There is, however, one difference. It has been held that, under some circumstances, an agency may have a legal duty to seek art additional apportionment from **OMB. Berends v. Butz**, 357 F. Supp. 143, 155-56 (D. Minn. 1973); **Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States**, 622 F.2d 539,552 n.9 (Ct. Cl. 1980). In **Berends v. Butz**, the Secretary of Agriculture had terminated an emergency **farm** loan program, allegedly due to a shortage of funds. The court found the termination improper and directed reinstatement of the program. Since the shortage of funds related to the amount apportioned and not the amount available under the appropriation, the court found that the Secretary had a duty to request an additional apportionment in order to continue implementing the program. The case does not address the nature and extent of any duty **OMB might** have in response to such a request.

Subsection (a)(2) makes it a violation to obligate or expend in excess of an administrative subdivision of an apportionment to the extent provided in the agency’s fund control regulations. The import of 31 U.S.C. § 1514 becomes much clearer when it is read in conjunction with 31 U.S.C. §1517(a)(2). The statute does not prescribe the level of **fiscal** responsibility for violations below the apportionment level. It merely recommends that the agency set the level at the highest practical point and suggests no more than one subdivision below the

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the provisions for fines and/or jail are intended **to be reserved** for particularly flagrant violations.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the administrative and penal sanctions apply only to violations of the three provisions **cited—31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1342, and 1517(a)**. They do not, for example, apply to violations of 31 U.S.C. § 1512.36 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1957).

b. Reporting Requirements

Once it is determined that there has been a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a), 1342, or 1517(a), the agency head **“shall** report immediately to the President and Congress **all** relevant facts and a statement of actions taken.” 31 U.S.C. § 1351, 1517(b). The report to the President is to be forwarded through the Director of **OMB**. Further instructions on preparing the reports maybe found in **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, §§ 32.2-32.4. The reports are to be signed by the agency head. *Id.* § 32.7.

**As** noted, the report is to include all pertinent facts and a statement of all actions taken (any administrative discipline imposed, referral to the Justice Department where appropriate, new safeguards imposed, etc.), presumably including a request for additional appropriations where **necessary**. It is also understood that the agency will do everything it can lawfully do to mitigate the financial effects of the violation. **E.g.**, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 768, 772 (1976); **B-114841.2-O. M.**, January 23, 1986. In view of the explicit provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 1351, it has been held that there is no private right of action for declaratory, mandatory, or injunctive relief under the **Antideficiency Act**. Thurston v. United States, 696 F. **Supp.** 680 (D.D.C. 1988).

Factors such **as** mistake, inadvertence, lack of intent, or the minor nature of a violation do not affect the **duty** to report. **Of** course, if the agency feels there are extenuating circumstances, it is entirely appropriate to include them in the report. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 356 (1955).

What if GAO uncovers a violation in the course of **its** audit activities but the agency thinks GAO is wrong? The agency should still make the required reports, and should include an explanation of the disagreement. **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, § 32.5. See also GAO report entitled Anti-Deficiency Act: Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service Violates the Anti-Deficiency Act, **GAO/AFMD-87-20** (March 1987).

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## 5. Penalties and Reporting Requirements

### a. Administrative and Penal Sanctions

Violations of the **Antideficiency** Act are subject to sanctions of two types, administrative and penal. The **Antideficiency** Act is the only one of the Title 31 funding statutes to prescribe penalties of both types, a fact which says something about congressional perception of the Act's importance.

An officer or **employee** who violates 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (obligate/ expend in excess or advance of appropriation), § 1342 (voluntary services prohibition), or § 1517(a) (obligate/ expend in excess of an apportionment or administrative subdivision as specified by regulation) “**shall** be subject to appropriate administrative discipline including, when circumstances warrant, suspension from duty without pay or removal from office.” 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349(a), 1518. For a case in which an **official** was reduced in grade and reassigned to other duties, see Duggar v. Thomas, 550 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1982) (upholding the agency's action against a charge of discrimination).

In addition, an officer or employee who “knowingly and willfully” violates any of the three provisions cited above “**shall** be fined not more than \$5,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.” 31 U.S.C. §§ 1350, 1519. As far as the editors are aware, it appears that no officer or employee has ever been prosecuted, much less convicted, for a violation of the **Antideficiency** Act as of this writing. The knowing and willful failure to record an **overobligation** in order to conceal an **Antideficiency** Act violation is also a criminal offense. See 71 **Comp. Gen.** (B-245856.7, August 11, 1992).

Earlier in this chapter, we pointed out that factors such as the absence of bad faith or the lack of intent to commit a violation are irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a violation has occurred. However, intent is relevant in evaluating the assessment of penalties. Note that the **criminal** penalties are linked to a determination that the law was “knowingly and willfully” violated, but the administrative sanction provisions do not contain similar language. Thus, intent or state of mind may (and probably should) be taken into consideration when evaluating potential administrative sanctions (whether to assess them and, if so, what type), but must be taken into consideration in determining applicability of the criminal sanctions. Understandably,

are generally **fixed** by law. Thus, permitting the employees to come to work would result in an obligation to pay salary for the time worked, **an** obligation in advance of appropriations in violation of section **1341(a)**. With respect to section 1342, no one was suggesting that the employees were offering to work gratuitously, even **assuming** they could lawfully do so, which for the most part they cannot. The fact that employees were willing **to** take the risk that the necessary appropriation would eventually be enacted did not avoid the violation. Clearly, the employees still expected to be paid eventually. **B-197841**, March 3, 1980. “During a period of expired appropriations,” the Comptroller General stated, “the only way the head of an agency can avoid violating the **Antideficiency** Act is to suspend the operations of the agency and instruct employees not to report to work until an appropriation is enacted.” *Id.* at 3.

However, GAO, like **all** other agencies, had been groping for a better solution. Whatever might be the cause of a particular funding gap, it seemed clear that it was not the intent of Congress that the federal government simply shut down. At the beginning of **FY 1980**, GAO prepared an internal memorandum to address its own operations. The memorandum said, in effect, that employees could continue to come to work, but that operations would have to be severely restricted. No new obligations could be incurred for contracts or small purchases of any kind, and of course the employees could not **actually** be paid until appropriations were enacted. The memorandum was printed in the Congressional Record, and at least one Senator viewed the approach as “**commonsense guidelines**.”<sup>60</sup> The memorandum was noted in **B-197841**, discussed above, but it was conceded that those guidelines, however sensible they might appear, would nevertheless “legally produce widespread violations of the **Antideficiency** Act.” *Id.* at 4.

Less than two months after **B-197841** was issued, the Attorney General issued a formal opinion to the President. The Attorney General essentially agreed with GAO’s analysis that permitting employees to work during a funding gap would violate the **Antideficiency** Act, but concluded further that the approach outlined in the GAO internal memorandum went beyond what the Act permitted. 43 Op. Att’y Gen. \_\_\_\_ (No. 24), 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16 (1980). The opinion stated:

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<sup>60</sup>125 Cong. Rec. **26974** (October 1, 1979).

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## 6. Funding Gaps

The term “funding gap” refers to a period of time between the expiration or exhaustion of an appropriation and the enactment of a new one. A funding gap is one of the most difficult **fiscal** problems a federal agency may have to face. As our discussion here will demonstrate, the case law reflects an attempt **to** forge a workable solution to a bad situation.

Funding gaps occur most commonly at the end of a fiscal year when new appropriations, or a continuing resolution, have not yet been enacted. In this context, a gap may affect only a few agencies (if, for example, only one appropriation act remains **unenacted** as of October 1), or the entire federal government. A funding gap may also occur if a particular appropriation becomes exhausted before the end of the **fiscal** year, in which event it may affect only a single agency or a single program, depending on the scope of the appropriation.

Funding gaps occur for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the complexity of the budget and appropriations process makes it difficult at best for Congress to get everything done on time. Add to this the enormity of some programs and the need to address budget deficits and the scope of the problem becomes more apparent. Also, to some extent, funding gaps are perhaps an inevitable reflection of the political process.

As GAO has pointed out, funding gaps, actual or threatened, are both disruptive and **costly**.<sup>59</sup> They also produce extremely difficult legal problems under the **Antideficiency** Act. The basic question, easy to state but not quite as easy to try to answer, is what is an agency permitted or required to do when faced with a funding gap? Can it continue with “business as usual,” or must it lock up and go home, or is there some acceptable middle ground?

In 1980, a congressional subcommittee asked whether agency heads could legally permit employees to come to work when the applicable appropriation for salaries had expired and Congress had not yet enacted either a regular appropriation or a continuing resolution for the next fiscal year. The Comptroller General replied that 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a) and 1342 were both violated if employees reported for work under those circumstances. The salaries of federal employees

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<sup>59</sup>GAO, Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, PAD-81-31 (March 3, 1981); Government Shutdown: Permanent Funding Lapse Legislation Needed, GAO/GGD-91-76 (June 1991).

entitlement program are funded from other than one-year appropriations, e.g., a trust fund, but the salaries of personnel who administer the program are funded by one-year money. As long as money for the benefit payments remains available, administration of the program is, by necessary implication, “authorized by law,” unless the entitlement legislation or its legislative history provides otherwise or Congress takes **affirmative** measures to suspend or terminate the program.

(4) Obligations “necessarily incident to presidential initiatives undertaken within his constitutional powers.” Example: the power to grant pardons and **reprieves**.<sup>62</sup>

The second broad category reflects the exceptions authorized under 31 U.S.C. § 1342—**emergencies** involving the safety of human life or the protection of **property**. The Attorney General suggested the following rules for interpreting the scope of this exception:

“First, there must be some reasonable and **articulable connection** between the function to be performed and the safety of human life or the protection of property. Second, there must be some reasonable likelihood that the safety of human life or the protection of property **would** be compromised, in some degree, by delay in the performance of the function in question.”

5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 8. The Attorney General then cited the identical exception language in the deficiency apportionment prohibition of 31 U.S.C. § 1515, and noted that **OMB** followed a similar approach in granting deficiency apportionments over the years. Given the wide variations in agency activities, it would not be feasible to attempt an advance listing **of** functions or activities that might qualify under this exception. Accordingly, the Attorney General made the following recommendation:

“To erect the most solid foundation for the Executive Branch’s practice in this regard, I would recommend that, in preparing contingency plans for periods of lapsed appropriations, each government department or agency provide for the Director of the **Office** of Management and Budget some written description, that **could** be transmitted to Congress, of what the head of the agency, assisted by its general counsel, considers to be the agency’s emergency functions.”

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<sup>62</sup>The same rationale would apply to the legislative branch. B-241911, October 23, 1990 (non-decision letter).

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“[T]here is nothing in the language of the **Antideficiency** Act in its long history from which any exception to its terms during a period of lapsed **appropriations** may be inferred. . . .

....

“[F]irst of all. . . on a lapse in appropriations, federal agencies may incur no obligations that cannot lawfully be funded from prior appropriations unless such obligations are otherwise authorized by law. There are no exceptions to this rule under current law, even where obligations incurred earlier would avoid greater costs to the agencies should appropriations later be enacted.

“Second, the Department of Justice will take actions to enforce the criminal provisions of the Act in appropriate cases in the future when violations of the **Antideficiency** Act are alleged. This does not mean that departments and agencies, upon a lapse in appropriations, will be unable logistically to terminate functions in an orderly way. . . . [Authority may be inferred from the **Antideficiency** Act itself for federal **officers** to incur those minimal obligations **necessary** to closing their agencies.” 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 19,20.

This opinion seemed to say that agencies had little choice but to lock up and go home. A second formal opinion, 43 Op. **Att’y Gen.** \_\_, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (1981), went into much more detail on possible exceptions and should be read in conjunction with the 1980 opinion.

As set forth in the 1981 Attorney General opinion, the exceptions fall into two broad categories. The first category is obligations “authorized by law.” Within this **category**, there are four types of exceptions:

- (1) Activities under funds which do not expire at the end of the fiscal year, i.e., multiple-year and no-year **appropriations**.<sup>61</sup>
- (2) Activities authorized by statutes which expressly permit obligations in advance of appropriations.
- (3) Activities “authorized by necessary implication from the specific terms of duties that have been imposed on, or of authorities that have been invested in, the agency.” To take the example given in the opinion, there will be cases where benefit payments under an

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<sup>61</sup>This would also include certain **revolving fund** operations, but not those whose use requires affirmative authorization in annual appropriation acts. B-241730.2, **February 14, 1991** (Government **Printing** Office revolving fund).



This, then, is the basic framework. There are a number of exceptions to the **Antideficiency Act** which would permit certain activities to continue during a funding gap. For activities not covered by any of the exceptions, however, the agency must proceed with prompt and orderly termination or violate the Act and risk invocation of the criminal sanctions. A very brief restatement may be found in 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 555 (1982).

Within this framework, GAO and the Justice Department have addressed a number of specific problems agencies have encountered in coming to grips with funding gaps. For example, towards the end of FY 1982, the President vetoed a supplemental appropriations bill. As a result, the Defense Department did not have sufficient funds to meet the military payroll. The total payroll obligation consisted of (1) the take-home pay of the individuals, and (2) various items the employing agency was required to withhold and transfer to someone else, such as federal income tax and Social Security contributions. The Treasury Department published a change to its regulations permitting a temporary deferral of the due date for payment of the withheld items, and the Defense Department, relying on the "safety of human life or protection of property" exception, used the funds it had available to pay military personnel their full take-home pay. The Attorney General upheld the legality of this action. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. \_\_\_, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 27 (1982). The Comptroller General agreed, but questioned the blanket assumption that all military personnel fit within the exception. B-208985, October 5, 1982; B-208951, October 5, 1982. The extent to which this device might be available to civilian agencies would depend on (1) Treasury's willingness to grant a similar deferral, and (2) the extent to which the agency could legitimately invoke the emergency exception.

Additional cases dealing with funding gap problems are:

- Salaries of commissioners of Copyright Royalty Tribunal attach by virtue of their status as officers without regard to availability of funds. Salary obligation is therefore viewed as "authorized by law" for purposes of **Antideficiency Act**, and commissioners could be retroactively compensated for periods worked without pay during a funding gap. 61 Comp. Gen. 586 (1982).
- Richmond district office of Internal Revenue Service shut down for half a day in October 1986 due to a funding gap. Subsequent legislation authorized retroactive compensation of employees

5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 11. Lest this approach be taken too far, Congress added the following sentence to 31 U.S.C. § 1342:

“As used in this section, the term ‘emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property’ does not include ongoing, regular functions of government the suspension of which would not imminently threaten the safety of human life or the protection of property.”

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §13213(b), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-621 (1990). The conference report on the 1990 legislation explains the intent:

“The conference report also makes conforming changes to title 31 of the United States Code to make clear that. . . ongoing, regular operations of the Government cannot be sustained in the absence of appropriations, except in limited circumstances. These changes guard against what the conferees believe might bear overly broad interpretation of an opinion of the Attorney General issued on January 16, 1981, regarding the authority for the continuance of Government functions during the temporary lapse of appropriations, and **affirm** that the constitutional power of the purse resides with Congress.”

**H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1170 (1990).**

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals added to the list of exceptions, holding the suspension of the civil jury **trial** system for lack of funds unconstitutional. Arrester v. United States District Court, 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). Faced With the potential exhaustion of appropriations for juror fees, the Administrative **Office** of the United States Courts, at the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States, had sent a memorandum to all district court judges advising that civil jury trials would have to **be** suspended until more money was available. Basing its holding on the Constitution and expressly declining to rule on the **Antideficiency** Act, the court held that a suspension for more than a “most minimal” time violated the seventh amendment. *Id.* at 1430. See also Hobson v. Brennan, 637 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1986).

Since the appropriation was not yet actually exhausted, and since there **was** still ample time for Congress to provide additional funds, the court noted that **its** decision did not amount to ordering Congress to appropriate money. The court noted, but did not address, the far more difficult question of what would happen if the appropriation became exhausted and Congress refused to appropriate additional funds. *Id.* at 1430–31 and 1431 **n.14**.

had pointed out, and GAO agreed, that automatic funding legislation could have the undesirable effects of (1) reducing pressure on Congress to make timely funding decisions, and (2) permitting major portions of the government to operate for extended periods without action by either House of Congress or the President. The ideal solution, both agencies agreed, is the timely enactment of the regular appropriation bills.

GAO continues to support the concept of an automatic continuing resolution in a form that does not reduce the incentive to complete action on the regular appropriation bills. Managing the Cost of Government: Proposals for Reforming Federal Budgeting Practices, GAO/AFMD-90-1 (October 1989) at 28-29. A 1991 report analyzed the impact of a funding gap which occurred over the 1990 Columbus Day weekend and again renewed the recommendation for permanent legislation to, at a minimum, allow agencies to incur obligations to compensate employees during temporary funding gaps but not pay them until enactment of the appropriation. Government Shutdown: Permanent Funding Lapse Legislation Needed, GAO/GGD-91-76 (June 1991). The report stated:

"In our opinion, shutting down the government during temporary funding gaps is an inappropriate way to encourage compromise on the budget. Beyond being counterproductive from a financial standpoint, a shutdown disrupts government services. In addition, forcing agency managers to choose who will and will not be furloughed during these temporary funding lapses severely tests agency management's ability to treat its employees fairly." Id. at 9.

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## D. Supplemental and Deficiency Appropriations

A supplemental appropriation may be defined as "an act appropriating funds in addition to those in an annual appropriation act."<sup>63</sup> The purpose of a supplemental appropriation is to fund projects and activities not included in the budget request for the current annual appropriation and which cannot be postponed until the next regular appropriation. Factors generating the need for supplemental appropriations include the following:

- Enactment of legislation adding new or increased functions
- Unanticipated surge in workload
- Inflation higher than that projected for the fiscal year
- Emergency situations involving unforeseen expenditures

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<sup>63</sup>GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, PAD-81-27, at 79.

- affected. GAO concluded that the **legislation** applied to intermittent as well as regular full-time employees, and held that the intermittent employees could be compensated in the form of administrative leave for time lost during the half-day furlough. **B-233656**, June 19, 1989.
- Witness who had been ordered to appear in federal court was stranded without money to return home when court did not convene due to funding gap. Cash disbursement to permit witness to return home or secure overnight lodging was held permissible since hardship circumstances indicated reasonable likelihood that safety of witness would be jeopardized. 5 Op. Off. **Legal** Counsel 429 (1981).

There are also a few cases addressing actions an agency has taken to forestall the effects of a funding gap. In 62 **Comp. Gen.** 1 (1982), the Merit Systems Protection Board, faced with a substantial cut in its appropriation, placed most of its employees on half-time, half-pay status in an attempt to stretch its appropriation through the end of the **fiscal** year. A subsequent supplemental appropriation provided the **necessary** operating funds. GAO advised that it was within the Board's discretion, assuming the availability of **sufficient** funds, to grant retroactive administrative leave to the employees who had been affected by the partial shutdown.

GAO reviewed another furlough plan in 64 **Comp. Gen.** 728 (1985). The Interstate Commerce Commission had determined that if it continued its normal rate of operations, it would exhaust its appropriation six weeks before the end of the fiscal year. To prevent this from happening, it furloughed **its** employees for one day per week. GAO found that the ICC's actions were in compliance with the **Antideficiency** Act. While the ICC was thus able to continue essential services, the price was financial hardship for its employees, plus "serious backlogs, missed deadlines and reduced efficiency." **Id.** at 732.

GAO has issued several reports on funding gaps. The **first** was **Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, PAD-81-31** (March 3, 1981). In that report, GAO noted the costly and disruptive effects of funding gaps, and recommended the enactment of permanent legislation to permit federal agencies to incur obligations, but not disburse funds, during a funding gap. In the second report, **Continuing Resolutions and an Assessment of Automatic Funding Approaches, GAO/AFMD-86-16** (January 1986), GAO compared several possible options but this time made no specific recommendation. **OMB**

Unless otherwise provided, a restriction contained in an annual appropriation act **will** apply to funds provided in a supplemental appropriation act even though the restriction is not repeated in the supplemental. For example, a restriction in a foreign assistance appropriation act prohibiting the use of funds for assistance to certain countries would apply equally to funds provided in a supplemental appropriation for the same fiscal year. **B-158575**, February 24, 1966. Similarly, a provision in an annual appropriation act that “**no** part of **any** appropriation for the Bureau of Reclamation contained in this Act shall be used for the salaries and expenses” of certain **officials** who were not **qualified** engineers would apply as well to funds appropriated in supplemental appropriation acts for the same fiscal year. **B-86056**, May 11, 1949. The rule applies to supplemental authorizations as well as supplemental appropriations. **B-106323**, November 27, 1951. If a supplemental appropriation act includes a new appropriation which is separate and distinct from the appropriations being supplemented, restrictions contained in the original appropriation act will not apply to the new appropriation unless **specifically** provided. **Id.** The fiscal year limitations of the original appropriation, however, would still apply.

The rule that supplemental appropriations are subject to restrictions contained in the regular appropriation act being supplemented applies equally to specific dollar limitations. Thus, if a regular annual appropriation act **specifies** a maximum limitation for a particular object, either by using the words “not to exceed” or otherwise, a more general supplemental appropriation for the same **fiscal** year does not authorize an increase in that limitation. 19 **Comp. Gen.** 324 (1939); 4 **Comp. Gen.** 642 (1925); **B-71583**, February 20, 1948; **B-66030**, May 9, 1947. Naturally, this principle will not apply if the supplemental appropriation specifically provides for the object in question. 19 **Comp. Gen.** 832 (1940).

Restrictions appearing in a supplemental appropriation act may not reach back and apply to balances remaining in the original annual appropriation, depending on the precise statutory language used. Thus, without more, a restriction in a supplemental applicable by its terms to “this appropriation” would apply only to the supplemental funds. **B-31546**, January 12, 1943. See also 31 **Comp. Gen.** 543 (1952).

- Pay increases not previously budgeted
- Items not included in regular appropriation for lack of timely authorization
- Poor program planning

There is a technical distinction between supplemental appropriations and deficiency **appropriations**.<sup>64</sup> However, Congress stopped enacting separate “deficiency appropriation **acts**” in the **1960s** and now, supplemental appropriations and deficiency appropriations are combined in “supplemental appropriation acts.” The rules governing the availability of supplemental and deficiency appropriations are essentially the same. Thus, the term “supplemental appropriation” for purposes of the following discussion should be construed as including both types.

A supplemental appropriation “supplements the original appropriation, partakes of its nature, and is subject to the same limitations as to the expenses for which it can be used as attach by law to the original appropriation” unless otherwise provided. 4 **Comp. Dec.** 61 (1897). See also 27 **Comp. Gen.** 96 (1947); 25 **Comp. Gen.** 601 (1946); 20 **Comp. Gen.** 769 (1941). This means that a supplemental appropriation is subject to the purpose and time limitations, plus any other applicable restrictions, of the appropriation being supplemented.

Thus, **an** appropriation made to supplement the regular annual appropriation of a given fiscal year is available beyond the expiration of that fiscal year only to liquidate obligations incurred within the fiscal year. The unobligated balance of a supplemental appropriation will expire at the end of the fiscal year in the same manner as the regular annual appropriation. See 27 **Comp. Gen.** 96 (1947); 4 **Comp. Dec.** 61 (1897); 3 **Comp. Dec.** 72 (1896). Of course, a supplemental appropriation, just like any other appropriation, can be made available until expended (no-year). E.g., 36 **Comp. Gen.** 526 (1957); **B-72020**, January 9, 1948.

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<sup>64</sup>A deficiency appropriation is an appropriation made to pay obligations legally created but ‘or which sufficient funds are not available in the appropriation originally made for that purpose. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 96 (1947); 25 **Comp. Gen.** 601,604 (1946); 4 **Comp. Dec.** 61,62 (1897). The need for deficiency appropriations often results from violations of the Antideficiency Act, and they can be made in the same fiscal year as the overobligated appropriation or in a later year. Since they serve essentially the same purpose as supplemental appropriations, the distinction had become recognized by the late 1950s as a “distinction without a difference.” See 103 **Cong. Rec.** 6420 (1957).

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## E. Augmentation of Appropriations

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### 1. The Augmentation Concept

**AS** a general proposition, an agency may not augment its appropriations from outside sources without specific **statutory** authority. The prohibition against augmentation is a corollary of the separation of powers doctrine. When Congress makes an appropriation, it is also establishing an authorized program level. In other words, it is telling the agency that it cannot operate beyond the **level** that it can finance under its appropriation. To permit an agency to operate beyond this level with funds derived from some other source without **specific** congressional sanction would amount **to** a usurpation of the congressional prerogative. Restated, the objective of the rule against augmentation of appropriations is **to** prevent a government agency from undercutting the congressional power of the purse by circuitously **exceeding** the amount Congress has appropriated for that activity.

There is no statute which, in those precise terms, prohibits the augmentation of appropriated funds. The concept does nevertheless have an adequate statutory basis, although it must be derived from several separate enactments. **Specifically:**

- 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), the “miscellaneous receipts” statute.
- 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), restricting the use of appropriated funds to their intended purposes. Early decisions often based the augmentation prohibition on the combined effect of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3302(b) and 1301(a). See, e.g., 17 **Comp. Dec.** 712 (1911); 9 **Comp. Dec.** 174 (1902).
- 18 U.S.C. § 209, which prohibits the payment of, contribution to, or supplementation of the salary of a government officer or **employee** as compensation for his or her **official** duties from any source other than **the government** of the United States.

The augmentation concept manifests itself in a wide variety of contexts. One application is the prohibition against transfers between appropriations without **specific** statutory authority. An unauthorized transfer is an improper augmentation of the receiving appropriation. E.g., 23 **Comp. Gen.** 694 (1944); **B-206668**, March 15, 1982. In **B-206668**, for example, a department received a General Administration appropriation plus separate appropriations for the

At onetime, supplemental appropriation acts specified that the funds were for the same objects and subject to the same limitations as the appropriations being supplemented. The (then) Bureau of the Budget wanted to delete this language pursuant **to** its mandate **to eliminate** unnecessary words in **appropriations**.<sup>65</sup> The Comptroller General agreed that the appropriation language was unnecessary, pointing out that these conditions would apply even without being explicitly stated in the supplemental appropriation acts themselves. **B-13900**, December 17, 1940.

In addition to supplementing prior appropriations, a supplemented appropriation act may make entirely new appropriations which are separate and distinct from those made by **an** earlier appropriation act. Where a supplemental appropriation act contains new legislation, whether permanent or temporary, the new legislation will take effect on the date the supplemental is enacted absent a clear intent to make it retroactive. 20 **Comp. Gen.** 769 (1941). In the cited decision, an appropriation **included** in a supplemental appropriation act enacted late in **fiscal** year 1941 which for the **first** time permitted payment of transportation expenses of certain military dependents was held effective on the date of enactment of the supplemental act and not on the frost day of **FY** 1941.

A supplemental appropriation may also provide for a new object within a lump-sum appropriation. If the original appropriation was not available for that object, then the supplemental amounts to anew appropriation. For example, a **FY** 1957 supplemental appropriation for the Maritime Administration provided \$18 million for a nuclear-powered merchant ship under the heading “ship construction.” Funds for the nuclear-powered ship had been sought under the regular “ship construction” lump-sum appropriation for **FY** 1957, but had been denied. Under the circumstances, the Comptroller **General** found that the supplemental appropriation amounted **to** a specifically earmarked maximum for the vessel, and that the agency **could** not exceed the \$18 million by using funds from the regular appropriation. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 526 (1957).

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<sup>65</sup>Prior to the 1982 recodification of Title 31, the mandate was found in 31 U.S.C. § 623. The recoilers thought **those words** themselves were unnecessary, and the concept **is** now included in the general mandate in 31 U.S.C. § 1104(a) to “**use uniform terms**” in requesting appropriations.



have it washed, the result is the same-the car gets washed and your own money is free to be used for something else. Be that as it may, the **majority** of the cases support limiting the augmentation rule to the receipt of money. In the final analysis, the distinction probably makes little practical difference. **In** view of 31 U.S.C. §1342, limiting the augmentation rule **to** the receipt of funds does not mean that the rule can be negated by the unrestricted acceptance of **services**.

In a 1991 case, 70 **Comp. Gen.** 597, GAO concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission **would** not improperly augment its appropriations by permitting private carriers **to install** computer equipment at the ICC headquarters, to facilitate access to electronically **filed** rate tariffs. Installation was viewed as a reasonable exercise of the ICC's statutory authority to prescribe the form and manner of tariff **filing** by those over whom the agency has regulatory authority. Somewhat similar in concept to the **workfare** case, however, the decision suggests that use of the equipment for other purposes, such as word processing by ICC staff, would be an improper augmentation, **and** advised the ICC to establish controls to prevent this.

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## 2. Disposition of Moneys Received: Repayments and Miscellaneous Receipts

### a. General Principles

#### (1) The “miscellaneous receipts” statute

A very important statute in the overall scheme of government **fiscal** operations is 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), known as the “miscellaneous receipts” statute. Originally enacted in 1849 (9 Stat. 398), 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) provides:

“Except as provided in section 3718(b) of this title, an official or agent of the Government receiving money for the Government from any source **shall** deposit the money in the Treasury as soon as **practicable** without deduction for any charge or claim.”

Penalties for violating 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) are found in 31 U.S.C. § 3302(d), and include the possibility of removal from office. In addition, if funds which should have been deposited in the Treasury but were not are lost or stolen, there is the risk of personal liability. **E.g.**, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (1891) (liability would attach where funds,

administration of **its** component bureaus. The unauthorized transfer of **funds** from the bureau appropriations to the General Administration appropriation was held to be an improper augmentation of the latter appropriation. As with the transfer prohibition itself, however, the augmentation rule has no application at the agency allotment level within the same appropriation account. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 601 (1991).

It should also be apparent that the augmentation rule is related to the concept of purpose availability. For example, a very early case pointed out that charging a general appropriation when a **specific** appropriation is exhausted not only violates 31 **U.S.C. § 1301(a)** by using the general appropriation for an unauthorized purpose, but also improperly augments the **specific** appropriation. [1] Bowler, First **Comp. Dec.** 257,258 (1894). However, it is most closely related to the subject of this chapter-availability as to amount-because it has the effect of restricting executive spending to the amounts appropriated by Congress. In this respect, it is a logical, perhaps indispensable, complement to the **Antideficiency** Act.

For the most part, although the cases are not entirely consistent, GAO has distinguished between receipts of money and receipts of services, dealing with the former under the augmentation rule and the latter under the voluntary services prohibition (31 **U.S.C. § 1342**). For example, in **B-13378**, November 20, 1940, a private organization was willing to donate either funds or services. Since the agency lacked statutory authority to accept gifts, acceptance of a cash donation would improperly augment its appropriations. Acceptance of services was distinguished, however, and addressed under 31 **U.S.C. § 1342**. GAO drew the same distinction in **B-125406**, November 4, 1955. More recently, acceptance by the Federal Communications Commission of free space at industry trade shows was found not to constitute an augmentation of the Commission's appropriation because there had been no donation of funds. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1984).

In apparent conflict with these cases, however, is **B-21 1079.2**, January 2, 1987, which stated that, without statutory authority, an agency would improperly augment its appropriations by accepting the uncompensated services of "workfare" participants to do work which would normally be done by the agency with **its** own personnel and funds. Logic would seem to support the formulation in **B-21 1079.2**. Certainly, if I wash your car without charge or if I give you money to

In addition to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), several other statutes require that moneys received in various **specific** contexts be deposited as miscellaneous **receipts**.<sup>67</sup> Examples are:

- 7 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2246, 2247 (proceeds from sale of various products by Secretary of Agriculture)
- 10 U.S.C. § 2667 (moneys received by the military departments from authorized leases)
- 16 U.S.C. § 499 (revenue from the national **forests**, such as timber sales, subject to the deductions specified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 500 and 501)
- 19 U.S.C. § 527 (customs fees, penalties, and forfeitures)
- 40 U.S.C. § 485(a) (proceeds from sale of surplus public property, except as provided in other subsections of section 485)<sup>68</sup>

Although it is preferable, it is not necessary that the statute use the words “**miscellaneous receipts**.” A statute requiring the deposit of funds “into the Treasury of the United States” will be construed as meaning the general fund of the Treasury. 27 **Comp. Dec.** 1003 (1921).

To understand the significance of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) and related statutes, it is **necessary** to recall the provision in Article I, section 9 of the Constitution directing that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Once money is deposited into a “miscellaneous receipts” account, it takes an appropriation to get it back out. *E.g.*, 3 **Comp. Gen.** 296 (1923); 2 **Comp. Gen.** 599,600 (1923); 13 **Comp. Dec.** 700,703 (1907). Thus, the effect of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) is to ensure that the executive branch remains dependent upon the congressional appropriation process. Viewed from this perspective, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) emerges as another

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<sup>67</sup>Several specific references to miscellaneous receipts in the pre-1982 version of Title 31 were deleted in the recodification because they were regarded as covered by the general prescription of the new section 3302. An example is the so-called User Charge Statute. The pre-recodification version, 31 U.S.C. § 483a, required fees to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. The current version, 31 U.S.C. § 9701, omits the requirement because, as the Revision Note points out, it is covered by § 3302. Other examples are 31 U.S.C. §§ 485 and 487 (1976 ed.).

<sup>68</sup>Section 485 stems from the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. Prior to this law, proceeds from the sale of public property were required to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts under the more general authority of what is now 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). See *Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States*, 275 U.S. 13,34 (1927); *Pan American Petroleum and Transport Co. v. United States*, 273 U.S. 456,502 (1927). (These are the notorious “Teapot Dome” cases.) Property sales not governed by 40 U.S.C. § 485, such as the situation in 28 **Comp. Gen.** 38 (1948), for example, would remain subject to 31 U.S.C. § 3302.

which disbursing agent had placed in bank which was not an authorized depository, were lost due to bank failure).

“It is **difficult** to see,” said an early decision, “how a legislative prohibition could be more clearly expressed.” 10 **Comp. Gen.** 382, 384 (1931). Simply stated, any money an agency receives from a source outside of the agency must be deposited into the Treasury. This means deposited into the general fund (“miscellaneous receipts”) of the Treasury, not into the agency’s own appropriations, even though the agency’s appropriations may be technically still “in the Treasury” until the agency actually spends **them**.<sup>66</sup> The Comptroller of the Treasury explained the distinction in the following terms:

“It [31 U.S.C. § 3302(b)] could hardly be made more comprehensive as to the moneys that are meant and these moneys are required to be paid ‘into the Treasury.’ This does not mean that the moneys are to be added to a fund that has been appropriated from the Treasury and may be in the Treasury or outside. [Emphasis in original. ] It seems to me that it can only mean that they shall go into the general fund of the Treasury which is subject to any disposition which Congress might choose to make of it. This has been the holding of the accounting officers for many years. [Citations omitted.] If Congress intended that these moneys should be returned to the appropriation from which a similar amount had once been expended it could have been readily so stated, and it was not.”

22 **Comp. Dec.** 379,381 (1916). See also 5 **Comp. Gen.** 289 (1925).

The term “miscellaneous receipts” does not refer to any single account in the Treasury. Rather, it refers to a number of receipt accounts under the heading “General Fund.” These are **all** listed in the Treasury Department’s “Federal Account Symbols and Titles” publication.

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<sup>66</sup>As a general proposition, an agency’s appropriations do remain “in the Treasury” until needed for a valid purpose. Unless Congress expressly so provides, an agency may not have its appropriations paid over directly to it to be held pending disbursement. 21 **Comp. Gen.** 489 (1941).

defines authorized repayments in terms of two general classes, reimbursements and refunds, as follows:

“a. Reimbursements to appropriations which represent amounts collected from outside sources for commodities or services furnished, or **to** be furnished, and which bylaw may be credited directly to **appropriations**.

“b. Refunds to appropriations which represent amounts collected from outside sources for payments made in error, overpayments, or **adjustments** for **previous** amounts **disbursed**, including returns of authorized advances.”

As used in the above definitions, the term “reimbursement” generally refers to situations in which retention by the agency is authorized by statute. The term “refund” embraces a category of mostly nonstatutory exceptions in which the receipt is directly related to, and is a direct reduction of, a previously recorded expenditure. Thus, the recovery of an erroneous payment or overpayment which **was** erroneous at the time it was made qualifies as a refund to the appropriation originally charged. **E.g., B-139348**, May 12, 1959 (utility overcharge refund); **B-138942-O.M.**, August 26, 1976 (collections resulting from disallowances by GAO under the “Fly America Act”). Also, the return of an authorized advance, such as a travel advance, is a “refund.”

At this point, an important distinction must be made. Moneys collected to reimburse the government for expenditures previously made are not automatically the same as “**adjustments** for previous amounts disbursed.” Reimbursements must generally, absent statutory authority to the contrary, be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. The mere fact that the reimbursement is related to the prior expenditure—although this is an indispensable element of an authorized “**refund**”—is not in itself sufficient to remove the transaction from the scope of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). See, for example, 16 **Comp. Gen.** 195 (1936); 24 **Comp. Dec.** 694 (1918); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 253 (1915); **B-45198**, October 27, 1944. The controlling principles were stated as follows in two early decisions:

“The question as to whether moneys **collected** to reimburse the Government for expenditures previously made should be used to reimburse the appropriations from which the expenditures were made or should **be** covered into the **general** fund of the Treasury has often been before the accounting officers of the Treasury and this office, and it has been uniformly held that in the absence of an express provision in the statute to the contrary, such funds should be covered in as **miscellaneous** receipts.” 5 **Comp. Gen.** 289,290 (1925),

element in the statutory pattern by which Congress retains control of the public purse under the separation of powers doctrine. **See** 51 **Comp. Gen.** 506,507 (1972); 11 **Comp. Gen.** 281,283 (1932); 10 **Comp. Gen.** 382,383 (1931) (the intent is that ‘all the public moneys shall go into the Treasury; appropriations then follow”).

Accordingly, for an agency **to** retain and credit **to** its own appropriation moneys which it should have deposited into the general fund of the Treasury is an improper augmentation of the agency’s appropriation. This applies even though the appropriation is a no-year appropriation. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 31 (1966). (No-year status relates **to** duration, not amount.)

Receipts in the form of “monetary credits” are treated for deposit and augmentation purposes the same as cash. 28 **Comp. Gen.** 38 (1948) (use by government of monetary credits received as payment for sale of excess electric power held unauthorized unless agency **transfers** corresponding amount from its appropriated funds to miscellaneous receipts). This will not apply, however, where it is clear that the appropriation or other legislation involved contemplates a different treatment. **B-125127**, February 14, 1956 (transfer to miscellaneous receipts not required where settlement of accounts was to be made on “net balance” basis). See also 62 **Comp. Gen.** 70, 74–75 (1982) (credit procedure which would differ from treatment of cash receipts recognized in legislative history).

## (2) Exceptions

Exceptions to the “miscellaneous receipts” requirement fall into two broad categories, statutory and nonstatutory:

1. An agency may retain moneys it receives if it has statutory authority to do so. In other words, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) will not apply if there is specific statutory authority for the agency to retain the funds.
2. Receipts that qualify as “repayments” to an appropriation maybe retained to the credit of that appropriation and are not required to be deposited into the General Fund. 6 **Comp. Gen.** 337 (1926); 5 **Comp. Gen.** 734,736 (1926); **B-138942** -O. M., August 26, 1976.

These exceptions are embodied in Treasury Department-GAO Joint Regulation No. 1, § 2, reprinted at 30 **Comp. Gen.** 595 (1950), which

within the time and purpose limits of the appropriation. However, if the appropriation has expired for obligational purposes (but has not yet been closed), the repayment must be credited to the expired account, not to current funds. See 23 **Comp. Gen.** 648 (1944); 6 **Comp. Gen.** 337 (1926); **B-138942-O.** M., August 26, 1976. If the repayment relates to an expired appropriation, crediting the repayment to current funds is an improper augmentation of the current appropriation unless authorized by statute. **B-114088**, April 29, 1953. These same principles apply to a refund in the form of a credit, such as a credit for utility overcharges. **B-139348**, May 12, 1959; **B-209650-O.** M., July 20, 1983.<sup>69</sup> Once an appropriation account has been closed in accordance with 31 U.S.C. §§ 1552(a) or 1555, repayments must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts regardless of how they would have been treated prior to closing. 31 U.S.C. § 1552(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1405 (1990).

Where funds are authorized to be credited to an appropriation, restrictions on the basic appropriation apply to the credits as well as to the amount originally appropriated. **A-95083**, June 18, 1938.

The fact that some particular reimbursement is authorized or even required by law is not, standing alone, sufficient to overcome 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). E.g., 67 **Comp. Gen.** 443 (1988); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 60 (1915); 1 **Comp. Dec.** 568 (1895). The accounting for that reimbursement—whether it maybe retained by the agency and, if so, how it is to be credited—will depend on the terms of the statute. Some statutes, for example, permit reimbursements to be credited to current appropriations regardless of which appropriation “earned” the reimbursement. As a general proposition, however, this practice, GAO has pointed out, diminishes congressional control. For further discussion of these concepts in the context of statutes applicable to the Defense Department, see GAO report entitled Reimbursements to Appropriations: Legislative Suggestions for Improved Congressional Control, **FGMSD-75-52** (November 1, 1976).

As might be expected, there have been a great many decisions involving the “miscellaneous receipts” requirement. It is virtually impossible to draw further generalizations from the decisions other

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<sup>69</sup>It should not be automatically assumed that every form of “credit” accruing to the government under a contract will qualify as a “refund” to the appropriation. See, e.g., **A-51604**, May 31, 1977.

“On the other hand, if the collection involves a refund or repayment of **moneys** paid from an appropriation in excess of what **was** actually due such refund **has** been held to be properly **for** credit to the appropriation originally charged.. . .” **5 Comp. Gen. 734,736 (1926).**

The key language in the above passage is “in excess of what was actually due.” Apart from the more obvious situations-refunds of overpayments, erroneous payments, unused portions of authorized advances-the type of situation contemplated by the “**adjustments** for previous amounts disbursed” portion of the **definition** is illustrated by **23 Comp. Gen. 652 (1944)**, The Agriculture Department was authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with states for soil conservation projects. Some states were prohibited by state law from making advances and were limited to making reimbursements after the work was performed. In these cases, Agriculture initially put up the state’s share and was later reimbursed. The Comptroller General held that Agriculture could credit the reimbursements to the appropriation charged for the project. The distinction between this **type** of situation and the simpler “related to a previous expenditure” situation in which the money must go to miscellaneous receipts lies in the nature of the agency’s obligation. Here, Agriculture was not required to contribute the state’s share; it could simply have foregone the projects in those states which could not advance the funds. This is different from a situation in which the agency is required to make a given expenditure in any event, subject to later reimbursement. In **23 Comp. Gen. 652**, the agency made payments larger than it was required to make, knowing that the “excess” of what it paid over what it had to pay would (or at least was required to) be returned. See also **64 Comp. Gen. 431 (1985)**; **61 Comp. Gen. 537 (1982)**; **B-69813**, December 8, 1947; **B-220911.2-O. M.**, April 13, 1988.

For other examples of refunds as that term is used in the Joint Regulation, see **69 Comp. Gen. 260 (1990)** (recoveries under False Claims Act to the extent of reimbursing erroneous payments); **65 Comp. Gen. 600 (1986)** (rebates from Travel Management Center contractors); **62 Comp. Gen. 70 (1982)** (partial repayment of contribution to International Natural Rubber Organization occasioned by addition of new members); **B-139348**, May 12, 1959 (refund of overcharge by public utility); **B-209650-O. M.**, July 20, 1983 (same).

A repayment is credited to the appropriation initially charged with the related expenditure, whether current or expired. If the appropriation is still current, then the funds remain available for further obligation



385 (1931). The deadline applies to all receipts, including those **to** be credited to an appropriation account (which, of course, is “in the Treasury”), not just those for deposit as miscellaneous receipts. **E.g.**, 10 **Comp. Gen.** 382 (1931).

(4) Money not received “for the Government”

As originally enacted, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) required deposit in the Treasury of moneys received “for the use of the United States” (9 Stat. 398). The 1982 recodification of Title 31 changed this language to moneys received “for the Government.” The meaning, of course, is the same. Although the Comptroller General has not attempted to define this phrase in any detail, its scope, consistent with the statutory purpose, is broad. There is no distinction between money received for the use of the United States and money received for the use of a particular agency; such a distinction would largely nullify the statute.

As will be seen from the following case summaries, situations in which the “for the use of the United States” clause was the primary basis for the decision do not fall into any particular pattern.

In **B-205901**, May 19, 1982, a railroad had furnished 15,000 gallons of fuel to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for use in an undercover investigation of thefts of diesel **fuel** from the railroad. The railroad and FBI agreed that the fuel or the proceeds from **its** sale would be returned upon completion of the investigation. In view of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), the FBI then asked whether money generated from the sale of the fuel had to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

In one sense, it could be argued that the money was received “for the use of the United States,” in that the FBI planned to use it as evidence. However, the Comptroller General pointed out, this is not the kind of receipt contemplated by 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). Citing 33 Op. **Att’y Gen.** 316,321 (1922), the decision concluded that “[f]unds are received for the use of the United States only if they are **to** be used to bear the expenses of the Government or to pay the obligations of the United States.” Therefore, there was no legal barrier to returning the funds to the railroad.

In another case, GAO held that misconduct fines levied on Job Corps participants by the Labor Department need not be treated as money

than **to** restate the basic rule: Art agency must deposit into the General Fund of the Treasury any funds it receives from sources outside of the agency unless the receipt constitutes **an** authorized repayment or **unless** the agency **has** statutory authority to retain the funds for credit to its own appropriations.

### (3) Timing of deposits

As to the timing of the deposit in the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) says merely “as soon as practicable.” There is another statute, however, now found at 31 U.S.C. § 3302(c), which provides in relevant part:

“(1) A person having custody or possession of public money, including a disbursing **official** having public money not for current expenditure, shall deposit **the money** without delay in the Treasury or with a depository designated by the **Secretary** of the Treasury under law. Except as provided in paragraph (2), money required to be **deposited** pursuant to this subsection shall be deposited not later than the third day after the custodian receives the money. . . .

“(2) The Secretary of the Treasury may by regulation prescribe that a person having custody or possession of money required **by** this subsection to be deposited shall deposit such **money** during a period of time that is greater or lesser than the period of time **specified** by the second sentence of paragraph (1).”

This statute, formerly designated as Revised Statutes § 3621, originated in 1857 (11 Stat. 249). It was amended in 1896 (29 Stat. 179) to specify a deadline of 30 days. The time limit was reduced to three days by section 2652(b)(1) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (98 Stat. 494, 1152).

Treasury Department regulations provide:

“An agency will achieve same day deposit of monies. Where same day deposit is not cost-effective or is impracticable, next day deposit of monies must be achieved.”

31 C.F.R. § 206.5(a)(1) (1991). However, receipts of less than \$1,000 may be accumulated and deposited when the total reaches \$1,000. *Id.* § 206.5(b)(1). Further procedural guidance is contained in 1 Treasury Financial Manual Chapter 5-4000.

As a general proposition, section 3302(c) and the Treasury regulations place an outer limit on what is “practicable” under section 3302(b). 11 *Comp. Gen.* 281, 283–84 (1932); 10 *Comp. Gen.* 382,

Finally, several of the trust fund cases noted **later** in this chapter **have** employed the “not received for the use of the United States” rationale. **E.g.**, 60 **Comp. Gen.** 15,26-27 (1980); **B-241744**, May 31, 1991; 13-166059, July 10, 1969; **B-43894**, September 11, 1944; **B-24117-O. M.**, April 21, 1942.

b. Contract Matters

(1) Excess **reprocurement** costs

We use the term “excess **reprocurement** costs” hereto include two factually different but conceptually related situations:

1. **Original** contractor defaults. Agency still needs the work done and contracts with someone else to complete the work, almost invariably at a cost higher than the original contract price. Original contractor is liable to the government for these “excess **reprocurement** costs.”

2. Agency incurs **additional expense** to correct defective work by original contractor. Contractor is liable for the amount of this additional expense.

Disposition of amounts recovered in these situations has generated numerous cases. As a general proposition, the answer depends on the timing **of** the recovery in relation **to** the agency’s **reprocurement** or corrective action and the status of the applicable appropriation. The objective is to avoid the depletion of currently available appropriations to get what the government was supposed to get under the original obligation. The rules were most recently summarized, and the case law reviewed, in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 838 (1986).

The rules are as **follows**:

1. **If**, at the time of the recovery from the original contractor, the agency has not yet incurred the additional expense, the agency may **retain** the amount recovered to the extent necessary to fund the **reprocurement** or corrective measures. The collection is credited to the appropriation obligated for the original contract, without regard to the status of that appropriation.

2. **If**, at the time of recovery from the original contractor, the agency has already incurred the additional **reprocurement** or corrective expense, the agency may retain the **recovery** for credit to the applicable appropriation, to the extent necessary to reimburse itself,

received for the use of the United States for purposes of 31 U.S.C. §3302(b). The governing legislation specifically authorized “reductions of allowances” as a disciplinary measure. Labor felt that, in some cases, immediate collection of a cash **fine** from the individual’s pocket would be more effective. Finding a legislative intent to confer broad discretion in matters of enrollee discipline, GAO agreed that the cash fines could be regarded as a form of disciplinary allowance reduction, and accordingly credited **to** Job Corps appropriations. **B-130515**, August 18, 1970. GAO followed the same approach in a similar question several years later in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 666,671 (1986).

In 64 **Comp. Gen.** 217 (1985), a food service concession contract required the contractor to reserve a percentage of income to be used for the replacement of government-owned equipment. The reserve was found not to constitute money “for the Government” within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. §3302(b). GAO distinguished an earlier decision, 35 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1955), because the reserve here was merely a bookkeeping entry whereas the proposal in the 1955 case would have required the actual transfer of funds to a bank account. 64 **Comp. Gen.** at 219.

Two cases deal with fees paid to contractors. In **B-166506**, October 20, 1975, the Environmental Protection Agency had a number of contracts with private firms for the processing, storage, and retrieval of various kinds of recorded environmental information. Much of this information was of value to private parties and available under the Freedom of Information Act. Fees collected by an agency under **FOIA** must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. Here, however, EPA proposed advising requesting parties to deal directly with the contractors, who would charge and retain fees for providing the data, although the requesters would retain the right to deal with EPA. GAO approved the proposal, concluding that fees charged by the contractors in these circumstances were not money received for the use of the United States. The decision cautioned, however, that the fees charged and retained by the contractors could not exceed the fees which EPA could charge if it provided the services directly. Thus, the fees could include the direct costs of document search and duplication, but not costs associated with developing the information. In 61 **Comp. Gen.** 285 (1982), GAO provided similar advice to the Federal Election Commission in connection with requests from the public for microfilm copies of **its** reports.

**charged** with the contract and expended for completion of the work. The appropriation involved was a no-year appropriation.

- 44 **Comp. Gen.** 623 (1965). Recovery for defective work could be credited to **an** expired annual appropriation. Since the corrective work had not yet been undertaken, the funds would remain available for that corrective work under the “replacement contract” theory.
- 65 **Comp. Gen.** 838 (1986). Recovery for faulty design could be used for necessary corrective work. The appropriation involved was a multiple-year appropriation still available for obligation at the time of the recovery.

In the default situation, the earliest decisions held that the agency could retain excess **reprocurement** costs recovered from the **defaulting** contractor. Consistent with the defective work cases, the early default cases involved situations in which the recovered funds would still be available for obligation, either because the appropriation used for the contract was still available or under the replacement contract theory. 21 **Comp. Dec.** 107 (1914) (expired annual appropriation, **reprocurement** not yet effected); 16 **Comp. Dec.** 384 (1909) (no-year appropriation). However, the decisions inexplicably changed course, starting apparently with 23 **Comp. Dec.** 352 (1916), and for several decades thereafter consistently held, without attempting much further analysis, that excess **reprocurement** costs recovered from defaulting contractors had to be deposited as miscellaneous **receipts**.<sup>70</sup>

The two lines of cases met in a 1983 decision, 62 **Comp. Gen.** 678. That decision recognized that there was no real reason to distinguish between default and defective work for purposes of accounting for recoveries. The rules should be the same in both situations. Accordingly, 62 **Comp. Gen.** 678 modified the prior default cases and held, in effect, that the rules previously applied in the defective work cases should be applied in the future to all excess **reprocurement** cost cases “without reference to the event that gave rise to the need for the replacement contract—that is, whether occasioned by a default or by defective workmanship.” *Id.* at 681. The decision went on to hold that the Bureau of Prisons **could** retain damages recovered from a

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<sup>70</sup>E.g., 46 **Comp. Gen.** 554 (1966); 40 **Comp. Gen.** 590 (1961); 27 **Comp. Gen.** 117 (1947); 14 **Comp. Gen.** 729 (1935); 14 **Comp. Gen.** 106 (1934); 10 **Comp. Gen.** 510 (1931); 8 **Comp. Gen.** 284 (1928); 26 **Comp. Dec.** 877 (1920); A-26073, March 20, 1929, **aff’d** upon reconsideration, A-26073, August 8, 1929; A-24614, June 20, 1929. The rule was applied regardless of whether the funds were **actually** collected or merely withheld from contract payments due. 52 **Comp. Gen.** 45 (1972).

if that appropriation is still available for obligation, If the appropriation is no longer available for obligation, the recovery should go to miscellaneous receipts.

These rules apply **equally** to default **and** defective work situations. To restate them from the perspective of the type of appropriation involved, if the appropriation used to fund the original contract is a no-year appropriation, the recovery may be credited to that appropriation regardless of whether the agency has or has not yet actually incurred the additional costs. If the appropriation is an annual or multiple-year appropriation and the agency has not yet incurred the additional costs as of the time of recovery, the agency may credit the collection to the appropriation regardless of whether it is still current or expired. In the case of an annual or multiple-year appropriation where the agency has already incurred the **reprocurement** or corrective costs as **of** the time of recovery, the agency may retain the recovery if the appropriation is still available for obligation, but not if it has expired. (Where the excess costs have already been incurred and the appropriation has expired at the time of recovery, depletion of currently available funds is clearly not a concern.)

Prior to 1983, there were essentially two separate lines of cases, one dealing with defective work and the other dealing with default. The defective work cases, if one examines the facts and types of appropriations involved, had always applied the principles stated above, although not necessarily in those terms. Some illustrative cases are summarized below:

- **8 Comp. Gen. 103 (1928).** Supplies delivered by a contractor were found upon inspection to be unsatisfactory for use, that is, not in accordance with the terms of the contract. It was held that a refund by the contractor could be credited to the appropriation originally charged, on the theory that the payment was improperly made from the appropriation in the first instance. The appropriation involved was an annual appropriation, and the corrective costs had not been paid as of the time of the recovery.
- **34 Comp. Gen. 577 (1955).** An amount recovered from a contractor's surety because the work failed to meet specifications after the contractor received final payment was regarded as in the nature of a reduction in contract price representing the value of unfinished work, and therefore amounted to the recovery of an unauthorized overpayment. As such, it could be deposited in the appropriation

appropriation status and the timing of agency action, the fact patterns may be categorized as follows:

1. No-year appropriation; recovery made before agency incurs additional costs.
2. No-year appropriation; additional costs incurred prior to **recovery**.
3. Annual or multiple-year appropriation; recovery made before agency **incurs** additional costs; appropriation still current at time of recovery.
4. Annual or multiple-year appropriation; additional costs incurred prior to recovery; appropriation still current at time of recovery.
5. Annual or multiple-year appropriation; recovery made before agency incurs additional costs; appropriation expired at time of **recovery**.
6. Annual or multiple-year appropriation; additional costs incurred prior to recovery; appropriation expired at time of recovery.

In the first five situations, the agency may retain amounts recovered to the extent necessary to fund the **reprocurement** or corrective work, or to reimburse itself for costs already incurred. In the sixth situation, the **recovery** goes to the Treasury as miscellaneous **receipts**.<sup>72</sup>

(2) Other contract situations

The traditional rule for liquidated damages is that they maybe retained in the appropriation originally charged. 44 **Comp. Gen.** 623 (1965); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 365 (1943); 9 **Comp. Gen.** 398 (1930); 18 **Comp. Dec.** 430 (1911). See also **B-237421**, September 11, 1991. The rationale for retaining liquidated damages in the appropriation account rather than depositing them in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts is that they effect an authorized reduction in the price of the individual contract concerned, and also that this would make them available for return to the contractor should the liability subsequently

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<sup>72</sup>It is entirely possible that some of the default cases modified by 62 **Comp. Gen.** 678 involved this precise situation, in which event the result in those cases would still be correct. However, since this cannot be known with certainty from the text of the decisions alone, it is best to disregard them.

contractor charged with defective work, for credit to the appropriation which had been used to replace the defective work. Although not noted in the decision, the appropriation **to** be credited was a no-year appropriation. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 838,841 **n.3** (1986).

The decision added another new element: The rules would apply even where the recovery, by virtue of factors such as inflation or underbidding, exceeds the amount paid to the original contractor. Of course, the reason behind permitting retention of the funds is to enable the agency to get what it originally bargained for, not for the agency to make a “profit” on the transaction. Thus, any amounts recovered over and above what is actually necessary to fund the **reprocurement** or corrective work (or to reimburse the appropriation charged with that work, if it is still currently available) must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, 62 **Comp. Gen.** at 683.

It follows logically from what has been said that the proceeds of a forfeited performance bond should be available to the contracting agency if and to the extent necessary to fund a replacement contract to complete the work of the original contract, and this was the holding in 64 **Comp. Gen.** 625 (1985). It had been held in an earlier case that, under a contract for the exchange of government property for private property, when the government delivers its property but the contractor defaults, moneys received from a surety under a performance bond, presumably representing the value of the government property delivered, could be regarded as in recoupment of the “advance payment” and used for a replacement purchase. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 117 (1947).<sup>71</sup>

In 65 **Comp. Gen.** 838 (1986), GAO reviewed the evolution of the case law on excess **reprocurement** costs, restated the rules, and pointed out that in no case had GAO approved agency retention of recovered funds where the **reprocurement** or corrective costs “had already been paid from art appropriation which, at the time of the **recovery**, was no **longer** available for obligation.” **Id.** at 841 **n.5**.

Before leaving the subject, it maybe **helpful** to once again summarize the **rules** in a slightly different manner. From the perspective of

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<sup>71</sup>27 **Comp. Gen.** 117 went on to **state** that any moneys recovered from the **contractor** over **and** above the amount of the performance bond had to go to **miscellaneous** receipts. It was this portion of the decision that was **modified** by 62 **Comp. Gen.** 678.



Somewhat similarly, it was held in 39 **Comp. Gen.** 647 (1960) that to require amounts refunded to the United States for contract violations under the Great Plains Conservation Program to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts would deplete the appropriation to that extent and would thereby defeat the statutory purpose. However, the exception was permitted only for the refund of “unearned payments,” that is, violations which amounted to a failure of consideration such that the payments did not result in any benefit to the program. Refunds of “earned payments,” that is, where the payments had resulted in some benefit to the program, would have to go to miscellaneous receipts since their retention would constitute an improper augmentation. In recognizing the limited exception, the Comptroller General noted that the terms of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) “are general in nature and should receive a reasonable construction with respect to any particular form of income or receipt,” *Id.* at 649. The decision also noted that the “contracts” involved were—not procurement contracts but were more in the nature of grants. *Id.*

Refunds received by the government under a price redetermination clause may be credited to the appropriation from which the contract was funded. 33 **Comp. Gen.** 176 (1953). However, if the refund is entirely voluntary on the part of the contractor, the money goes to miscellaneous receipts. 24 **Comp. Gen.** 847, 851 (1945).

Refunds received by the government under a warranty clause maybe considered as an adjustment in the contract price and therefore credited to the appropriation originally charged under the contract. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 145 (1954). The same result applies where the warranty refund is in the form of a replacement purchase credit. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 384 (1948). (These cases are conceptually related to the “defective work” cases discussed earlier, and the result follows logically from the result in those cases.)

A different type of credit was discussed in 53 **Comp. Gen.** 872 (1974). It was proposed to require prospective timber sale purchasers to make certain property surveys, the cost of which would be credited against the sale price. The surveys had previously been financed from Forest Service appropriations. GAO viewed the proposal as an unauthorized augmentation of those appropriations. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture could not apply savings in the form of credits accrued under a contract for the handling of food stamp sales receipts to offset the cost of a separate data collection contract, even

be relieved. However, where this rationale does not apply—for example, in a case where the contractor did nothing and therefore earned nothing and the Comptroller General had denied the remission of liquidated damages under 41 U.S.C. § 256a—the liquidated damages should be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 554 (1966).

In some liquidated damage situations, the agency will not have incurred any additional **reprocurement** or corrective costs. This might happen in a case where an agency received liquidated damages for delay in performance but the contractor’s performance, though late, was otherwise satisfactory. In other cases, however, the agency will incur additional **costs**. In the situation described in 46 **Comp. Gen.** 554, for example, the agency would presumably need to **reprocure**, in which event it could retain the liquidated damages in accordance with the rules for excess **reprocurement** costs just discussed. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 625 (1985) (modifying 46 **Comp. Gen.** 554 to that extent). Consistent with these rules, liquidated damages credited to an expired appropriation may not be used for work which is not part of a legitimate replacement contract. **B-242274**, August 27, 1991.

Compensation paid by an insurance company for damage to government property caused by a contractor may not be used to augment the agency’s appropriation used for the contract, absent specific statutory authority, and the moneys, whether paid to the government or to the contractor, are for deposit into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 129 (1987); 48 **Comp. Gen.** 209 (1968). The retention of insurance proceeds was also involved in **B-93322**, April 19, 1950, an apparent exception based on the particular circumstances involved. In that case, the General Services Administration had entered into a contract for renovation of the Executive Mansion. The contract required the contractor to carry adequate fire and hazard insurance. The renovation project had been undertaken under a specific appropriation which was enough for the initial, cost but would not have been sufficient for repairs in the event of a fire or other hazard. Since the renovation was a “particular job of temporary nature,” and since a contrary result would defeat the purpose of the appropriation, the Comptroller General held that insurance proceeds received in the event a covered risk occurred could be retained and used for the cost of repairs.

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c. Damage to Government  
Property and Other Tort  
Liability

As a general proposition, amounts recovered by the government for loss or damage to government property cannot be credited to the appropriation available to repair or replace the property, but must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 431 (1985) (damage to government motor vehicle); 26 **Comp. Gen.** 618 (1947) (recovery from insurance company for **damage** to government vehicle); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 808 (1924) (loss of Coast Guard vessel resulting from collision).<sup>73</sup> While the recovery may well be “related” to a prior expenditure for repair of the property, it is not an “**adjustment**” of a previous disbursement for purposes of Treasury-GAO Joint Regulation No. 1.64 **Comp. Gen.** 431,433 (1985).

There are statutory exceptions. One involves property purchased and maintained by the General Services Administration from the General Supply Fund, a revolving fund established by 40 U.S.C. § 756. By virtue of 40 U.S.C. § 756(c), recoveries for loss or damage to General Supply Fund property are credited to the General **Supply** Fund. This includes recoveries from other federal agencies for **damage** to GSA motor pool vehicles. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 515 (1980).

Another is 16 U.S.C. § 579c, which authorizes the Forest Service to retain the proceeds of bond forfeitures resulting from failure to complete performance under a permit or timber sale contract, and money received from a judgment, compromise, or settlement of a government claim for present or potential **damage** to lands or improvements under the administration of the Forest Service. If the receipt exceeds the amount necessary to complete the required work or make the needed repairs, the excess must be transferred to miscellaneous receipts. This provision is discussed in 67 **Comp. Gen.** 276 (1988), holding that the proceeds of a bond forfeiture could be used to reimburse a general Forest Service appropriation which had **been charged with** the cost of repairs.

In addition, where an agency has statutory authority to retain income derived from the use or sale of certain property, and the governing legislation shows an intent for the particular program or activity to be **self-sustaining**, the agency may retain recoveries for loss or **damage** to that property. 24 **Comp. Gen.** 847 (1945); 22 **Comp. Gen.** 1133

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<sup>73</sup>Further cases for this proposition are 35 **Comp. Gen.** 393 (1956); 28 **Comp. Gen.** 476 (1949); 15 **Comp. Gen.** 683 (1936); 5 **Comp. Gen.** 928 (1926); 20 **Comp. Dec.** 349 (1913); 14 **Comp. Dec.** 87 (1907); 9 **Comp. Dec.** 174 (1902).

though both contracts were necessary to the same program objective. **A-51604**, May 31, 1977.

The rule that money received by the government under a contract is governed by 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) unless one of the established exceptions applies is underscored by the case of Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. Rice, 789 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1992). The Air Force had awarded a contract to a commercial air carrier to provide passenger and cargo service to a remote base in the Aleutian Islands. The carrier's revenue would be derived almost entirely from fares either purchased directly or reimbursed by the United States (military personnel, their dependents, and government contractor employees). The contract granted the carrier landing rights and ground support at the base, and the contractor agreed to return a specified portion of its receipts as a "concession fee," to be deposited in the base morale, welfare, and recreation fund. "[I]nnovation consistent with the law should be encouraged," said the court, "but this transaction so plainly violates the express terms of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) . . . that it should be nipped in the bud." *Id.* at 421. Since there was no authority to divert the funds from the Treasury to the welfare fund, and since the diversion would actually increase the cost to the government, the court found the contract award to be arbitrary and capricious, and declared the contract "null, void and of no force and effect." *Id.* at 423.

A similar GAO decision is 35 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1955), holding that a provision in a food services contract under which a portion of gross receipts would be set aside in a reserve fund for the repair and replacement of government-owned equipment was contrary to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b).

If a contract requires the government to pay a deposit on containers and provides for a refund by the contractor of the deposit upon return of the empty containers by the government, the refund maybe credited to the appropriation from which the deposit was paid. **B-8121**, January 30, 1940. However, if the contract establishes a time limit for the government to return the empty containers and provides further that thereafter title to the containers shall be deemed to pass to the government, a refund received from the contractor after expiration of the time limit is treated as a sale of surplus property and must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 462 (1943).

damaged in transit. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 31 (1966). See also 28 **Comp. Gen.** 666 (1949); 2 **Comp. Gen.** 599 (1923); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 703 (1916); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 379 (1916). There is a narrow exception in cases where the freight bill on the shipment of the property lost or damaged exceeds the amounts paid for repairs and both are payable from the same appropriation, in which event the bill is reduced and the amount deducted to cover the cost of repairs is allowed to remain to the credit of the appropriation. 21 **Comp. Dec.** 632 (1915), as amplified in 8 **Comp. Gen.** 615 (1929) and 28 **Comp. Gen.** 666 (1949). The rule and exception are discussed in 46 **Comp. Gen.** 31 and in **B-4494**, September 19, 1939. Also, as with receipts in general, the miscellaneous receipts requirement does not apply if the appropriation or fund involved is made reimbursable by statute. 46 **Comp. Gen.** at 33.

The requirement to deposit as miscellaneous receipts recoveries from carriers for property lost or damaged in transit does not apply to operating funds of the National Credit Union Administration since, even though the funds are treated as appropriated funds for most other purposes, they are technically not direct appropriations but fees and assessments collected from member credit unions. 50 **Comp. Gen.** 545 (1971).

While the preceding cases have all involved loss or damage to property, the United States may also recover amounts resulting from tortious injury to persons, for example, under the so-called Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2651. See, e.g., 57 **Comp. Gen.** 781 (1978). Such recoveries must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 52 **Comp. Gen.** 125 (1972).

A case involving the **Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act of 1964**, 31 U.S.C. § 3721, provides a good illustration of an adjustment to a prior disbursement, i.e., an authorized refund which the agency may retain for credit to the disbursing appropriation. The statute authorizes agencies to pay claims by their employees for personal property lost or damaged incident to service. In cases where there may be third-party liability (e.g., an insurer or carrier), the agency has a choice. It may pay the entire amount of the employee's claim and be subrogated to the employee's claim against the third party, or it may require the "employee to pursue the third-party claim first. If the agency chooses the former option, it may retain any third-party recoveries for credit to the appropriation used to pay the

(1943). While the two cited decisions involve recoveries from insurers, the principle applies equally to recoveries directly from the party responsible for the loss or damage. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 352 (1947).

There is also a nonstatutory exception. Where a private party responsible for loss or damage to government property agrees to replace it in kind or to have it repaired to the satisfaction of the proper government officials and to make payment directly to the party making the repairs, the arrangement is permissible and the agency is not required to transfer an amount equal to the cost of the repair or replacement to miscellaneous receipts.<sup>74</sup> The principle was first recognized in 14 **Comp. Dec.** 310 (1907), and has been followed, either explicitly or implicitly, ever since. **E.g.**, 67 **Comp. Gen.** 510 (1988); **B-87636**, August 4, 1949; **B-128209-O.M.**, July 12, 1956. The exception applies even though the money would have to go to miscellaneous receipts if the responsible party paid it directly to the government. 67 **Comp. Gen.** at 511; **B-87636**, August 4, 1949. For an apparent “exception to the exception” based on the specific legislation involved, see 28 **Comp. Gen.** 476 (1949).

If one regards 14 **Comp. Dec.** 310 from the standpoint of pure logic, it appears difficult to support. It is, in fact, one of the extremely few instances in which the decisions have sanctioned doing indirectly something that cannot be done directly. Be that as it may, the exception has been followed since 1907 and appears to be firmly entrenched. Thus, for example, in **B-128209-O.M.**, July 12, 1956, GAO addressed the relationship between 14 **Comp. Dec.** 310 and 28 **Comp. Gen.** 476, stating that “14 **Comp. Dec.** 310 has been followed for almost 50 years and we have never expressed disagreement with the conclusion reached therein.” The exception does not disturb the rule itself; it is “nothing more than an exception that maybe advantageous if the timing of repair and payment can be made to coincide.” 64 **Comp. Gen.** 431,433 (1985).

The rule that recoveries for loss or damage to government property must ‘be deposited as miscellaneous receipts applies equally to recoveries from common carriers for government property lost or

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<sup>74</sup>A 1943 case suggested a different result, i.e., the agency might have to transfer the value of the repairs to miscellaneous receipts, if the agency had a specific appropriation for repair or replacement of the property in question. 22 **Comp. Gen.** 1133, 1137 (1943). GAO indicated in 67 **Comp. Gen.** 510 (1988) that this would not be the case, although 67 **Comp. Gen.** 510 did not deal with a specific repair appropriation, which would appear to be a rare case in any event.

Service for service of civil process and judicial execution seizures and sales, **to** the extent provided in advance in appropriation acts); 28 U.S.C. § 1931 (specified portions of filing fees paid to the clerk of court, to the extent provided in **annual** appropriation acts). The relevant legislation will determine precisely what may be retained. E.g., 34 **Comp. Gen.** 58 (1954).

Training fees illustrate both the general rule and statutory exceptions. Under the Government Employees Training Act, an agency may extend its training programs to employees of other federal agencies on a reimbursable or **nonreimbursable** basis. 5 U.S.C. § 4104. The agency may, unless it receives appropriations for interagency training, retain the fees. **B-241269**, February 28, 1991 (non-decision letter). Similarly, an agency may admit state and **local** government employees to **its** training programs, and may charge a fee or waive it in whole or in part. Fees received are credited to the appropriation to which the training costs were charged. 42 U.S.C. 54742. The agency may also admit other private persons to its training programs on a space-available and fee basis, but unless it has statutory authority to the contrary, must deposit the fees as miscellaneous receipts. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 673 (1963); **B-241269**, February 28, 1991; **B-190244**, November 28, 1977.

Parking fees assessed by federal agencies under the authority of 40 U.S.C. § 490(k) are to be credited to the appropriation or fund originally charged for providing the service. However, any amounts collected in excess of the actual cost of providing the service must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 897 (1976). Parking fees may be authorized by statutes other than 40 U.S.C. § 490(k), in which event the terms of the particular statute must be examined. For example, parking fees at Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities are addressed in 38 U.S.C. § 5009. Originally, the fees had to go to miscellaneous receipts under 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). 45 **Comp. Gen.** 27 (1965). However, 38 U.S.C. § 5009 was later amended and the fees now go into a revolving fund,

Income derived from the installation and operation of vending machines on **government-owned** or controlled property is generally for deposit as miscellaneous receipts, 32 **Comp. Gen.** 124 (1952); **A-44022**, August 14, 1944. However, there are two **major** exceptions. First, if the contractual arrangement with the vendor is made by an employee association with administrative approval, the employee

claim. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 537 (1982). Art agency adopting the former policy, the decision **stated—**

“will be making payments in some cases that are, strictly speaking, higher than are required. In such cases, it is entirely legitimate to treat a third-party **recovery** as a reduction in the amount previously disbursed rather than as an augmentation of the agency’s appropriation.” *Id.* at 540.

A comparison of 61 **Comp. Gen.** 537 with the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act case, 52 **Comp. Gen.** 125, illustrates the distinction previously discussed with respect to applying the definition of “refund”— 61 **Comp. Gen.** 537 is an example of an **adjustment** to an amount previously disbursed; 52 **Comp. Gen.** 125 illustrates a collection which must go to miscellaneous receipts even though it is “related” to a prior expenditure. See 61 **Comp. Gen.** at 539–40; 64 **Comp. Gen.** 431, 432–33 (1985). In this respect, the situation in 61 **Comp. Gen.** 537 is very similar to the situation in 23 **Comp. Gen.** 652 (1944), described in our earlier discussion.

#### d. Fees **and Commissions**

Fees and commissions paid either to the government itself or to a government employee for activities relating to official duties must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts absent statutory authority to the contrary.

In the case of fees paid directly to the government, the result is a simple application of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). Thus, the following items, it has been held, must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts:

- Commissions from the use of pay telephones in government buildings. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 213 (1980); 44 **Comp. Gen.** 449 (1965); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 873 (1944); 14 **Comp. Gen.** 203 (1934); 5 **Comp. Gen.** 354 (1925); **B-4906**, October 11, 1951.
- Fees and related reimbursable incidental expenses paid to the Department of Agriculture in connection with the investigation of and issuance of certifications of quality on certain farm products. 2 **Comp. Gen.** 677 (1923).
- Fees collected under the Freedom of Information Act. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 684,687 (1980).

Of course, art agency may retain fees and use them to offset operating costs if and to the extent expressly authorized by statute. Examples are 28 U.S.C. § 1921(c) (fees collected by the United States Marshals



service, even if otherwise proper, could not be implemented without specific statutory authority because the payments could not be retained by the **enlistees** but would have to be deposited in the Treasury under 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). **B-200013**, April 15, 1981.

e. Economy Act

The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 and 1536, authorizes the **inter- and intra-departmental** furnishing of materials or performance of work or services on a **reimbursable** basis. It is a statutory exception to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), authorizing a performing agency to credit reimbursements to the appropriation or fund charged in executing its performance. However, **this** is not mandatory. The performing agency may, at **its** discretion, deposit reimbursements for both direct and indirect costs in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. **57 Comp. Gen.** 674,685 (1978), **modifying 56 Comp. Gen.** 275 (1977).

There is one area in which the agency has no discretion. Reimbursements may not be credited to an appropriation against which no charges have been made in executing the order. This would constitute an improper augmentation. Such reimbursements must therefore be deposited into the General Fund as miscellaneous receipts. An example would be depreciation in some cases. **57 Comp. Gen.** at 685-86.

f. Setoff

Collections by **setoff** may be factually distinguishable from direct collections, but the effect on the appropriation is the same. If crediting an agency appropriation with a direct collection in a particular instance would result in an improper augmentation, then retaining an amount collected by **setoff** would equally constitute an improper augmentation. Thus, **setoffs** must be treated the same as direct collections. If an agency could retain a direct collection in a given situation, it can retain the **setoff**. However, if a direct collection would have to go to miscellaneous receipts, the **setoff** also has to go to miscellaneous receipts. In this latter situation, the agency must take **the** amount of the **setoff** from **its** own appropriation and transfer it to the General Fund of the Treasury. **E.g., 2 Comp. Gen.** 599 (1923); **20 Comp. Dec.** 349 (1913).

A hypothetical situation will illustrate. Suppose a contractor negligently damages a piece of government equipment and becomes liable to the government in the amount of \$500. Suppose further that an employee of the contracting agency, in a separate transaction,

group may retain the income. 32 **Comp. Gen.** 282 (1952); **B-1 12840**, February 2, 1953. Second, under the Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 **U.S.C. § 107d-3**, vending machine income in certain cases must go to blind licensee-operators or state agencies for the blind. See **B-238937**, March 22, 1991 and **B-199132**, September 10, 1980 (non-decision letters).

For purposes of determining the disposition of amounts collected, there is a distinction between donations, which are voluntary, and fees and assessments, which are not. Statutory authority to accept gifts and donations does not include fees and assessments exacted involuntarily. 25 **Comp. Gen.** 637,639 (1946); **B-195492**, March 18, 1980; **B-225834** .2-0. M., April 11, 1988. This is more of a presumption than a rule, however, and specific circumstances may warrant different treatment. E.g., **B-232482**, June 4, 1990 (not improper for Commerce Department to treat certain registration fees as “contributions” within scope of 22 **U.S.C. § 2455(f)**; interpretation **ratified first** by appropriation, later by specific legislation).

Fees paid to individual employees require a two-step analysis. The first step is the principle that the earnings of a government employee in excess of the regular compensation gained in the course of or in connection with his or her services belong to the government and not to the individual employee. The second step is then the application of 31 **U.S.C. § 3302(b)**. Using this analysis, GAO has held that fees were required to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the following instances:

- An honorarium paid to an Army officer for delivering a lecture at a university in his capacity as an officer of the United States. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 29 (1957).
- Fees collected from private individuals by government employees for their services as notaries public. 16 **Comp. Gen.** 306 (1936).
- Witness fees and any allowances for travel and subsistence, over and above actual expenses, paid to federal employees for testifying in **certain** state court proceedings. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 591 (1957); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 628 (1944); 15 **Comp. Gen.** 196 (1935); **B-160343**, November 23, 1966.

Applying the same analysis, a proposal under which a nonprofit corporation funded entirely by private industry would **pay** monthly “bonuses” to Army **enlistees** to encourage enlistment and satisfactory

However, the existence of a revolving fund does not automatically signal that 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) will never apply. In other words, it should not be assumed that a revolving fund is incapable of being improperly augmented. Thus, where the statute establishing the fund does not authorize the crediting of receipts of a given type back into the fund, those receipts must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. See 69 **Comp. Gen.** 260 (1990); 40 **Comp. Gen.** 356 (1960); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 986 (1944); 20 **Comp. Gen.** 280 (1940).

Augmentation of a revolving fund may occur in other ways, depending on the nature of the fund and the terms of the governing legislation. Examples are:

- Statute authorizes Bureau of Land Management to **retain** funds collected as a result of coal trespasses on federal lands, to use those funds to repair damage to the specific lands involved in the trespass, and, within the Bureau's discretion, to refund any excess. An excess of collections over repair costs which the Bureau determines is inappropriate to refund should not be retained in the revolving fund to be used for other purposes, but must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. **B-204874**, July 28, 1982.
- Corps of Engineers has a revolving fund used to provide supervision and administration of certain construction work for other agencies on a reimbursable basis, **it** charges a flat rate calculated to recover actual costs over the long run. Recovery from a contractor for faulty design may be reimbursed to the fund to the extent of the amount actually charged, but any excess must go to the **Treasury**. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 838 (1986). However, an "excess" representing costs which were not calculated into the flat rate may be reimbursed to the fund, **B-237421**, September 11, 1991.

Legislation which merely authorizes, or even requires, that certain expenditures be reimbursed is not sufficient to create a revolving fund. Reimbursements must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts unless the statute specifically authorizes retention by the agency. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 443 (1988); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 60 (1915); 1 **Comp. Dec.** 568 (1895).

#### h. Trust Funds

Moneys properly received by a federal agency in a trust capacity are not subject to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) and thus do not have to be deposited in the **Treasury** as miscellaneous receipts. 60 **Comp. Gen.**

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negligently damages property of the contractor. The contractor files a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the agency settles the claim for \$600. Neither party disputes the validity or amount of either claim. The agency sets the contract debt off against the tort claim and makes a net payment to the contractor of \$100. However, if the agency stops here, it has augmented **its** appropriation to the tune of \$500. If the tort claim had never occurred and the agency collected the \$500 from the contractor, the \$500 would have to go to miscellaneous receipts (see “Contract Matters,” above). Conversely, if the contract claim did not exist, the agency would end up paying \$600 on the tort **claim**. Now, combining both claims, if both were paid without **setoff**, the net result would be that the agency is out \$600. The **setoff** cannot operate to put the agency’s appropriation in a better position than it would have been in had the agency and contractor simply exchanged checks. Thus, in addition to paying the contractor \$100, the agency must deposit \$500 from its own appropriation into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

A different type of “**setoff**” occurs under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. When an agency pays an employee back pay under the Back Pay Act, it must deduct amounts the employee earned through other employment during the time period in question. The agency simply pays the net amount. There is no requirement to transfer the amount of the deduction for outside earnings to miscellaneous receipts 31 **Comp. Gen.** 318(1952). The deduction for outside earnings is not really a collection; it is merely part of the statutory formula for determining the amount of the payment.

#### **g.** Revolving Funds

A **major** exception to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) is the revolving fund. Under the revolving fund concept, receipts are credited directly to the fund and are available, without further appropriation by Congress (unless the Legislation specifies otherwise), for expenditures to carry out the purposes of the fund. An agency must have **statutory** authority to establish a revolving fund. The enabling statute will specify the receipts that may be credited to the fund and the purposes for which they may be expended. An example is the General Services Administration’s “General Supply Fund,” noted above under “Damage to Government Property.” Receipts that are properly for deposit to a revolving fund are, obviously, exempt from the miscellaneous receipts requirement of § 3302(b). **E.g.**, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 316 (1922).

part by trust funds and in part by appropriated funds, although the activities in question were supported mostly by appropriated funds,

The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has cautioned against carrying this theory too far in the case of nonstatutory trusts created by executive action. For example, the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia sued a transportation company for causing an oil spill in the Chesapeake Bay. A settlement was proposed under which the defendant would donate money to a private waterfowl preservation organization. The OLC found that the proposal would contravene 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), stating:

"In our view, the fact that no cash actually touches the palm of a federal official is irrelevant for purposes of § [3302(b)], if a federal agency could have accepted possession and retains discretion to direct the use of the money. The doctrine of constructive receipt will ignore the form of a transaction in order to get to its substance. . . . Since we believe that money available to the United States and directed to another recipient is constructively 'received' for purposes of § [3302(b)], we conclude that the proposed settlement is barred by that statute."

**4B** Op. Off. Legal Counsel 684,688 (1980). There was a solution in that case, however. Since the United States had not suffered any monetary loss, it was not required to seek damages. The proposed contribution by the defendant could be attributed to the co-plaintiff, Virginia, which of course is not subject to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). *Id.* 75

GAO reached a similar conclusion in **B-210210**, September 14, 1983, holding that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission lacked authority to enter into a settlement agreement under which a party charged with violation of the Commodity Exchange Act would donate funds to an educational institution with no relationship to the violation. A more recent case concluded that, without statutory authority, permitting a party who owes a penalty to contribute to a research project in lieu of paying the penalty amounts to a circumvention of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) and improperly augments the agency's research appropriations. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 17 (1990). A case saying essentially the same thing in the context of Clean Air Act violations is **B-247155**, July 7, 1992.

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<sup>75</sup>The opinion noted that the proposed settlement would be authorized under subsequent amendments to the governing legislation.

15,26 (1980); 27 **Comp. Gen.** 641 (1948). In the latter case, the government of Persia had made a payment to the United States government to reimburse expenses incurred in sending an American vessel to Persia to return to the United States the body of an American official killed by a mob in **Tehran**. The State Department suggested that the money **be** used as a trust fund for the education **of** Persian students. However, the Comptroller General found that the funds had not been received under conditions which would constitute a “proper and legal trust” and therefore were properly deposited as miscellaneous receipts, the clear implication being that 31 **U.S.C. § 3302(b)** would not **apply** to money received in a valid trust capacity.

Other authorities supporting this general proposition are Emery v. United States, 186 F.2d 900,902 (**9th Cir.** 1951) (money paid to United States under court order as refund of overcharges by persons who had violated rent control legislation was held in trust for tenants and could be disbursed to them without need for appropriation); Varney v. Warehime, 147 F.2d 238,245 (**6th Cir.** 1945) (assessments levied against milk handlers to defray certain wartime expenses were trust funds and did not have to be covered into the Treasury); United States v. Sinnott, 26 F. 84 (D. Ore. 1886) (proceeds from sale of lumber made at Indian sawmill were to be applied for benefit of Indians and were not subject to 31 **U.S.C. § 3302(b)**); 62 **Comp. Gen.** 245, 251–52 (1983) (proceeds from sale of certain excess stockpile materials where federal agency was acting on behalf of foreign government); **B-223146**, October 7, 1986 (moneys received by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation when acting in its trustee capacity); **B-43894**, September 11, 1944; **B-23647**, February 16, 1942 (taxes and **fin**es collected in foreign territories occupied by American armed forces); **B-24117-O. M.**, April 21, 1942 (penalty **on** defaulted bond received by United States as trustee for Indians).

In addition, receipts generated by activities financed with trust funds are generally credited to the trust fund and not deposited **as** miscellaneous receipts **B-166059**, July 10, 1969 (**recovery** for damage to property purchased with trust funds); **B-4906**, October 11, 1951 (receipts accruing from activities financed from Federal Old-Age and **Survivors** Insurance Trust Fund). See also 50 **Comp. Gen.** 545, 547 (1971) (summarizing the holding in **B-4906**). In 51 **Comp. Gen.** 506 (1972), GAO advised the Smithsonian Institution that receipts generated by various activities at the National Zoo need not be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. The Smithsonian is financed **in**

- B-235577.2-O. M.**, November 9, 1989 (civil penalties under Food Stamp Act). See also 39 **Comp. Gen.** 647,649-50 (1960).
- Interest earned on grant advances by grantees other than states. **E.g.**, 69 **Comp. Gen.** 660 (1990).
  - Reimbursements received for child care services provided by federal agencies for their employees under authority of 40 U.S.C. § 490b. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 443, 448-49 (1988).
  - Receipts generated by undercover operations by law enforcement agencies. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 353 (1988); 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 684, 686 (1980). In GAO's opinion, however, short-term operations (a card game or dice game, for example) maybe treated as single transactions. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 353, clarifying **B-201751**, February 17, 1981. Thus, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) need not be read as requiring an undercover agent participating in a card game to leave the table to make a miscellaneous receipts deposit after every winning hand. If, however, the agent ends up with winnings at the end of the game, the money cannot be used to offset expenses of the operation.<sup>76</sup> Related cases are 5 **Comp. Gen.** 289 (1925) and 3 **Comp. Gen.** 911 (1924) (moneys used to purchase evidence for use in criminal prosecutions and recovered when no longer needed for that purpose must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts).
  - Proceeds from silver and gold sold as excess property by the Interior Department as successor to the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Administration. (The silver and gold had been obtained by melting down unsold commemorative medals which had been struck by the Treasury Department for sale by the ARBA.) **B-200962**, May 26, 1981.
  - Income derived from oil and gas leases on "acquired lands" (as distinguished from "public domain lands") of the United States used for military purposes. **B-203504**, July 22, 1981.

j. Miscellaneous Cases: Money Retained by Agency

Most cases in which an agency may credit receipts to **its** own appropriation or fund involve the areas previously discussed: authorized repayments, Economy Act transactions, revolving funds,

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<sup>76</sup>Starting in FY 1979, **th** Federal Bureau of Investigation, and later the Drug Enforcement Administration as well, received authority annually, first in authorization acts and later in appropriation acts, to use proceeds from undercover operations to offset reasonable and necessary expenses of the operations. **E.g.**, Pub. L. No. 102-140, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 782, 791-93 (1991) (FY 1992 Justice Department appropriation act). As soon as the proceeds or the balance thereof are no longer necessary for the conduct of the operation, they are to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. Id. § 102(b)(2). The Internal Revenue Service, the subject of 67 **Comp. Gen.** 353, received similar authority late in 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7601(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4504), but it appears to have expired as of December 31, 1991 (Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3301(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4917).

GAO considered **similar** issues in several cases involving consent orders between the **Department** of Energy and **oil** companies charged with violation of federal oil price and **allocation** regulations. The Department has **limited authority** to use recovered overcharge funds for **restitutionary** purposes, and in fact has a duty to attempt restitution. However, **to** the extent this cannot reasonably be accomplished or funds remain **after** restitution efforts have been exhausted, the funds may not be used for energy-related programs with no **restitutionary** nexus but must be deposited in the Treasury pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). 62 **Comp. Gen.** 379 (1983); 60 **Comp. Gen.** 15 (1980). It is equally unauthorized to give the funds to charity or to use them to augment appropriations for administering the overcharge refund program. **B-200170**, April 1, 1981.

In a 1991 case, an agency had discovered a \$10,000 bank account belonging to an employee morale club which had become defunct. No documentation of the club's creation or dissolution could be located. Thus, if the club had ever provided for the disposition of its funds, it could no longer be established. Clearly, the money was not received for the use of the government for purposes **of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b)**. It was **equally** clear that the money could not be credited to the agency's appropriations. GAO advised that the money could be turned over to a successor employee **morale** organization to be used for its intended **purposes**. **If** no successor organization stepped forward, the funds would have to be deposited in a Treasury trust account in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1322. **B-241744**, May 31, 1991.

i. Miscellaneous Cases: Money **In** addition to the categories discussed above, there have been numerous other decisions involving the disposition of receipts in various contexts. Some cases in which the Comptroller **General** held that receipts of a particular type must be deposited in the Treasury as **miscellaneous** receipts under 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) or related statutes **are** set forth below.

- Costs awarded to the United States **by a court** under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 47 **Comp. Gen.** 70 (1967).
- Moneys collected as a fine **or penalty**. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 17 (1990) (civil penalties assessed against Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees); 69 **Comp. Gen.** 260 (1990) (penalties—as opposed to the recovery of actual losses—under the False Claims Act); 47 **Comp. Gen.** 674 (1968) (dishonored checks); 23 **Comp. Dec.** 352 (1916);



In the occasional case, the authority maybe less than specific. In B-1 14860, March 20, 1975, for example, based on the broad authority of the National Housing Act, GAO advised that the Department of Housing and Urban Development **could** require security deposits from tenants in HUD-owned multifamily projects. consistent with practice in the private sector, the deposit **would** be considered the property of the tenant and held in an escrow account, to be either returned to the tenant upon completion of the lease or forfeited to the government in cases of breach.

A final case we will note is 24 **Comp. Gen.** 514 (1945), an exception stemming from the particular funding arrangement involved rather than a specific statute. The case dealt with certain government corporations which did not receive **regular** appropriations but instead received annual authorizations for expenditures from their **capital** funds for administrative expenses. An appropriation act had imposed a limit on certain communication expenditures and provided that savings resulting from the limit “shall not be diverted to other use but **shall** be covered into the **Treasury** as miscellaneous receipts.” The **Comptroller General** construed this as meaning returned to the source from which made available. In the case of the corporations in question, this meant that the savings **could** be returned to their **capital** funds.

k. Money Erroneously  
Deposited **as** Miscellaneous  
Receipts

The various accounts that comprise the heading “miscellaneous receipts” are just that—they are receipt accounts, not expenditure or appropriation accounts. As noted **earlier**, by virtue of the Constitution, once money is deposited into miscellaneous receipts, it takes an appropriation to get it back out. What, therefore, can be done if an agency deposits some money into miscellaneous receipts by mistake?

This question really involves **two** separate situations. In the **first** situation, an agency receives funds which it is authorized, under the principles discussed above, to credit to its own appropriation or fund, but erroneously deposits them as miscellaneous receipts. The decisions have always recognized that the agency can make **an** appropriate **adjustment** to correct the error. In an **early** case, the Interior Department sold some property and deposited the proceeds as miscellaneous receipts when in fact it was statutorily authorized to credit the proceeds to its reclamation fund. The Interior Department then requested a transfer of the funds back to the reclamation fund, and the Secretary of the Treasury asked the Comptroller of the

or the other specific situations noted. There is another group of cases, not susceptible of further generalization, in which an agency simply has **specific** statutory authority to retain certain receipts. Examples are:

- Forest Service may retain moneys paid by permittees on national forest lands representing their pro rata share under cooperative agreements for the operation and maintenance of waste disposal systems under the **Granger-Thye Act**. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1142 (1976).
- Customs Service may, under 19 U.S.C. §1524, retain charges collected from airlines for **preclearance** of passengers and baggage at airports in Canada, for credit to the appropriation originally charged with providing the service. 48 **Comp. Gen.** 24 (1968).
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation may retain interest on loans of excess foreign currencies made under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. 52 **Comp. Gen.** 54 (1972).
- Payroll deductions **for government-furnished** quarters under 5 U.S.C. § 5911 are retained in the appropriation(s) or fund(s) from which the employee's salary is paid. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 235 (1980), as modified by 60 **Comp. Gen.** 659 (1981). However, if the employee pays directly rather than by payroll deduction, the direct payments must go to miscellaneous receipts unless the agency has specific statutory authority to retain them. 59 **Comp. Gen.** at 236.<sup>77</sup>
- Under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, receipts from the sale or lease of public lands are distributed in the manner specified in the statute. This was held to include the proceeds of bid deposits forfeited by successful mineral lease bidders who fail to execute the **lease**. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 570 (1986).
- By virtue of provisions in the Job Training Partnership Act and annual appropriation acts, certain receipts generated by Job Corps Centers may be retained for credit to the Labor Department appropriation from which the Centers are funded. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 666 (1986).
- Legislation establishing the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution authorized the Commission to retain revenues derived from its licensing activities but did not address sales revenues. Sales revenues, therefore, had to be deposited as miscellaneous receipts. **B-228777**, August 26, 1988.

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<sup>77</sup>For agencies funded under the annual Interior Department and Related Agencies appropriation acts, the rentals, whether collected by payroll deduction or otherwise, go into a "special fund" maintained by each agency to be used for maintenance and **operation** of the quarters. 5 U.S.C. § 5911 note.

question); 63 **Comp. Gen.** 189 (1984) (Department of Energy deposited overcharge recoveries from oil companies into general fund instead of first attempting to use them **to make restitutionary** refunds); **B-217595**, April 2, 1986 (interest collections subsequently determined to have been erroneous).

One case, 53 **Comp. Gen.** 580 (1974), combined elements of both situations. The Army Corps of Engineers had been authorized to issue discharge permits under the Refuse Act Permit Program. The program was statutorily transferred in 1972 to the Environmental Protection Agency. Under the User Charge Statute, 31 U.S.C. §9701, both the Corps and EPA had charged applicants a fee. In some cases, the fees had been deposited as miscellaneous receipts before the applications were processed. The legislation that transferred the program to EPA also provided that EPA could authorize states to issue the permits. However, there was no provision that authorized EPA to transfer to the states any fees **already** paid. Thus, some applicants found that they had paid a fee to the Corps or EPA, received nothing for it, and were now being charged a second fee by the state for the same application. EPA felt that the original fees should be **refunded**. So did the applicants.

GAO noted that the User Charge Statute contemplates that the federal agency **will** furnish something in exchange for the fee. Since this had not been done, the fees could be viewed as having been erroneously deposited in the general fund. However, the fees had not been erroneously received—the Corps and EPA had been entirely correct in charging the fees in the first place—so the appropriation **made by 31 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)** could not be used. There was a way out, but the refunds would require a two-step process. The Corps **and** EPA should have deposited the fees in a trust **account**<sup>79</sup> and kept them there until the applications were processed, at which time depositing as **miscellaneous** receipts would have been proper. Thus, EPA could first transfer the funds from the general fund to its suspense account as **the** correction of an error, and then make the refunds directly from the suspense account.

In cases where the “Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered” appropriation is otherwise **available**, it is available without regard to

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<sup>79</sup>See also **B-3596/A-51615**, November 30, 1939. Use of a deposit fund suspense account is equally acceptable. **B-158381**, June 21, 1968.

Treasury if it was authorized. Of course it was, replied the Comptroller:

“This is not taking money out of the Treasury in violation of paragraph 7, section 9, Article I of the Constitution. . . .

“The proceeds of the sale. . . have been appropriated by law. Taking it from the Treasury and placing it to the credit in the Treasury of the appropriation to which it belongs violates neither the Constitution nor any other law, but simply corrects an error by which it was placed to the unappropriated surplus instead of to the appropriation to which it belongs.” 12 **Comp. Dec.** 733, 735 (1906).

This concept has consistently been followed. See 45 **Comp. Gen.** 724 (1966); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 762 (1924); 2 **Comp. Gen.** 599 (1923).<sup>78</sup>

In the second situation, a private party pays money to a federal agency, the agency deposits it as miscellaneous receipts, and it is subsequently determined that the party is entitled to a refund. Here, in contrast to the first situation, an appropriation is necessary to get the money out. E.g., 3 **Comp. Gen.** 296 (1923).

There is a permanent indefinite appropriation for refunding collections “erroneously received and covered” which are not properly chargeable to any other appropriation. 31 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The availability of this appropriation depends on exactly where the receipts were deposited. If the amount subject to refund was credited to some specific appropriation account, the refund is chargeable to the same account. If, however, the receipt was deposited in the general fund as miscellaneous receipts, then the appropriation made by 31 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) is available for the refund, provided that the amount in question was “erroneously received and covered.” 61 **Comp. Gen.** 224 (1982); 55 **Comp. Gen.** 625 (1976); 17 **Comp. Gen.** 859 (1938).

Examples of cases in which use of the “Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered” appropriation was found authorized are 71 **Comp. Gen.** — (B-239769.2, July 24, 1992) (refund to investment company of late **filing** fee upon issuance of order by Securities and Exchange Commission exempting company from **filing** deadline for **fiscal** year in

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<sup>78</sup>The reverse adjustment is made when funds which should have been deposited as **miscellaneous** receipts are erroneously credited to an appropriation. The **remedy** is a transfer from the appropriation to the appropriate miscellaneous **receipts** account. **E.g., B-48722**, April 16, 1945.

statutory authority is necessary. As the Supreme Court has said, “[u]ninterrupted usage from the foundation of the Government has sanctioned it.” United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 90 (1950). The gifts may be of real property or personal property, and they may be testamentary (made by will) or inter vivos (made by persons who are not dead yet). Since monetary gifts to the United States go to the general fund of the Treasury, there is no augmentation problem.

However, as the Supreme Court held in the Burnison case, a state may prohibit testamentary gifts by its domiciliaries to the United States. Also, a state may impose an inheritance tax on property bequeathed to the United States. United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 (1896). The tax is not regarded as a constitutionally impermissible tax on federal property “since the tax is imposed upon the legacy before it reaches the hands of the government. The legacy becomes the property of the United States only after it has suffered a diminution to the amount of the tax. . . .” Id. at 630.

While gifts to the United States do not require statutory authority, gifts to an individual federal agency stand on a different footing. The rule is that a government agency may not accept for its own use (i.e., for retention by the agency or credit to its own appropriations) gifts of money or other property in the absence of specific statutory authority. 16 Comp. Gen. 911 (1937). As the Comptroller General said in that decision, “[w]hen the Congress has considered desirable the receipt of donations. . . it has generally made specific provision therefor . . . .” Id. at 912. See also B-13378, November 20, 1940; A-44015, March 17, 1937.

Thus, acceptance of a gift by an agency lacking statutory authority to do so is an improper augmentation. If an agency does not have statutory authority to accept donations, it must turn the money in to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. E.g., B-139992, August 31, 1959 (proceeds of life insurance policy designating federal agency as beneficiary).

For purposes of this discussion, the term “gifts” maybe defined as “gratuitous conveyances or transfers of ownership in property without any consideration.” 25 Comp. Gen. 637,639 (1946); B-217909, September 22, 1986. A receipt that does not meet this definition does not become a gift merely because the agency characterizes it as one. For example, a fee paid for the privilege of

whether the original payment was made under protest. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 243 (1975). Payments under 31 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) are made by the Treasury Department without the need for settlement action by GAO, except in doubtful cases. **B-142380**, March 24, 1960 (circular letter). The procedure is for the finance office of the agency making the refund to submit a Standard Form 1166 to the Treasury Department, citing account **20X1807** in the “appropriations summary” block. See **B-217595**, April 2, 1986; **B-210638**, July 5, 1984 (non-decision letter).

The appropriation made by 31 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) is available only to refund amounts actually received and deposited. If a given refund bears interest, for example, a refund claim approved by a contracting officer under the Contract Disputes Act, the interest portion must be charged to the contracting agency’s operating appropriations for the fiscal year in which the award is made. **B-217595**, April 2, 1986.

If an agency collects money from someone to whom it owes a refund from a prior transaction, it should not simply deposit the net amount. The correct procedure is to deposit the new receipt into the general fund (assuming that’s the proper receptacle), and then make the refund using the “Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered” appropriation. **B-19882**, October 28, 1941; **A-96279**, September 15, 1938. However, GAO has approved offsetting a refund against future amounts due from the same party in cases where there is a continuing relationship, but suggested that the party be given the choice. **B-217595**, April 2, 1986, at 4.

Clearly, if the receipt cannot be regarded as erroneous, 31 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) is not available. 53 **Comp. Gen.** 580 (1974); **B-14611**, July 6, 1961. Also, the “Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered” appropriation is available only where the amount to be refunded was deposited into the general fund. E.g., 11 **Comp. Dec.** 300 (1904). If a refund is due of moneys deposited somewhere other than the general fund, some other basis must be sought.

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### 3. Gifts and Donations to the Government

#### a. Donations to the Government

It has long been recognized that the United States (as opposed to a particular agency) may receive and accept gifts. No particular

limited-purpose authorities available to the military are found in 10 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2607.

We may also note a statute tailor-made for the philanthropist desiring to make a donation for the express purpose of reducing the national debt. (Some people think they already do this in April of each year.) The Secretary of the Treasury may accept **gifts** of money, obligations of the United States, or other intangible personal **property** made for the express purpose of reducing the public debt. Gifts of other real or personal property for the same purpose may be made to the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 31 U.S.C. §3113.

Assuming the existence of the requisite **statutory** authority, it is quite easy to make a gift to the government. There are no particular forms required. A simple letter to the appropriate agency head transmitting the funds for the stated purpose will **suffice**. See **B-157469**, July 24, 1974 (non-decision letter).

A 1980 GAO study found that, during fiscal year 1979, 41 government agencies received a total of \$21.6 million classified as **gift** revenue. See report entitled Review of Federal Agencies' Gift Funds, **FGMSD-80-77** (September 24, 1980). The report pointed out that the use of **gift** funds dilutes congressional oversight because the funds do not go through the appropriation process. The report recommended that agencies be required to more fully disclose gift fund operations in their budget submissions.

The issue raised in most gift cases is the purpose for which gift funds may be used. This ultimately depends on the scope of the agency's statutory authority and the terms of the gift. Gift funds are accounted for as trust funds. They must be deposited in the Treasury as trust funds under 31 U.S.C. §1321(b), to be disbursed in accordance with the terms of the trust. In 16 **Comp. Gen.** 650,655 (1937), the Comptroller General stated:

“Where the Congress authorizes Federal officers to accept private gifts or **bequests** for a specific purpose, often subject to certain prescribed conditions as to administration, authority must of necessity be reposed in the custodians of the trust fund to make expenditures for administration in such a manner as to carry out the purposes of the trust and to comply with the prescribed conditions thereof without reference to **general** regulatory and prohibitory statutes applicable to public funds.”

filming a motion picture in a national park is not a gift and must be deposited as miscellaneous receipts rather than in the agency's trust fund. 25 **Comp. Gen.** 637 (1946). See also **B-61938**, April 16, 1948. Similarly, a reduction of accrued liability in fulfillment of a contractual obligation is not a donation for purposes of a statute authorizing appropriations to match "donations." **B-183442**, October 21, 1975.

A number of departments and agencies have statutory authority to accept gifts. A partial listing is contained in **B-149711**, August 20, 1963. The statutory authorizations contain varying degrees of specificity as to precisely what may be accepted (money, property, services, etc.). For example, the State Department's gift statute, 22 U.S.C. §2697, authorizes the acceptance of gifts of money or property, real or personal, and, in the Secretary's discretion, conditional gifts. A case discussing this statute is 67 **Comp. Gen.** 90 (1987) (United States Information Agency may accept donations of radio programs prepared by private syndicators for broadcast over Voice of America facilities). Another is 70 **Comp. Gen.** 413 (1991) (United States Information Agency may accept donations of foreign debt). Authority to accept voluntary services does not include donations of cash. **A-86115**, July 15, 1937; **A-51627**, March 15, 1937.

The authority of the Defense Department to accept gifts is found in several statutes. First, the Defense Department may accept contributions of money or real or personal property "for use by the Department of Defense" from any person, foreign government, or international organization. The money and proceeds from the sale of property are credited to the Defense Cooperation Account in the Treasury. The money is not automatically available to Defense, but is available for obligation or expenditure only in the manner and to the extent provided in appropriation acts. 10 U.S.C. § 2608 (**Supp. III 1991**). Second, the Department may accept services, supplies, real property, or the use of real property under a mutual defense or similar agreement or as reciprocal courtesies, from a foreign government for the support of any element of United States armed forces in that country. 10 U.S.C. § 2350g (**Supp. III 1991**). These authorities formed the basis for the United States to accept contributions from foreign governments and others to defray the costs of the 1991 military operations in the Persian Gulf. See GAO report, Operations Desert Shield/Storm: Foreign Government and Individual Contributions to the Department of Defense, GAO/NSIAD-92-144 (**May 1992**). Other



Under a statute authorizing the Federal Board for Vocational Education to accept donations to be used “in connection with the appropriations hereby made or hereafter to be made, to defray the expenses of providing and maintaining courses of vocational rehabilitation,” the funds could be used only to supplement the Board’s regular appropriations and could not be used for any expense not legally payable from the regular appropriation. The statute here conferred no discretion. 27 **Comp.** Dec. 1068 (1921).

If an agency is authorized to accept conditional **gifts** (**gifts** made on the condition that the funds be used for a specific authorized purpose), the funds may be used to augment a “not to exceed” earmark applicable to that purpose. **B-52501**, November 9, 1945. (Although the statute involved in **B-52501**, the predecessor of 10 U.S.C. § 2608 noted above, no longer exists, the point of the decision is still valid.)

Once it is determined that the proposed use will not contravene the terms of the agency’s authorizing statute, the agency will have some discretion under the trust theory. The area in which this discretion has most often manifested itself in the decisions is entertainment. Although appropriated funds are generally not available for entertainment, several decisions have established the proposition that donated funds may be used for entertainment. This does not mean any entertainment agency **officials** may desire. Donated funds maybe used for entertainment only if the entertainment will further a valid function of the agency, if the function could not be accomplished as effectively from the government’s standpoint without the expenditure, and if the expenditure does not violate any restrictions imposed by the donor on the use of the funds. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 379 (1966); **B-170938**, October 30, 1972; **B-142538**, February 8, 1961. See also **B-195492**, March 18, 1980; **B-152331**, November 19, 1975. (**B-152331** involved a trust fund which included both gift and non-gift funds.) It follows that donated funds may not be used for entertainment which does not **bear** a legitimate relationship to official agency purposes. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 260 (1982), affirmed upon reconsideration, **B-206173**, August 3, 1982 (donated funds improperly used for breakfast for Cabinet wives and Secretary’s Christmas party); **B-198730**, April 13, 1981 (non-decision letter).

The trust fund concept was also applied in 36 **Comp. Gen.** 771 (1957). The Alexander Hamilton Bicentennial Commission had been

While this passage correctly states the trust theory, agencies have sometimes misconstrued it to mean that they have free and unrestricted use of donated funds. This is not **the** case. On the one hand, donated funds are not subject to all of the restrictions applicable to direct appropriations. Yet on the other hand, they are still “public funds” in a very real sense. They can be used only in furtherance of authorized agency purposes and incident to the terms of the trust. See **B-195492**, March 18, 1980.

An interesting illustration of this point occurred in **B-16406**, May 17, 1941. A citizen had bequeathed money in her will to a hospital. When the will was made, the hospital belonged to the state of Louisiana. By the time the will was probated, however, it had been acquired by the United States. Louisiana was concerned that the bequest might, if deposited in the United States Treasury, be diverted from the decedent’s intent. There was no need for concern, the Comptroller General advised. The money would have to be deposited as trust funds and would be available for expenditure only for the purposes specified in the trust, i.e., for the hospital.

Since gift funds are accounted for as trust funds, they are presumably subject to the Antideficiency Act. See OMB Circular No. **A-34, § 21.1** (1985), which includes trust fund expenditure accounts in the definition of “appropriation or fund.”

In evaluating the propriety of a proposed use of gift funds, it is first necessary to examine the precise terms of the statute authorizing the agency to accept the gift. Limitations imposed by that statute must be followed. Thus, under a statute which authorized the Forest Service to accept donations “for the purpose of establishing or operating any forest research facility,” the Forest Service could not turn over unconditional gift funds to a private foundation under a cooperative agreement, with the foundation to invest the funds and use the proceeds for purposes other than establishing or operating forest research facilities. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1059 (1976). See also 40 **Op. Att’y Gen.** 66 (1941) (Library of Congress could not, without statutory authority, share income from donated property with Smithsonian Institution); **B-198730**, December 10, 1986 (funds donated to Library of Congress to further purposes of Library’s Center for the Book could not be used for unrelated Library programs).

Gifts which involve continuing expense present special problems. Although there are no recent cases, indications are that the agency needs specific statutory authority-not merely general authority to accept gifts-since the agency's appropriations would not otherwise be available to make the continuing expenses. For example, an individual made a testamentary gift to a United States naval hospital. The will provided that the money was to be invested in the form of a memorial fund, with the income to be used for **specified** purposes. The Comptroller General found this objectionable in that "the United States would become, in effect, a trustee for charitable uses, would never gain a legal title to the money, but would have the burden and obligation of administering in perpetuity a trust fund. . . ." Also, absent **specific** authorization by Congress, appropriations would not be available for the expenses of administering the trust. Therefore, absent congressional authorization to accept the donation "as made," it could not be accepted either by the naval hospital, 11 **Comp. Gen.** 355 (1932), or by the Treasury Department, **A-40707**, December 15, 1936. See also *Story v. Snyder*, 184 **F.2d** 454,456 (**D.C. Cir.** 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 ("[g]ifts to the United States which involve any duty, burden, or condition, or are made dependent upon some future performance by the United States, are not accepted by the Government unless by the express authority of Congress"); 10 **Comp. Gen.** 395 (1931); 22 **Comp. Dec.** 465 (1916)<sup>80</sup>; 30 **Op. Att'y Gen.** 527 (1916). A few of the cases (e.g., 10 **Comp. Gen.** 395 and 30 **Op. Att'y Gen.** 527) have tied the result in with the **Antideficiency Act** prohibition against incurring obligations in advance of appropriations.

A question which appears to have received little attention is whether an agency with **statutory** authority to accept gifts may use either appropriated funds or donated funds to solicit the gifts. GAO found that the Holocaust Memorial Council may use either appropriated or donated funds to hire a fund-raiser, but the cases have little precedent value since the legislation involved included specific authority to solicit as well as accept donations. See **B-211149**, December 12, 1985; **B-211149**, June 22, 1983.

An interesting, and hopefully unique, situation presented itself in **B-230727**, August 1, 1988. Congress had enacted legislation to establish a Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United

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<sup>80</sup>Some wag once said, jokingly we think, that if you looked hard enough You **could probably find** a case dealing with the use of appropriated funds to buy dog food. 22 **Comp. Dec.** 465 is it.

given statutory authority to accept gifts and wanted to use the donations to award Alexander Hamilton Commemorative Scholarships. The **Commission** was to have a brief existence and would not have sufficient time to **administer** the scholarship awards. The Comptroller General held that the Commission could, prior to the date of its expiration, transfer the funds to a responsible private **organization** for the purpose of enabling proper administration of the scholarship awards. The distinction between this case and 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1059, mentioned above, is that in 36 **Comp. Gen.** 771, the objective of transferring the funds to a private organization was to better carry out an authorized purpose. In 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1059, the objective was to enable the funds to be used for unauthorized purposes.

Another case illustrating permissible administrative discretion under the trust theory is **B-131278**, September 9, 1957. A number of persons had made donations to St. Elizabeth's Hospital to enable it to buy an organ for its chapel. The donors (organ donors?) had made the **gifts** on the condition that the Hospital purchase a high-quality (expensive) organ. When the Hospital issued its invitation for bids on the organ, the specifications were sufficiently restrictive so as to preclude offers on lower quality organs. The decision found this to be entirely within the Hospital's discretion in using the gift funds in accordance with their terms.

**As** noted above, however, the agency's discretion in **administering** its gift funds is not unlimited. Thus, for example, an agency may not use gift funds for purely personal items such as greeting cards. 47 **Comp. Gen.** 314 (1967); **B-195492**, March 18, 1980.

The particular statutory scheme will determine the extent to which donated funds are subject to other laws governing the expenditure of public funds. In two cases, for example, where it was clear that a designated activity was to be carried out **solely** or primarily with donated funds, GAO found that the recipient agency could invest the gift funds in non-Treasury interest-bearing accounts, and was not required to comply with the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 or the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 68 **Comp. Gen.** 237 (1989) (Christopher Columbus **Quincentenary** Jubilee Commission); **B-211149**, December 12, 1985 (Holocaust Memorial council).

F. Supp. 87,90 (D. Minn. 1969). For purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 209, the proverb that it is better to give than to receive doesn't work. Both the giving and the receiving are criminal offenses under the statute. The employee would presumably violate the law by receiving more than he or she is entitled to receive under applicable statutes and regulations. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 273 (1922).

Second, they are improper as unauthorized augmentations. To the extent the private contribution replaces the employee's government salary, it is a direct augmentation of the employing agency's appropriations. To the extent the contribution supplements the government salary, it is an augmentation in an indirect sense, the theory being that when Congress appropriates money for an activity, all expenses of that activity must be borne by that appropriation unless Congress specifically provides otherwise.

An early case in point is 2 Comp. Gen. 775 (1923). The American Jewelers' Protective Association offered to pay the salary and expenses of a customs agent for one year on the condition that the agent be assigned exclusively for that year to investigate jewelry smuggling. The Comptroller General found the arrangement improper, for the two reasons noted above. Whether the payments were to be made directly to the employee or to the agency byway of reimbursement was immaterial.

Most questions in this area involve schemes for private entities to pay official travel expenses. From the sheer number of cases GAO has considered, one cannot help feeling that the bureaucrat must indeed be a beloved creature. Prior to 1991, a long series of decisions established the proposition that donations from private sources for official travel to conduct government business constituted an unlawful augmentation unless the employing agency had **statutory** authority to accept gifts. If the agency had such authority, the donation could be made to the agency, not the individual employee, and the agency would then reimburse the employee in accordance with applicable travel laws and regulations, with the allowances reduced as appropriate in the case of contributions in kind.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>Some cases from this series are 59 Comp. Gen. 415 (1980); 55 Comp. Gen. 1293 (1976); 49 Comp. Gen. 572 (1970); 46 Comp. Gen. 689 (1967); 36 Comp. Gen. 268 (1956); 26 Comp. Dec. 43 (1919).

Nations, to be funded solely from private contributions. The effective date of the legislation **was** March 1, 1989. Unfortunately, the legislation failed to provide a mechanism for anyone (Treasury Department or General Services Administration, for example) to accept and account for donations prior to the effective date, and the Commission itself could not do so since it had no **legal** existence. Thus, unless the statute were amended to authorize some other agency to act on the Commission's behalf, potential donors could not make contributions prior to the effective date since there was no one authorized to accept them.

Occasionally, someone makes a gift to the United States and later wants the money back. Where the elements of an unconditional gift have been satisfied (intent to make a gift, delivery, and acceptance), claims for refund have been denied, **A-94582**, June 6, 1938; **B-151432-O. M.**, June 3, 1963.

Finally, if an agency is authorized to accept gifts, it may also accept a loan of equipment by a private party without charge to be used in connection with particular government work. The agency's appropriations for the work will be available for repairs to the equipment, but only to the extent necessary for the continued use of the equipment on the government work, and not after the government's use has terminated. 20 **Comp. Gen.** 617 (1941). In one case, GAO approved the loan of private property to a federal agency by one of its employees, without charge and apparently without statutory authority, where the agency administratively determined that the equipment was necessary to the discharge of agency functions and the loan was in the interest of the United States. 22 **Comp. Gen.** 153 (1942). The decision stressed, however, that the practice should not be encouraged. The decision seems to have been based in part on wartime needs and its precedent value would therefore seem minimal. See, e.g., **B-168717**, February 12, 1970.

b. Donations to Individual Employees

(1) Contributions to salary or expenses

As a general proposition, unless authorized by statute, private contributions to the salary or expenses of a federal employee are improper. First, they may in some circumstances violate 18 U.S.C. § 209, which prohibits the supplementation of a government employee's salary from private sources. "The evils of such, were it permitted, are obvious." Exchange National Bank v. Abramson, 295

1293 (1976). An employee who receives an authorized donation after the government has already paid the **travel** expenses cannot keep everything. The employee must refund to the government the amount by which his or her allowances would have been reduced had the donation been received before the allowances were paid. **The** agency may then **credit** this refund to its travel appropriation as **an** authorized repayment. **Id. at** 1294-95.

The statute requires an “appropriate reduction” in travel payments in order to preclude the agency from paying for something that has already been reimbursed by an authorized private organization. An employee being reimbursed on an “actual expense” basis should not be claiming items which would duplicate private reimbursements. Thus, the agency is not required to reduce the actual expense entitlement by the **value** of provided meals. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 185 (1985). However, the value of subsistence items furnished in kind must be deducted where the employee is being reimbursed on a per diem basis. **Id. at** 188; 49 **Comp. Gen.** 572,576 (1970).

The authority conferred by 5 U.S.C. § 4111 is expressly limited to organizations exempt from taxation under section 501 (c)(3) of the **Internal** Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (religious, charitable, **scientific**, educational, etc.). It does not extend to organizations which may be tax-exempt under other portions of § 501. **B-225986**, March 2, 1987. Also, it does not **apply** to an organization whose application for exemption under § 501(c)(3) has not yet been approved; subsequent approval is not retroactive for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 4111. **B-225264**, November 24, 1987 (non-decision letter).

Donations made under the express condition that they be used for some unauthorized purpose should be returned to the donor. 47 **Comp. Gen.** 319 (1967).

(2) Promotional and other travel-related items

In recent years, commercial airlines and others have devised a variety of schemes, which change from time to time, to reward frequent customers. Promotional materials awarded to customers may take various forms—bonus trips, reduced-fare coupons, cash, merchandise, credits toward future goods or services, etc. Government employees traveling on government business are eligible for these promotional items the same as anyone else. There is,

One problem with this system was the lack of uniformity in treatment, varying with the agency's **statutory** authority. Congress addressed the situation in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, **§ 302**, 103 Stat. 1716, 1745, codified at 31 U.S.C. §1353. Subsection (a) provides as follows:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Director of the **Office** of Government Ethics, shall prescribe by regulation the conditions under which an agency in the executive branch (including an independent agency) may accept payment, or authorize an employee of such agency to accept payment on the agency's behalf, from non-Federal sources for travel, subsistence, and related expenses with respect to the attendance of the employee (or the spouse of such employee) at any meeting or similar function relating to the **official** duties of the employee. Any cash payment so accepted shall be credited to the appropriation applicable to such expenses. In the case of a payment in kind so accepted, a pro rata reduction **shall** be made in any entitlement of the employee to payment from the Government for such expenses.”

GSA's implementing regulations, published on March 8, 1991 (56 Fed. Reg. 9878), are found at 41 C.F.R. **Parts** 304-1 and 304-2. Thus, as long as acceptance complies with the statute and regulations, there is no longer an augmentation problem. The existence or lack of separate statutory authority to accept gifts is immaterial,

Another relevant statute, which seemingly overlaps 31 U.S.C. **§ 1353** to some extent but was left untouched by it, is 5 U.S.C. §4111, enacted as part of the Government Employees Training Act. Under this provision, an employee may accept (1) contributions and awards incident to training in **nongovernment** facilities, and (2) payment of travel, subsistence, and other expenses incident to attendance at meetings, but only if the donor is a tax-exempt nonprofit **organization**.<sup>82</sup> If an employee receives a contribution in cash or in kind under this section, travel and subsistence allowances are subject to an “appropriate reduction.”

Section 4111 authorizes the employee to accept the donation. It does not authorize the agency to accept the donation, credit it to its appropriations, and then reimburse the employee. 55 **Comp. Gen.**

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<sup>82</sup>The rules under 5 U.S.C. § 4111 are stated and applied in a number of sources in addition to the cases cited in the text. See, for example, B-171751, February 11, 1971, and two GAO reports involving the Agency for International Development (**Travel Practices: Private Funding of AID Employees' Travel**, GAO/NSIAD-87-92, March 1987, and **Travel Practices: Use of Airline Bonus Coupons and Privately Funded Travel by AID Employees**, GAO/NSIAD-86-26, November 1985).



Items such as promotional coupons that provide for future free or reduced-cost travel should be integrated into the agency's travel plans. **FPMR**, 41 C.F.R. § 101-25.103-2(b). Merchandise items which the receiving agency cannot use must be disposed of in accordance with General Services Administration regulations. *Id.* §§ 101-25.103-2(d), 101-25.103-4.

Since the benefit is the property of the government from the moment the employee receives it, an employee who uses it for personal travel or other personal use becomes indebted to the government for the full value of the benefit received. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 233 (1984); **B-216822**, March 18, 1985.<sup>86</sup>

The typical bonus program is not automatic, but requires the traveler to submit an application and, in some cases, pay a fee. An employee who has paid such a fee maybe reimbursed, not to exceed the amount of expected savings to the government. **FTR**, 41 C.F.R. § 301-1.6(f)(2); 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229,231.

The employee may retain two types of promotional "gift":

- Merchandise items of nominal intrinsic value (pens, pencils, note pads, calendars, etc.). 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229,233,
- Benefits which have no value to the government, such as free upgrades to first class. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229, 232; **B-212559**, February 24, 1984. The free upgrade should be used only for official travel. **B-223387-O.M.**, August 22, 1986.

In addition, the Federal Travel Regulations were amended in 1989 to permit an employee, subject to agency approval, to obtain premium-class accommodations through the redemption of frequent traveler benefits.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> At the time **B-216822** was issued, the indebtedness could not be waived. The waiver statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5584, has since been amended to include debts arising from travel or transportation allowances, so this portion of the decision should be disregarded.

<sup>87</sup> 41 C.F.R. § 301.3.3 3(d)(3)(ii)(F), added by 54 Fed. Reg. 47523,47524 (November 15, 1989). GAO supported the amendment. See 67 **Comp. Gen.** 79,83 (1987); **B-235185**, August 18, 1989 (non-decision letter). Prior to the amendment, such a redemption would not have been authorized under the guidelines set forth in the decisions. See GAO report, Frequent Fliers: Use of Airline Bonus Awards by AID Employees, GAO/NSIAD-86-217 (September 1986).

however, one important distinction. “Anyone else” may keep them; the government employee, with certain exceptions, may not.

The fundamental principle underlying the decisions and regulations in this area is that any benefit, cash payment or otherwise, received by a government employee from private sources incident to or resulting from the performance of **official** duty is regarded as having been received on behalf of the government and is the property of the **government**.<sup>83</sup> It should also be noted that the promotional items are not really “gifts”; they are more in the nature of benefits “earned” as a result of the expenditure of federal funds, **B-216052**, January 29, 1985 (non-decision letter). While the cases are not “augmentation of appropriations” cases, they are sufficiently related to the subject matter of this section to warrant brief treatment here.

GAO’s “leading case” in this area is 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229 (1984), and many of the points noted below will be found in that decision. In addition, the basic rules are reflected in the Federal Property Management Regulations (**FPMR**), 41 C.F.R. § 101-25.103, and Federal Travel **Regulations (FTR)**, 41 C.F.R. Parts 301-1 and 301-3.

The primary rule is that, except as noted below, promotional items or benefits of any type received by a government employee resulting in whole or in part from **official** travel are the property of the government and may not be retained by the employee for personal use. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229.<sup>84</sup> The fact that the individual obtains the benefit through a combination of official and personal travel is immaterial. **Id.**<sup>85</sup> An employee wishing to take advantage of **promotional benefits should** maintain separate accounts for official and personal travel. **FTR**, 41 C.F.R. § 301-1.6(f)(1). Whether the benefit is transferable or nontransferable is also immaterial. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 229, 232–33; **B-215826**, January 23, 1985.

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<sup>83</sup>There are common-sense exceptions to this. For example, a 1977 Justice Department opinion, summarized in **B-199656**, March 21, 1984 (non-decision letter), held that a government employee may retain a public service award in the form of cash from a private organization even though the service was performed as a government employee.

<sup>84</sup>See also 69 **Comp. Gen.** 643 (1990); 67 **Comp. Gen.** 79 (1987); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 203, 206 (1980); **B-210717.2**, February 24, 1984; **B-199656**, July 15, 1981; GAO report, Use of Airline Bonus Coupons and Privately Funded Travel by AID Employees, **GAO/NSIAD-86-26** (November 1985).

<sup>85</sup>See also **B-215826**, January 23, 1985; **B-212559**, February 24, 1984; **B-235185**, August 18, 1989 (non-decision letter); **B-218524**, April 1, 1986 (non-decision letter).

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should be any different since the airline is entitled to be made whole in either case.

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#### 4. Other Augmentation Principles and Cases

As pointed out earlier in our introductory comments, the augmentation theory is relevant in a wide variety of contexts. The most common applications are the areas previously discussed—the spectrum of situations involving the miscellaneous **receipts** statute and the acceptance of gifts. This portion of the discussion will present a sampling of cases to illustrate other applications of the **theory**.

Another way of stating the augmentation rule is that when Congress appropriates funds for an activity, the appropriation represents a limitation Congress has **fixed** for that activity, and all expenditures for that activity must come from that appropriation absent express authority to the **contrary**. Thus, a federal institution is normally not eligible to receive grant funds from another federal institution. It is not necessary for the grant statute to expressly exclude federal institutions as eligible grantees; the rule **will** apply based on the augmentation theory unless the grant statute expressly includes federal institutions. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 662,664 (1978); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 694 (1944); **B-1** 14868, April 11, 1975.

The improper treatment of reimbursable transactions may result in an augmentation. Thus, if a given reimbursement must be credited to the appropriation that “earned” it, i.e., that financed the **transaction**, and that appropriation has expired, crediting the reimbursement to current funds is an improper augmentation. An example of this type of transaction is the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §1535.

An agency may have the option of crediting reimbursements either to current funds or to the appropriation which financed the transaction. An example here is the Arms Export Control Act (Foreign Military Sales Act). Even here, however, crediting a reimbursement to an account which bears no relationship to the transaction would be an unauthorized augmentation. **B-132900-O.** M., November 1, 1977. Several statutes applicable to the Defense Department provide similar options. For a detailed discussion of these statutes, see **B-179708-O.** M., December 1, 1975; **B-179708-O.M.**, July 21, 1975; GAO report entitled Reimbursements to Appropriations: Legislative Suggestions for Improved Congressional Control, **FGMSD-75-52** (November 1, 1976).

An employee may keep a prize won in a contest or lottery sponsored by an air carrier if the contest was open to the general public and not limited to ticket-holding passengers. **B-199656**, July 15, 1981.

Also, there is no problem with the acceptance of life insurance benefits offered to federal employees by travel management contractors **at** no additional cost to the government where the government would receive no financial benefit by declining. **B-222234**, December 9, 1986.

Similarly, if an employee chooses to charge official travel expenses to a personal credit card and subsequently receives a cash or credit rebate on purchases made with that card, the employee may keep the entire rebate since it is not directly related to **official** travel. **B-236219**, May 4, 1990. As the decision suggests, the answer would presumably be different if the rebate were based solely on use of the card for official travel.

Denied boarding compensation (compensation paid by an air carrier when a passenger is involuntarily “bumped”) is payable to the government and not to the individual employee. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 95 (1979); **B-227280**, October 14, 1988; **B-224590**, November 10, 1986; **B-148879**, July 20, 1970, affirmed upon reconsideration, **B-148879**, August 28, 1970; **FTR**, 41 C.F.R. § 301-3.5(b). Since this is not a gift, but is more in the nature of damages, it must be deposited into miscellaneous receipts. 41 **Comp. Gen.** 806 (1962); **FTR**, *supra*. However, an employee who voluntarily vacates his or her seat and takes a later flight may retain overbooking compensation received from the airline, subject to offset for any additional travel expenses caused by the employee’s voluntary action. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 203 (1980); **B-196145**, January 14, 1980.

A strange result occurs if a federal agency makes a mandatory space requisition that forces an airline to “bump” a passenger who turns out to be another federal employee. The airline can charge the agency for the overbooking compensation it is required to pay. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 519 (1983). The bumped employee turns the money into his or her employing agency, which in turn deposits it in the Treasury. The net result is the transfer of the amount of the overbooking compensation from the requisitioning agency to the general fund of the Treasury. While 62 **Comp. Gen.** 519 did not expressly address the case of a bumped federal employee, there is no apparent reason why the result

validation of unpatented mining claims, although it may charge for other services in connection with the validation which it is not required to furnish); **B-211953**, December 7, **1984** (General Services Administration may not seek reimbursement for costs of storing records which it is required by law to store **and** for which it receives appropriations).

The Merit Systems Protection Board may not accept reimbursement from other federal agencies for travel expenses of hearing **officers** to hearing sites away from the Board's regular **field** offices. **Holding** the hearings is not **a** service to the other agency, but is a Board function for which it receives appropriations. The inadequacy of the Board's appropriations to permit sufficient travel is legally irrelevant. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 415 (1980), **affirmed** upon reconsideration, 61 **Comp. Gen.** 419 (1982). Where an agency provides personnel to act as hearing officers for another agency, it maybe reimbursed if it is not required to provide the **officers** (**B-192875**, January 15, 1980), but may not be reimbursed if it is required to provide them (32 **Comp. Gen.** 534 (1953)).

Similar issues can arise when an agency is trying to decide which of **its** appropriations to use for a given object. In 68 **Comp. Gen.** 337 (1989), for example, the Railroad Retirement Board wanted to make performance awards to personnel in its Office of Inspector General, and was unsure whether to charge its appropriation for the **IG's** office or its general appropriation. A reasonable argument could be made to support either choice. Thus, the Board could make an election as long as it remained consistent thereafter. Since there was no indication that the **IG** appropriation was intended to be the exclusive funding source for the performance awards, using the general appropriation would not result in an improper augmentation of the **IG** appropriation.

A somewhat analogous situation could arise if an agency agrees to reduce or forgo receipts to which it is entitled, and the party owing those receipts agrees in return to make some expenditure which would otherwise have to be borne by a separate appropriation of the same agency. GAO examined such a situation in **B-77467**, November 8, 1950, involving the leasing of lands under the **Bankhead-Jones** Farm Tenant Act at reduced rentals on condition that the lessees in return perform certain improvements to the **land**. There was no augmentation in that case, however, since the statute expressly authorized the leasing with or without consideration and on such

Failure to recover all required costs in a reimbursable Economy Act transaction improperly **augments** the appropriations of the ordering agency. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 674,682 (1978).

Similarly, treating a transaction which should be reimbursed as **nonreimbursable** may result in an improper augmentation. For example, an agency receives appropriations to do its own work, not that of another agency. Accordingly, as a general proposition, interdepartmental loans of **personnel** on a **nonreimbursable** basis improperly augment the appropriations of the receiving agency. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 635 (1986); 64 **Comp. Gen.** 370 (1985).

Reimbursement by one agency to another in situations which are not the proper subject of an Economy Act agreement or where reimbursement is not otherwise statutorily authorized is improper for several reasons: It is an unauthorized transfer of appropriations; it violates 31 U.S.C. §1301(a) by using the reimbursing agency's appropriations for other than their intended purpose; and it is an improper augmentation of the appropriations of the agency receiving the reimbursement. (The cases do not always cite **all** of these **theories**; they again illustrate the close interrelationship of the various **concepts** discussed throughout this publication.) The situation arises, for example, when agencies attempt to use the Economy Act for a "service" which is a normal part of the providing agency's mission and for which it receives appropriations.

To illustrate, an agency acquiring land cannot reimburse the Justice Department for the legal expenses incurred incident to the acquisition because these are regular administrative expenses of the Justice Department for which it receives appropriations. 16 **Comp. Gen.** 333 (1936). Similarly, an agency cannot reimburse the Treasury Department for the administrative expenses incurred in making disbursements on its account. 17 **Comp. Gen.** 728 (1938).

Federal agencies may not reimburse the Patent **Office** for services performed in administering the patent and trademark laws since the Patent **Office** is required bylaw to furnish these **services** and receives appropriations for them. 33 **Comp. Gen.** 27 (1953). Nor may they reimburse the Library of Congress for recording assignments of copyrights to the United States. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 14 (1951). See also 40 **Comp. Gen.** 369 (1960) (Interior Department may not charge other agencies for the cost of conducting hearings incident **to** the

decades, however, as the federal budget has grown in both size and complexity, a lump-sum approach has become a virtual necessity. For example, an appropriation act for an establishment the size of the Defense Department structured solely on a line-item basis would rival the telephone directory in bulk.

The amount of a **lump-sum** appropriation is not derived through guesswork. It is the result of a lengthy budget and appropriation process. The agency first submits its appropriation request to Congress through the **Office** of Management and Budget, supported by detailed budget justifications. Congress then reviews the request and enacts an appropriation which maybe more, less, or the same as the amount requested. Variations from the amount requested are usually explained in the appropriation act's legislative history, most often in committee reports.

**All** of this leads logically to a question which can be phrased in various ways: How much flexibility does an agency have in spending a lump-sum appropriation? Is it legally bound by its original budget estimate or by expressions of intent in legislative history? How is the agency's legitimate need for administrative flexibility balanced against the constitutional role of the Congress as controller of the public purse?

The answer to these questions is one of the most important principles of appropriations law. The rule, simply stated, is this: Restrictions on a lump-sum appropriation contained in the agency's budget request or in legislative history are not legally binding on the department or agency unless they are carried into (**specified** in) the appropriation act itself, or unless some other statute restricts the agency's spending flexibility. Of course, the agency cannot exceed the total amount of the lump-sum appropriation, and its spending must not violate other applicable statutory restrictions. The rule applies equally whether the legislative history is mere acquiescence in the agency's budget request or an affirmative expression of intent.

The rule recognizes the agency's need for flexibility to meet changing or unforeseen circumstances, yet **preserves** congressional control in several ways. First, the rule merely says that the restrictions are not legally binding. The practical wisdom of making the expenditure is an entirely separate question. An agency that disregards the wishes of its oversight or appropriations committees will most likely be called

terms as the Secretary of Agriculture determined would best accomplish the purposes of the act.

The following cases illustrate other situations which GAO found would result in unauthorized augmentations:

- The Customs Service may not charge the party-in-interest for travel expenses of customs employees incurred incident to official duties performed at night or on a Sunday or holiday. 43 **Comp. Gen.** 101 (1963); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 960 (1924). See also 22 **Comp. Dec.** 253 (1915).
- Department of Energy may not use overcharge refunds collected from oil companies to pay the administrative expenses of its Office of Hearings and Appeals. **B-200170**, April 1, 1981.
- Proposal for airlines to reimburse Treasury to permit Customs Service to hire additional staff to reduce clearance delays at Miami airport was unauthorized in that it would augment appropriations made by Congress for that service. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 294 (1980).

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## F. Lump-Sum Appropriations

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### 1. The Rule-General Discussion

A lump-sum appropriation is one that is made to cover a number of **specific** programs, projects, or items. (The number maybe as small as two.) In contrast, a line-item appropriation is available only for the specific object described.

Lump-sum appropriations come in many forms. Many smaller agencies receive only a single appropriation, usually termed “Salaries and Expenses” or “Operating Expenses.” All of the agency’s operations must be funded from this single appropriation.

**Cabinet-level** departments and larger agencies receive several appropriations, often based on broad object categories such as “operations and maintenance” or “research and development.” For purposes of this discussion, a lump-sum appropriation is simply one that is available for more than one specific object.

In earlier times when the federal government was much smaller and federal programs were (or at least seemed) much simpler, very **specific** line-item appropriations were more common. In recent



Two common examples of devices Congress uses when it **wants** to restrict an agency's spending flexibility are line-item appropriations and earmarks. Another approach is illustrated by the **following** provision, the most restrictive we have seen, from the 1988 continuing resolution:

"Amounts and authorities provided by this resolution shall be in **accordance** with the reports accompanying the bills as passed by or reported to the House and the Senate and in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference accompanying this Joint **Resolution.**"<sup>92</sup>

The 1983 appropriation act for the Department of Housing and Urban Development contained this restriction:

"Where appropriations in titles I and II of this Act are expendable for travel **expenses** and no **specific** limitation has been **placed** thereon, the expenditures for such travel expenses may not exceed the amounts set forth **therefor** in the budget estimates submitted for the appropriations. . . ." <sup>93</sup>

A provision prohibiting the use of a construction appropriation to start any new project for which an estimate was not included in the budget is discussed in 34 **Comp. Gen.** 278 (1954).

Also, the availability of a lump-sum appropriation maybe restricted by provisions appearing in statutes other than appropriation acts, such as authorization acts. For example, if **an** agency receives a line-item authorization and a lump-sum appropriation pursuant **to** the authorization, the line-item restrictions and earmarks in the authorization act will apply just as if they appeared in the appropriation act itself. The topic is discussed in more detail, with citations, in Chapter 2.

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## 2. Specific Applications

### a. Effect of Budget Estimates

Perhaps the easiest case is the effect of the agency's own budget estimate. The rule here was stated in 17 **Comp. Gen.** 147, 150 (1937) as follows:

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<sup>92</sup>Pub. L. No. 100-202, §107, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-434 (1987).

<sup>93</sup>Pub. L. No. 97-272, §401, 96 Stat. 1160, 1178 (1982).

upon to answer for its digressions before those committees next year. An agency that fails to “keep faith” with the Congress may **find** its next appropriation reduced or limited by line-item restrictions. That Congress is fully aware of this relationship is evidenced by the following statement from a 1973 House Appropriations Committee report:

“In a strictly legal sense, the Department of Defense could utilize the funds appropriated for whatever programs were included under the individual appropriation accounts, but the relationship with the Congress demands that the **detailed justifications** which are presented in support of budget requests be followed. To do otherwise would cause Congress to lose **confidence** in the requests made and probably result in reduced appropriations or line item appropriation **bills**.”<sup>88</sup>

Second, restrictions on an agency’s spending flexibility exist through the operation of other laws. For example, a “**Salaries and Expenses**” appropriation may be a large lump sum, but much of it is in fact **nondiscretionary** because the salaries of agency employees are **fixed by law**.<sup>89</sup> Third, reprogramming arrangements with the various committees provide another safeguard against abuse. Finally, Congress always holds the ultimate trump card. It has the power to make any restriction legally binding simply by including it in the appropriation **act**.<sup>90</sup> Thus, the treatment of lump-sum appropriations may be regarded as yet another example of the efforts of our legal and political systems to balance the conflicting objectives of executive flexibility and congressional **control**.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Report of the House Committee on Appropriations on the 1974 Defense Department appropriation bill, H.R. Rep. No. 662, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973).

<sup>89</sup>Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 72 (1975).

<sup>90</sup>For possible limitations on this statement, see *New York V. United States*, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2426 (1992); *Nevada v. Skinner*, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989).

<sup>91</sup>The effort has not always been free from controversy. One senator, concerned with what he felt was excessive flexibility in a 1935 appropriation, tried to make his point by suggesting the following:

“Section 1. Congress hereby appropriates \$4,880,000,000 to the President of the United States to use as he pleases.

“Sec. 2. Anybody who does not like it is fined \$1,000.”

79 Cong. Rec. 2014 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg), quoted in Fisher, supra note 89, at 62–63.

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b. Restrictions in Legislative History

The issue raised in most of the decisions results from changes to or restrictions on a **lump-sum** appropriation imposed during the legislative process. The “leading case” in this area is 55 **Comp. Gen.** 307 (1975), the so-called “LTV case.” The Department of the Navy had selected the McDonnell Douglas Corporation to develop a new fighter aircraft. LTV Aerospace Corporation protested the selection, arguing that the aircraft McDonnell Douglas proposed violated the 1975 Defense Department Appropriation Act. The appropriation in question was a lump-sum appropriation of slightly over \$3 billion under the heading “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy.” This appropriation covered a **large** number of projects, including the fighter aircraft in question. The conference report on the appropriation act had stated that \$20 million was being provided for a Navy combat fighter, but that “[adaptation of the selected Air Force Air Combat Fighter to be capable of carrier operations is the prerequisite for use of the funds provided.” It was conceded that the McDonnell Douglas aircraft was not a derivative of the Air Force fighter and that the Navy’s selection was not in accord with the instructions in the **conference** report. The issue, therefore, was whether the conference report was legally binding on the Navy. In other words, did Navy act illegally in choosing not to follow the conference report?

The ensuing decision is GAO’s most comprehensive statement on the legal availability of lump-sum appropriations. Pertinent excerpts are set forth below:

“[Congress has recognized that in most instances it is desirable to maintain executive flexibility to shift around funds within a particular lump-sum appropriation account so that agencies can make necessary adjustments for ‘unforeseen developments, changing requirements, . . . and legislation enacted subsequent to appropriations.’ [Citation omitted. ] This is not to say that Congress does not expect that funds will be spent in accordance with budget estimates or in accordance with restrictions detailed in Committee reports. However, in order to **preserve** spending flexibility, it may choose not to impose these particular restrictions as a matter of law, but **rather** to leave it to the agencies to ‘keep faith’ with the Congress. . . .

“On the other hand, when Congress does not intend to permit agency flexibility, but intends to impose a legally binding restriction on an agency’s use of funds, it does so by means of explicit statutory language. . . .

“Accordingly, it is our view that when Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what **can** be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and

“The amounts of individual items in the estimates presented to the **Congress** on the **basis** of which a lump sum appropriation is enacted are not binding on **administrative** officers unless carried into the appropriation act **itself**.”

See also **B-63539**, June 6, 1947; **B-55277**, January 23, 1946; **B-35335**, July, 17, 1943; **B-48120-O. M.**, October 21, 1948.

It follows that the lack of a specific budget request will not preclude an expenditure from a lump-sum appropriation which is otherwise **legally** available for the item in question. To illustrate, the Administrative **Office** of the U.S. Courts asked for a supplemental appropriation of \$11,000 in 1962 for necessary salaries and expenses of the Judicial Conference in revising and improving the federal rules of practice and procedure. The House of Representatives did not allow the increase but the Senate included the full amount. The bill went to conference but the conference was delayed and the agency needed the money. The Administrative **Office** then asked whether it **could** take the \$11,000 out of **its** regular 1962 appropriation even though it had not specifically included this item in its 1962 budget request. Citing 17 **Comp. Gen.** 147, and noting that the study of the federal rules was a continuing **statutory** function of the Judicial Conference, the Comptroller General concluded as follows:

“[I]n the absence of a specific limitation or prohibition in the appropriation under consideration as to the amount which maybe expended for revising and improving the Federal Rules of practice and procedure, you would not be **legally** bound by your budget estimates or absence thereof.

“If the Congress desires to restrict the availabilityof a particular appropriation to the several items and amounts thereof submitted in the budget estimates, such control may be effected by limiting such **items** in the appropriation act itself. Or, by a general provision of law, the availability of appropriations could be limited to the items and the amounts contained in the budget estimates. In the absence of such limitations an agency’s lump-sum appropriation is legally available to carry out the functions of the agency.”

This decision is **B-149163**, June 27, 1962. See also 20 **Comp. Gen.** 631 (1941); **B-198234**, March 25, 1981; **B-69238**, September 23, 1948. The same principle would **apply** where the budget request was for an amount less than the amount appropriated, or for zero. 2 **Comp. Gen.** 517 (1923); **B-126975**, February 12, 1958.

for DLGN 42 . . . “ The committee reports on the appropriation act and the related authorization act indicated that, out of the \$244 million appropriated, \$152 million was for construction of the DLGN 41 and the remaining \$92 million was for long lead time activity on the DLGN 42. It was clear that, if the \$152 million specified in the committee reports for the DLGN 41 was legally binding, obligations resulting from exercise of the contract option would exceed the available appropriation.

The Comptroller General applied the “LTV principle” and held that the \$152 million was not a legally binding limit on obligations for the DLGN 41. As a matter of law, the entire \$244 million was legally available for the DLGN 41 because the appropriation act **did** not include any restriction. Therefore, in evaluating potential violations of the **Antideficiency Act**, the relevant appropriation amount is the total amount of the lump-sum appropriation minus sums already obligated, not the lower figure derived from the legislative **history**.<sup>94</sup> As the decision recognized, Congress could have imposed a **legally** binding limit by the very simple device of appropriating a specific amount only for the DLGN 41, or by incorporating the committee reports in the appropriation language,

This decision illustrates another important point: The terms “lump-sum” and “line-item” are relative concepts. The \$244 million appropriation in the Newport News case could be viewed as a line-item appropriation in relation to the broader “Shipbuilding and Conversion” category, but it was also a lump-sum appropriation in relation to the two specific vessels included. This factual distinction does not affect the applicable legal principle. As the decision explained:

“Contractor urges that LTV is **inapplicable** here since LTV involved a lump-sum appropriation whereas the DLGN appropriation is a more specific ‘line item’ appropriation. While we recognize the factual distinction drawn by Contractor, we nevertheless believe that the principles set forth in LTV are equally applicable and **controlling** here. . . . [I]mplicit in our holding in LTV and in the other authorities cited is the view that dollar amounts in appropriation acts are to be interpreted differently from statutory words in general. This view, in our opinion, pertains whether the dollar amount is a lump-sum appropriation available for a large number

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<sup>94</sup>Of course, all this meant was that there would be 00 Antideficiency Act violation at the time the option was exercised. The decision recognized that subsequent actions could still produce a violation. 55 *Comp. Gen.* at 826.

**indicia** in committee reports and other legislative **history** as to how the funds should or are expected to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on Federal agencies. . . .

. . . .

We further point out that Congress itself **has** often recognized the reprogramming flexibility of executive agencies, and we think it is at least implicit in such [recognition] that Congress is well aware that agencies are not legally bound to follow what is **expressed** in Committee reports when those expressions are not explicitly carried over into the statutory language. . . .

. . . .

We think it follows from the above discussion that, as a general proposition, there is a distinction to be made between utilizing legislative history for the purpose of **illuminating** the intent underlying language used in a statute and resorting to that history for the purpose of writing into the law that which is not there.

. . . .

“As observed above, this does not mean agencies are free to ignore clearly expressed legislative history applicable to the use of appropriated funds. They ignore such expressions of intent at the peril of strained relations with the Congress. The Executive branch. . . has a practical duty to abide by such expressions. This duty, however, must be understood to fall short of a statutory requirement giving rise to a legal infraction where there is a failure **to** carry out that duty.”

55 **Comp. Gen.** at 318,319,321,325. Accordingly, GAO concluded that Navy’s award did not **violate** the appropriation act and the contract therefore was not illegal.

The same volume of the Comptroller General’s decisions contains another often-cited case, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812 (1976), the Newport News case. This case also involved the Navy. This time, Navy wanted to exercise a contract option for construction of a nuclear powered guided missile frigate, designated **DLGN 41**. The contractor, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, argued that exercising the contract option would violate the **Antideficiency** Act by obligating more money than Navy had in its appropriation.

The appropriation in question, Navy’s “Shipbuilding and Conversion” appropriation, provided “for the **DLGN** nuclear powered guided missile frigate program, \$244,300,000, which shall be available only for construction of **DLGN 41** and for advance procurement funding

The treatment of lump-sum appropriations as described above has been considered by the Department of Justice and the courts as well as GAO, and **all** have reached the same result. For example, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded in one case that the Department could, in the Attorney General's discretion, reallocate funds within the same lump-sum appropriation in order to avoid an impending deficiency for the United States **Marshals** Service. **4B** OP. Off. Legal Counsel 701 (1980). Another case applying these principles is **4B** Op. Off. Legal Counsel 674 (1980).

The **United** States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit **has** noted that lump-sum appropriations have a "well understood meaning" and stated the rule as follows:

"A **lump-sum** appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to distribute the funds among some or **all** of the **permissible** objects **as** it sees fit."

International Union v. Donovan, 746 **F.2d** 855,861 (**D.C. Cir.** 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825. The court in that case refused to impose a "reasonable distribution" requirement on the exercise of the agency's discretion, and found that discretion unreviewable. *Id.* at 862–63. See also McCarey v. McNamara, 390 **F.2d** 601 (**3d Cir.** 1968); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622 **F.2d** 539, 547 **n.6** (**Ct. Cl.** 1980).

One court, seemingly at odds with the weight of authority, has concluded that an agency was required by 31 **U.S.C. § 1301(a)** (purpose statute) to spend money in accordance with an earmark appearing **only** in legislative history. Blue Ocean Preservation Society v. Watkins, 767 **F. Supp.** 1518 (**D. Haw.** 1991). An additional factor in that case was that the agency had unsuccessfully sought congressional approval to reprogram the funds in question.

**c. "Zero Funding" Under a Lump-Sum Appropriation**

Does discretion under a lump-sum appropriation extend so far as to permit an agency to "zero fund" a particular program? Although there are few cases, the answer would appear, for the most part, to be yes, as long as the program is not mandatory and the agency uses the funds for other authorized purposes to avoid impoundment complications. E.g., B-209680, February 24, 1983 (agency could properly decide not to fund a program where committee reports on appropriation stated that no funds were being provided for that

of items, as in LTV, or, as here, a more **specific** appropriation available for only two items.” 55 **Comp. Gen.** at 821–22.

A precursor of LTV and *Newport News* provides another interesting illustration. In 1974, controversy and funding uncertainties surrounded the Navy’s “Project Sanguine,” a communications system for sending command and control messages to submerged **submarines** from a single transmitting location in the United States. The Navy had requested \$16.6 million for Project Sanguine for **FY 1974**. The House deleted the request, the Senate restored it, the conference committee compromised and approved \$8.3 million. The Sanguine funds were included in a \$2.6 billion lump-sum Research and Development appropriation. Navy spent more than \$11 million for Project Sanguine in 1974. The question was whether Navy violated the **Antideficiency** Act by spending more than the \$8.3 million provided in the conference report. GAO found that it did not, because the conference committee’s action was not specified in the appropriation act and was therefore not legally binding. Significantly, the appropriation act did include a proviso prohibiting use of the funds for “full scale development” of Project Sanguine (not involved in the \$11 million expenditure), illustrating that Congress knows perfectly well how to impose a legally binding restriction when it desires to do so. GAO report, Legality of the Navy’s Expenditures for Project Sanguine During Fiscal Year 1974, LCD-75-315 (January 20, 1975); **B-168482** -0. M., August 15, 1974.

Similarly, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare received a \$12 billion lump-sum appropriation for public assistance in 1975. Committee reports indicated that \$9.2 million of this amount was being provided for research and development activities of the **Social and Rehabilitation Service**. Since this earmarking of the \$9.2 million was not carried into the appropriation act itself, it did not constitute a statutory limit on the amount available for the program. **B-164031(3)**, April 16, 1975.

GAO has applied the rule of the LTV and *Newport News* decisions in a number of additional cases and reports, several of which involve variations on the basic theme.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>See 64 **Comp. Gen.** 359 (1985); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 228 (1980); B-247853.2, July 20, 1992; B-231711, March 28, 1989; B-222853, September 29, 1987; B-204449, November 18, 1981; 5204270, October 13, 1981; B-202992, May 15, 1981; B-157356, August 17, 1978; B-159993, September 1, 1977; B-163922, October 3, 1975; Internal Controls: Funding of International Defense Research and Development Projects, GAO/NSIAD-91-27 (October 1990).



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paid for services of cleaners, but it does not vest in the **commissioners the discretion** to determine that the entire amount shall be paid for rent and that the cleaning services shall be left unprovided for, or be provided for from other funds.”

Id. at 624. Although this result may at **first** glance seem inconsistent **with** the authorities previously cited, it would not have been possible **as** a practical matter to rent **office** space and totally eliminate cleaning services, and the use of any other appropriation would have been clearly improper. A factor which apparently influenced the decision was that the “regular **office** force” was somehow being coerced to **do** the cleaning, and these were employees paid from a separate appropriation. Id. Thus, 1 **Comp. Gen.** 623 should be viewed **as** an exception **based on** its own particular circumstances.

program, although agency would have been equally free **to** fund the program under the lump-sum appropriation); **B-167656**, June 18, 1971 (agency has discretion to discontinue a function funded under a lump-sum appropriation to cope with a shortfall in appropriations); **4B** Op. Off. Legal Counsel 701,704 **n.7** (1980) (same point).

The more difficult question is whether the answer is the same where there is no shortfall problem and where it is clear that Congress wants the program funded. In International Union v. Donovan, cited above, the court upheld an agency's decision to allocate no funds to a program funded by a lump-sum appropriation. Although there was in that case a "congressional realization, if not a congressional intent, that nothing would be expended" for the program in question, 746 **F.2d** at 859, it seems implicit from the court's discussion of applicable law that the answer would have been the same if legislative history had "directed" that the program be funded. The same result would seem to follow from 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812 (1976), discussed above, holding that the entire unobligated balance of a lump-sum appropriation should be considered available for one of the objects included in the appropriation, at least for purposes of assessing potential violations of the **Antideficiency Act**.

In **B-114833**, July 21, 1978, the Department of Agriculture wanted to use its 1978 lump-sum Resource Conservation and Development appropriation to fund existing projects rather than starting any new ones, even though Congress had expressly provided funds for certain new **RC&D** projects. Since the congressional action was stated in committee reports but not in the statute itself, the Department's proposed course of action was legally permissible.

An early decision reaching a different result is 1 **Comp. Gen.** 623 (1922). The appropriation in question provided for "rent of offices of the recorder of deeds, including services of cleaners as necessary, not to exceed 30 cents per hour, . . . \$6,000." The Comptroller General held that the entire \$6,000 could not be spent for rent. The decision stated:

"[S]ince [the appropriation act] provides that the amount appropriated shall cover both rent and cleaning services, it must be held that the entire amount can not be used for rent alone.

"... The law leaves to the discretion of the commissioners the question as to what portion of the amount appropriated shall be paid for rent and what portion shall be

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There is no legal requirement for you as an individual to keep track of your “obligations.” For the government, there is.

The concept of “obligation” is central to appropriations law. This is because of the principle, one of the most fundamental, that an obligation must be charged against the relevant appropriation in accordance with the rules relating to purpose, time, and amount. The term “available for obligation” is used throughout this publication to refer to availability as to purpose, time, and amount. This chapter will explore exactly what an obligation is.

It would be nice to start with an all-inclusive and universally applicable definition of “obligation.” Unfortunately, because of the immense variety of transactions in which the government is involved, such a definition does not exist. In fact, the Comptroller General has noted that formulating an all-inclusive **definition** would be impracticable, if not impossible. **B-116795**, June 18, 1954. As stated in **B-192282**, April 18, 1979, GAO—

“has generally avoided a universally applicable legal definition of the term ‘obligation,’ and has instead analyzed the nature of the particular transaction at issue to determine whether an obligation has been incurred.”

At **first** glance, this passage appears to beg the question. (How can you determine whether an obligation has been incurred if you don’t **first** define what an obligation is?) It is perhaps more accurate to say that GAO has defined “obligation” only in the most general terms, and has applied the concept to individual transactions on a case-by-case basis.

The most one finds in the decisions are general statements referring to **an** obligation in such terms as “a definite commitment which creates a legal liability of the Government for the payment of appropriated funds for goods and services ordered or received.” **B-116795**, June 18, 1954. See also 21 **Comp. Gen.** 1162, 1163 (1941) (circular letter); **B-222048**, February 10, 1987; **B-82368**, July 20, 1954; **B-24827**, April 3, 1942; **B-190**, June 12, 1939. **From** the earliest days, the Comptroller General has cautioned that the obligating of appropriations must be “definite and certain.” **A-5894**, December 3, 1924.

Thus, in very general and simplified terms, an “obligation” is some action that creates a liability or definite commitment on the part of the government to make a disbursement at some later time.

An advance of funds to a working fund does not in itself serve to obligate the funds. See 23 **Comp. Gen.** 668 (1944); **B-180578-O.** M., September 26, 1978. The same result holds for funds transferred to a special “holding account” established for administrative convenience. **B-1** 18638, November 4, 1974 (appropriations for District of Columbia Public Defender Service under control of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts are not obligated by transfer to a “Judicial Trust Fund” established by the Administrative Office).

The typical question on obligations is framed in terms of when the obligation may or must be “recorded,” that is, officially charged against the spending agency’s appropriations. Restated, what action is necessary or **sufficient** to create an obligation? This is essential in determining what fiscal year to charge, with all the consequences that flow from that determination. It is also essential to the broader concern of congressional control over the public purse.

Before proceeding with the **specifics**, two **general** points should be noted:

- For appropriations law purposes, the term “obligation” includes both matured and **unmatured** commitments. A matured commitment is a legal liability that is currently payable. An **unmatured** commitment is a liability which is not yet payable but for which a definite commitment nevertheless exists. For example, a contractual liability to pay for goods which have been **delivered** and accepted has “matured.” The liability for monthly rental payments under a lease is largely **unmatured** although the legal liability covers the entire rental period. Both types of liability are “obligations.” The fact that an **unmatured** liability may be subject to a right of cancellation does not negate the obligation. **A-97205**, February 3, 1944, at 9–10. An “**unmatured liability**” as described in this paragraph is different from a “contingent liability” as discussed later in this chapter.
- The obligation takes place when the definite commitment is made, even though the actual payment may not take place until the following **fiscal** year. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 351 (1977); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 862 (1944).

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## B. Criteria for Recording Obligations (31 U.S.C. § 1501)

The **overrecording** and the **underrecording** of obligations are equally improper. **Overrecording** (recording as obligations **items** which are not) is usually done to prevent appropriations from expiring at the end of a **fiscal** year. **Underrecording** (failing to record legitimate obligations) makes it impossible to determine the precise status of the appropriation and may result in violating the **Antideficiency** Act. A 1953 decision put it this way:

**“In order to determine the status of appropriations, both from the viewpoint of management and the Congress, it is essential that obligations be recorded in the accounting records on a factual and consistent basis throughout the Government. Only by the following of sound practices in this regard can data on existing obligations serve to indicate program accomplishments and be related to the amount of additional appropriations required.”** 32 Comp. Gen. 436,437 (1953).

The standards for the proper recording of obligations are found in 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a), originally enacted as section 1311 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1955 (68 Stat. 830). A Senate committee has described the origin of the statute as follows:

‘Section 1311 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1955 resulted from the **difficulty** encountered by the House Appropriations Committee in obtaining reliable **figures** on obligations from the executive agencies in connection with the budget review. It was not uncommon for the **committees** to receive two or three different **sets** of **figures** as of the same date. This situation, together with rather vague explanations of certain types of obligations particularly in the military departments], caused the House Committee on Appropriations to institute studies of agency obligating practices.

....

“The result of these examinations laid the foundation for the committee’s conclusion that loose practices had grown up in various agencies, **particularly** in the recording of obligations in situations where no real obligation existed, and that by reason of these practices the Congress did not have reliable information in the form of accurate obligations on which to determine an agency’s future requirements. To correct this situation, the committee, with the cooperation of the General Accounting **Office** and the Bureau of the Budget, developed what has become the **statutory** criterion by which the validity of an obligation is determined. . . .”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the primary purpose of 31 U.S.C. § 1501 is to ensure that agencies record only those transactions which meet **specified**

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<sup>1</sup>Senate Committee on Government Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government, S. Dec. No. 11, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1961).

standards for legitimate obligations. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 962,964 (1975); 51 **Comp. Gen.** 631,633 (1972); **B-192036**, September 11, 1978.<sup>2</sup>

Subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. § 1501 prescribes specific criteria for recording obligations. The subsection begins by stating that “[a]n amount shall be recorded as an obligation of the United States Government only when supported by documentary evidence of. . . .” Subsection (a) then goes on to list nine criteria for recording obligations. Note that the statute requires “documentary evidence” to support the recording in each instance. In one sense, these nine criteria taken together may be said to comprise the “definition” of an obligation.<sup>3</sup>

If a given transaction does not meet any of the criteria, then it is not a proper obligation and may not be recorded as one. Once one of the criteria is met, however, the agency not only may but must at that point record the transaction as an obligation. While 31 U.S.C. § 1501 does not explicitly state that obligations must be recorded as they arise or are incurred, it follows logically from an agency’s responsibility to comply with the **Antideficiency Act**. GAO has made the point in reports and decisions in various contexts. E.g., Substantial Understatement of Obligations for Separation Allowances for Foreign National Employees, **B-179343**, October 21, 1974, at 6; **FGMSD-75-20**, February 13, 1975, at 3 (letter report); 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4,6 (1985); **B-226801**, March 2, 1988; **B-192036**, September 11, 1978; **A-97205**, February 3, 1944, at 10.

It is important to emphasize the relationship between the existence of an obligation and the act of recording. Recording evidences the obligation but does not create it. If a given transaction is not sufficient to constitute a valid obligation, recording it will not make it one. E.g., B-197274, February 16, 1982 (“reservation and notification” letter held not to constitute an obligation, act of recording notwithstanding, where letter did not impose legal liability on government and

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<sup>2</sup>Although 31 U.S.C. § 1501 does not expressly apply to the government of the District of Columbia, GAO has expressed the view that the same criteria should be followed. **B-180578-O.M.**, September 26, 1978. This is because the proper recording of obligations is the only way to assure compliance with 31 U.S.C. § 1341, a portion of the **Antideficiency Act**, which does expressly apply to the government of the District of Columbia. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (so-called “Home Rule” Act), Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 603(e), 87 Stat. 774,816 (1973).

<sup>3</sup>**Financial Management in the Federal Government**, supra note 1, at 86.



subsequent formation of contract was within agency's control). Conversely, failing to record a valid obligation in no way diminishes its validity or affects the fiscal year to which it is properly chargeable. **E.g., B-226782, October 20, 1987** (letter of intent, executed in **FY 1985** and found to constitute a contract, obligated **FY 1985** funds, notwithstanding agency's failure to treat it as an obligation); 63 **Comp. Gen.** 525 (1984); 38 **Comp. Gen.** 81,82-83 (1958).

The precise amount of the government's liability should be recorded as the obligation where that amount is known. However, where the precise amount is not known at the time the obligation is incurred, the obligation should be recorded on the basis of the agency's best estimate. **E.g., 56 Comp. Gen. 414, 418 (1977)** and cases cited therein; 21 **Comp. Gen.** 574 (1941). See also **OMB Circular No. A-34, §322.1,22.2**. Where an estimate is used, the basis for the estimate must be shown on the obligating document. As more precise data on the liability becomes available, the obligation must be periodically **adjusted**. GAO, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 3.4.D (1990).

Retroactive **adjustments** to recorded obligations, like the initial recordings themselves, must be supported by documentary evidence. The use of statistical methods to make **adjustments** "lacks legal foundation if the underlying transactions cannot be **identified** and do not support the calculated totals." GAO report, Financial Management: Defense Accounting **Adjustments** for Stock Fund Obligations Are **Illegal**, **GAO/AFMD-87-1** (March 11, 1987) at 6; **B-236940**, October 17, 1989.

A related concept is the allocation of obligations for administrative expenses (utility costs, computer services, etc.) between or among programs funded under separate appropriations. There is no rule or formula for this allocation apart from the general prescription that the agency must use a supportable methodology. Merely relying on the approved budget is not sufficient. See GAO report, Financial Management: Improvements Needed in **OSMRE's** Method of Allocating Obligations, **GAO/AFMD-89-89** (July 1989). An agency may initially charge common-use items to a single appropriation as long as it makes the appropriate **adjustments** from other benefiting appropriations before or as of the end of the **fiscal year**. 31 **U.S.C.** §1534. The allocation must be in proportion to the benefit. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 592 (1991).

Further procedural guidance may be found in **OMB Circular No. A-34** (Instructions for Budget Execution); the Treasury Financial Manual; and GAO's Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies. **For the most part, the statutory criteria in 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)** reflect standards that had been developed in prior decisions of the Comptroller General over the years. See, **e.g.**, 18 **Comp. Gen.** 363 (1938); 16 **Comp. Gen.** 37 (1936). The remainder of this section will explore the nine **specific** recording criteria.

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**1. Subsection (a)(1):**  
Contracts

Subsection **(a)(1)** of 31 U.S.C. § 1501 establishes minimum requirements for recording obligations for contracts. Specifically, there must be documentary evidence **of—**

“(l) a binding agreement between an agency and another person (including **an** agency) that **is—**

“(A) in writing, in a way and form, and for a purpose authorized **by** law; and

“(B) executed before the end of the period of availability for obligation of the appropriation or fund used for **specific** goods to be delivered, real property to be bought or leased, or work or service to be provided.”

As seen in Chapter 5, the general rule for obligating **fiscal** year appropriations by contract **is** that the contract imposing the obligation must be made **within** the **fiscal** year sought to be charged and must meet a bona fide need of that **fiscal** year. **E.g.**, 37 **Comp. Gen.** 155 (1957). This discussion will center on the timing of the obligation from the perspective of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1).

Subsection **(a)(1)** actually imposes several **different** requirements (1) a binding agreement; (2) in writing; (3) for a purpose authorized bylaw; (4) executed before the expiration of the period of **obligational** availability; and (5) a contract calling for **specific** goods, real property, work, or services.

a. Binding Agreement

While the agreement must be legally binding (offer, acceptance, consideration, made by authorized official), it does not have to be the final “**definitized**” contract. The Legislative history of subsection **(a)(1)** makes this clear. The following excerpt is taken from the conference report:

“Section 131 l(a)(l) precludes the recording of an obligation **unless** it is supported by documentary evidence of a binding agreement between the parties as **specified** therein. It is not necessary, however, that the binding agreement be the final formal contract on any **specified** form. The primary purpose is to require that there be an offer and an acceptance imposing **liability** on both parties. For example, an authorized order by one agency on another agency of the Government, if accepted by the latter and meeting the requirement of specificity, etc., is **sufficient**. Likewise, a letter of intent accepted by a contractor, **if sufficiently specific** and definitive **to** show the purposes and scope of the contract finally to be executed, would constitute the binding agreement required.”

The following passage from 42 **Comp. Gen.** 733,734 (1963) remains a useful general prescription:

“**The** question whether Government funds are obligated at any specific time is answerable **only** in terms of an analysis of written arrangements and conditions agreed to by the United States and the party with whom it is dealing. If such analysis discloses a **legal** duty on the part of the United States which constitutes a legal **liability** or which could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the **part** of the other Party beyond the control of the United States, an obligation of funds may generally be stated to exist.”

In 35 **Comp. Gen.** 319 (1955) and more recently in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 431 (1980), the Comptroller General set forth the factors that must be present in order for a binding agreement to exist for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1) with respect to contracts awarded under competitive procedures:

1. Each bid must have been in writing.
2. The acceptance of each bid must have been communicated to the bidder in the same manner as the bid was made. If the bid was mailed, the contract must have been placed in the mails before the **close** of the **fiscal** year. If the bid was delivered other than by mail, the contract must have been delivered in like manner before the end of the **fiscal** year.
3. Each contract must have incorporated the terms and conditions of the respective bid without **qualification**. Otherwise, it must be viewed **as** a counteroffer and there would be no binding agreement until accepted by the contractor.

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<sup>4</sup>H.R. Rep. No. 2663, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954), quoted in B-118654, August 10, 1965.

To **illustrate**, where the agency **notified** the successful bidder of the award by telephone near the end of **FY 1979** but did not mail the contract document until **FY 1980**, there was no valid obligation of **FY 1979** funds. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 431 (1980). See also 35 **Comp. Gen.** 319 (1955).<sup>5</sup> A document is considered “mailed” when it is placed in the custody of the Postal Service (given to postman or dropped in mailbox or letter chute in **office** building); merely delivering the document to an agency messenger with instructions to mail it is insufficient. 59 **Comp. Gen.** at 433.

Similarly, there was no recordable obligation of **FY 1960** funds where the agency erroneously mailed the notice of award to the wrong bidder and did not notify the successful bidder until the first day of **FY 1961**. 40 **Comp. Gen.** 147 (1960),

It is important to note that, in the above cases, the obligation was **invalid** only with respect to the **fiscal** year the agency wanted to charge. The agency could still proceed to finalize the obligation but would have to charge funds current in the subsequent **fiscal** year. 59 **Comp. Gen.** at 433; 40 **Comp. Gen.** at 148.

A mere request for an additional allocation with no indication of acceptance does not create a recordable obligation. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 829 (1960). **Similarly**, a work order or purchase order maybe recorded as an obligation only where it constitutes a binding agreement for specific work or services. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1955).

A “letter of intent” is a preliminary document that may or may not constitute an obligation. At one extreme, it maybe nothing more than an “agreement to agree” with neither party bound until execution of the formal contract. E.g., B-201035, February 15, 1984, at 5. At the other extreme, it may contain all the elements of a contract, in which event it will create binding obligations. The crucial question is whether the parties intended to be bound, determinable primarily from the language actually used. Saul Bass & Associates v. United States, 505 **F.2d** 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974). For a good example of a letter

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<sup>5</sup>This is a relatively rare situation in which the **early** decisions were somewhat more “liberal.” E.g., A-28429, August 27, 1929 (**FY 1929** funds held **obligated** where bids were **solicited** and received and the lowest bid authorized to be accepted during **FY 1929** although formal contract not executed until **early FY 1930**). The explicit language of 31 **U.S.C. § 1601** would preclude this result today, although use of a **preliminary** letter contract, **discussed** later in the text, would at least **partially** solve the problem.

of intent creating contractual obligations, see **B-226782**, October 20, 1987.

A letter of intent which amounts to a contract is also **called** a “letter contract.” In the context of government procurement, it is used most commonly when there is insufficient time to prepare and execute the **full** contract before the end of the **fiscal** year. As indicated in the legislative history quoted earlier, a “letter of intent” accepted by the contractor may form the basis of an obligation if it is sufficiently specific and definitive to show the purpose and scope of the contract. 21 **Comp. Gen.** 574 (1941); **B-127518**, May 10, 1956. Letters of intent should be used “**only** under conditions of the utmost urgency.” 33 **Comp. Gen.** 291,293 (1954). Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, letter contracts may be **used—**

“when (1) the Government’s interests demand that the contractor be given a binding commitment so that work can start immediately and (2) negotiating a **definitive** contract is not possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement.”

FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.603-2(a).

The amount to be obligated under a letter contract is the government’s maximum liability under the **letter** contract itself, without regard to additional obligations anticipated to be **included** in the definitive contract or, restated, the amount necessary to cover expenses to be incurred by the contractor prior to execution of the definitive contract. The obligation is recorded against funds available for obligation at the time the letter contract is issued. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,421 (1955); **B-197274**, September 23, 1983; **B-197274**, February 16, 1982; **B-127518**, May 10, 1956. See also FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.603-2(d) and 16.603-3(a).

Once the definitive contract is executed, the government’s liability under the **letter** contract is merged into it. If **definitization** does not occur **until** the **following fiscal** year, the definitive contract **will** obligate funds of the **latter** year, **usually** in the amount of the total contract price **less** an appropriate deduction for obligations under the **letter** contract. **B-197274**, September 23, 1983. In this regard, the cited decision states, at page 5:

“The **definitized** contract then supports obligating against the appropriation current at the time it is entered into since it is, in fact, a bona fide need of that year. The amount of the **definitized** contract would ordinarily be the **total** contract costless

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either the actual costs incurred under the **letter** contract (when known) or the amount of the maximum **legal** liability permitted by the letter contract (when the actual costs cannot be determined).\*

Letter contracts should be **definitized** within 180 days. FAR, 48 **C.F.R. § 16.603-2(c)**. Also, letter contracts should not be used **to** record excess obligations as this distorts the agency's funding picture. See **GAO report, Contract Pricing: Obligations Exceed Definitized Prices on Unpriced Contracts, GAO/NSIAD-86-128** (May 1986).

b. Contract **"in Writing"**

Although the binding agreement under 31 **U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)** must be **"in writing,"** the **"writing"** is not necessarily limited to words on a piece of paper. The traditional mode of contract execution is to **affix** original handwritten signatures to a document (paper) setting forth the contract terms, and this is likely to remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Change is in the winds, however, and traditional interpretations are being reassessed in light of advancing computer technologies. In 1983, GAO's legal staff, in an internal memorandum to one of GAO's audit divisions, took note of modern legal trends and advised that the **"in writing"** requirement could be satisfied by computer-related media which produce tangible recordings of information, such as punch cards, magnetic cards, tapes, or disks. **B-208863** (2)-0. M., May 23, 1983.

Eight years later, the Comptroller General issued his **first** formal decision on the topic, 71 **Comp. Gen.** 109 (1991). The National Institute of Standards and Technology asked whether federal agencies could use certain Electronic Data Interchange (**EDI**) technologies to create valid contractual obligations for purposes of 31 **U.S.C. § 1501(a)**. Yes, replied the Comptroller, as long as there are adequate safeguards and controls to provide no **less** certainty and protection of the government's interests as under a **"paper and ink"** method. The decision states:

We conclude that **EDI** systems using message authentication codes which follow **NIST's** Computer Data Authentication Standard (**Federal** Information Processing

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<sup>6</sup>In the opinion of the editors, it is questionable whether, for obligation purposes, limiting the deduction to actual costs where known should be viewed as a general ride. Where the obligation under the letter contract is not excessive and is otherwise proper (meets bona fide needs test, etc.), it is arguable that the **full** obligation under the letter contract, even if not fully performed prior to **definitization**, should nevertheless **stand** as an obligation against the prior year's appropriation.

**Standard (FIPS) 113** [footnote omitted] or digital signatures following **NIST's** Digital Signature Standard, as currently proposed, can produce **a form of evidence that is acceptable** under section 1501.”

While there may be some room for interpretation as to what constitutes a “writing,” the writing, in some acceptable form, must **exist**. Under the plain terms of the statute, an oral agreement may not be recorded as an obligation. In United States v. American Renaissance Lines, Inc., 494 **F.2d 1059** (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020, the court found that 31 U.S.C. **§1501(a)(1)** “establishes virtually a statute of frauds” for the government’ and held that neither party can judicially enforce an oral contract in violation of the statute.

However, the Court of Claims and its successor, the Claims Court, have taken the position that 31 U.S.C. **§1501(a)(1)** does not bar recovery “outside of the contract” where **sufficient** additional facts exist for the court to infer the necessary “meeting of minds” (contract implied-in-fact). Narva Harris Construction Corp. v. United States, 574 **F.2d 508** (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 1, 19–20 (1987). Cf. Kinzley v. United States, 661 **F.2d 187** (Ct. Cl. 1981). In **addition**, according to the Claims Court, it is also possible to have an express oral contract if the required elements are **present**— “mutuality of intent to be bound, **definite** offer, unconditional acceptance, and **consideration**”—**and** if the government official involved had actual authority to bind the government. Edwards v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. **411**, 420 (1991).

These **would** be examples of subsequently imposed liability where the agency did not record—and lawfully could not have recorded—an obligation when the events giving rise to the liability took place. If a contractor received a judgment in this type of situation, the obligational impact on the “contracting agency” would depend on whether the case was subject to the Contract Disputes Act. If the Act applies, the judgment would be payable initially from the **permanent** judgment appropriation (31 U.S.C. **§ 1304**), to be reimbursed by the agency from currently available appropriations. If the Act does not apply, the judgment would be paid from the judgment appropriation

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<sup>7</sup>A “statute of frauds” is a law requiring contracts to be in writing in order to be enforceable. Mc@ if not all, states have some version of such a statute. Strictly **speaking**, as the Comptroller General has noted, there is no federal statute of frauds. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 829,831 (1960). See also 55 **Comp. Gen.** 833 (1976).

without reimbursement, and there would thus be no obligational impact on the agency.

In **B-118654**, August 10, 1965, GAO concluded that a notice of award signed by the contracting officer and issued before the close of the **fiscal** year did not satisfy the requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1) where it incorporated **modifications** of the offer as to price and other terms which had been agreed to orally during negotiations. The reason is that there was no evidence in writing that the contractor had agreed to the modifications. GAO conceded, however, that the agency's argument that there was documentary evidence of a binding agreement for purposes of section 1501(a)(1) did have some merit. A similar issue arose in a 1977 case. While the decision implies (without mention of **B-118654**) that an obligation based on **an** award letter which incorporated telephone conversations relating to pricing might not be defeated if otherwise sufficient to **satisfy** 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1), the potential defect in any event would not afford a basis for a third party (in this case a protesting unsuccessful offeror) to object to the contract's legality. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 768,775 (1977).

c. Requirement of Specificity

The statute requires **documentary** evidence of a binding agreement for specific goods or services. An agreement that fails this test is not a valid obligation.

For example, a State Department contract under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Program establishing a contingency fund "to provide funds for refugee assistance by any means, organization or other voluntary agency as determined by the Supervising **Officer**" did not meet the requirement of specificity and therefore was not a valid obligation. **B-147196**, April 5, 1965.

Similarly, a purchase order which lacks a description of the products **to** be provided is not sufficient to create a recordable obligation. **B-196109**, October 23, 1979. In the cited decision, a purchase order for "regulatory, warning, and guide signs based on information supplied" on requisitions to be issued did not validly obligate **FY** 1978 funds where the requisitions were not sent to the supplier until after the close of **FY** 1978.

d. Invalid **Award/Unauthorized Where** a contract award is determined to be invalid, the effect is that Commitment no binding agreement ever existed as required by 31 U.S.C.



§ 1501(a)(1) and therefore there was no valid obligation of funds. 38 **Comp. Gen.** 190 (1958); **B-157360**, August 11, 1965. Under more recent authorities discussed in Chapter 5, however, the original obligation is not extinguished for **all** purposes, and the funds remain available post-expiration to fund a valid “replacement contract.” 70 **Comp. Gen.** 230 (1991); 68 **Comp. Gen.** 158 (1988). Where the invalidity is determined under a bid protest, which will presumably cover most such instances, the extended availability described in the GAO decisions is statutorily defined as 90 working days after the final ruling on the protest. 31 U.S.C. §1558. Thus, cases like 38 **Comp. Gen.** 190 must be regarded as modified to this extent. Of course, the obligation does not survive post-expiration for anything other than a valid replacement contract.

Where the Comptroller General awards bid preparation costs to a successful protester under authority of 31 U.S.C. §3554(c), payment should be charged to the agency’s procurement appropriations current at the time GAO issued **its** decision. **If** the amount must be verified prior **to** payment, the agency should record an estimated obligation, using GAO’s decision as the obligating document. Upon verification, the obligation is **adjusted** up or down as necessary, on the basis of the documents substantiating the amount. **B-199368.4**, January 19, 1983 (non-decision letter).

Claims resulting from unauthorized commitments raise obligation questions in two general situations. If the circumstances surrounding the unauthorized commitment are **sufficient** to give rise to a contract implied-in-fact, it maybe possible for the agency to ratify the unauthorized act. If the ratification occurs in a subsequent fiscal year, the obligation is chargeable to the prior year, i.e., the year in which the need presumably arose and the claimant performed. **B-208730**, January 6, 1983. If ratification is not available for whatever reason, the only remaining possibility for payment is a quantum meruit recovery under a theory of contract implied-in-law. The quantum meruit theory permits payment in limited circumstances even in cases where there was no valid obligation, for example, where the contractor has made partial delivery operating under what he believed to be a valid contract. **B-1** 18428, September 21, 1954. The obligational impact is the same as for ratification-payment is chargeable to the fiscal year in which the claimant performed. **B-210808**, May 24, 1984; **B-207557**, July 11, 1983.

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e. Variations in Quantity to Be  
Furnished

In some types of contracts, the quantity of goods to be furnished or services to be performed may vary. The quantity maybe indefinite or it maybe stated in terms of a definite minimum with permissible variation. Variations may be at the option of the government or the contractor. The obligational treatment of this type of contract depends on the exact nature of the contractual **liability** imposed on the government.

Before proceeding, it is important to define some terms. A requirements contract is one in which the government agrees to purchase all of its needs for the particular item or service during the contract period from the contractor, and the contractor agrees to fill all such needs. An indefinite-quantity contract is one in which the contractor agrees to supply whatever quantity the government may order, within limits, with the government under no obligation to use that contractor for all of its requirements. FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ **16.503(a)**, **16.504(a)**; Mason v. United States, 615 F.2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Hemet Valley Flying Service Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 512, ‘51 5–16 (1985). Under either type of contract, the government orders specific quantities from time to time by issuing a document variously termed a work order, task order, delivery order, etc.

In a requirements contract, the government must state a realistic and good faith estimate of its total anticipated requirements, based on the best and most current information available. 48 C.F.R. § **16.503(a)(1)**; 13-190855, March 31, 1978; **B-188426**, September 20, 1977. Maximum and minimum quantities may be specified but are not required. 48 C.F.R. § **16.503(a)(2)**; **B-226992.2**, July 13, 1987; Unlimited Enterprises, Export-import, Inc., ASBCA No. 34825,88-3 **BCA** 1120,908 (1988). Needs must relate to the contract period. 21 **Comp. Gen.** 961,964 (1942).

If, in the exercise of good faith, the anticipated requirements simply do not materialize, the government is not obligated to purchase the stated estimate or indeed, if no requirements arise, to place any orders with the contractor beyond any required minimum. AGS-Genesys Corp., ASBCA No. 35302, **89-2 BCA ¶ 21,702** (1989); World Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 20354,75-2 **BCA** 1111,536 (1975); 47 **Comp. Gen.** 365,370 (1968), The contractor assumes the risk that non-guaranteed requirements may fall short of expectations, and has no claim for a price **adjustment** if they do. Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 967 F.2d 579 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 688 (1958). If,

however, the government attempts to meet **its** requirements elsewhere, including the development of in-house capability, or if failure to place orders with the contractor for valid needs is otherwise found to evidence lack of good faith, liability will result. **E.g.**, **Torncello v. United States**, 681 **F.2d** 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982); **Cleek Aviation v. United States**, 19 Cl. Ct. 552 (1990); **Viktoria Transport GmbH & Co.**, **ASBCA** No. 30371,88-3 **BCA ¶** 20,921 (1988); **California Bus Lines**, **ASBCA** No. 19732,75-2 **BCA ¶** 11,601 (1975); **Henry Angelo & Sons, Inc.**, **ASBCA** No. 15082, 72-1 **BCA ¶** 9356 (1972); **B-182266**, April 1, 1975.

An **indefinite-quantity** contract, under current regulations, must include a minimum purchase requirement which must be more than nominal. 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(a). An indefinite-quantity contract without a minimum purchase requirement is regarded as illusory and unenforceable. It is no contract at all. **Mason v. United States**, 615 **F.2d** at 1346 n.5; **Torncello v. United States**, 681 **F.2d** at 761; **Modem Systems Technology Corp. v. United States**, 24 Cl. Ct. 360 (1991). Apart from the specified minimum, the government is free to **obtain** its requirements from other contractors. **Government Contract Services, Inc.**, **GSBCA** No. 8447,88-1 **BCA ¶** 20,255 (1987); **Alta Construction Co.**, **PSBCA** NO. 1395,87-2 **BCA** 1119,720 (1987).

What does all this **signify** from the perspective of obligating appropriations? As we noted at the outset, the obligational impact of a variable quantity contract depends on exactly what the government has bound itself to do. A fairly simple generalization can be deduced from the decisions: In a variable quantity contract (requirements or indefinite-quantity), any required minimum purchase must be obligated when the contract is executed; subsequent obligations occur as work orders or delivery orders are placed, and are chargeable to the **fiscal** year in which the order is placed.

Thus, in a variable quantity contract with no guaranteed minimum-or any analogous situation in which there is no liability **unless** and until an order is placed—there would be no recordable obligation at the time of award. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 129 (1983); 60 **Comp. Gen.** 219

(1981); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 459,462 (1955); **B-124901**, October 26, 1955 (“**call contract**”).<sup>8</sup> Obligations are recorded as orders are placed.

The same approach applies to a contract for a freed quantity in which the government reserves an option to purchase an additional quantity. The contract price for the freed quantity is an obligation at the time the contract is entered into; the reservation of the option ripens into an obligation only if and when the government exercises the option. 19 **Comp. Gen.** 980 (1940).

A more recent application of these concepts is **B-192036**, September 11, 1978. The National Park Service entered into a construction contract for the development of a national historic site. Part of the contract price was a “contingent sum” of \$25,000 for “Force Account Work,” described in the contract as miscellaneous items of a minor nature not included in the bid schedule. No “Force Account Work” was to be done except under written orders issued by the contracting officer. Since a written order was required for the performance of work, no part of the \$25,000 could be recorded as an obligation unless and until such orders were issued and accepted by the contractor. That portion of the master contract itself which provided for the Force Account Work was not sufficiently **specific** to create an obligation.

In a 1955 case, the Army entered into a contract for the procurement of lumber. The contract contained a clause permitting a ten-percent **overshipment** or **undershipment** of the quantity ordered. This type of clause was standard in lumber procurement contracts. The Comptroller General held that the Army could obligate the amount necessary to pay for the maximum quantities deliverable under the contract. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 596 (1955). Here, the quantity was **definite** and the government was required to accept the permissible variation.

In **another** 1955 case, the General Services Administration had published in the Federal Register an offer to purchase chrome ore up to a stated **maximum** quantity. Formal agreements would not be executed until producers made actual tenders of the ore. The program

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<sup>8</sup>As cases such as 63 **Comp. Gen.** 129 illustrate, there can be many variations on the basic indefinite-quantity theme. It should not be assumed that every variation will violate the current FAR minimum purchase requirement.

published in the Federal Register was a mere offer to purchase and GSA **could** not obligate funds to cover the **total** quantity authorized. Reason: there was no mutual assent and therefore no binding agreement in writing until a producer responded to the offer and a formal contract was executed. **B-125644**, November 21, 1955.

So-called “level of effort” contracts are conceptually related to the “variation in quantity” cases. In one case, the Environmental Protection Agency entered into a **cost-plus-fixed-fee** contract for various services at an EPA facility. The contractor’s contractual obligation was expressed as a “level of effort” in terms of staff-hours. The contractor was to provide up to a stated maximum number of direct staff-hours, to be applied on the basis of work orders issued during the course of the contract. Since the government was obligated under the contract to order specific tasks, the contract was sufficiently definitive to **justify** recording the full estimated contract amount at the time of award. **B-183184**, May 30, 1975. See also 58 **Comp. Gen.** 471,474 (1979); **B-199422**, June 22, 1981 (non-decision letter).

f. Amount **to** Be Recorded

In the simple firm fixed-price contract, the amount to be recorded presents no problem. The contract price is the recordable obligation. However, in many types of contracts, the final contract price cannot be known at the time of award and an estimate must be recorded. The basic principle—record your best estimate, **adjusting** the obligation up or down periodically as more precise information becomes available—has already been summarized in our preliminary discussion of 31 U.S.C. §1501(a).

Under a fixed-price contract with escalation, price redetermination, or incentive provisions, the amount to be obligated initially is the **fixed** price stated in the contract the target price in the case, for example, of a contract with an incentive clause. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418 (1955); **B-133170**, January 29, 1975; **B-206283-O.M.**, February 17, 1983. Thus, in an incentive contract with a target price of \$85 million and a ceiling price of \$100 million, **the** proper amount to record initially as an obligation is the target price of \$85 million. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 812,824 (1976).

When obligations are recorded based on a target price, the agency should establish appropriate safeguards to guard against violations of the **Antideficiency** Act. This usually means the administrative

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reservation of sufficient funds to cover potential **liability**. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418 at 420–21; **B-206283-O. M.**, **February** 17, 1983.

g. Administrative Approval of Payment

In some cases, the contractual arrangement or related **statutory** or regulatory requirements may provide a process for administrative review and approval as a prerequisite to payment. This mayor may not affect the obligational process, depending on the purpose of the review. (The review and approval here refers to a process in addition to the normal review and approval of the voucher by a **certifying** officer which is always required.)

To illustrate, in 46 **Comp. Gen.** 895 (1967), GAO approved a Veterans Administration procedure under which charges for fee-basis outpatient treatment of eligible veterans would be recorded as obligations at the time VA administratively approved the vouchers. Since the review and approval process was necessary to determine whether the government should accept liability, no contractual obligation arose until that time. See also **B-133944**, January 31, 1958, and **B-92679**, July 24, 1950.

A 1977 case, **B-137762.32**, July 11, 1977, **will** further illustrate the concept. The case concerned a contract between the Internal Revenue Service and an informant. Under IRS regulations, there is no liability to make payment until IRS has evaluated the worth of the information and has assessed and collected any underpaid taxes and penalties. It is at this point that an appropriate IRS official determines that a reward should be paid and its amount, and it is at this point that a recordable obligation arises.

Byway of contrast, the obligation for a court-appointed attorney under the **Criminal** Justice Act occurs at the time of appointment and not when the court approves the payment voucher, even though the exact amount of the obligation is not determinable until the voucher is approved. This is because the government becomes contractually liable by the order of appointment, with subsequent court review of the voucher intended **only** to insure the reasonableness of the expenses incurred. Thus, payment must be charged to the fiscal year in which the appointment was made. 50 **Comp. Gen.** 589 (1971).

h. Miscellaneous Contractual Obligations

The core issue in many of the previously discussed cases has been when a given transaction ripens into a recordable obligation, that is,

precisely when the “definite commitment” occurs. Many of the cases do not **fit** neatly into categories. Rather, the answer must be derived by analyzing the nature of the contractual or statutory commitments in the particular case.

A 1979 case dealt with a lease arrangement entered into by the Peace Corps in Korea. Under a particular type of lease recognized by Korean law, the lessee does not make installment rental payments. Instead, the lessee makes an initial payment of approximately 50 percent of the assessed valuation of the property. At the end of the lease, the lessor is required **to** return the entire initial payment. The lessor makes his profit by investing the initial payment at the local interest rate. Since the lease is a binding contractual commitment and since the entire amount of the initial payment may not **be** recoverable for a number of reasons, GAO found it improper to treat the initial payment as a mere advance or an account receivable (as in the case of travel advances) and thus not reflected as an obligation. Rather, the amount of the initial payment must be recorded as an obligation chargeable to the **fiscal** year in which the lease is entered into, with subsequent returns to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. **B-192282, April 18, 1979.**

Several cases deal with court-related obligations. For example, the obligation for fees of jurors-including retroactive increases authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1871—**occurs** at the time the jury service is performed. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 472 (1974). See also 50 **Comp. Gen.** 589 (1971), dealing with obligations under the Criminal Justice Act, discussed above under “Administrative Approval of Payment.”

The recording of obligations for land commissioners appointed to determine just compensation in land condemnation cases was discussed in **B-184782**, February 26, 1976, and 56 **Comp. Gen.** 414 (1977). The rules derived from these decisions are as follows:

- The obligation occurs at the time of appointment and is chargeable to the fiscal year of appointment if a specific case is referred to the commission in that fiscal year.
- Pendency** of an action will satisfy the bona fide needs rule and will be sufficient to support the obligation even though services are not actually performed until the following fiscal year.
- Appointment of a “continuous” land commission creates no obligation **until** a particular action is referred to it.

- An amended court order increasing the compensation **of a** particular commissioner amounts to a new obligation and the full compensation is chargeable to the appropriation current at the time of the amended order.
- **A valid** obligation occurs under the above principles even though the order of appointment does not expressly charge the costs to the United States because, under the Constitution, the costs cannot be assessed against the **condemnee**.

(Beginning with fiscal year 1978, the appropriation to compensate land commissioners was switched from the Justice Department to the Judiciary and since then has been a no-year appropriation. We retain the above summary here to illustrate the analysis and because it may have use by analogy in similar situations.)

i. Interagency Transactions

It is not uncommon for federal agencies to provide goods or services to other federal agencies. Subsection **(a)(1)** of 31 U.S.C. § 1501 expressly applies to interagency contracts. This, however, does not embrace all interagency transactions. When an agency obtains goods or services from another agency, the obligational treatment of the transaction depends on whether or not the order is “required by law” to be placed with the other agency. If it is “required by law,” the transaction is governed by subsection **(a)(3)** of 31 U.S.C. § 1501, discussed later in this section. If it is not “required by **law**,” subsection **(a)(1)** applies. Interagency orders not required by law are sometimes termed “voluntary orders.” Thus, except for “required by law” situations, the recording criteria are the same whether the contract is with a private party or another federal agency.

(1) Economy Act vs. other authority

A **major** source of authority for voluntary interagency agreements is the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535. An Economy Act



agreement—assuming it meets the criteria of subsection (a)(I)—is recorded as an obligation the same as any other **contract**.<sup>9</sup> However, Economy Act agreements are subject to one additional requirement. Under 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d), the period of availability of funds transferred pursuant to an Economy Act agreement may not exceed the period of availability of the source appropriation. Thus, one-year appropriations obligated by an Economy Act agreement must be **deobligated** at the end of the fiscal year charged to the extent that the performing agency has not performed or incurred valid obligations under the agreement. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 317 (1959); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,421-22 (1955). It was, for example, improper for the **Library** of Congress to use annual funds transferred to it under Economy Act agreements **and** unobligated by it prior to the end of the **fiscal** year to provide services in the following fiscal year. Financial Audit: First Audit of the Library of Congress Discloses Significant Problems, **GAO/AFMD-91-13** (August 1991). The reason for this requirement is to prevent the Economy Act from being used to extend the obligational life of an appropriation beyond that provided by Congress in the appropriation act. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 83, 85 (1951). The **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d) does not apply to obligations against no-year appropriations. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 317,319 (1959).

Where the agreement is based on some statutory authority other than the Economy Act, the recording of the obligation is still governed by 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1). However, 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d) does not apply. In this situation, the obligation will remain payable in full from the appropriation initially charged, regardless of when performance occurs, in the same manner as contractual obligations generally, subject, of course, to the *bona fide* needs rule and to any restrictions in the legislation authorizing the agreement. Thus, it is necessary to determine the correct statutory authority for any interagency agreement in order to apply the proper obligational principles.

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<sup>9</sup>The determination of whether a interagency agreement is “binding” for purposes of recording under 31 U. SC. § 1501(a)(1) is made in the same manner as if the contract were with a private party—examining precisely what the parties have “committed” themselves to do under the terms of the agreement. However, an agreement between two government agencies cannot be legally “enforced” against a defaulting agency in the sense of compelling performance or obtaining damages. Enforcement against another agency is largely a matter of comity and good faith. Thus, the term “binding” in the context of interagency agreements reflects the undertakings expressed in the agreement without regard to the legal consequences (or lack thereof) of non-performance.

The following three cases, involving interagency provision of services, will illustrate these principles.

- Agreement under which funds were transferred from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to **Federal** Aviation Administration to provide training for air traffic control trainees was found authorized by **Manpower** Development and Training Act of 1962 rather than Economy Act. Therefore, while **initial** recording of obligation was governed by 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1), funds remained available for further obligation by FAA subject to time limits of Manpower Act rather than **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d). 51 **Comp. Gen.** 766 (1972).
- Agreement entered into in **FY** 1976 between Administrative **Office** of U.S. Courts and General Services Administration for design and implementation of automated payroll system was authorized by Federal Property and Administrative Services Act rather than Economy Act. Since agreement met requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1), it was properly recordable as a valid obligation against **FY** 1976 funds and was not subject to 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d). 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1497 (1976).
- Army Corps of Engineers entered into agreement with Department of Housing and Urban Development to perform flood insurance studies pursuant to orders placed by HUD. Since the agreement presumably required the Corps to perform as HUD placed the orders, a recordable obligation would arise when HUD placed an order under the agreement. Since agreement was authorized by **National** Flood Insurance Act rather than Economy Act, funds obligated by order **would** remain obligated even though Corps did not complete performance (or contract out for it) **until** following fiscal year. **B-167790**, September 22, 1977.

A voluntary interagency order for goods is subject to the same basic rules as a voluntary interagency order for services. If the order is governed by the Economy Act and otherwise meets the criteria of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1), it is recordable as an obligation when the order is placed but is subject to the **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d). If the order is not governed by the Economy Act, it constitutes an obligation **only** to the extent that the performing agency has completed the work or has awarded contracts to **fill** the order. For example, Military Interdepartmental Procurement Requests (**MIPR**) are viewed as authorized by the Economy Act. Therefore, while a **MIPR** may be initially recorded as an obligation under 31 U.S.C.

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**§ 1501(a)(1)**, it is subject to the **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. **§ 1535(d)** and is thus ultimately chargeable to appropriations current when the performing component incurs **valid** obligations. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 563 (1980); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,422 (1955).

Regardless of the statutory basis for the agreement, an obligation is recordable under subsection (a)(1) only if the criteria of that subsection—binding agreement, sufficiently **specific**, etc.—are met.

In **B-193005**, October 2, 1978, GAO considered the procurement of crude oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, the General Services Administration may procure materials for other federal agencies and may delegate this authority. GSA had delegated the authority to procure fuel commodities to the Secretary of Defense. Thus, the Department of Energy could procure the oil through the Defense Fuel Supply Center in a non-Economy Act transaction. An order placed by the Department of Energy could be recorded as an obligation under 31 U.S.C. **§ 1501(a)(1)** if it constituted a “binding agreement,” and the funds would remain available for contracts awarded by Defense beyond the original period of obligational **availability**.<sup>10</sup> This result would have been precluded by 31 U.S.C. **§ 1535(d)** had the transaction been governed by the Economy Act. An order would constitute a binding agreement for recording purposes if accepted by the requisitioned agency, or if the requisitioned agency were required to perform under the terms of a “master” agreement.

In 59 **Comp. Gen.** 602 (1980), GAO considered the procedure by which the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ordered “strip stamps” from the Bureau of Engraving. (These are the excise tax stamps one sees pasted across the caps of liquor bottles.) GAO reviewed pertinent legislation and concluded that ATF was not “required by law” to procure its strip stamps from the Bureau of Engraving. Since individual **orders** were not binding agreements, it was essentially immaterial in one important respect whether the order was governed by the Economy Act or some other law; in neither event could ATF’s funds remain obligated beyond the last day of a fiscal

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<sup>10</sup> In a subsequent letter to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Comptroller General pointed out that the 1978 decision would not affect the applicability of the Impoundment Control Act to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve program since the statutory definition of “deferral” applies to expenditures as well as obligations. **B-200685**, December 23, 1980.

year **to** the extent an order remained unfilled. Funds could be considered obligated at the end of a **fiscal** year only **to** the extent that stamps were printed or in process or that the Bureau of Engraving had entered into a contract with a third party to provide them.

Thus, a voluntary interagency order, whether authorized by the Economy Act or some other law, is recordable under 31 **U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)** only **if it** constitutes a binding agreement and meets the other criteria of that subsection. If it does, the applicability or non-applicability of 31 **U.S.C. § 1535(d)** then becomes relevant. **If it** does not, the order constitutes an obligation only to the extent the performing agency has completed the work or has awarded contracts to have it done. In addition to 59 **Comp. Gen.** 602 and **B-193005**, see 39 **Comp. Gen.** 829 (1960); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705,708 (1955); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 88 (1943); **B-180578-O. M.**, September 26,1978.

Similarly, an order for an item not stocked by the requisitioned agency (or, if out of stock, not routinely on order) is not a recordable obligation until the requisitioned agency purchases the item or executes a contract for it. The reason is that the order is not a binding agreement. It is **merely** an offer which is accepted by the requisitioned agency's **performance**. The **basic** rules in this area were established by 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1955).

## (2) Orders from stock

The obligational treatment of orders for items to be delivered from stock of the requisitioned agency derives from 32 **Comp. Gen.** 436 (1953). An order for items to be delivered from stock is a recordable obligation **if (1)** it is intended to meet a **bona fide** need of the fiscal year in which the order is placed or to replace stock used in that **fiscal year**,<sup>11</sup> and **(2)** the order is firm and complete. To be firm and complete, the order must request prompt **delivery** of specific available stock items for a stated consideration and must be accepted by the supplying agency in writing. "Available" means on hand or routinely on order. However, acceptance is not required for common-use stock items which are on hand or on order **and** will be delivered promptly.

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<sup>11</sup>The fact that the replacement stock will not be used until the following year will not defeat an otherwise **valid** obligation. See 44 **Comp. Gen.** 695 (1965).

Although these rules were developed prior to the enactment of **31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)**, they continue to govern the recording of obligations under that statute. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1955); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,422 (1955). Materials which are specially created for a particular purpose are not “stock.” 44 **Comp. Gen.** 695 (1965).

(3) Project orders

“Project orders” are authorized by 41 **U.S.C. § 23**, which provides:

“All orders **or** contracts for work or material or for the manufacture of material **pertaining to** approved projects heretofore or hereafter placed with **Government-owned** establishments shall be considered **as** obligations in the same manner as provided for similar orders or contracts placed with commercial manufacturers or private contractors, and the appropriations shall remain available for the payment of the obligations so created as in the case of contracts or orders with commercial manufacturers or private **contractors.**”<sup>12</sup>

This statute, derived from **earlier** appropriation act provisions appearing shortly after World War I, applies only to the military departments, although the orders may be placed with **any** “Government-owned establishment.” **B-95760**, June 27, 1950.<sup>13</sup> Precisely why the statute was enacted is not clear. Some discussion of its origins may be found in 26 **Comp. Dec.** 1022 (1920). The Coast Guard has virtually identical authority in 14 **U.S.C. § 151**.

A project order is a valid and recordable obligation when the order is issued and accepted, regardless of the fact that **performance** may not be accomplished until after the expiration of the **fiscal** year. 1 **Comp. Gen.** 175 (1921); **B-135037-O. M.**, June 19, 1958. The statute does not, however, authorize the use of the appropriations so obligated for the purpose of replenishing stock used in connection with the order. **A-25603**, May 15, 1929. The requirement of specificity applies to project orders the same as any other recordable obligations under 31 **U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)**. **B-126405**, May 21, 1957.

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<sup>12</sup>The term “approved projects,” as used in 41 **U.S.C. § 23**, has no special meaning. It refers simply to “projects that have been approved by officials having legal authority to do so.” **B-171049-O. M.**, February 17, 1972. Cf. 26 **Comp. Dec.** 1022, 1023–24 (1920).

<sup>13</sup>The rationale of **B-95760** is not clearly stated. The provision first appeared as permanent authority in the Army’s FY 1921 appropriation (41 Stat. 975). Had it been intended to apply to all agencies, it would not have been necessary to repeat it for the Navy in 1922 (42 Stat. 812) and the Coast Guard in 1942 (56 Stat. 328).

Since a project order is not an Economy Act **transaction**, the **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1535(d) does not apply. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,422 (1955). See also 16 **Comp. Gen.** 752 (1937). Also, unlike the Economy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 23 does not authorize advance payment. Thus, advance payment for project orders is not authorized unless permitted by some other statute. **B-95760**, June 27, 1950.

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**2. Subsection (a)(2): Loans** Under 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2), a recordable obligation exists when there is documentary evidence of “a loan agreement showing the amount and terms of repayment.”

A loan agreement is essentially contractual in nature. Thus, to have a valid obligation, there must be a proposal by one party and an acceptance by another. Approval of the loan application must be communicated to the applicant within the **fiscal** year sought to be charged, and there must be documentary evidence of that communication. **B-159999** -O. M., March 16, 1967. Where a loan application is made in one fiscal year and approval is not communicated to the applicant until the following **fiscal** year, the obligation is chargeable to the later year. Id.; **B-159999-O.M.**, December 14, 1966.

Telegraphic notification of approval of a loan application where the amount of the loan and terms of repayment are thereby agreed upon is legally acceptable. **B-159999-O. M.**, December 14, 1966.

To support a recordable obligation under subsection (a)(2), the agreement must be **sufficiently definite** and **specific**, just as in the case of subsection (a)(1) obligations. To illustrate, the United States and the government of Brazil entered into a loan agreement in 1964. As a condition precedent to any disbursement under the agreement, Brazil was to **furnish** a statement covering utilization of the funds. The funds **were to** be used for various economic and social development projects “as may, from time to time, be agreed upon in writing” by the governments of the United States and Brazil. While the loan agreement constituted a valid binding contract, it was not sufficiently definite or **specific** to validly obligate **FY** 1964 funds. The basic agreement was little more than an “agreement to agree,” and an obligation of funds could arise only when a particular “utilization

statement” was submitted and approved. **B-155708-O. M.**, April 26, 1965.

Prior to fiscal year 1992, the amount to be recorded in the case of a loan was quite simple—the face amount of the loan. From the budgetary perspective, this was undesirable because the obligation was indistinguishable from any other cash outlay. By disregarding at the obligational stage the fact that loans are supposed to be repaid, this treatment did not reflect the true cost to the government of direct loan programs. Congress addressed the situation in the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, enacted as section 13201 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-609, and codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 661–661f (Supp. III 1991). The general approach of the **FCRA** is to require the advance provision of budget authority to cover the subsidy portion of direct **loans** (in recognition of the fact that not all **loans** are repaid), with the non-subsidy portion (the portion expected to be repaid) financed through borrowings from the Treasury. The Office of Management and Budget has issued detailed implementing instructions in **OMB Circular No. A-34**, Part VI (1991). The **FCRA** applies to new direct **loan** obligations incurred on or after October 1, 1991.

**FCRA** defines “direct loan” as “a disbursement of **funds** by the Government to a **non-Federal** borrower under a contract that requires the repayment of such funds with or without interest.” 2 U.S.C. § 661a(1). A direct loan obligation is “a binding agreement by a Federal agency to make a direct loan when specified conditions are fulfilled by the borrower.” *Id.* § 661a(2). The “cost” of a direct loan is the estimated long-term cost to the government, taking into consideration disbursements and repayments, calculated on a net present value basis at the time of disbursement. *Id.* § 661a(5).

Unless otherwise provided by statute, new direct **loan** obligations may be incurred only to the extent that budget authority to cover their costs is provided in advance. *Id.* § 661c(b). Under this provision, the typical appropriation will **include** both an appropriation of budget authority for the subsidy costs and a program ceiling (total face amount of loans supportable by the cost appropriation). The appropriation is made to a “program account.” When a direct loan obligation is incurred, its cost is obligated against the program account. The actual financing is done through a revolving, non-budget “financing account.” Loan repayments are credited to the financing

account. See generally OMB Circular No. **A-34**, §62.6. The **overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of either the loan subsidy or the credit level supportable by the enacted subsidy violates the **Antideficiency Act. Id.** 563.2.

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### **3. Subsection (a)(3): Interagency Orders Required by Law**

The third standard for recording obligations, 31 U.S.C. §1501(a)(3), is “an order required by law to be placed with [a federal] agency.”

Subsection (a)(3) means exactly what it says. An order placed with another government agency is recordable under this subsection only if it is required by statute or statutory regulation to be placed with the other agency. The subsection does not apply to orders which are merely authorized rather than required. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1955).

An order required by law to be placed with another agency is not an Economy Act transaction. Therefore, the **deobligation** requirement of 31 U.S.C. §1535(d) does not apply. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 3,5 (1955).

The fact that the work will be performed in the next **fiscal** year does not defeat the obligation as long as the bona fide need testis met. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 386 (1980); 35 **Comp. Gen.** 3 (1955). Also, the fact that the work is to be accomplished and reimbursement made through use of a revolving fund is immaterial. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 3 (1955); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1955).

A common example of “orders required by law” is printing and binding to be done by the Government Printing **Office**. The rule is that a requisition for printing services maybe recorded as an obligation when placed if (1) there is a present need for the printing, and (2) the requisition is accompanied by copy or specifications **sufficient** for GPO to proceed with the job.

Thus, a requisition by the **Commission** on Fine Arts for the printing of “Sixteenth Street Architecture, Volume I” placed with GPO in **FY** 1977 and accompanied by manuscript and specifications obligated **FY** 1977 funds and was chargeable in its entirety to **FY** 1977, notwithstanding that the printing would be done in the following **fiscal** year. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 386 (1980). However, a requisition for U.S. Travel Service sales promotional literature placed with GPO near the end of **FY** 1964 did not obligate **FY** 1964 funds where no copy or manuscript was furnished to GPO until **FY** 1965,44 **Comp. Gen.** 695 (1965). For other



printing cases illustrating these rules, see 29 **Comp. Gen.** 489 (1950); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 82 (1943); **B-154277**, June 5, 1964; **B-123964**, August 23, 1955; **B-1** 14619, April 17, 1953; **B-50663**, June 30, 1945; **B-35807**, August 10, 1943; **B-35967**, August 4, 1943; **B-34888**, June 21, 1943.

An agency may use a printing estimate furnished by GPO to establish the level of funds **to** be obligated pending receipt of a bill reflecting actual cost. However, the printing estimate alone, even if written, unaccompanied by the placement of an order, is not sufficient to create a valid and recordable obligation. **B-182081**, January 26, 1977, **affirmed** in **B-182081**, February 14, 1979. In the cited decision, there was no valid obligation before the ordering commission went out of existence and its appropriations ceased to be available for further obligation. Therefore, there was **no** appropriation available to reimburse GPO for work done under the invalid purported obligation.

GPO is required by **law** to print certain congressional materials such as the Congressional Record, and receives a “Printing and Binding” appropriation for this purpose. For such items where no further request or authorization is required, a copy of the **basic** law authorizing the printing plus a copy of the appropriation constitute the obligating documents. **B-123964**, August 23, 1955.

Another common “order required bylaw” situation is building alteration, management, and related services to be performed by the General Services Administration. For example, a job order by the Social Security **Administration** for building repairs validly obligated funds of the fiscal year in which the order was placed, by virtue of subsection **(a)(3)**, notwithstanding that GSA was unable to perform the work **until** the following fiscal year. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 3 (1955). See also **B-158374**, February 21, 1966. However, this result assumes compliance with the bona fide need concept. Thus, an agreement for work incident to the relocation of Federal Power Commission employees placed in **FY** 1971 did not validly obligate **FY** 1971 funds where it was clear that the relocation was not required to, and would not, take place, nor would the space in question be made tenantable, until the following **fiscal** year. **B-95136-O. M.**, August 11, 1972. Orders placed with GSA are further discussed in 34 **Comp. Gen.** 705 (1955).

As noted earlier, GAO has expressed the view that the recording criteria of 31 U.S.C. §1501(a) should be followed in evaluating

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obligations of the government of the District of Columbia. Thus, orders by a department of the **D.C.** government for repairs and improvements which are required by statute or statutory regulation to be placed with the **D.C.** Department of General Services and performed through use of the Repairs and Improvements Working Fund create valid obligations when the orders are placed.  
**B-180578-O.M.**, September 26, 1978.

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**4. Subsection (a)(4):**  
Orders Without Advertising

The fourth recording standard in 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a) is—

“an order issued under a law authorizing purchases without advertising (A) when necessary because of a public exigency; (B) for perishable subsistence supplies; or (C) within **specific** monetary limits.”

Subsection (a)(4) is limited to statutorily authorized purchases without advertising in the three situations **specified**. The subsection must be self-explanatory **as** there appear to be no Comptroller General decisions under it.

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**5. Subsection (a)(5):**  
**Grants** and Subsidies

**In** the case of federal assistance program funds, 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5) requires that the obligation be supported by documentary evidence of a grantor subsidy payable:

“(A) from appropriations made for payment of, or contributions to, amounts required to be paid in **specific** amounts freed by law or under formulas prescribed by law;

“(B) under an agreement authorized by law; or

“(C) under plans approved consistent with and authorized by law.”

a. Grants

In order to properly obligate an appropriation for an assistance **program**, some action creating a definite liability against the appropriation must occur during the period of the obligational availability of the appropriation. In the case of grants, the obligating action will usually be the execution of a grant agreement. The particular document will vary and may be in the form of an agency's approval of a grant application or a letter of commitment. See 39 **Comp. Gen.** 317 (1959); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 861,863 (1958); 31 **Comp. Gen.** 608 (1952); **B-128190**, June 2, 1958; **B-114868.01-O.M.**, March 17, 1976.

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In this connection, GAO's Accounting Principles and Standards state:

**"Accounting for a federal assistance award begins with the execution of an agreement or the approval of an application or similar document in which the amount and purposes of the grant, the performance periods, the obligations of the parties to the award, and other terms are set out. A legal obligation to disburse the assistance funds, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, generally occurs with an executed agreement or an approved application or similar document."**<sup>14</sup>

As a general proposition, four requirements must be met. to properly obligate assistance funds:

- There must be some action to establish a **firm** commitment on the part of the United States.
- The commitment must **be** unconditional on the part of the **United States**. See 50 **Comp. Gen.** 857,862 (1971).
- There **must be documentary** evidence of the commitment. Champaign County v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 611 **F.2d** 1200 (**7th Cir.** 1979) (court refused to regard documentation requirement as "form over substance"); 512 F.2d 1263, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, 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governor and he had not yet agreed, even though the award instruments had already been executed.

Once the appropriation has been properly obligated, **performance** and the actual disbursement of **funds** may carryover beyond the period of obligational availability. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 608, 610 (1952); 20 **Comp. Gen.** 370 (1941); **B-37609**, November 15, 1943; **B-24827**, April 3, 1942; **B-124374-O.M.**, January 26, 1956.

Applying the above principles, the Comptroller General found that a document entitled “**Approval** and Award of Grant” used by the Economic Development Administration was sufficient for recording grant obligations under the local public works program because it “reflects the Administration’s acceptance of a grant application; **specifies** the project approved and the amount of **funding**; and imposes a deadline for affirmation by the grantee.” **B-126652**, August 30, 1977.

**If** the above requirements are not met, then the appropriation is not validly obligated. Thus, the Comptroller General found an attempted obligation invalid in **B-164990**, September 6, 1968, where the grantee corporation was not in existence when the obligation was recorded. Also, the relevant program legislation must be examined to see if there are any additional requirements.

The preceding cases mostly involve obligations evidenced by the issuance of an award instrument. Questions may also arise over exactly when an obligation “freed by law” or under a required plan takes place. For example, under the Medicaid program, the obligation occurs under a state plan when an entitlement is created in favor of the state. This happens when a covered medical service is provided. See **B-164031(3).150**, September 5, 1979.

Also, where an agency is required to allocate funds to states on the basis of a statutory formula, the formula establishes the obligation to each recipient rather than the agency’s allocation since, if the allocation is erroneous, the agency must **adjust** the amounts paid each recipient. See 41 **Comp. Gen.** 16 (1961); **B-164031(3).150**, September 5, 1979. In this type of situation, the obligation occurs by operation of law, even though there may have been no formal recording. A decision discussing this concept in the context of the Job Training Partnership Act is 63 **Comp. Gen.** 525 (1984). For a

**discussion of obligation and deobligation of funds under the** now defunct Comprehensive Employment and **Training** Act (the predecessor of the Job Training Partnership Act) **in** the context of the Impoundment Control Act, see **B-200685**, April 27, 1981.

The rules for **deobligation** and **reobligation** of assistance funds are the same as for appropriated funds generally. program legislation in a given case may, of course, provide for different treatment. For example, **B-21 1323**, January 3, 1984, considered a provision of the Public Works **and** Economic Development Act of 1965 under which funds apportioned to states remained available to the state until expended. Under that particular provision, **funds deobligated** as the result of a cost underrun could be **reobligated** by the state, without **fiscal** year limitation, for purposes within the scope of the program statute.

b. Subsidies

There have been relatively few cases dealing **with** the **obligational** treatment of subsidies, although the principles should parallel those for **grants** since they both derive from subsection **(a)(5)**. In one case, GAO considered legislation authorizing the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board to make “interest **adjustment**” payments to member banks. The payments were designed to **adjust** the effective rates of interest charged by member banks on short- and long-term borrowing, the objective being to stimulate residential construction for low- and middle-income families. Funds were appropriated **to** the Board for this purpose on a fiscal year basis. GAO concluded that an obligation arose for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5) when a Federal Home **Loan** Bank made a **firm** and unconditional commitment in writing to a member institution, provided that the commitment letter included a reasonable expiration date. The funds would have to be **deobligated** to the extent that a member institution failed to execute loans prior to the specified expiration date. 50 **Comp. Gen.** 857 (1971).

In 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4 (1985), GAO advised the Department of Education that mandatory interest subsidies under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program should be recorded as obligations on a “best estimate” basis as they arise, even if the recordings would exceed available budgetary resources. Since the subsidies are not discretionary obligations but are imposed by law, there would be no **Antideficiency** Act violation. The decision overruled an earlier case (**B-126372**, September 18, 1956) which had held that the recording of obligations for mail rate

subsidies **to** air carriers could be deferred until the time of payment, 65 **Comp. Gen.** at 8 **n.3**.

In 64 **Comp. Gen.** 410 (1985), GAO considered obligations by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for operating subsidies to state public housing authorities for low-income housing projects. Under the governing statute and regulations, the amount of the subsidy was determined upon HUD's approval of the state's annual operating budget, although the basic commitment stemmed from an **annual** contribution contract, HUD's practice, primarily for **states** whose fiscal year coincides with that of the federal government, was to record the obligation on the basis of an estimate, issued in a letter of intent. GAO found this to be legally permissible, but cautioned that HUD was required to **adjust** the obligation up or down once it approved the operating budget.

A 1983 decision, **B-212145**, September 27, 1983, discusses the use of estimates subject to subsequent **adjustment** for the recording of obligations under the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, 31 **U.S.C.** §§ 6901–6906.

From the perspective of the recording of obligations, these two **decisions—64 Comp. Gen.** 410 and **B-212145—are** simply applications of the general principle, previously noted, that best estimates should be recorded when more precise information is not available, subject to later **adjustment**.

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## 6. Subsection (a)(6): Pending Litigation

The sixth standard for recording obligations is “a liability that may result from pending litigation.” 31 **U.S.C.** § 1501(a)(6).

Despite its seemingly broad language, subsection (a)(6) has very limited application. Most judgments against the United States **are** paid from a permanent indefinite appropriation, 31 **U.S.C.** § 1304, covered in detail in Chapter 14. Accordingly, since the expenditure of agency funds is not involved, judgments payable under 31 **U.S.C.** § 1304 have no obligational impact on the respondent agency.

Not all judgments against the United States are paid from the permanent judgment appropriation. Several types are payable from agency funds. However, the mere fact that a judgment is payable from agency funds does not make it subject to subsection (a)(6). Thus far,

the Comptroller General has applied subsection **(a)(6)** in only two situations—land condemnation (35 **Comp. Gen.** 185 (1955)) and certain impoundment litigation (54 **Comp. Gen.** 962 (1975)).

In land condemnation proceedings, the appropriation is obligated when the request is made to the Attorney General to institute the proceedings. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,423 (1955); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 67 (1954); 17 **Comp. Gen.** 664 (1938); 4 **Comp. Gen.** 206 (1924).

As stated in 35 **Comp. Gen.** 185, 187, subsection **(a)(6)** requires recording an obligation in cases where the government is definitely liable for the payment of money out of available appropriations and the pending litigation is for the purpose of determining the amount of the **government's** liability. Thus, for judgments payable from agency appropriations in other than land condemnation and impoundment cases, the standard of 35 **Comp. Gen.** 185 should be applied to determine whether an obligation must be recorded.

In cases where a judgment will be payable from agency funds but recording is not required, 35 **Comp. Gen.** 185 suggested that the agency should nevertheless administratively reserve sufficient funds to cover the contingent **liability** to avoid a possible violation of the **Antideficiency Act**. *Id.* at 187. While the administrative reservation may still be a good **idea** for other reasons, the **majority** of more recent cases (cited and summarized in Chapter 6 under the heading **Intentional Factors Beyond Agency Control**) have taken the position that **overobligations** resulting from court-ordered payments do not violate the **Antideficiency Act**.

It should be apparent that the preceding discussion applies to money judgments—judgments directing the payment of money. In some types of litigation, a court may order an agency to take some **specific** action. While compliance will result in the expenditure of agency funds, this type of judgment is not within the scope of 35 **Comp. Gen.** 185. While we have found no cases, it seems clear from the application of 31 **U.S.C. § 1501(a)** in other contexts that no recordable obligation would arise while this type of litigation is still “pending.”

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**7. Subsection (a)(7):  
Employment and Travel**

Under 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(7), obligations are recordable when supported by documentary evidence of “employment or services of persons or expenses of travel under law.” This subsection covers a **variety** of loosely related obligations.

a. Wages, Salaries, Annual  
Leave

salaries of government employees, as well as related items that flow from those salary entitlements such as retirement fund contributions, are obligations at the time the salaries are earned, that is, when the **services** are rendered. 24 **Comp. Gen.** 676, 678 (1945).<sup>15</sup> For example, in 38 **Comp. Gen.** 316 (1958), the Commerce Department wanted to treat the salaries of employees performing **administrative** and engineering services on highway construction projects as part of the construction contract costs. Under this procedure, the anticipated expenses of the employees, salaries included, would be recorded as an obligation at the time a contract was awarded. However, the Comptroller General held that this would not constitute a valid obligation under 31 U.S.C. § 1501. The employee expenses were not part of the contract costs and could not be obligated before the services were performed.

Subsection (a)(7) is not limited to permanent federal employees. It applies as well to persons employed in other capacities, such as temporary or intermittent employees or persons employed under a personal services contract. In Kinzley v. United States, 661 F.2d 187 (Ct. Cl. 1981), for example, the court found various agency correspondence sufficient compliance with subsection (a)(7) to permit a claim for compensation for services rendered as a project coordinator. Unlike subsection (a)(1), the court pointed out, subsection (a)(7) does not require a binding agreement in writing between the parties, but only documentary evidence of “employment or services of persons.” *Id.* at 191.

For persons compensated on an actual expense basis, it may be necessary to record the obligation as an estimate, to be **adjusted** when the services are actually performed. Documentation requirements to support the obligation or subsequent claims are up to the agency. **E.g., B-217475**, December 24, 1986.

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<sup>15</sup>The Federal Labor Relations Authority has also applied this principle in “*un@* the negotiability of various union proposals. See Fort Knox Teachers Ass’n and Board of Education, 27 F. L.R.A. 203 (No. 34, 1987); Fort Knox Teachers Ass’n and Fort Knox Dependent Schools, 26 F. L.R.A. 934 (No. 108, 1987).



When a pay increase is granted to wage board employees, the effective date of the increase is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 5344. This effective date determines the government's **liability to** pay the additional compensation. Therefore, the increase is chargeable to appropriations currently available for payment of the wages for the period to which the increases apply. 39 **Comp. Gen.** 422 (1959). This is true regardless of the fact that appropriations maybe **insufficient** to discharge the obligation and the agency may not yet have had time to obtain a supplemental appropriation. The obligation in this situation is considered "authorized bylaw" and therefore does not violate the **Antideficiency Act**. *Id.* at 426.

Annual leave status "is synonymous with a work or duty status." 25 **Comp. Gen.** 687 (1946). As such, annual leave obligates appropriations current at the time the leave is taken. *Id.*; 50 **Comp. Gen.** 863,865 (1971); 17 **Comp. Gen.** 641 (1938). A separate obligation for annual leave is necessary only when it becomes due and payable as terminal leave. **OMB Circular No. A-34**, 523.2. Except for employees paid from revolving funds (25 **Comp. Gen.** 687 (1946)), or where there is some statutory indication to the contrary (**B-70247**, January 9, 1948), the obligation for terminal leave is recorded against appropriations for the **fiscal** year covering the employee's last day of active service. 25 **Comp. Gen.** 687, 688 (1946); 24 **Comp. Gen.** 578, 583 (1945).

Bonuses such **as** performance awards or incentive awards obligate appropriations current at the time the awards are made. Thus, for example, where **performance** awards to Senior Executive Service **officials** under 5 U.S.C. § 5384 were made in **FY** 1982 but actual payment had to be split between **FY** 1982 and **FY** 1983 to stay within statutory compensation ceilings, the entire amount of the awards remained chargeable to **FY** 1982 funds. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 114, 115 **n.2** (1984). The same principle would apply to other types of discretionary payments; the administrative determination creates the obligation. **E.g., B-80060**, September 30, 1948.

Employees terminated by a reduction in force (**RIF**) are entitled by statute to severance pay. Severance pay is obligated on a pay period by pay period basis. Thus, where a **RIF** occurs near the end of a fiscal year and severance payments **will** extend into the following **fiscal** year, it is improper to charge the entire amount of severance pay to the

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fiscal year in which the RIF occurs. **B-200170**, July 28, 1981; **OMB Circular No. A-34, § 23.2.**<sup>16</sup>

GAO reached a different result in **B-200170**, September 24, 1982. The United States Metric Board was scheduled to terminate its existence on September 30, 1982. Legislative history indicated that the Board's **FY 1982** appropriation was intended to include severance pay, and no appropriations had been requested for **FY 1983**. Under these circumstances, severance payments to be made in **FY 1983** were held chargeable to the **FY 1982** appropriation. A contrary result would have meant that the **FY 1982** funds would expire, and Congress would have had to appropriate the same funds again for **FY 1983**.

b. Compensation Plans in  
Foreign Countries

By statute, the State Department is required to establish compensation plans for foreign national employees of the Foreign Service in foreign countries. The plans are to be "based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation practices. . . for corresponding types of positions in the locality of employment," to the extent consistent with the public interest. 22 **U.S.C. § 3968(a)(1)**.

Under subsection (b) of 22 **U.S.C. § 3968**, other government agencies are authorized to **administer** foreign national employee compensation programs in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Foreign Service Act. This provision, for example, authorized the Defense Department to establish a pension and life insurance program for foreign national employees in Bermuda, provided that it corresponded to prevailing local practice. 40 **Comp. Gen.** 650 (1961).

Subsection (c) of 22 **U.S.C. § 3968** authorizes the Secretary of State to prescribe regulations for local compensation plans applicable to all federal agencies. To the extent this authority is not exercised, however, the statute does not otherwise require that a plan established by another agency conform to the State Department's plan. An agency establishing a local plan should, to the extent not regulated by State, coordinate with other agencies operating in the locality. 40 **Comp. Gen.** at 652. (As a practical matter, two agencies operating in the same locality should not develop substantially

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<sup>16</sup>GAO had previously equivocated on the issue of obligating for severance pay, preferring to coordinate with OMB's budget procedures, subsequently issued in OMB Circular No. A-34. See 45 **Comp. Gen.** 584 (1906).

different plans, **assuming** both legitimately reflect prevailing local practice.)

**To** the extent the authority of 22 U.S.C. § 3968 is exercised in a given country, the obligational treatment of various elements of compensation may vary from what would otherwise be required. For example, Colombian law provides for the advance payment of accrued severance pay to help the employee purchase or make improvements on a home. Thus, under a compensation plan for foreign national employees in Colombia, severance pay would be recorded as an obligation against the **fiscal** year appropriation current at the time of accrual. **B-192511**, February 5, 1979.

While 22 U.S.C. § 3968 authorizes compensation plans based on local practice, it does not permit automatic disregard of **all** other laws of the United States. Thus, under the Colombian severance pay program noted above, if the employee subsequently is terminated for cause or **otherwise** loses eligibility, the agency must proceed with collection action under the Federal Claims Collection Act, local practice to the contrary **notwithstanding**. **B-192511**, June 8, 1979. Similarly, accrued severance pay retains its status as United States funds up to actual disbursement and is therefore subject to applicable **fiscal** and fund control requirements. **B-199722**, September 15, 1981 (severance pay plan in Jordan).

In several foreign countries, foreign nationals employed by the United States are entitled to be paid a “separation allowance” when they resign, retire, or are otherwise separated through no fault of their own. The allowance is based on length of service, rate of pay at time of separation, and **type** of separation. Unlike severance pay for federal employees, these separation allowances represent binding commitments which accrue during the period of employment. As such, they should be recorded as obligations when they are earned rather than when they are paid. **FGMSD-76-25**, October 17, 1975; **FGMSD-75-20**, February 13, 1975; Substantial Understatements of Obligations for Separation Allowances for Foreign National Employees, **B-179343**, October 21, 1974. (These three items are GAO reports, the **first** two being untitled letter reports.)

#### C. Training

The obligation for training frequently stems from a services contract and to that extent is recordable under subsection **(a)(1)** rather than

subsection (a)(7). The rules for **training** obligations are summarized in Chapter 5, Section B.5.

d. Uniform Allowance

The Federal Employees Uniform Act, 5 U.S.C. §5901, authorizes a uniform allowance for each employee required by statute or regulation to wear a uniform. The agency may furnish the uniform or pay a cash allowance. Where an agency elects to pay an allowance, the obligation arises when the employee incurs the expense and becomes entitled to reimbursement. Thus, the appropriation chargeable is the one currently available at the time the employee makes the expenditure or incurs the debt. 38 **Comp. Gen.** 81 (1958).

e. Travel Expenses <sup>17</sup>

The obligation of appropriations for expenses relating to travel was an extremely fertile area and generated a large number of decisions before 31 U.S.C. § 1501 was enacted. The cases seem to involve every conceivable permutation of facts involving trips or transactions covering more than one **fiscal** year. The enactment of 31 U.S.C. § 1501 logically prompted the question of how the new statute affected the prior decisions. **It** did not, replied the Comptroller General. Thus, the starting point is that subsection (a)(7) incorporates prior <sup>GAO</sup> decisions on obligations for travel. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 183 (1955); 34 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1955).

The “leading case” in this area appears to have been 35 **Comp. Gen.** 183 (1955), which states the pertinent rules. The rules for **travel** may be **summarized** as follows: The issuance of a travel order in itself does not constitute a contractual obligation. The travel order is merely an authorization for the person specified to incur the obligation. The obligation is not incurred until the travel is actually performed or until a ticket is purchased, provided in the latter case the travel is to be performed in the same **fiscal** year the ticket is purchased. 35 **Comp. Gen.** at 185. A 1991 decision, 70 **Comp. Gen.** 469, reaffirmed the principle that the expenses of **temporary** duty travel are chargeable to the **fiscal** year or years in which they are actually incurred.

Some of the earlier cases in this evolutionary process areas follows:

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<sup>17</sup>This section does not apply to travel incident to employee transfers. The rules for employee transfers are set forth separately later.

- Where tickets are purchased in one fiscal year and the travel is performed in the following fiscal year, the obligation is chargeable to the year in which the travel is performed, even though early purchase of the tickets may have been necessary to assure reservations. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 764 (1948); 26 **Comp. Gen.** 131 (1946).
- A “continuous journey” involving more than one segment obligates funds of the year in which the ticket was purchased, as long as the trip starts in that same **fiscal** year. However, procurement of transportation en route is a new obligation. Similarly, a round-trip ticket obligates funds at the time of purchase as long **as** the trip starts in the same **fiscal** year. However, if the return portion of the ticket cannot be used and a separate return ticket must be purchased, a new obligation is created. 26 **Comp. Gen.** 961 (1947); **A-36450**, May 27, 1931.
- Per diem incident to official travel accrues from day to day. Per diem allowances are chargeable to appropriations current when the allowances accrue (i.e., when the expenditures are made). Thus, where travel begins in one fiscal year and extends into the next **fiscal** year, the per diem obligation must be split along fiscal year lines, even though the cost of the travel itself may have been chargeable in its entirety to the prior fiscal year. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 197 (1943).
- Reimbursement on a mileage basis is chargeable to the **fiscal** year in which the major portion of the travel occurred. **If** travel is begun sufficiently prior to the end of a **fiscal** year to enable the employee to complete a continuous journey before the close of the fiscal year, the obligation is chargeable entirely to that year. However, if the travel **is** begun so late in the fiscal year that the major portion of it is performed in the succeeding fiscal year, it is chargeable to appropriations for the succeeding year. 9 **Comp. Gen.** 458, 460 (1930); 2 **Comp. Dec.** 14 (1895).
- Where (1) an employee is authorized to travel by privately owned vehicle at not to exceed the constructive cost of similar travel by rail, (2) the trip starts in one fiscal year and extends into the following **fiscal** year, and (3) the journey would have been completed in the prior year had rail travel been used, the travel expense is chargeable **to** the fiscal year in which the travel began. 30 **Comp. Gen.** 147 (1950).

Other cases involving obligations for travel expenses are: 16 **Comp. Gen.** 926 (1937); 16 **Comp. Gen.** 858 (1937); 5 **Comp. Gen.** 1 (1925); 26 **Comp. Dec.** 86 (1919); **B-134099**, December 13, 1957;

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**A-30477**, April 20, 1939; **A-75086**, July 29, 1936; **A-69370**, April 10, 1936.

f. State Department: Travel  
Outside Continental United  
States

By virtue of 22 U.S.C. §2677, appropriations available to the State Department for travel and transportation outside the continental United States “shall be available for such expenses when any part of such travel or transportation begins in one **fiscal** year pursuant to travel orders issued in that year, notwithstanding the fact that such travel or transportation may not be completed during that same **fiscal** year.” This provision appeared in appropriation acts starting in 1948 and was subsequently made **permanent** and codified. It has the effect of excluding State Department travel or transportation outside the continental United States from some of the earlier decisions. The authority is permissive rather than mandatory. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1963).

Section 2677 applies to temporary duty travel as well as travel incident to change of duty station. 71 **Comp. Gen.** \_ (**B-246702**, August 6, 1992). In either case, expenses are chargeable to the year in which the travel is ordered as long as some travel-related expense is also incurred in that year, even though the physical travel may not begin until the following year. *Id.* Travel-related expenses in this context include miscellaneous **incidental** expenses such as inoculations and passports **as** long as they are not incurred at a time so far removed from the actual travel as to question their legitimacy as incident to the travel. 30 **Comp. Gen.** 25 (1950). The statute also permits charging the prior year for expenses incurred under amended travel orders **issued** in the subsequent **fiscal** year as long as some part of the travel or transportation began in the prior **fiscal** year. 29 **Comp. Gen.** 142 (1949).

The statute does not permit retroactive charging of an expired appropriation. Thus, the Comptroller General found it improper to **issue** a travel authorization in one fiscal year designating the succeeding fiscal year as the appropriation to be charged, and then, at the start of the succeeding **fiscal** year, cancel the authorization and replace it with a new authorization retroactively designating the prior year. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1963).

g. Employee  
Transfer/Relocation Costs

A government employee transferred to a new duty station is entitled to various allowances, primarily travel expenses of the employee and his

or her immediate family, and transportation and **temporary** storage of household goods. 5 U.S.C. §5724. In addition, legislation enacted in 1967, now found at 5 U.S.C. § **5724a**, authorized several new **types** of relocation expenses for transferred employees. **Specifically**, they are: (1) per diem allowance for employee's immediate family en route between **old** and new duty station; (2) expenses of one house-hunting trip to new duty station; (3) temporary quarters allowance incident to relocation; (4) certain expenses of real estate transactions incurred as a result of the transfer; and (5) a miscellaneous expense allowance.

The leading case on the obligation of employee transfer expenses is 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45 (1984). The rule is that “for **all [reimbursable]** travel and transportation expenses of a transferred employee, the agency should record the obligation against the appropriation current when the employee is issued travel orders.” *Id.* at 48. This treatment applies to expenses **stemming** from **employee transfers**; it does not apply to expenses **stemming** from **temporary** duty. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 469 (1991).

The rule of 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45 applies to obligations for extensions of temporary quarters subsistence expenses—the obligation is chargeable to the year in which the transfer order was issued, 64 **Comp. Gen.** 901 (1985). It also applies to dislocation allowances payable to members of the armed services incident to a permanent change of station move. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 474 (1988).

Agencies have discretionary authority under 5 U.S.C. § **5724c** to contract with private **firms** for arranging the purchase of a transferred employee's old residence. Since this service is wholly discretionary and in no way an “entitlement,” the agency's obligation to a relocation firm stems from **its** contract with the **firm**, not from the employee's transfer. Thus, the obligation under one of these arrangements occurs when a purchase order under the contract is awarded. 66 **Comp. Gen.** 554 (1987). (Since the obligation is evidenced by a written contract, it would **be** recorded under subsection (a)(1).)

The decision at 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45 overruled prior inconsistent decisions such as 28 **Comp. Gen.** 337 (1948) (storage) and **B-122358**, August 4, 1976 (relocation expenses under 5 U.S.C. § **5724a**). In assessing the impact of 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45, however, care must be taken to determine precisely what has been overruled and what has not. For example, since 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45 dealt with reimbursable

expenses, prior decisions addressing the transportation of household goods shipped directly by the government presumably remain valid.<sup>18</sup>

Also, 35 **Comp. Gen.** 183 (1955) should not be regarded as “overruled,” notwithstanding language to the contrary in 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45. There are two reasons for this. First, 35 **Comp. Gen.** 183 was not limited to employee transfers, but dealt with travel in other contexts as well, situations not involved in the 1984 decision. Second, 35 **Comp. Gen.** 183 states, at page 185:

“It may be stated, however, that we have no objection to recording tentatively as obligations the estimated cost of transportation to be purchased and reimbursements **therefor** to be earned, including reimbursements for transportation of household **effects**, within the current **fiscal** year at the time the travel **orders** are actually issued where it is **administratively** determined desirable in order to avoid certain additional accounting requirements; but all estimated amounts for travel and related expenses so recorded should be **adjusted** to **actual** obligations periodically. . . .”

This is not very different from the holding of 64 **Comp. Gen.** 45.

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## 8. Subsection (a)(8): Public Utilities

Under 31 U.S.C. s 1501(a)(8), a recordable obligation arises when there is documentary evidence of “services provided by public utilities.”<sup>19</sup>

Government agencies are not required to enter into contracts with public utilities when charges **are** based on rates that are freed by regulatory bodies. However, contracts may be used if desired by the utility or the agency. GAO, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 6.2.C.5 (1990).

If there is a contract, monthly estimates of the cost of services to be performed, based on past experience, maybe recorded as obligations. If there is no contract, obligations should be recorded only on the basis of services **actually** performed. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 459,462 (1955).

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<sup>18</sup>If the government ships the goods, the obligation occurs when a carrier picks up the goods pursuant to a government bill of lading. If separate bills of lading are issued covering different segments of the shipment, each bill of lading is a separate and distinct obligation. E.g., 31 **Comp. Gen.** 471 (1952).

<sup>19</sup>Prior to the 1982 recodification of Title 31, subsection (a)(7) included public utilities as well as employment and travel expenses. The recodification logically separated public utilities into a new subsection since it is unrelated to the other items. Thus, pre-1982 materials refer to eight subsections whereas there are now nine.



A statute relating to obligations for public utility services is 31 U.S.C. § 1308. Under this law, in making payments for telephone services and for services like gas or electricity where the quantity is based on metered readings, the entire payment for a billing period which begins in one fiscal year and ends in another is chargeable to appropriations current at the end of the billing period. If the charge covers several fiscal years, 31 U.S.C. § 1308 does not apply. A charge covering several fiscal years must be prorated so that the charge to any one **fiscal** year appropriation will not exceed the cost of service for a one-year period ending in that fiscal year. 19 **Comp. Gen.** 365 (1939). GAO has construed this statute as applicable to teletypewriter services as well. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 414 (1955).

The General Services Administration is authorized to enter into contracts for public utility services for periods not exceeding 10 years. 40 U.S.C. § 481(a)(3). A contract for the procurement of telephone equipment and related services has been held subject to this provision even where the provider was not a “traditional” form of public utility. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 569 (1983). Noting that the concept of what constitutes “public utility service” is flexible, the decision emphasized that the nature of the product or service provided rather than the nature of the provider should govern for purposes of 40 U.S.C. § 481(a)(3). 62 **Comp. Gen.** at 575. The decision also concluded that GSA is not required to obligate the total estimated cost of a multi-year contract under 40 U.S.C. § 481(a)(3), but is required to obligate only **its** annual costs. *Id.* at 572, 576.

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**9. Subsection (a)(g): Other Legal Liabilities** The final standard for recording obligations, 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(9), is documentary evidence of any “other legal liability of the Government against an available appropriation or fund.”

This is sort of a catch-all category designed to pick up valid obligations which are not covered by subsections (a)(1) through (a)(8). 34 **Comp. Gen.** 418,424 (1955).

Thus far, the decisions provide very little guidance on the types of situations that might be covered by subsection (a)(9). The few decisions that mention subsection (a)(9) generally cite it in conjunction with one of the other subsections and stop short of a definitive statement as to its independent applicability. See, e.g., 54

**Comp. Gen.** 962 (1975) (impoundment litigation); **B-192511**, February 5, 1979 (severance pay **plan** under 22 U.S.C. § 3968).

Another case, although not specifically citing subsection (a)(9), pointed out a situation that would seemingly qualify under that subsection: estimates of municipal tax liabilities on United States property located in foreign countries, based on tax bills received in prior years. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 319 (1955).

Thus, subsection (a)(9) must be applied on a case-by-case basis. If a given item is a **legal** liability of the United States, if appropriations are legally available for the item in terms of purpose and time, and if the item does not fit under any of the other eight subsections, then subsection (a)(9) should be considered.

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## C. Contingent Liabilities

A “contingent liability” is a potential **liability** which may become an actual liability if some particular event happens or does not happen. A more formal definition is:

“An existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to a possible loss to an agency that **will** ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.”<sup>20</sup>

If and when the contingency materializes, the **liability** ripens into a recordable obligation. GAO, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 3.4.C. See also, e.g., 62 **Comp. Gen.** 143, 145 (1983).

The contingent liability poses somewhat of a fiscal dilemma. On the one hand, it is by definition not sufficiently definite or certain to support the formal recording of an obligation. Yet on the other hand, sound financial management, as well as **Antideficiency Act** considerations, dictates that it somehow be recognized. The middle ground between recording an obligation and doing nothing is the “administrative reservation” or “commitment” of **funds**.<sup>21</sup> Reserves for contingencies are recognized in both the **Antideficiency Act** (31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)) and the Impoundment Control Act (2 U.S.C. § 684(b)). Also, a contingent liability which is less than an obligation

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<sup>20</sup>GAO Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget process, PAD-81-27, at 86.

<sup>21</sup>See 7 GAO-PPM § 3.4.E; B-238201, April 15, 1991 (non-decision letter).

but nevertheless sufficiently important to warrant recognition should be reflected in a footnote to pertinent financial statements. See 37 **Comp. Gen.** 691,692 (1958); see also 62 **Comp. Gen.** 143, 146 (1983).

The treatment of contingent liabilities is largely a matter of sound judgment. “No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances that would require disclosure. Judgment would have to be exercised with respect to the possible financial implications.” 37 **Comp. Gen.** at 694. The general question to ask in this context is whether a given situation is sufficiently probable to justify recognition or is **little** more than a mere possibility. Some guidance maybe found in GAO’s Accounting Principles and **Standards**,<sup>22</sup> and in 37 **Comp. Gen.** 691.

One example of a contingent liability which should be recognized is a pending claim under the “changed conditions” clause of a contract. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 691 (1958). It is not a recordable obligation until **adjudicated** and allowed. Another is an authorized indemnification provision limited to appropriations available at the time of a loss. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 824, 826–27 (1975), overruling in part 42 **Comp. Gen.** 708 (1963) to the extent the latter decision **held** establishment of a reserve unnecessary.

Termination liability under a renewal option or similar contract is another type of contingent liability. As a general proposition, “an amount equal to the maximum contingent liability of the Government [must be] always available for obligation from appropriations current at the time the contract is made and at the time renewals thereof are made.” 37 **Comp. Gen.** 155, 160 (1957). See also 43 **Comp. Gen.** 657 (1964); 8 **Comp. Gen.** 654 (1929). In some circumstances, GAO has held that termination liability amounts to an actual obligation. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 143 (1983); **B-238581**, October 31, 1990.

Obligating funds for potential termination liability can tie up large **sums** for a long period of time. Administrative reservation is also an imperfect solution because the reserved funds may have to give way to higher priority items as the fiscal year progresses. Also, reservation does not **preserve** the funds beyond their period of availability and has

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<sup>22</sup>GAO, **Policy and Procedures Manual** for Guidance of **Federal Agencies**, title 2, Appendix I, § C50 (1984).

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to be repeated each **fiscal** year. Congress in **several** instances has provided for varying forms of alternative treatment of termination liability. See 51 **Comp. Gen.** 598,604 (1972); B-I 74839, March .20, 1984; **B-159141**, August 18, 1967; **B-1 12131**, **July 27, 1953**.

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## D. Reporting Requirements

When 31 U.S.C. § 1501 was originally enacted in 1954, it required each agency to prepare a report each year on the **unliquidated** obligations and unobligated balance for each appropriation or fund under the agency's control. The reports were to be submitted to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the (then) Bureau of the Budget, and GAO. GAO was often asked by the appropriations committees to review these reports.

After several years of reviewing reports, the appropriations committees determined that the requirement had served its purpose, and Congress amended the law in 1959 to revise and relax the reporting procedures. The current reporting requirements are found at 31 U.S.C. §§ **1108(c)** and **1501(b)**.

Under 31 U.S.C. § **1108(c)**, each agency, when submitting requests for appropriations to the Office of Management and Budget, must report that “the statement of obligations submitted with the request contains obligations consistent with section 1501 of this title.” See 39 **Comp. Gen.** 422,425 (1959). Implementing instructions are contained in OMB Circular No. **A-11** (Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates), §11.7. The reports must be certified by officials designated by the agency head. The certification must be supported by adequate records, and the agency must retain the records and certifications in such form as to facilitate audit and reconciliation. Officials designated to make the certifications may not redelegate the **responsibility**.<sup>23</sup>

The conference report on the original enactment of 31 U.S.C. § **1501** specified that the officials designated to make the certifications **should be** persons with overall responsibility for the recording of obligations, and “**in** no event should the designation be below the level

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<sup>23</sup>Sample certification statements may be found in OMB Circular No. A-11, §11.7, and GAO's Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, §3.8.A.

of the chief accounting officer of a **major** bureau, service, or constituent organizational **unit**.”<sup>24</sup>

The person who makes certifications under 31 U.S.C. §1108(c) is not a “certifying officer” for purposes of personal accountability for the funds in question. Although he or she may be coincidentally an “authorized **certifying** officer,” the two functions are legally separate and distinct. **B-197559-O.M.**, May 13, 1980.

The statute does not require 100 percent verification of **unliquidated** obligations prior to certification. Agencies may use statistical sampling. **B-199967** -O. M., December 3, 1980.

In the case of transfer appropriation accounts under interagency agreements, the certification official of the spending agency must make the certifications to the head of the advancing agency and not to the head of the spending agency. GAO, **Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies**, **title 7. § 3.8.A.**

Finally, 31 U.S.C. §1501(b) provides that any statement of obligations furnished by any agency to the Congress or to any congressional committee “shall include only those amounts that are obligations consistent with subsection (a) of this section. ”

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## **E. Deobligation**

The definition of the term “**deobligation**” is a “downward **adjustment** of previously recorded **obligations**.”<sup>25</sup> **Deobligations** occur for a variety of reasons. Examples are:

- Liquidation in amount less than amount of original obligation. **E.g.**, **B-207433**, September 16, 1983 (cost underrun); **B-183184**, May 30, 1975 (agency called for less work than maximum provided under level-of-effort contract).
- Cancellation of projector contract.
- Initial obligation determined to be invalid.

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<sup>24</sup>**H. R. Rep. No. 2663, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.** 18 (1954), quoted in **Financial Management in the Federal Government**, S. Dec. No. 11, **87th Cong., 1st Sess.** 88 (1961), and in **50 Comp. Gen.** **857,862 (1971).**

<sup>25</sup>GAO, **Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process**, PAD-81-27, at 56.

- Reduction of previously recorded estimate.
- Correction of bookkeeping errors or duplicate obligations.

In addition, **deobligation** maybe statutorily required in some instances. An example is **31 U.S.C. § 1535(d)**, requiring **deobligation** of appropriations obligated under an Economy Act agreement to the extent the performing agency has not incurred valid obligations under the agreement by the end of the fiscal year.

For the most part, there are no special rules relating to **deobligation**. Rather, the treatment of **deobligations** follows logically from the principles previously discussed in this and preceding chapters. **Thus—**

- Funds **deobligated** within the original period of obligational availability are once again available for new obligations just as if they had never been obligated in the first place. Naturally, any new obligations are subject to the purpose, time, and amount restrictions governing the source appropriation.
- Funds **deobligated** after the expiration of the original period of obligational availability are not available for new obligations. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 410 (1985); 52 **Comp. Gen.** 179 (1972). They maybe retained as unobligated balances in the expired account until the account is closed, however, and are available for **adjustments** in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1553(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1404 (1990).

A proper and **unliquidated** obligation should not be **deobligated** unless there is some valid reason for doing so. Absent a valid reason, it is improper to **deobligate** funds solely to “free them up” for new obligations. To do so risks violating the **Antideficiency** Act. For example, where a government check issued in payment of some valid obligation cannot be promptly negotiated (if, for example, it is returned as undeliverable), it is improper to **deobligate** the funds and use them for new obligations. 15 **Comp. Gen.** 489 (1935); **A-44024**, September 21, 1942. (The two cited decisions deal with provisions of law which have since changed, but the thrust of the decisions remains the same.) The **Antideficiency** Act violation would occur if the payee of the original check subsequently shows up and demands payment but the funds are no longer available because they have been **reobligated** and the account contains insufficient funds.

Under some programs, an agency provides funds to an intermediary which in turn distributes the funds **to** members of a class of beneficiaries. The agency records the obligation when it provides, or legally commits itself to provide, the funds to the intermediary. It is undesirable for many reasons to permit the intermediary to hold the funds **indefinitely** prior to reallocation. Unless the program Legislation provides otherwise, the agency may establish a reasonable cutoff date at which time unused funds in the hands of the intermediary are “recaptured” by the agency and **deobligated**. GAO recommended such a course of action in 50 **Comp. Gen.** 857 (1971). If recapture occurs during the period of availability, the funds may be **reobligated** for program purposes; if it occurs after the period of availability has ended, the funds expire absent some contrary direction in the governing legislation. **Id.**; Dabney v. Reagan, No. 82 Civ. 2231-CSH (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 1985).

Congress may occasionally by statute authorize an agency to **reobligate deobligated** funds after expiration of the original period of availability. This is called “**deobligation-reobligation**” (or “**deob-reob**”) authority. Such authority exists only when expressly granted by statute. **Deobligation-reobligation** authority generally contemplates that funds will be **deobligated** only when the original obligation ceases to exist and not as a device to effectively augment the appropriation. See **B-173240-O**. M., January 23, 1973. Also, absent statutory authority to the contrary, “**deob-reob**” authority applies only to obligations and not to expenditures. Thus, repayments to an appropriation **after** expiration of the original period of obligational **availability** are not available for **reobligation**. **B-121836**, April 22, 1955.





# Continuing Resolutions

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# Continuing Resolutions

## A. Introduction

### 1. Definition and General Description

The term “continuing resolution” may be defined as follows:

“Legislation enacted by Congress to provide budget authority for Federal agencies and/or **specific** activities to continue in operation until the regular appropriations are enacted. Continuing resolutions are enacted when action on appropriations is not completed by the beginning of a **fiscal year**.”<sup>1</sup>

For the most part, continuing resolutions are temporary appropriation acts. With a few exceptions to be noted later, they **are** intended by Congress to be stop-gap measures enacted to keep existing federal programs functioning after the expiration of previous budget authority and until regular appropriation acts can be enacted. Congress resorts to the continuing resolution when there is no regular appropriation for a program or agency, perhaps because the two Houses have not yet agreed on common language, because authorizing legislation has not yet been enacted, or because the President has vetoed an appropriation act passed by Congress. 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530,532 (1979). Also, given the size and complexity of today’s government, the consequent complexity of the budget and appropriations process, and the occasionally differing policy objectives of the executive and legislative branches, it has become increasingly difficult for Congress **to** enact all of the regular appropriation acts before the **fiscal** year ends.

Continuing resolutions are nothing new. We have found administrative decisions discussing them as far back as the **1880s**.<sup>2</sup> At one time, they were called “temporary resolutions.” The term “continuing resolution” came into widespread use in the early **1960s**.<sup>3</sup>

In the 20 years from **FY 1962** to **FY 1981**, 85 percent of the appropriation bills for federal agencies were enacted after the start of

<sup>1</sup>GAO, Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, PAD-81-27 (3d ed. March 1981), St 44.

<sup>2</sup>4 Lawrence, **First Comp. Dec.** 116(1883); 3 Lawrence, **First Comp. Dec.** 213 (1882).

<sup>3</sup>For a brief **historical sketch**, see Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, by Louis Fisher, GGR 74-210, Chapter V (1974). Fisher identifies what may have been the **first** continuing resolution, an 1876 resolution (19 Stat. 65) requested by President Grant. Id. at 31–32.

the fiscal year and thus necessitated continuing resolutions. GAO has discussed the problems inherent in this situation in several reports: Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, **PAD-81-31** (March 3, 1981), Continuing Resolutions and an Assessment of Automatic Funding Approaches, **GAO/AFMD-86-16** (January 1986), and Government Shutdown: Permanent Funding Lapse Legislation Needed, **GAO/GGD-91-76** (June 1991). Funding gaps and the legal problems they present are discussed separately in Chapter 6.

Continuing resolutions are enacted as joint resolutions making continuing appropriations for a certain fiscal year. Although enacted in this form rather than as an “act,” once passed by both Houses of Congress and approved by the President, a continuing resolution becomes a public law and has the same force and effect as any other statute. **B-152554**, December 15, 1970; *Oklahoma v. Weinberger*, 360 F. Supp. 724, 726 (W.D. Okla. 1973). Since a continuing resolution is a form of appropriation act, it often will include the same types of restrictions and conditions that are commonly found in regular appropriation acts. E.g., **B-210603**, February 25, 1983 (ship construction appropriation in continuing resolution making funds available “**only** under a firm, **fixed** price type contract”). Having said this, however, it is necessary to note that continuing resolutions, at least those in what we will call the “traditional form,” differ considerably from regular appropriation acts.

Continuing resolutions may take different forms. The “traditional” form, used consistently (with some variation) into the **1980s**, employed essentially standard language and was clearly a temporary measure. An example of this form is the **1982** continuing resolution, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183 (1981). When enacting continuing resolutions in this form, there is clear indication that Congress intends and expects that the normal authorization and appropriation process will eventually produce appropriation acts which will replace or terminate the budget authority contained in the resolution. Thus, a continuing resolution of this type generally provides that funds appropriated for an activity by the resolution will no longer be available for obligation if the activity is later funded by a regular appropriation act, or Congress indicates its intent to end the activity by enacting an applicable appropriation act without providing for the activity. 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530, 532 (1979). Obligations already incurred under the resolution, however, may be liquidated.

Unlike regular appropriation acts, continuing resolutions in their traditional form do not usually appropriate **specified** sums of money. Rather, they usually appropriate “**such** amounts as maybe necessary” for continuing projects or activities at a certain “rate for operations.” The rate for operations may be the amount provided for the activity in an appropriation act that has passed both Houses but has not become law; the lower of the amounts provided when each House has passed a different act; the lower of the amounts provided either in an act which has passed only one House or in the administration’s budget estimate; the amount specified in a particular conference report; the **lower** of either the amount provided in the budget estimate or the “current rate”; or simply the current rate. Therefore, in order to determine the sum of money appropriated for any given activity by this type of continuing resolution, it is necessary to examine documents other than the resolution itself. Some continuing resolutions have used a combination of “formula appropriations” of the types described in this paragraph and appropriations of specific dollar amounts. An example is the 1984 continuing resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983).

There are times when Congress acknowledges at the outset that it is not likely to enact one or more regular appropriation acts during the current fiscal year. See, for example, the 1980 continuing resolution, Pub. L. No. 96-86, 93 Stat. 656 (1979), which provided budget authority for the legislative branch for the entire f-year.

For a few years in the **1980s**, Congress used a **very different** form of continuing resolution, simply stringing together the complete texts of appropriation **bills** not yet enacted and enacting them together in a single “omnibus” package. This approach reached its extreme in the 1988 continuing resolution, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987), which included the complete texts of all 13 of the regular appropriation bills. This form of continuing resolution differs from the traditional form in two key respects:

- Unlike the traditional continuing resolution, the “full text” version amounts to an acknowledgement that no further action on the **unenacted** bills will be forthcoming, and consequently provides funding for the remainder of the **fiscal** year.
- When the entire text of an appropriation bill is incorporated into a continuing resolution, the appropriations are in the form of **specified** dollar amounts, the same as if the individual bill had been enacted.

The “full text” format generally does not raise the same issues of statutory interpretation that arise under the traditional format. However, it produces new ones. For example, in a continuing resolution which consolidates the full texts of what would otherwise have been several separate appropriation acts, GAO has construed the term “this act” as referring only to the individual “appropriation act” in which it appears rather than to the entire continuing resolution. **B-230110, April 11, 1988.**

While the omnibus approach of the 1988 resolution may appear convenient, it generated considerable controversy because, among other reasons, it is virtually “veto-proof”—the President has little choice but to sign the bill or bring the entire government to an abrupt halt.

There was no continuing resolution for fiscal year 1989. **All 13** of the appropriation **bills** were enacted on time, for what was reported to be the first time in 12 **years**.<sup>4</sup> For fiscal year 1990, Congress reverted to the traditional type of continuing resolution. See Pub. L. No. 101-100, 103 Stat. 638 (1989).

Questions arising under continuing resolutions can be grouped loosely into two broad categories. First are questions in which the fact that a continuing resolution is involved is **purely** incidental, in other words, questions which could have arisen just as easily under a regular appropriation act. For example, one of the issues considered in **B-230110, April 11, 1988**, was whether certain provisions in the 1988 resolution constituted permanent legislation. Cases in this category are included with their respective topics throughout this publication and are not repeated in this chapter.

Second are issues that are unique to continuing resolutions, and these are the focus of the remainder of this chapter. For the most part, the material deals with the traditional form of continuing resolution as it **is this** form that uses concepts and language found only in continuing resolutions.

One point that should emerge from the GAO decisions and opinions is the central role of legislative intent. To be sure, legislative intent cannot change the plain meaning of a statute; Congress must enact

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<sup>4</sup>All Spending Bill Completed on Time, New York Times, October 2, 1988, at 27.

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what it intends in order to make it law. However, there are many cases in which the statutory language alone does not provide a clear answer, and indications of congressional intent expressed in well-established methods, viewed in light of the purpose of the continuing resolution, will tip the balance.

In one case, for example, a continuing resolution provided a lump-sum appropriation for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's research and facilities account, and provided further for the transfer of \$1.8 million from the Fisheries Loan Fund. The **first** continuing resolution for 1987 included the transfer provision and was signed into law on October 1, 1986. The Fisheries **Loan** Fund was scheduled to expire at "the close of September 30, 1986." Under a strictly technical reading, the \$1.8 million ceased to be available once the clock struck midnight on September 30. However, the Comptroller General found the transfer provision effective, noting that a contrary result would "frustrate the obvious intent of Congress." **B-227658**, August 7, 1987.

While many of the continuing resolution provisions to be discussed will appear highly technical (because they are highly technical), there is an essential logic to them, evolved over many years, which is more readily seen from the perspective not of a **specific** case or problem, but of the overall goals and objectives of continuing resolutions and their relationship **to** the rest of the budget and appropriations process.

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## 2. Use of Appropriation Warrants

**Funds**, including funds appropriated under a continuing resolution, are drawn from the Treasury by means of an appropriation **warrant** (TFS Form 6200).<sup>5</sup> A warrant is the official document issued **pursuant** to law by the Secretary of the Treasury that establishes the amount of money authorized to be withdrawn from the **Treasury**.<sup>6</sup> Under 31 U.S.C. § 3323(a), warrants authorized by law are to be signed by the **Secretary** of the Treasury and countersigned by the Comptroller General.

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<sup>5</sup>Treasury Financial Manual, Vol. I, § 2-2040.

<sup>6</sup>Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, *supra* note 1, at 81.

Requirements relating to Treasury **warrants** maybe waived. Section **115(a)** of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, 31 U.S.C. § **3326(a)**, states:

“(a) When the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General decide that, with **sufficient** safeguards, existing procedures maybe changed to simplify, improve, and economize the control and accounting of **public** money, they may prescribe joint regulations for waiving any part of the requirements in effect on September 12, 1950, **that—**

“(1) **warrants** be issued and countersigned for the receipt, retention, and disbursement of public money and trust **funds** . . . .”

Under the authority of this section, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General have issued several joint **regulations**.<sup>7</sup>

In the specific context of appropriation warrants, the joint regulations have been used to phase out the countersignature requirement. First, Department of the Treasury-General Accounting **Office** Joint Regulation No. 5 (October 18, 1974) waived the requirement for all appropriations except continuing resolutions. Next, Treasury-GAO Joint Regulation No. 6 (October 1, 1983) further **simplified** the process by requiring issuance of a **warrant** and countersignature under a continuing resolution only once, for the total amount appropriated, unless a subsequent resolution changed the annual amount. Finally, Treasury-GAO Joint Regulation No. 7, effective January 1, 1991, eliminated the countersignature requirement completely.

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<sup>7</sup>Treasury-GAO Joint Regulations are included as an appendix to Title 7 of the GAO Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies. Because of **their nature**, they are not published in the Federal Register. Some of the earlier ones, but not those noted in the text, were published in the annual “Comp. Gen.” volumes. Title 7 of the Policy and Procedures Manual is the **only** GAO reference in which the regulations **and** amendments can be found together in a single location.

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## B. Rate for Operations

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### 1. Current Rate

The current rate, as that term is used in continuing resolutions, is equivalent to the total amount of money which was available for obligation for an activity during the fiscal year immediately prior to the one for which the continuing resolution is enacted.

The term ‘current rate’ is used in continuing resolutions to indicate the level of spending which Congress desires for a program. For example, a resolution may appropriate sufficient funds to enable a program to operate at a rate for operations “not in excess of the current rate,” or at a rate “not in excess of the lower of the current rate” or the rate provided in a certain bill. It is possible to read the term “current rate” as referring to either the amount of money available for the program in the preceding year, or an amount of money **sufficient** to enable continuation of the program at the **level** of the preceding year. The two can be very different.

**As** a general proposition, GAO regards the term “current rate” as referring to a sum of money rather than a program **level**. E.g., 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530,533 (1979); **B-194362**, May 1, 1979. Thus, when a continuing resolution appropriates in terms of the current rate, the amount of money available under the resolution will be limited by that rate, even though an increase in the minimum wage may force a reduction in the number of people participating in an employment program (**B-194063**, May 4, 1979), or an increase in the mandatory **level** of assistance will reduce the number of meals provided under a meals for the elderly program (**B-194362**, May 1, 1979).

The term “current rate” refers to the rate of operations carried on within the appropriation for the prior **fiscal** year. **B-152554**, December 6, 1963. The current rate is equivalent to the total appropriation, or the total funds which were available for obligation, for an activity during the previous fiscal year. Edwards v. Bowen, 785 **F.2d** 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); 64 **Comp. Gen.** 21 (1984); 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530,533 (1979); **B-194063**, May 4, 1979; **B-194362**, May 1, 1979; **B-164031(1)**, December 13, 1972. Funds **administratively** transferred from the account during the fiscal year, under authority contained in substantive legislation, should not be deducted in determining the current rate. **B-197881**, April 8, 1980; **B-152554**, November 4, 1974.



It follows that funds transferred into the account during the fiscal year pursuant to statutory authority should be excluded. **B-197881, April 8, 1980.**

In those instances in which the program in question has been funded by one-year appropriations in prior years, the current rate is equal to the total funds appropriated for the program for the previous **fiscal** year. **E.g.**, 64 **Comp. Gen.** 21,22 (1984); 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530 (1979); **B-194362**, May 1, 1979. In those instances in which the program has been funded **by** multiple-year or no-year appropriations in prior years, the current rate is equal to the total funds appropriated for the previous fiscal year plus the total of unobligated budget authority carried over into that year from prior years. 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530 (1979); **B-152554**, October 9, 1970.

One apparent deviation from this calculation of current rate occurred in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530 (1979), a case involving the now obsolete **CETA** (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act) program. In that decision, the Comptroller General, in calculating the current rate under the 1979 continuing resolution, included funds appropriated in a 1977 appropriation act and obligated during 1977. **Ordinarily, only** funds appropriated by the fiscal year 1978 appropriation act, and carryover funds unobligated at the beginning of fiscal year 1979, would have been included in the current rate. However, in this instance the funds appropriated in 1977 were included because it was clear from the legislative history of the appropriation act that Congress intended these funds to be an advance of appropriations for fiscal year 1978. Accordingly, Congress did not appropriate funds for this activity in the fiscal year 1978 appropriation act. Thus, in order to ascertain the actual amount available for the activity for fiscal year 1978, it was necessary to include the advance funding provided by the 1977 appropriation act. The rationale used in this decision would apply only when it is clear that Congress was providing advance funding for the reference fiscal year in an earlier year's appropriation act.

Where funding for the preceding fiscal year covered only a part of that year, it may be appropriate to “annualize” the previous year’s appropriation in order to determine the current rate. This was the result in 61 **Comp.Gen.** 473 (1982), in which then 1981 appropriation for a particular program had been contained in a supplemental appropriation act and was intended to cover only the

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last quarter of the fiscal year. The current rate for purposes of the **FY** 1982 continuing resolution was four times the **FY** 1981 figure.

There are exceptions to the rule that “current rate” means a sum of money rather than a program level. For example, GAO construed the **FY** 1980 continuing resolution as appropriating sufficient funds to support an increased number of Indochinese refugees in view of explicit statements by both the Appropriations and the Budget Committees that the resolution was intended to fund the higher program level. **B-197636**, February 25, 1980. Also, the legislative history of the **FY** 1981 continuing resolution (Pub. L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351) indicated that in some instances “current rate” must be interpreted so as to avoid reducing existing program levels.

It is always preferable for the exception to be specified in the resolution itself. Starting with the first continuing resolution for fiscal year 1983 (Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186 (1982)), Congress began appropriating for the continuation of certain programs “at a rate to maintain current operating levels.” GAO has construed this language as meaning sufficient funds to maintain the program in question at the same operating level as at the end of the immediately preceding **fiscal year**. **B-209878**, April 14, 1983; **B-200923**, November 16, 1982 (non-decision letter) (incorporating some **discussion** of legislative history).

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## 2. Rate Not Exceeding Current Rate

When a resolution appropriates funds to continue an activity at a rate for operations “not in excess of the current rate,” the amount of funds appropriated by the resolution is equal to the current rate less any unobligated balance carried over into the present year.

As discussed in the preceding section, the current rate is equivalent to the total amount of funds that was available for obligation for a project or activity in the preceding fiscal year. When the continuing resolution appropriates funds to continue an activity at a rate for operations “not in excess of the current rate,” it is the intent of Congress that the activity have available for obligation in the present fiscal year no more funds **than** it had available for obligation in the preceding fiscal year. Therefore, if there is a balance of unobligated funds which can be carried over into the present **fiscal year**, this balance must be deducted from the current rate in determining the amount of funds appropriated by the continuing resolution. If this

were not done, the program would be funded at a higher level in the present year than it was in the preceding year, which is not permitted by the language of the resolution. E.g., 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530,535 (1979).

For example, suppose the continuing resolution for **fiscal** year 1992 appropriates **sufficient** funds to continue an activity at a rate not exceeding the current rate. The current rate, or the **total** amount which was available for obligation in **fiscal** year 1991, is \$1,000,000. Of this amount, \$100,000 remains unobligated at the end of **1991**, and is available for obligation in 1992. If the activity is to operate at a rate not to exceed the current rate, \$1,000,000, then the resolution can appropriate **no** more than the difference between the current rate and the carryover from 1991 to 1992, or \$900,000. If the resolution were interpreted as appropriating the full current rate, then a total of \$1,100,000 would be available for **fiscal** year 1992, and the **activity** would be able to operate at a rate in excess of the current rate, a result prohibited by the language of the resolution.

An unobligated balance which does not carryover into **the** present **fiscal** year (the more common situation) does not have to be deducted. **B-152554**, November 4, 1974.

A commonly encountered form of continuing resolution formula appropriation is an amount not in excess of the current rate or the rate provided in some reference item, whichever is lower. The reference item may be an **unenacted** bill, a conference report, the President's budget estimate, etc. When the current rate produces the lower figure—the situation encountered in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530—the above rule applies and an unobligated carryover balance must be deducted to determine the amount appropriated by the continuing resolution. However, when the current rate is not the lower of the two referenced items, the rule does not necessarily apply.

**To illustrate**, a continuing resolution appropriated funds for the **Office** of Refugee Resettlement at a rate for operations not in excess of the lower of the current rate or the rate authorized by a bill as passed by the House of Representatives. The rate under the House-passed bill was \$50 million. The current rate was \$77.5 million, of which \$39 million remained unobligated at the end of the preceding **fiscal** year and was authorized to be carried over into the current **fiscal** year. If the continuing resolution had simply specified a rate not in excess of

the current rate, or if the rate in the House-passed bill had been greater than the current rate, it would have been necessary to deduct - the \$39 million carryover balance from the \$77.5 million current rate to determine the maximum funding level for the current year. Here, however, the rate in the House-passed bill was the lower of the two.

Reasoning that the “current rate” already includes an unobligated carryover balance, if any, whereas the rate in the House-passed bill did not **include** a prior year’s balance, and supported by the legislative history of the continuing resolution, the Comptroller General concluded that the amount available for the current year was the amount appropriated by the resolution, \$50 million, plus the unobligated carryover balance of \$39 million, for a total of \$89 million. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 649 (1985). The decision distinguished 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530, stating that “the rule with respect to deduction of unobligated balances in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530 is not applicable where the lower of two referenced rates is not the current rate.” *Id.* at 652–53. The case went to court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result. **Edwards v. Bowen**, 785 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).

In sum, if a continuing resolution appropriates the lower of the current rate or the rate in some reference item, you compare the two numbers to determine which is lower before taking any unobligated carryover balance into account. If the current rate is lower, you then deduct the carryover balance to determine the funding level under the continuing resolution. If the rate in the reference item is **lower**, the funding level is the reference rate plus the carryover balance unless it is clear that this is not what was intended.

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### 3. Spending Pattern Under Continuing Resolution

#### a. Pattern of Obligations

An agency may determine the pattern of its obligations under a continuing resolution so long as it operates under a plan which will keep it within the rate for operations limit set by the resolution. If an agency usually obligates most of its annual budget in the first month or **first** quarter of the **fiscal** year, it may continue that pattern under the resolution. If **an** agency usually obligates funds uniformly over the entire year, it will be limited to that pattern under the resolution,

unless it presents convincing reasons why **its** pattern must be changed in the current **fiscal** year.

Continuing resolutions are often enacted to cover a limited period of time, such as a month or a calendar quarter. The time limit stated in the resolution is the **maximum** period of time during which funds appropriated by the resolution are available for obligation.

However, this limited period of availability does not affect the amount of money appropriated by the resolution. The rate for operations specified in the resolution, whether in terms of an appropriation act which has not yet become law, a budget estimate, or the current rate, is an annual amount. The continuing resolution, in general, regardless of its period of duration, appropriates this **full** annual amount. See **B-152554**, November 4, 1974.

Because the appropriation under **a** continuing resolution is the **full** annual amount, an agency may generally follow any pattern of obligating funds, so long as it is operating under a plan which will enable continuation of activities throughout the **fiscal** year within the limits of the annual amount appropriated. Thus, under a resolution with a duration of one month, and which appropriates funds at a rate for operations not in excess of the current rate, the agency is not necessarily limited to incurring obligations at the same rate it incurred them in the corresponding month of the preceding year. **B-152554**, December 6, 1963. The same principle applies when the resolution appropriates funds at a rate to maintain current operating levels. **B-209676**, April 14, 1983.

However, the pattern of obligations in prior years does provide a framework for determining the proper pattern of obligations under the continuing resolution. For example, if the activity is a formula grant program in which nearly all appropriated funds are normally obligated at the beginning of the **fiscal** year, then the full annual amount should be made available to the agency under the resolution, even though the resolution may be in effect for only one month. However, if the activity is salaries and expenses, in which funds are normally obligated uniformly throughout the year, then the amount made available to the agency should be only one-twelfth of the annual amount under a one-month resolution or one-fourth of the annual amount under a calendar quarter resolution. **B-152554**, February 17, 1972.

Congress can, of course, alter the pattern of obligations by the language of the resolution. For example, if the resolution **limits** obligations in any calendar quarter to one-fourth of the annual rate, the agency is limited to that one-fourth rate regardless of its normal pattern of obligations, **B-152554**, October 16, 1973. Further, even if the resolution **itself** does not have such limitations, but the legislative history clearly shows the intent of Congress that only one-fourth of the annual rate be obligated each calendar quarter, only this amount should be made available unless the agency **can** demonstrate a real need to exceed that rate. **B-152554**, November 4, 1974.

b. Apportionment

The requirement that appropriations be apportioned by the **Office** of Management and Budget, imposed by the **Antideficiency** Act, applies to funds appropriated by continuing resolution as well as regular appropriations. See generally **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, Part **IV** (1985).

Typically, **OMB** has permitted some continuing resolution funds to be apportioned automatically. For example, if a given continuing resolution covers 10 percent of a **fiscal** year, **OMB** may permit 10 percent of the appropriation to be apportioned automatically, meaning that the agency can obligate this amount without seeking a specific apportionment. Under such an arrangement, if program requirements produced a need for additional funds, the agency would have to seek an apportionment from **OMB** for the larger amount.

Apportionment requirements may vary from year to year because of differences in duration and other aspects of applicable continuing resolutions. A device **OMB** has commonly used to announce its apportionment requirements for a given fiscal year is an **OMB** Bulletin reflecting the particular continuing resolution for that year.

With the change in warrant procedures brought about by the Treasury-GAO Joint Regulations discussed earlier, the apportionment **process** plays an even more vital role in controlling an agency's pattern of obligations under a continuing resolution.

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#### 4. Liquidation of Contract Authority

When in the preceding **fiscal** year Congress has provided an agency with contract authority, the continuing resolution must be interpreted as appropriating **sufficient** funds to liquidate that authority to the extent it becomes due during the period covered by the continuing resolution.

When an activity operates on the basis that in one year Congress provides contract authority to the agency and in the next year appropriates funds to liquidate that authority, then a continuing resolution in the second year must be interpreted as appropriating **sufficient** funds to liquidate the outstanding contract authority. The term “contract authority” means express statutory authority to incur contractual obligations in advance of appropriations. Thus, there is no “rate for operations” limitation in connection with the liquidation of due debts based on **validly** executed contracts entered into under statutory contract authority. In this context, rate for operations limitations apply only to new contract authority for the current **fiscal** year. **B-114833**, November 12, 1974.

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#### 5. Rate for Operations Exceeds Final Appropriation

If an agency operating under a continuing resolution incurs obligations within the rate for operations limit, but Congress subsequently appropriates a total annual amount **less** than the amount of these obligations, the obligations remain valid, **B-152554**, February 17, 1972.

For example, a continuing resolution for a period of one month may have a rate for operations limitation of the current rate. The activity being funded is a grant program and the agency obligates the full annual amount during the period of the resolution. Congress then enacts a regular appropriation act which appropriates for the activity an amount less than the obligations already incurred by the agency. Under these circumstances, the obligations incurred by the agency remain valid obligations of the United States.

Having established that the “excess” obligations remain valid, the next question is how they are to be paid. At one time, GAO took the position that an agency finding **itself** in this situation must not incur any further obligations and must attempt to negotiate its obligations downward to come within the amount of the final appropriation. **B-152554**, February 17, 1972. **If** this is not possible, the agency would have to seek a supplemental or deficiency appropriation. This

position was based **on** a provision commonly appearing in continuing resolutions along the following lines:

“Expenditures made pursuant to this joint resolution **shall** be charged to the applicable appropriation, fund, or authorization whenever a **bill** in which such applicable appropriation, fund, or authorization is contained is enacted into **law**.”<sup>8</sup>

However, the 1972 opinion failed to take into consideration another provision commonly included in continuing resolutions:

“Appropriations made and authority granted pursuant to this joint resolution **shall** cover **all** obligations or expenditures incurred for any program, project, or activity during the period for which funds or authority for such project or activity are available under this joint resolution.”<sup>9</sup>

When these two provisions are considered together, it becomes apparent that the purpose of the first provision is merely to emphasize that the funds appropriated by the continuing resolution are not in addition to the funds later provided when the applicable regular appropriation act is enacted. Accordingly, GAO modified the 1972 opinion and held that funds made available by a continuing resolution remain available to pay validly incurred obligations which exceed the amount of the final appropriation. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 9 (1982). See also 67 **Comp. Gen.** 474 (1988); **B-207281**, October 19, 1982.

Thus, obligations under a continuing resolution are treated as follows:

“When an annual appropriation act provides sufficient funding for an appropriation account to cover obligations previously incurred under the authority of a continuing resolution, any unpaid obligations are to be charged to and paid from the applicable account established under the annual appropriation act. Similarly, to the extent the annual act provides sufficient funding, those obligations which were incurred and paid during the period of the continuing resolution must be charged to the account created by the annual appropriation act. On the other hand, to the extent the **annual** appropriation act does not provide sufficient funding for the appropriation account to cover obligations validly incurred under a continuing resolution, the obligations in excess of the amount provided by the annual act should be charged to and paid from the appropriation account established under authority of the continuing resolution.

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<sup>8</sup>**E.g.**, Pub. L. No. 101-100, § 104, 103 Stat. 638,640 (1989) (1990 continuing resolution). Comparable provisions have been included in continuing resolutions for over a century. See, for example, the FY 1883 **continuing** resolution (22 Stat. 384) discussed in 3 Lawrence, **First Comp. Dec.** 213 (1882).

<sup>9</sup>**E.g.**, Pub. L. No. 101-100, **supra** note 8, 5103.



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[Footnote omitted.] Thus the funds made available by the resolution **must** remain available to pay these obligation.”

62 **Comp. Gen.** 9, 11–12 (1982). However, to comply with the intent of the lower appropriation, **OMB** requires that agencies “reduce obligations in the most cost-effective way and to the maximum extent possible.” **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, §22.1. Thus, as **GAO** had advised in 1972, agencies are still required **to** make their best efforts to remain within the amount of the final appropriation. The change recognized in 62 **Comp. Gen.** 9 is that, to the extent an agency is unable to do so, the appropriation made by the continuing resolution remains available **to** liquidate the “excess” obligations.

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## C. Projects or Activities

“Projects or activities” **as** used in continuing resolutions may have two meanings. When **determining** which government programs are covered by the resolution, and the rate for operations limit, the term “project or activity” refers to the total appropriation rather than to **specific** activities. When determining whether an activity was authorized or carried out in the preceding year, the term “project or activity” may refer to the **specific** activity. The following paragraphs will elaborate.

The term “projects or activities” is used in two contexts in continuing resolutions. First, it is used in the appropriating language to indicate which government programs are to be **funded** and at what rate. Thus a resolution might appropriate sufficient funds to continue “projects or activities provided for” in a certain appropriation bill “to the extent and in the manner” provided in the bill. Occasionally Congress will use only the term “activities” by appropriating sufficient funds “for continuing the following activities, but at a rate for operations not in excess of the current rate.”

When used in this context, “projects or activities” or simply “activities” does not refer to specific items contained as activities in the **administration’s** budget submission or in a committee report.

Rather, the term refers to the appropriation for the preceding fiscal year. **B-204449**, November 18, 1981.<sup>10</sup> Thus, **if a** resolution appropriates funds to continue “projects or activities” under a certain authorizing act at a rate for operations not exceeding the current rate, the agency is operating within the **limits** of the resolution so long as the total of obligations under the appropriation does not exceed the current rate. **Within** the appropriation, an agency may fund a particular activity at a higher rate than that activity was funded in the previous year and still not violate the current rate limitation, assuming of course that the resolution itself does not provide to the contrary.

An exception to the interpretation that “projects or activities” refers to the appropriation **in** existence in the preceding **fiscal** year occurred in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 530 (1979). In prior years, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act programs had been funded in two separate appropriations, Employment and Training Assistance and **Temporary** Employment Assistance. The individual programs under the two appropriations differed only in that the number of jobs provided under Temporary Employment Assistance depended on the condition of the national economy.

Concurrently with the enactment of the 1979 continuing resolution, Congress amended the **CETA** authorizing legislation so that certain programs previously operating under the Temporary Employment Assistance appropriation were to operate in **fiscal** year 1980 under the Employment and Training **Assistance** appropriation. Under these circumstances, if the phrase “activities under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act” in the continuing resolution had been interpreted as referring to the two separate appropriations made in the preceding year, and the current rates calculated accordingly, there would have been **insufficient** funds available for the now increased programs under the Employment and Training Assistance appropriation, and a surplus of funds available for the decreased programs under the **Temporary** Employment Assistance appropriation. To avoid this result, the Comptroller General

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<sup>10</sup>This position also follows from decisions such as **B-162447**, March 8, 1971, read in conjunction with decisions on the availability of **lump-sum** appropriations. Of **course**, if the appropriation for the preceding **fiscal** year was a line-item appropriation, then the scope of “project **or** activity” will be limited accordingly. See 66 **Comp. Gen.** 484 (1987) (**Special** Defense Acquisition Fund, a revolving fund made **available** by annual “limitation on obligations” provisions, held a “projector activity” for purposes of appropriating language in a **continuing** resolution).

interpreted the 1979 continuing resolution as appropriating a single lump-sum amount for all **CETA** programs, based on the combined current rates of the two appropriation accounts for the previous year. See 58 **Comp. Gen.** at 535–36.

The term “projects or activities” has also been used in continuing resolutions to prohibit the use of funds to start new programs. Thus, many resolutions have contained a section stating that no funds made available under the resolution shall be available **to** initiate or resume any project or activity which was not conducted during the preceding **fiscal** year. When used in this context, the term “projects or activities” refers to the individual program rather than the total appropriation. See 52 **Comp. Gen.** 270 (1972); 35 **Comp. Gen.** 156 (1955).

One exception to this interpretation occurred in **B-1** 78131, March 8, 1973. In that instance, in the previous **fiscal** year funds were available generally for construction of buildings, including plans and **specifications**. However, a **specific** construction project was not actually under way during the previous year. Nonetheless it was decided that, because funds were available generally for construction in the previous year, this specific project was not a new project or activity and thus could be funded under the continuing resolution.<sup>11</sup>

In more recent years, Congress has resolved the differing interpretations of “project or activity” by altering the language of the new program limitation. Rather than limiting funds to programs which were actually conducted in the preceding year, the more recent resolutions prohibit use of funds appropriated by the resolution for “any project or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available” **during the preceding fiscal year**.<sup>12</sup> Thus, if an agency had **authority** and sufficient funds to carry out a particular program in the preceding year, that program is not a new project or activity regardless of whether it was actually operating in the preceding year.

A variation occurred in 60 **Comp. Gen.** 263 (1981). A provision of the Higher Education Act authorized loans to institutions of higher

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<sup>11</sup>**Cf.** 4 **Lawrence**, **First Comp.** Dec. 116 (1883), which concluded that **obligations made** under a continuing resolution for certain building **repairs** not then authorized violated the **Antideficiency** Act.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Pub. L. No. 101-100, § 101(c), 103 Stat. 638 (1989) (1990 continuing resolution).

education from a revolving fund, not to exceed limitations **specified** in appropriation acts. Congress had not released money from the loan fund since 1978. The **FY 1981** continuing resolution provided funds to the Department of Education based on its regular **FY 1981** appropriation bill as passed by the House of Representatives. The House-passed version included \$25 million for the higher education loans. Since the continuing resolution did not include a general prohibition against using funds for projects not funded during the preceding fiscal year, the \$25 million from the loan fund was available under the continuing resolution, notwithstanding that the program had not been funded in the preceding year.

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## D. Relationship to Other Legislation

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**1. Not Otherwise Provided For** Continuing resolutions often appropriate funds to continue **projects** “not otherwise provided for.” This language limits funding to those programs which are not funded by any other appropriation act. Programs which received funds under another appropriation act are not covered by the resolution even though the authorizing legislation which created the program is mentioned **specifically** in the continuing resolution. See **B-183433**, March 28, 1979. For example, if a resolution appropriates funds to continue activities under the Social Security Act, and a specific program under the Social Security Act has already been funded in a regular appropriation act, the resolution does not appropriate any additional funds for that program.

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## 2. Status of Bill or Budget Estimate Used as Reference

When a continuing resolution appropriates funds at a rate for operations specified in a certain bill or in the administration’s budget estimate, the status of the bill or estimate on the date the resolution **passes** is controlling, unless the resolution **specifies** some other reference date.

A continuing resolution will often provide funds to continue activities at a rate provided in a certain bill that has passed one or both Houses of Congress, or at the rate provided in the administration’s budget estimate. **In** such instances, the resolution is referring to the status of

the bill or budget estimate on the date the resolution became law. **B-164031(2).17**, December 5, 1975; **B-152098**, January 30, 1970.

For example, the resolution may provide that activities are to be continued at the current rate or at the rate provided in the budget estimate, whichever is lower. The budget estimate referred to is the one in existence at the time the resolution is enacted, and the rate for operations cannot be increased by a subsequent upward revision of the budget estimate. **B-164031(2).17**, December 5, 1975.

Similarly, **if a** resolution provides that activities are **to** continue at the rate provided in a certain appropriation bill, the resolution is referring **to** the status of the bill on the date the resolution is enacted. A later veto of the bill by the President would not affect the continuation of programs under the resolution. **B-152098**, January 15, 1973.

Where a continuing resolution provides funds based on a reference bill, this includes restrictions or limitations contained in the reference bill, as well as the amounts appropriated, unless the continuing resolution provides otherwise. 33 **Comp. Gen.** 20 (**B-116069**, July 10, 1953);<sup>13</sup> **B-199966**, September 10, 1980. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 **F.2d** 114 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court construed a provision in a reference bill prohibiting the implementation of certain regulations, accepting without question the restriction as having been “enacted into law” by a continuing resolution which provided funds “to the extent and in the manner provided for” in the reference bill. See also Connecticut v. Schweiker, 684 **F.2d** 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207. Obviously, the same result applies under a “full text” continuing resolution. **B-221694**, April 8, 1986.

A provision in a continuing resolution using a reference bill may incorporate legislative history, in which event the specified item of legislative history will determine the controlling version of the reference bill. For example, an issue in American Federation of Government Employees v. Devine, 525 **F. Supp.** 250 (D.D.C. 1981), was whether the 1982 continuing resolution prohibited the Office of Personnel Management from funding coverage of therapeutic abortions in government health plans. The resolution funded employee health benefits “under the authority and conditions set forth

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<sup>13</sup>Two decisions begin on the same page, hence the variation incitation format.

in **H.R. 4121** as reported to the Senate on September 22, 1981.” An earlier version of **H.R. 4121** had included a provision **barring** the funding of therapeutic abortions. However, the bill as reported to the full Senate by the Appropriations Committee on September 22, 1981, dropped the provision. Accordingly, the continuing resolution could not form the basis for refusing to fund therapeutic abortions in the plaintiff’s 1982 health plan.

It is **also** not uncommon for a continuing resolution to appropriate funds as provided in a particular reference **bill** at a rate for operations provided for in the conference report on the reference bill. At a minimum, this will include items on which the House and Senate conferees agreed, **as** reflected in the conference report. If the resolution also incorporates the “joint explanatory statement” portion of the conference report, then it will enact those amendments reported in “technical disagreement” as well. See **B-221694**, April 8, 1986; **B-205523**, November 18, 1981; **B-204449**, November 18, 1981.

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### **3. More Restrictive Authority**

The “more restrictive authority,” as that term is used in continuing resolutions, is the version of a bill which gives an agency less discretion in obligating and disbursing funds under a certain program.

Continuing resolutions will often appropriate funds to continue projects or activities at the rate provided in either the version of an appropriation act that has passed the House or the version that has passed the Senate, whichever is lower “or under the more restrictive authority.” Under this **language**, the version of the bill which appropriates the lesser amount of money for an activity will be controlling. If both versions of the bill appropriate the same amount, the version which gives the agency less discretion in obligating and disbursing funds under a program is the “more restrictive authority” and will be the reference for continuing the program under the resolution. **B-210922**, March 30, 1984; **B-152098**, March 26, 1973; **B-152554**, December 15, 1970.

However, this provision may not be used to amend or nullify a mandatory provision of prior permanent law. To illustrate, the Federal Housing Administration was required by a provision of permanent law to appoint an Assistant Commissioner to perform certain functions. The position subsequently became controversial. For the first month

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of **fiscal** year 1954, the agency operated under a continuing resolution which included the “more restrictive authority” provision. Language abolishing the position had been contained in one version of the reference bill, but not both. The bill, when subsequently enacted, abolished the position.

Under a strict application of the “more restrictive authority” provision, it could be argued that there was no authority **to** continue the employment of the Assistant **Commissioner** during the month covered by the continuing resolution. Noting that “laws are to be given a sensible construction where a literal application thereof would lead to **unjust** or absurd consequences, which should be avoided if a reasonable application is consistent with the legislative purpose,” the Comptroller General held that the Assistant Commissioner could be paid his **salary** for the month in question. **B-116566**, September 14, 1953. The decision concluded:

“[Manifestly the [more restrictive authority] language. . . was not designed to amend or nullify prior permanent **law** which theretofore required, or might thereafter require, the continuance of a **specific** project or activity during July 1953. . . .

....

“... Accordingly, it is concluded that the words ‘the lesser amount or the more restrictive authority’ as used in [the continuing resolution] had reference to such funds and authority as theretofore were provided in appropriations for [the preceding **fiscal** year], **and** which might be changed, enlarged or restricted from year to year.”

In addition, continuing resolutions frequently provide that a provision “which by its terms is applicable to more than one appropriation” and which was not included in the applicable appropriation act for the preceding fiscal year, will not be applicable to funds or authority under the resolution unless it was included in identical form in the relevant appropriation bill as passed by both the House and the Senate. Thus, in 52 **Comp. Gen.** 71 (1972), a provision in the House version of the 1973 Labor Department appropriation act prohibited the use of “funds appropriated by this Act” for Occupational **Safety** and Health Act inspections of firms employing 25 persons or less. The Senate version contained the identical version except **that** “15” was substituted for “25.” The continuing resolution for that year contained both the “more restrictive authority” and the “applicable to more than one appropriation” provisions. The Comptroller General concluded that, even though the House provision was more

restrictive, the **OSHA** provision did not apply to funds **under** the continuing resolution since it had not been contained in the 1972 appropriation act and by its terms it was applicable to more than one appropriation (i.e., it applied to the entire appropriation act). See also **B-142011**, August 6, 1969.

For purposes of the “applicable to more than one appropriation” provision, GAO has construed the “applicable appropriation act for the preceding **fiscal** year” as meaning the regular appropriation act for the preceding year and not a supplemental. **B-210922**, March 30, 1984. (The cited decision also illustrates some of the complexities encountered when the appropriation act for the preceding year was itself a continuing resolution.)

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#### 4. Lack of Authorizing Legislation

In order for a government agency to **carry** out a program, the program must first be authorized by law and then funded, usually by means of regular appropriations. This section deals with the relationship of continuing resolutions to programs whose authorization has expired or is about to expire. The common issue is the extent to which a continuing resolution provides **authority** to continue the program after expiration of the underlying authorization.

As the following discussion will reveal, there are no easy answers. The cases frequently involve a complex interrelationship of various legislative actions (or inactions), and are not susceptible **to** any meaningful formulation of simple rules. For the most part, the answer is primarily a question of intent, circumscribed of course by statutory language and aided by various rules of statutory construction.

We start with a fairly straightforward case. Toward the end of **FY** 1984, Congress was considering legislation (**S.2456**) to establish a commission to study the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33. The bill passed the Senate but was not enacted into law before the end of the **fiscal year**. The **FY** 1985 continuing resolution provided that “[t]here are hereby appropriated \$400,000 to carry out the provisions of **S.2456**, as passed by the Senate on September 21, 1984.”<sup>14</sup> If this provision were not construed as authorizing the establishment and operation of the commission as well as the appropriation of funds, it would have been absolutely meaningless. Accordingly, GAO concluded

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<sup>14</sup>Pub. L. No. **98-473**, **§136**, **98 Stat. 1837**, 1973 (1984).



that the appropriation incorporated the substantive authority of **S.2456.B-219727**, July 30, 1985. The result was supported by clear and explicit legislative history.

In a 1975 case, GAO held that the **specific** inclusion of a program in a continuing resolution will provide both authorization and funding **to** continue the program despite the expiration of the appropriation authorization legislation. Thus, for example, if the continuing resolution specifically states that the School Breakfast Program is to be continued under the resolution, the program maybe continued although funding authorization legislation for the program expires prior to or during the period the resolution is in effect. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289 (1975). The same result would follow if the intent to continue the program was made particularly clear in legislative history. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 318,320-21 (1986).

The result in 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289 flows from two concepts. First, the continuing resolution, as the later enactment, is the more recent expression of congressional intent. Second, if Congress can appropriate funds in excess of a specific ceiling in authorizing legislation, which it can, then it should be able to appropriate funds **to** continue a program whose funding authorization is about to expire, at least where the authorization of appropriations is not a legal prerequisite to the appropriation itself.

However, the “**rule**” of 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289 is not an absolute and the result in any given case will depend on several variables. Although not spelled out as such in any of the decisions, the variables may include: the degree of specificity in the continuing resolution; the apparent intent of Congress with respect to the expired program; whether what has expired is an authorization of appropriations or the underlying program authority itself; and the duration of the continuing resolution (short-term vs. full fiscal year).

In one case, for example, “**all** authority” under the Manpower Development and Training Act terminated on June 30, 1973. The program was not **specifically** provided for in the 1974 continuing resolution, and the authority in fact was not reestablished until enactment of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act six months later. Under these circumstances, the Claims Court held that, in the absence of express language **in** the continuing resolution or elsewhere, contracts entered into during the gap between expiration

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of the **MDTA** and enactment of **CETA** were without legal authority and did not bind the government. *Consortium Venture Corp. v. United States*, 5 Cl. Ct. 47 (1984), aff'd mem., 765 F.2d 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

In another case, recent Defense Department authorization acts, including the one for **FY 1985**, had authorized a test program involving payment of a price differential to “labor surplus area” contractors. The test program amounted to an exemption from **permanent** legislation prohibiting the payment of such differentials. **The 1985** provision expired, of course, at the end of **FY 1985**. The 1986 continuing resolution made no specific provision for the test program nor was there any evidence of congressional intent to continue the test program under the resolution. (This lack of intent was confirmed when the 1986 authorization act was subsequently enacted without the test program provision.) GAO found that the Defense Logistics Agency’s failure to apply the price differential in evaluating bids on a contract awarded under the continuing resolution (even though the differential had been included in the solicitation issued prior to the close of **FY 1985**) was not legally objectionable. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 318 (1986).

A more **difficult** case was presented in **B-207186**, February **10**, 1989. Congress enacted two pieces of legislation on December 22, 1987. One was a temporary extension of the **Solar Bank**, which had been scheduled to go out of existence on September 30, 1987. Congress had enacted several temporary extensions **while** it was considering reauthorization, the one in question extending the Bank’s life to March 15, 1988. The second piece of legislation was the final continuing resolution for **1988** which funded the government for the remainder of the fiscal year. The resolution included a specific appropriation of \$1.5 million for the Solar Bank, with a two-year period of availability.

If the concept of 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289 were applied, the result would have been that the specific appropriation in the continuing resolution, in effect, reauthorized the Solar Bank as well. However, the “later enactment of Congress” concept has little relevance when both laws are enacted on the same day. In addition, in contrast to 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289, there was no indication of congressional intent to continue

the Solar Bank beyond the March 1988 expiration **date**. Therefore, GAO distinguished prior **cases**,<sup>15</sup> found that the **two** pieces of legislation could be reconciled, and concluded that the resolution merely appropriated funds for the Bank to use during the remainder of **its** existence.

Another case involving a sunset provision is 71 **Comp. Gen.** 378 (1992). The legislation establishing the United States Commission on Civil Rights provided for the **Commission** to terminate on September 30, 1991. During **fiscal** year 1991, Congress was working on the Commission's reauthorization and its regular **FY** 1992 appropriation. Although both bills passed both Houses of Congress, neither was enacted into law by September 30. The **first** continuing resolution for **FY** 1992, with a cutoff date of October 29, 1991, expressly provided funds for activities included in the Commission's **yet-unenacted** 1992 appropriations bill. It was clear from **all** of this that Congress intended the Commission to continue operating beyond September 30. Thus, the continuing resolution effectively suspended the sunset date and authorized the Commission to operate until October 28, 1991, when the regular 1992 appropriation act was enacted, at which time the regular appropriation provided similar authority until November 26, when the reauthorization was enacted.

Appropriation bills sometimes contain provisions making the availability of the appropriations contingent upon the enactment of additional authorizing legislation. If a continuing resolution used a bill with such a provision as a reference, **and** if the authorizing legislation was not enacted, the amount contained in the appropriation bill, and therefore the amount appropriated by the continuing resolution, would be zero. To avoid this possibility, a continuing resolution may contain a provision suspending the effectiveness of such "contingency" provisions for the life of the resolution. 'G Such a suspension provision will be applicable only until the referenced appropriation bill is enacted into law. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289,294 (1975).

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<sup>15</sup>GAO had also applied the concept of 55 **Comp. Gen.** 289 in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 524 (1986), holding that a **specific** provision in a regular appropriation act permitted the continuation of an activity whose organic authority had expired at the end of the preceding **fiscal** year. See also **B-164031(3)**, January 3, 1973.

<sup>16</sup>E.g., Pub. L. No. 102-109, §109, 105 Stat. 551,553 (1992 continuing resolution).

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## E. Duration

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### 1. Duration of Continuing Resolution

Continuing resolutions generally provide that the budget authority provided for an activity by the resolution shall remain available until (a) enactment into law of a regular appropriation for the activity, (b) enactment of the applicable appropriation by both Houses of Congress without provision for the activity, or (c) a freed cutoff date, whichever occurs **first**.<sup>17</sup> Once either of the **first** two conditions occurs, or the cutoff date passes, funds appropriated by the resolution are no longer available for obligation and new obligations may be incurred only if a regular appropriation is made or if the termination date of the resolution is extended.

The period of availability of funds under a continuing resolution can be extended by Congress by amending the **fixed** cutoff date stated in the resolution. **B-165731(1)**, November 10, 1971; **B-152098**, January 30, 1970. The extension may run beyond the session of Congress in which it is enacted. **B-152554**, December 15, 1970.

Thus, some fiscal years have seen a series of continuing resolutions, informally designated “**first**,” “**second**,” etc., up to “**final**.” This happens **as** Congress extends the freed cutoff date for short time periods until either all the regular appropriation acts are enacted or Congress determines that some or all of the remaining bills will not be enacted individually, in which event relevant portions of the resolution will continue in effect for the remainder of the fiscal year.

The second condition of the standard duration provision-enactment of the appropriation by both Houses without provision for the activity-will be considered to have occurred only when it is clear that Congress intended to terminate the activity. Thus, in **B-164031(1)**, March 14, 1974, although regular and supplemental appropriation acts had been enacted without provision for a program, the Comptroller General decided that funds for the program were still available under the continuing resolution. In this case, the legislative history indicated that in enacting the regular appropriation act, Congress was providing funding for only some of the programs normally funded by this act and was deferring consideration of other

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<sup>17</sup>E.g., Pub. L. No. 102-109, §106, 105 Stat. at 553.

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programs, including the one in question. Therefore, the second condition was not applicable. Moreover, because supplemental appropriations are intended to provide funding only for new or additional needs, omission of the program from the supplemental did not trigger the second cutoff provision.

As discussed previously, once the applicable appropriation is enacted into law, expenditures made under the continuing resolution are charged to that appropriation, except that **valid** obligations incurred under the continuing resolution in excess of the amount finally appropriated are charged to the account established under the continuing resolution.

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## 2. Duration of Appropriations

For the most part, the duration (period of obligational availability) of an appropriation under a short-term continuing resolution does not present problems. If you have, say, only one month to incur obligations under a continuing resolution, it matters little that the corresponding appropriation in a regular appropriation act might be a multiple-year or no-year appropriation. Also, once the regular appropriation is enacted, it supersedes the continuing resolution and governs the period of availability. Questions may arise, however, under continuing resolutions whose duration is the balance of the **fiscal** year.

For example, the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1979 included the standard duration provision described above, with a cutoff date of September 30, 1979, the last day of the **fiscal** year. However, a provision in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act stated that “notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless enacted in specific limitation of the provisions of this subsection,” appropriations to carry out the **CETA** program shall remain available for two years. Applying the principle that a specific provision governs over a more general one, it was held that funds appropriated for **CETA** under the continuing resolution were available for obligation for two years in accordance with the **CETA** provision. **B-194063**, May 4, 1979; **B-1** 15398.33, March 20, 1979.

A few years earlier, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia had reached the same result in a case involving grants to states under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Pennsylvania. Weinberger, 367 F. Supp. 1378, 1384–85 (D.D.C.

1973). The court stated, “[i]t is a basic premise of statutory construction that in such **circumstances** the more specific measure . . . is to be held controlling over the general measure where inconsistencies arise in their application.” *Id.* at 1385.

Application of the same principle produced a similar result in **B-199966**, September 10, 1980. The 1980 continuing resolution appropriated funds for foreign economic assistance loans by referencing the regular 1980 appropriation bill which had passed the House but not the Senate. For that type of situation, the resolution provided for continuation of projects or activities “under the appropriation, fund, or authority granted by the one House [which had passed the bill].” The House-passed bill gave the economic assistance loan funds a two-year period of availability. The continuing resolution also included the standard duration provision with a cutoff date of September 30, 1980. Since the duration provision applied to the entire resolution whereas the provision applicable to the loan funds had a narrower scope, the latter provision was the more specific one and the loan funds were therefore held to be available for two years. See also 60 **Comp. Gen.** 263 (1981) for further discussion of similar continuing resolution language.

In some instances, an extended period of availability is produced by a specific exemption from the standard duration provision. For example, the 1983 continuing resolution provided foreign assistance funds “under the terms and conditions” set forth in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1982, and further exempted that appropriation from the duration provision. Since under the 1982 act, appropriations for the African Development Fund were to remain available until expended, appropriations to the Fund under the continuing resolution were also no-year funds. **B-212876**, September 21, 1983. In view of the express exemption from the duration provision, there was no need to apply the “specific vs. general” rule because there was no conflict. See also **B-210922**, March 30, 1984.

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### 3. Impoundment

The duration of a continuing resolution is relevant in determining the application of the Impoundment Control Act. Impoundment in the context of continuing resolutions was discussed in a letter to the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, **B-205053**, December 31, 1981. Generally, a withholding from obligation of funds provided

under a continuing resolution would constitute an impoundment. Where the continuing resolution runs for only part of the **fiscal** year, the withholding, even if proposed for the duration of the continuing resolution, should be **classified** as a deferral rather than a rescission. **Withholding** funds during a temporary continuing resolution is different from withholding them for the life of a regular annual appropriation in that, in the former situation, Congress is still deliberating over the regular funding levels. Also, deferred **funds** are not **permanently** lost when a continuing resolution expires if a subsequent funding measure is passed.

Under this interpretation, classification as a rescission would presumably still be appropriate where a regular appropriation is never passed, the agency is operating under continuing resolution authority for the entire **fiscal** year, and the timing of a withholding is such that **insufficient** opportunity would remain to utilize the **funds**. See **B-1 15398**, May 9, 1975.

The concepts in the two preceding paragraphs are reflected in **OMB Circular No. A-34, § 71.6** (1985).

Impoundment issues under continuing resolutions may arise in other contexts as well. See, **e.g.**, 64 **Comp. Gem** 649 (1985) (failure to make funds available based on good faith disagreement over treatment of carryover balances in calculating rate for operations held not to constitute an illegal rescission); **B-209676**, April 14, 1983 (no improper impoundment where funds were apportioned on basis of budget request although continuing resolution appropriated **funds** at rate to maintain program level, as long as apportionment was **sufficient** to maintain requisite program level).





# Liability and Relief of Accountable Officers

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# Liability and Relief of Accountable Officers

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## A. Introduction

The concept that a person should be held accountable for funds in his or her care is not peculiar to the government. **If** you get a job as a cashier at your local supermarket and come up short at the end of the day, you **will** probably be forced to make up the shortage from your own pocket. The store manager does not have to prove the loss was your fault. The very fact that the money is not there is sufficient to make you liable. Of course, if your cash register is emptied by an armed robber and you are in no way implicated, you will be off the hook.

Just like the private business enterprise, the government loses money in many ways. It is lost; it is stolen; it is paid out improperly; it is embezzled. Sometimes the money is recovered; often it is not. If government funds are lost because of some employee's misconduct or carelessness, and if the responsible employee is not required to make up the loss, the **result** is that the taxpayer ends up paying twice for the same thing, or paying for nothing.

When you accept the job at the supermarket, you do so knowing perfectly well that you **will** be potentially liable for losses. There is no reason why the government should operate any differently. **If** anything, there is a stronger case for the liability of government employees since they are, in effect, trustees for the taxpayers (themselves included). **As** the Comptroller General once stated, "A special trust responsibility exists with regard to public monies and with this special trust goes personal financial responsibility." B-161457, October 30, 1969. This chapter will explore these concepts-the liability and relief of government officers and employees who are entrusted with public funds or who have certain specific responsibilities in their disbursement. In government language, they are called "accountable officers."

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<sup>1</sup>This chapter deals solely with accountability for funds by those classified **as** accountable officers. Other types of accountability-accountability by employees who are not accountable officers or accountability for property **other than** funds-are covered in Chapter 13.

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## B. General Principles

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### 1. The Concepts of Liability and Relief

#### a. Liability

The concept of accountability for public funds in the form of strict personal liability evolved during the **19th** century. Its origins can be traced to a number of congressional enactments, some dating back to the Nation's infancy. The legislation establishing the Department of the Treasury in 1789 included a provision directing the Comptroller of the Treasury to "direct prosecutions for all delinquencies of officers of the revenue" (1 Stat. 66). A few years later, in 1795, Congress authorized the Comptroller to require "any person who has received monies for which he is accountable to the United States" to render "his accounts and vouchers, for the expenditure of the said monies," and to commence suit against anyone failing to do so (1 stat. 441).

In 1846, Congress mandated that all government officials safeguard public funds in their custody. The statute provided **that—**

"all public officers of whatsoever character, be, and they are hereby, required to keep safely, without loaning, using, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds than as allowed by this act, **all** the public money collected by them, or otherwise at any time placed in their possession and custody, till the same is ordered, by the proper department or officer of the government, to be **transferred** or paid out . . . ."

Act of August 6, 1846, **ch. 90, § 6, 9 Stat. 59,60**. This statute still exists, in modernized form, at 31 U.S.C. § 3302(a).

These are civil provisions. Congress also addressed **fiscal** accountability in a variety of criminal statutes. An important one is the Act of June 14, 1866, **ch. 122, 14 Stat. 64**, which declared it to be the duty **of** disbursing officers to use public funds entrusted to them "only as . . . required for payments to be made. . . in pursuance of law," **and** made it a felony for a disbursing officer to, among other things,

“apply any portion of the public money **intrusted** to him” for any purpose not prescribed by **law**.<sup>2</sup>

The strict liability of accountable officers became firmly established in a series of early Supreme Court decisions. In 1845, the Court upheld liability in a case where money had been stolen with no fault or negligence on the part of the accountable **officer**. In an often-quoted passage, the Court said:

“Public policy requires that every depositary of the public money should be held to a strict accountability. Not only that he should exercise the highest degree of vigilance, but that ‘he should keep safely’ the moneys which come to his hands. Any relaxation of this condition would open a **door** to frauds, which might be practiced with impunity. A depositary would have nothing more to do than to lay his plans and arrange his proofs, so as to establish his loss, without **lashes** on his part. Let such a principle be applied to our postmasters, collectors of the customs, receivers of public moneys, and others who receive more or less of the public funds, and what losses might not be anticipated by the public?”

United States v. Prescott, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 578, 588–89 (1845). While some might view this passage as unduly cynical of human nature, it makes the important point that the laws relating to the liability and relief of accountable officers are intended not only to give the officers incentive to guard against theft by others, but also to protect against dishonesty by the officers themselves.

An 1872 case, United States v. Thomas, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 337, recognized that the liability announced in Prescott, while strict, was not absolute. In that case, the Court refused to hold a customs official liable for funds which had been forcibly taken by Confederate forces during the Civil War. In formulating its conclusion, the Court recognized two exceptions to the strict liability rule:

“[N]o rule of public policy requires an officer to account for moneys which have been destroyed by an overruling necessity, or taken from him by a public enemy, without any fault or **neglect** on his part.”

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<sup>2</sup>This statute also still exists and is found at 18 U.S.C. § 653. Other provisions of the Criminal Code relevant to accountable officers include 18 U.S.C. § 643 (failure to render accounts), 648 (misuse of public funds), and 649 (failure to deposit). The four provisions of Title 18 cited in this note apply to “all persons charged with the safe-keeping, transfer, or disbursement of the public money.” 18 U.S.C. § 649(b).

Id. at 352. The exceptions, however, are limited. In Smythe v. United States, 188 U.S. 156 (1903), the Court reviewed its precedents, including Prescott and Thomas, and upheld the liability of a Mint official for funds which had been destroyed by fire, finding the loss attributable neither to “overruling necessity” nor to a public enemy.

The standard that has evolved from the cases and statutes noted is one of strict liability. It is **often** said that an accountable officer is, in effect, an “insurer” of the funds in his or her charge. **E.g.**, 64 **Comp. Gen.** 303,304 (1985); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112, 114 (1974); 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566,567 (1969); 6 **Comp. Gen.** 404,406 (1926); United States v. Heller, 1 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Md. 1932). The liability is automatic, and arises by operation of law at the moment a physical loss occurs or an erroneous payment is made. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 12, 14 (1990); 54 **Comp. Gen.** at 114.

Apart from whatever **statutory** provisions may exist from time to time, an accountable officer’s strict liability is based on public policy. **E.g.**, Prescott, 44 U.S. at 587–88 (“The liability of the defendant. . . arises out of . . . principles which are founded upon public policy”); Heller, 1 F. Supp. at 6 (strict liability “is imposed as a matter of public policy”).

#### b. Surety Bonding

The early **cases based** liability on two grounds. One, as noted above, was public policy, a consideration no less important now than it was then. The second basis was the terms of the officer’s bond. Prior to 1972, the fidelity bonding of accountable officers was required by law. See, **e.g.**, 22 **Comp. Gen.** 48 (1942); 21 **Comp. Gen.** 976 (1942). As an examination of the statement of the case in decisions such as Prescott, Thomas, and Smythe will reveal, the terms of the bond were very similar to, and in fact were derived from, the 1846 “keep safely” legislation quoted above. Thus, while the bond gave the government a more certain means of recovery, it did not impose upon accountable officers any duties that were not already required by statutes

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<sup>3</sup>The bonding requirement had been for the protection of the government, not the accountable officer. Under the bonding system, if the United States was compensated for a loss by the bonding company, the **company** succeeded to the rights of the United States and could seek reimbursement from the accountable officer. 68 **Comp. Gen.** 470, 471 (1989); B-186922, April 8, 1977.

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In a 1962 report, GAO concluded that bonding was not **cost-effective**,<sup>4</sup> and recommended legislation to repeal the bonding requirement. Review of the Bonding Program for Employees of the Federal Government, **B-8201**, March 29, 1962. Congress repealed the requirement in 1972, and accountable officers are no longer bonded. 31 U.S.C. § 9302. The last sentence of 31 U.S.C. § 9302 states explicitly that the prohibition on requiring surety bonds “does not affect the personal financial liability” of individual **officers** or employees. Thus, elimination of the bonding requirement has no effect on the legal liability of accountable officers. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974); **B-191440**, May 25, 1979.

c. Relief

The early cases and statutes previously noted made no mention of relief from **liability**.<sup>5</sup> “Relief” in this context means art action, taken by someone with the legal authority to do so, which absolves an accountable officer from liability for a loss. Prior to the World War 11 period, with limited exceptions for certain accountable officers of the armed forces, an accountable officer had but two relief options available. First, a disbursing officer could bring an action in what was then the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. 52512. Of course, the officer would probably need legal representation and would incur other expenses, none of which were reimbursable. Second, and this became the most common approach, was private relief legislation, a burdensome process for amounts which were often relatively small. There was no mechanism for providing relief at the administrative level, however meritorious the case. 4 **Comp. Gen.** 409 (1924); 27 **Comp. Dec.** 328 (1920).

Starting in 1941, Congress enacted a series of relief statutes, and there is now a comprehensive statutory scheme for the administrative relief of accountable officers who are found to be without fault. The **major** portion of this chapter **deals** with the application of this legislation.

It is important to distinguish between liability and relief. It is not the denial of relief that makes an accountable officer liable. The basic

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<sup>4</sup>Originally, accountable officers had to pay for their own bonds. 33 **Comp. Gen.** (1953). Legislation effective January 1, 1956, authorized the government to pay (69 Stat. 618).

<sup>5</sup>The “public enemy” situation **dealt** with in the **Thomas** case is not an example of relief. It is an example of a situation in which liability does not attach to begin with.

legal liability of an accountable **officer** arises automatically by virtue of the loss and is not affected by any lack of fault or negligence on the officer's part; relief is a separate process, and may take lack of fault into consideration to the extent authorized by the governing **statute**.<sup>6</sup> 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974); **B-167126**, August 28, 1978.

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## 2. Who Is an Accountable Officer?

An accountable officer is any government officer or employee who by reason of his or her employment is responsible for or has custody of government funds. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476,479 (1983); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113, 114 (1979); **B-188894**, September 29, 1977. Accountable **officers** encompass such officials as certifying officers, **civilian** and military disbursing officers, collecting officers, and other employees who by virtue of their employment have custody of government funds. With rare **exceptions**,<sup>7</sup> other officials who may have a role in authorizing expenditures (contracting officers, for example) are not accountable officers for purposes of the laws discussed in this chapter, although they may be made accountable in varying degrees by agency regulation. See **B-241856.2**, September 23, 1992.

### a. Certifying Officers

Accountability for public funds in civilian agencies rests primarily with the **certifying** officer, a government **officer** or employee whose job is or includes certifying vouchers (including voucher schedules or invoices used as vouchers) for payment. A certifying officer differs from other accountable officers in one key respect: the certifying officer has no public funds in his or her physical custody. Rather, accountability is based on the **nature** of the function. A certifying officer's liability, discussed in detail later in this chapter, is prescribed by 31 U.S.C. § 3528. In brief, certifying **officers** are responsible for the

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<sup>6</sup>While the generalizations in the text are true, as discussed later in this chapter, passage of time can eliminate the government's ability to enforce liability in improper payment cases, even without relief. In order to protect the government's position, agencies should move promptly to address an accountable officer's liability. Implications in a few cases such as 70 **Comp. Gen.** 616,622-23 (1991), that an agency can never enforce an accountable officer's liability for an improper payment **unless** it has first submitted the matter to GAO are misleading. See GAO's Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, chap. 8, which describes agencies' specific responsibilities in this area.

<sup>7</sup>On a few occasions, GAO has treated an official who directs the making of an expenditure as accountable even though not falling into one of the traditional categories of accountable officer. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 260,266 (1982) (illegal entertainment expenditures "must be paid by the . . . officials who authorized the expenditures"); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 360, 361 (1957) (cost of greeting cards "is a personal expense to be borne by the officer who ordered and sent the cards"); 7 **Comp. Gen.** 481,482 (1928) (same).



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legality of proposed payments, and are liable for the amount of illegal or improper payments resulting from their certifications.

A great many government officials make official “certifications” of one type or another, but this does not make them “certifying officers” for purposes of accountability **and** liability. The concepts of accountability and relief discussed in this chapter apply only to “authorized **certifying** officers” who certify vouchers upon which moneys are to be paid out by disbursing officers in discharging a debt or obligation of the government. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 953 (1944). This may in appropriate circumstances include the head of a department or agency. 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a)(1); 21 **Comp. Gen.** 976, 979 (1942); 40 **Op. Att’y Gen.** 284 (1943). An authorized **certifying** officer must be so designated in writing. 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a)(1).

Thus, an employee who “certified” overtime assignments in the sense of a timekeeper verifying that employees worked the hours of overtime claimed could not be held liable for resulting overpayments under an accountable officer theory. **B-197109**, March 24, 1980. Similarly, art official who certifies that long-distance telephone calls are necessary for official business as required by 31 U.S.C. § 1348(b) is not an accountable officer. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 19, 20–21 (1985). The same approach applies to various post-certification administrative actions, the rule being that once a voucher has been duly **certified** by an authorized official, subsequent administrative processing does not constitute certification for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3528.55 **Comp. Gen.** 388,390 (1975). For example, the Comptroller General has held that 31 U.S.C. § 3528 does not apply to an “approving officer” who approves vouchers after they have been duly certified. 21 **Comp. Gen.** 841 (1942).

b. Disbursing Officers

A disbursing officer is an officer or employee of a federal department or agency, civilian or military, designated to disburse moneys and render accounts in accordance with laws and regulations governing the disbursement of public funds. The term is essentially self-defining. As one court has stated:

“We do not find the term ‘disbursing officer’ statutorily defined, probably because it is **self-definitive**. It can mean nothing except an officer who is authorized to disburse funds of the United States.”

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Romney v. United States, 167 F.2d 521,526 (D.C.Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 847.

Whether an employee is a “disbursing officer” depends more on the nature of the person’s duties than on the title of his or her position. In some cases, the job title will be “disbursing officer.” This is the title for the disbursing officers of the Treasury Department who disburse for most civilian agencies under 31 U.S.C. §3321. For the military departments, which generally do their own disbursing, the title maybe “finance and accounting officer.” As a general proposition, any employee to whom public funds are entrusted for the purpose of making payments from those funds will be regarded as a disbursing officer. See B-151 156, December 30, 1963.

There may be more than one disbursing officer for a given transaction. Military disbursing operations provide an example. The account is often held in the name of a supervisory official such as a Finance and Accounting Officer, with the actual payment made by some subordinate (agent, cashier, deputy, etc.). Both are regarded as disbursing officers for purposes of liability and relief although, as we will discuss **later**, the standards for relief differ. E.g., 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476, 479–80 (1983); B-245127, September 18, 1991.

c. Cashiers

A cashier is an officer or employee of a federal department, agency, or corporation who, having been recommended by the head of the activity, has been designated as a cashier by the officer responsible for making disbursements and is thereby authorized to perform limited cash disbursing functions or other cash operations. Treasury Financial Manual (TFM), Vol. I, § 4-3020. Cashiers must be designated in writing. Id. §4-3025.

With respect to disbursing functions under 31 U.S.C. 53321, cashiers are divided into five categories: (1) Class A Cashier (may not advance **imprest** funds to another cashier except an alternate); (2) Class B Cashier (may advance **imprest** funds to alternate or **subcashier**); (3) Class D Cashier (receives funds solely for change-making purposes); (4) **Subcashier** (may receive **imprest** funds from a Class B or D cashier and is under supervision of same local office); and (5) Alternate to a Cashier or **Subcashier** (functions during absence of principal cashier but may act simultaneously if required by work load). Fuller descriptions may be found in the Treasury Department’s

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supplement to the TFM entitled Manual of Procedures and Instructions for Cashiers Operating Under 31 U.S.C. 3321 (July 1985).

Cashiers who are authorized to make payments from funds advanced to them are regarded as a category of disbursing officer. They are personally liable for any loss or shortage of funds in their custody unless relieved by proper authority. Further discussion of the role and responsibilities of cashiers maybe found in I TFM Chapter 4-3000 and in the Cashiers Manual.

For the most part, a cashier will be operating with funds advanced by his or her own employing agency. In some situations, however, such as an authorized interagency agreement, the funds maybe advanced by another agency. Liability and relief are the same in either case. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 666, 675–77 (1986).

d. Collecting Officers

Collecting officers are those who receive or collect money for the government, such as Internal Revenue collectors or Customs collectors. Collecting officers are accountable for all money collected. E.g., 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113, 114 (1979); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 403 (1924); 1 **Comp. Dec.** 191 (1895); **B-201673** et al., September 23, 1982. For example, an Internal Revenue collector is responsible for the physical safety of taxes collected, must pay over to the government **all** taxes collected, and must make good any money lost or stolen while in his or her custody unless relieved. E.g., 60 **Comp. Gen.** 674 (1981). However, under a **lockbox** arrangement whereby tax payments are mailed to a financial institution at a post office box and then wired to a Treasury account, Internal Revenue Service officials are not accountable for funds in the possession of the financial institution since they do not gain custody or control over those funds. **B-223911**, February 24, 1987.

The clerk of a bankruptcy court, if one has been appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 156(b), is the accountable officer with respect to fees paid to the court, as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1930, by parties commencing a case under the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 156(f). This provision, added in 1986, essentially codified the result of two GAO decisions issued the previous year, 64 **Comp. Gen.** 535 (1985) and **B-217236**, May 22, 1985.

In some situations, certain types of receipts maybe collected by a contractor. Since the contractor is not a government officer or

employee, the various accountable officer statutes discussed throughout this chapter do not apply, and the contractor's liability is governed by the terms of the contract. For example, a parking service contract with the General Services Administration required the contractor to collect parking fees at certain government buildings and to remit those fees to GSA on a daily basis. One day, instead of remitting the receipts, an official of the contractor took the money home in a paper bag and claimed to have been robbed in a parking lot near her residence. When GSA withheld the amount of the loss from contract payments, the contractor tried to argue that the risk of loss should **fall** upon the government. The Claims Court disagreed. Since the contract terms were clear and the contractor failed to comply, the contractor was held responsible for the loss. Miracle Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 466 (1984).

The Department of Agriculture has statutory authority to use volunteers to collect user fees **in** national forests. The volunteers, private individuals, are to be bonded, with the cost of the bonds paid by the Department. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a(k). In 68 **Comp. Gen.** 470 (1989), GAO concurred with the Department that the volunteers could be regarded as agents of the Forest Service and, as such, eligible for relief for non-negligent losses. The practical significance of this decision is that it would be difficult to recruit volunteers if they faced potential liability for non-negligent losses, a possibility that would exist even under a surety bond. Id. at 471.

e. Other Agents and  
Custodians

Occasionally, officers and employees who do not fit into any of the preceding categories, and who may not even be directly involved in government fiscal operations, are given custody of federal funds and thereby become accountable officers for the funds placed in their charge. Note in this connection that the "safekeeping" mandate of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(a) (made unmistakably clear by reference to the original 1846 language quoted earlier), applies to any government employee, regardless of job description, to whom public funds are entrusted in connection with the performance of government business. See, e.g., **B-170012**, February 3, 1972.

Examples of employees in this general custodial category include: a special messenger delivering cash to another location, **B-188413**, June 30, 1977; a messenger sent to the bank to cash checks, **B-226695**, May 26, 1987; State Department employees responsible for packaging and shipping funds to an overseas embassy, **B-193830**,

October 1, 1979; an officer in charge of a laundry operation on an Army base who had been advanced public funds to be held as a change fund, **B-155149**, October 21, 1964; and a Department of Energy special counsel with control over petroleum overcharge refunds, **B-200170**, April 1, 1981.

As with disbursing officers, there may be more than one accountable officer in a given case, and the concept of accountability is not limited to the person in whose name the account is officially held nor is it limited to the person or persons for whom relief is officially requested. For example, accounts in the regional offices of the U.S. Customs Service are typically held in the name of the Regional Commissioner. While the Regional Commissioner is therefore an accountable officer with respect to that account, subordinate employees who actually handle the funds are also accountable officers. **B-197324**, March 7, 1980; **B-193673**, May 25, 1979. The same principle applies to the various service centers of the Internal Revenue Service. E.g., 60 **Comp. Gen.** 674 (1981).

As demonstrated by the Customs and IRS situations, as well as the many cases involving military finance and accounting officers, a supervisory official will be an accountable **officer** if that official has actual custody of public funds, or if the account is held in the official's name, regardless of who has physical custody. Absent these factors, however, a supervisor is not an accountable officer and does not become one merely because he or she supervises one. E.g., **B-214286**, July 20, 1984; **B-194782**, August 13, 1979.

In each case, it is necessary to examine the particular facts and circumstances to determine who had responsibility for or custody of the funds during the relevant stages of the occurrence or transaction. Thus, in **B-193830**, October 1, 1979, money shipped from the State Department to the American Embassy in Paraguay never reached its destination. While the funds were chargeable to the account of the **Class B** cashier at the Embassy, the State Department employees responsible for packaging and shipping the funds were also accountable officers with respect to that transaction. In another case, a new **Class B** cashier had been recommended at a Peace Corps office in Western Samoa, and had in fact been doing the job, but his official designation was not made until after the loss in question. Since the new cashier, even though not yet formally designated, had possession of the funds at the time of the loss, he was an accountable officer.

However, since the former cashier retained responsibility for the **imprest** fund until formally replaced, he too was an accountable officer. **B-188881**, May 8, 1978.

In sum, any government officer or employee who physically handles government funds, even if only occasionally, is accountable for those funds while in his or her custody.

It maybe impossible, although this **will** happen only in extremely rare cases, to specify exactly who the proper accountable officer is. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration used a flash roll of 650\$100 bills and discovered that 15 bills had been replaced by counterfeits scattered throughout the roll. (The “roll” was actually a number of stacks.) The **roll had** been used in a number of investigations and in each instance, the transactions (transfers from cashier to investigators, returns to cashier, transfers between different groups of investigators) were recorded on receipts and the money was counted. While it was thus possible to determine precisely who had the roll on any given day, there was no way to determine when the substitution took **place** and hence to establish to whom the loss should be attributed. **B-191891**, June 16, 1980.

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### 3. Funds to Which Accountability Attaches

When we talk about the liability of accountable officers, we deliberately use the broad term “public funds.” As a general proposition, for purposes of accountability, “public funds” consists of three categories: appropriated funds, funds received by the government from **nongovernment** sources, and funds held in trust. It is important to emphasize that when we refer to certain funds as “**nonaccountable**” in the course of this discussion, all we mean is that the funds are not subject to the laws governing the liability and relief of accountable officers. Liability for losses may still attach on some other basis.

#### a. Appropriated Funds

Appropriated funds are accountable funds. The funds may be in the Treasury, which is where most appropriated funds remain pending disbursement, or they maybe in the form of cash advanced to a government **officer** or employee for some authorized purpose.

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(1) **Imprest funds**

The definitions of the various types of cashier refer primarily to the use of “**imprest** funds.” An **imprest** fund is essentially a petty cash fund. More specifically, it is a freed-cash fund (i.e., a freed dollar amount) advanced to a cashier for cash disbursements or other cash requirement purposes as specifically authorized. An **imprest** fund may be either a **stationary** fund, such as a change-making fund, or a revolving fund. Tressury Financial Manual (TFM), Vol. I, \$4-3020.

**Imprest** funds are commonly used for such things as small purchases, **travel** advances, and authorized emergency salary payments.

Guidance on the use of **imprest** funds may be found in GAO’s **Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies**, title 7, **§ 6.8**, I TFM chapter 4-3000, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. subpart 13.4. Agencies using **imprest** funds are required to **issue** implementing **regulations**. I TFM § 4-3030; FAR, 48 C.F.R. **§ 13.403(c)**. Except to the **extent** specified **in** an agency’s own **regulations (e.g., B-220466** et al., December 9, 1986), there are no subject matter limitations on the kinds of services payable from **imprest** funds. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 806 (1986).

**Imprest** funds of the revolving type are replenished to the freed amount as spent or used. As replenishment are needed, replenishment vouchers are submitted through the **certifying** officer to the disbursing officer. Replenishment vouchers must be supported by receipts or other evidence of the expenditures.

At any given time, **an imprest** fund may consist of cash, uncashed government checks, and other documents such as unpaid reimbursement vouchers, sales slips, invoices, or other receipts for cash payments. An **imprest** fund cashier must at all times be able to account for the full amount of the fund. I TFM § 4-3040.80. For example, if a cash box containing a \$1,000 **imprest** fund disappears, and at the time of disappearance the box contained \$500 in cash and \$500 in receipts for which reimbursement vouchers had not yet been issued, the loss to the government is the full \$1,000 and the cashier is accountable for that full amount. A cashier’s failure to keep adequate records, thus making proper reconciliation impossible, is negligence. **B-189084**, January 15, 1980.

Loss of a replenishment check before it reaches the cashier is not a situation requiring relief of the cashier. The proper procedure in such a situation is to report the loss to the disbursing office which issued the check to obtain a replacement. **B-203025**, October 30, 1981.

If in the government's interests, a checking account maybe setup in a private bank for **imprest** fund disbursements as long as adequate control procedures are developed. **B-1 17566**, April 29, 1959. Use of depositary accounts must be approved by the agency head or designee, is authorized only for cash withdrawal transactions, and should be limited to situations in which there is "strong justification." **I TFM \$4-3040.60**. The account maybe interest-bearing, in which event any interest earned must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. **Id.**

The method of **imprest** fund accountability changed starting with fiscal year 1985. Prior to that time, funds advanced to cashiers by Treasury disbursing officers were not "charged" to the agency's appropriations at the time of the advance but were carried on the disbursing officers' records of accountability. The cashiers were regarded as agents of the disbursing officers. In fact, it was common to refer to cashiers as "agent cashiers." E.g., **A-89775**, March 21, 1945. Charges were made to the applicable appropriation or fund accounts only when replenishment checks were issued. Relief requests had to be submitted through the Treasury's Chief Disbursing Officer.

In 1983, the Treasury Department proposed removing **imprest** fund advances from the disbursing officers' accountability inasmuch as the transactions were beyond the disbursing officers' control. GAO concurred. **B-212819-O**. M., May 25, 1984. The current. procedures are discussed in 70 **Comp. Gen.** 481 (1991). In brief, the charge to the agency's appropriation is now made at the time of the initial advance. However, since the advance does not qualify as an obligation under 31 U. S. C., § 1501, the charge must be in the form of a "commitment." or "reservation." In general, the actual obligation occurs when the advance is used and the cashier seeks replenishment. The preliminary charge is necessary to protect against violating the Antideficiency Act. Except for certain procedural matters (relief requests are no longer processed through the applicable disbursing officer), the changes have no effect on the cashier's liability as an accountable officer.



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An alternative approach to managing **imprest** funds is the “third-party draft” procedure described in I **TFM** \$4-3040.70. In brief, an agency may, with written approval from **its** Treasury **Financial** Center, retain a contractor to provide the agency with payment instruments, not to exceed a face value of \$1,000 each, drawn on the contractor’s account. The agency then uses these drafts for its **imprest** fund **transactions**, and reimburses the contractor for properly payable drafts which the contractor has paid. Since the funds being disbursed from the **imprest** fund under this system are not government funds, personal liability does not attach to the cashier. Id.; GAO Policy and Procedures Manual, title 7, § **6.8.B**.

(2) Flash rolls

Law enforcement officers on undercover assignments frequently need a supply of cash to support their operations, for example, to purchase contraband or to use as a gambling stake. This money, often advanced from an **imprest** fund, is called a “flash roll.” By the very nature of the activities involved, flash roll money is at high risk to begin with.

It is clear that a flash roll in the hands of a law enforcement agent retains its status **as** government funds. **Garcia v. United States**, 469 U.S. 70 (1984) (flash roll held to be money of the United States for **purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2114**, which makes it a criminal offense to assault a custodian of government money). However, flash roll money will be accountable in some situations and **nonaccountable** in others, depending on the nature of the loss. If the loss is within the risk inherent in the operation, such as the suspect absconding with the money, it is not viewed as an “accountable **officer**” loss but maybe handled internally by the agency. If the agency, under **its** internal investigation procedures, finds the agent with custody of the funds to have been negligent, it should hold the agent liable to the extent provided in its regulations. Otherwise, it may simply record the loss as a necessary expense against the appropriation which financed the **operation**. If, on the other hand, the loss occurs in the course of the operation but is unrelated to carrying out its purpose, the accountable officer laws apply. The decision **first** recognizing this distinction is 61 **Comp. Gen.** 313 (1982), applying it in the context of Drug Enforcement Administration undercover **operations**.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Prior decisions, such as B-192010, August 14, 1978, which had treated all flash roll losses as accountable officer losses, were modified accordingly. 61 **Comp. Gen.** at 316.

The fact pattern in the Garcia case illustrates the **nonaccountable** situation. A Secret Service agent had been given a flash roll to buy counterfeit currency from suspects in Miami. The agent met the suspects in a park. One of the suspects pulled a semi-automatic pistol and demanded the money. Other Secret Service agents rushed to the scene and apprehended the suspects, one of whom was trying to run off with the money. Of course there was no loss since the money was recovered. If the second suspect had gotten away with the money, however, the loss could have been treated as an expense of the operation, without the need to seek relief for anyone. GAO decisions finding flash roll losses “**nonaccountable**” under the standards of 61 **Comp. Gen.** 313 are **B-238222**, February 21, 1990 (suspect stole flash roll during drug arrest); **B-232253**, August 12, 1988 (informant stole money provided to rent undercover apartment); and **B-205426**, September 16, 1982 (federal agent robbed at gunpoint while trying to purchase illegal firearms).

An example of a case which remains subject to the accountable officer laws is **B-218858**, July 24, 1985. A federal agent, posing as a narcotics trafficker, stopped at a telephone booth to make a call. Two women approached the booth, which did not have a door. One diverted the agent’s attention while the other picked his pocket. The loss, while certainly incident to the undercover operation, was unrelated to its central purpose. Relief was granted. Other cases are:

- 64 **Comp. Gen.** 140 (1984) (agent set shoulder bag containing flash money on airport counter and left it unattended for several minutes while making ticket arrangements; relief denied).
- **B-210507**, April 4, 1983 (briefcase containing funds stolen when agent set it down in coffee shop for 15–20 seconds to remove jacket; relief granted).
- **B-220492**, December 10, 1985 (agent left funds in glove compartment while making phone call in high crime area; agency found him negligent).

As 64 **Comp. Gen.** 140 and **B-210507** point out, losses which occur while flash money is being transported to the location where it is intended to be used are at best incidental to the operation and are thus governed by the accountable officer laws.

The conspicuous display of a flash roll is not in and of itself negligence where necessary to the agent's undercover role. **B-194919**, November 26, 1980.

(3) Travel advances

Travel advances are authorized by 5 U.S.C. 55705. The statute expressly directs the recovery, from the traveler or from his or her estate, of advances not used for allowable travel expenses.

A travel advance is "based upon the employee's prospective entitlement to reimbursement" (**B-178595**, June 27, 1973), and is essentially for the convenience of the traveler. If it were not authorized, the traveler would have little choice but to use personal funds and then seek reimbursement at the end of the travel. Travel advances in the hands of the traveler are regarded as **nonaccountable** and hence not governed by the accountable **officer** laws. Rather, they are treated as **loans** for the personal benefit of the traveler. As such, if the funds are lost or stolen while in the traveler's custody, regardless of the presence or absence of fault attributable to the traveler, the funds must be recovered as provided by 5 U.S.C. 55705, and the accountable officer relief statutes do not apply. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 190 (1974); **B-206245**, April 26, 1982; **B-183489**, June 30, 1975. The same principle applies to traveler's checks. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 456, 460 (1985).

In many cases, a messenger or some other clerical employee picks up the funds for the traveler. If the funds are lost or stolen while in the intermediary's custody, and use of the **intermediary** was the traveler's choice, the intermediary is the agent of the traveler and the traveler, having constructively received the funds, remains liable. **B-204387**, February 24, 1982; **B-200867**, March 30, 1981. However, if use of the intermediary is required by agency or local policy, then the intermediary is the agent of the government and the traveler is not liable. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 402 (1988).

Even though the accountable **officer** relief statutes do not apply, it may be possible to effectively "relieve" the non-negligent traveler by considering a claim under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act of 1964, 31 U.S.C. 3721, to the extent permissible under the agency's implementing regulations. **B-208639**, October 5, 1982; **B-197927**, September 12, 1980.

Travel advances returned to government custody for reasons such as postponement of the travel regain their status as accountable funds, and an employee receiving custody of these funds is governed by the laws relating to the liability and relief of accountable **officers**. **B-200404**, February 12, 1981; **B-170012**, March 14, 1972; **B-170012**, May 3, 1971. Also, where an advance greatly exceeds the employee's legitimate travel expense needs and it is clear that the excess is intended to be used for operational purposes, the excess over reasonable needs may be treated as accountable funds and not part of the "loan." **B-196804**, July 1, 1980.

b. Receipts

In our definitions of governmental receipts and offsetting collections in Chapter 2, we noted that the government receives funds from **nongovernment** sources (a) from the exercise of its sovereign powers (e.g., tax collections, customs duties, court fees), and (b) from a variety of business-type activities (e.g., sale of publications). These collections, whether they are to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts or credited to some agency appropriation or fund, are accountable funds from the moment of receipt. Some examples are 64 **Comp. Gen.** 535 (1985) (fees paid to bankruptcy court); 60 **Comp. Gen.** 674 (1981) (tax collections); **B-200170**, April 1, 1981 (petroleum overcharge refunds); **B-194782**, August 25, 1980 (recreational fee collections).

c. Funds Held in Trust

When the government holds private funds in a trust capacity, it is obligated, by virtue of its fiduciary duty, to pay over those funds to the rightful owners at the proper time. Thus, although the funds are not appropriated funds, they are nevertheless accountable funds. The principle has been stated as follows:

"[T]he same relationship between an accountable **officer** and the United States is required with respect to trust funds of a private **character** obtained and held for some particular purpose sanctioned by law as is required with respect to public funds."

6 **Comp. Gen.** 515, 517 (1927). The Court of Claims said the same thing in Woog v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 80 (1913).

A common example is the Department of Veterans Affairs "Personal Funds of Patients" (**PFOP**) account. Patients, upon admission to a VA hospital, may deposit personal funds in this account for safekeeping and use as needed. Upon release, the balance is returned to the

patient. Patient funds in the **PFOP** account have been consistently treated as accountable funds. 68 **Comp. Gen.** 600 (1989); 68 **Comp. Gen.** 371 (1989); **B-226911**, October 19, 1987; **B-221447**, April 2, 1986; **B-215477**, November 5, 1984; **B-208888**, September 28, 1984.

Another example is private funds of litigants deposited in a registry account of a court of the United States, to be **held** pending distribution by order of the court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 552041 and 2042. These are also accountable funds under the trust fund concept. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 535 (1985); 6 **Comp. Gen.** 515 (1927); **B-200108/B-198558**, January 23, 1981. See also Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875) (court can summarily compel restitution of funds improperly withdrawn from registry account by former officers).

Other situations applying the trust fund concept are 67 **Comp. Gen.** 342 (1988) (Indian trust accounts administered by Bureau of Indian Affairs); 17 **Comp. Gen.** 786 (1938) (United States Naval Academy laundry fund); **B-190205**, November 14, 1977 (foreign currencies accepted in connection with accommodation exchanges authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 3342); and **A-22805**, November 30, 1929 (funds taken from prisoners at the time of their confinement, to be held in their **behalf**). See also 69 **Comp. Gen.** 314 (1990) (**BIA** may contract with private bank for ministerial aspects of trust fund disbursements, but government disbursing officer must retain responsibility for managerial and judgmental aspects).

Not all **nongovernment** funds in the custody of a government official are held in a trust capacity. For example, in **B-164419 -0**, M., May 20, 1969, GAO distinguished between funds of a foreign government held by the United States incident to a cooperative agreement (trust funds), and funds of a private contractor held by a government **official** for safekeeping as a favor **to** the contractor. The latter situation was a mere bailment for the benefit of the contractor, and the official was not **an** accountable officer with respect to those funds.

d. Items Which Are the  
Equivalent of **Cash**

The concepts of accountability and liability discussed in this chapter apply primarily to money. However, for reasons which should be apparent, accountability also attaches to certain non-cash items which are negotiable by the bearer or are otherwise the equivalent of cash. Examples are:

- Traveler's checks in the custody of an accountable officer. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 456 (1985); **B-235147.2**, August 14, 1991.
- Food stamps. **B-221580**, October 24, 1986 (non-decision letter).
- Government Transportation Requests. **B-239387**, April 24, 1991.
- Military payment certificates. **B-127937-O. M.**, August 2, 1956.
- Treasury **bonds with** interest coupons attached. **B-190506**, November 28, 1977, **affirmed** on reconsideration, **B-190506**, December 20, 1979.

In the second decision in **B-190506**, it was contended that loss of the bonds did not really result in a loss to the government because neither the bonds nor the coupons had been cashed and a "stop notice" had been placed with the Federal Reserve Bank. GAO **could** not agree, however, since the bonds were bearer bonds and the stop notice does not completely extinguish the government's liability to pay on them. (The Treasury Department no longer issues coupon bonds, although many older ones are still outstanding.)

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#### 4. What Kinds of Events Produce Liability?

The generic term for losses which trigger an accountable officer's liability is "**fiscal** irregularity." See GAO, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal **Agencies**, title 7, § 8.2. Fiscal irregularities are divided into two broad categories: (1) physical loss or deficiency, and (2) illegal or improper payment. Since, as we will see, the relief statutes are expressly tied to these categories, the proper **classification** of a **fiscal** irregularity is the essential first step in determining which statute to apply.

A working definition of "physical loss or deficiency" maybe found in **B-202074**, July 21, 1983:

"In sum, 'physical loss or deficiency' includes such things as loss by theft or burglary, loss in shipment, and **loss** or destruction by fire, accident, or natural disaster. It also includes the totally unexplained loss, that is, a shortage or deficiency with absolutely no evidence to explain the disappearance. . . . Finally, . . . **losses** resulting from fraud or embezzlement by subordinate finance **personnel** may. . . be treated as physical **losses**."

This definition has been repeated in several subsequent decisions such as 70 **Comp. Gen.** 616,621 (1991) and 65 **Comp. Gen.** 881,883 (1986). A loss resulting from a bank failure would also be treated as a physical loss. See 18 **Comp. Gen.** 639 (1939); 20 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 24 (1891).

The second type of fiscal irregularity is the “illegal, improper, or incorrect payment.” 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(c), 3528(a)(4). The keyword here is “**payment**”—“the disbursement of public funds by a disbursing **officer** or his subordinate.” B-202074, July 21, 1983. Improper payments include such things as payments obtained by fraud, whether by **nongovernment** persons or by government employees other than subordinate finance personnel; erroneous payments or overpayments resulting from human or mechanical error attributable to the government; payments prohibited by statute; and disbursements for unauthorized purposes. The legislative history of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c), the improper payment relief statute for disbursing officers, describes an improper payment as a payment “which the Comptroller General finds is not in strict technical conformity” with the law. Excerpts from the pertinent committee reports are quoted in 49 **Comp. Gen.** 38,40 (1969) and in B-202074, cited above.

A loss resulting from an uncollectible personal check maybe an improper payment or a physical **loss**, depending on the circumstances. If the loss results from an authorized check-cashing transaction, it is an improper payment because government funds were disbursed to the bearer. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 616 (1991). However, if the check is tendered to pay an obligation owed to the United States or to purchase something from the government, the loss, to the extent an accountable loss exists, would be a physical loss. In this connection, Treasury regulations provide:

“All checks received by any **Government** officer are accepted subject to collection. If any check cannot be collected in full or is lost or destroyed before collection, the administrative agency concerned is responsible for obtaining the proper payment. A payment by check is not effective **unless** and until the full proceeds have been received.”

I Treasury Financial Manual §5-2010. If a personal check is accepted subject to collection, and if the government does not exchange value for the check, any resulting loss is not a loss within the scope of the accountable officer laws and may be **adjusted** administratively by the agency. If, however, an accountable officer purports to accept a personal check in satisfaction of an obligation due the United States (rather than for collection only), or if the government parts with something of value in exchange for the check (e.g., sale of government property), a resulting loss is treated as a physical loss. B-201673 et al., September 23, 1982. See also 3 **Comp. Gen.** 403

(1924); **A-44019**, March 15, 1934; **A-24693**, October 30, 1929. The distinction is summarized in the following passage from **B-201673**:

“If a check tendered in payment of a free, duty, or penalty becomes uncollectible, it may be argued that the Government incurs a **loss** in the sense that it does not have money to which it was legally entitled, but it has not lost anything that it already had. When the check is in exchange for property, the Government has lost the property, the value of which is measured by the agreed-upon sales price. Of course, recovery of the property will remove or mitigate the loss.”

The concept of **B-201673** has also been applied to a check seized as forfeiture under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act and subsequently returned as uncollectible. **B-208398**, September 29, 1983.

A conceptually similar case is **B-216279**, October 9, 1984. A teller at a Customs Service auction gave a **receipt** to a customer and negligently failed to collect the tendered funds. It was suggested that there was no loss because the teller never had physical possession of the funds. However, the applicable relief statute (31 U.S.C. § 3527) uses the terms “physical loss or deficiency” in the disjunctive, and there was clearly a deficiency in the teller’s account to the extent of the property turned over in exchange for the lost payment.

While every fiscal irregularity by definition involves a loss or deficiency for which someone is accountable, not every loss or deficiency is a fiscal irregularity which triggers accountability. For example, an accountable officer is not liable for interest lost on collections which should have been deposited promptly but were not. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 303 (1985) (failure to deposit collections in designated depository); **B-190290**, November 28, 1977 (increased interest charges on funds borrowed from Treasury, no net loss to United States).

Also, losses resulting from the imperfect exercise of judgment in routine business operations, where no law has been violated, do not create accountable **officer** liability. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 881 (1986) (loss to Internal Revenue Service Tax Lien Revolving Fund caused by sale of property for substantially less than amount for which it had been redeemed).



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## 5. Amount of Liability

**As** a general proposition, the amount for which an accountable officer is **liable** is easy to determine: It is the amount of the physical loss or improper payment, reduced by any amounts recovered from the recipient (thief, improper payee, etc.). **E.g.**, 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858, 863–64 (1986); **B-194727**, October 30, 1979.

There is an exception, discussed in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858,863-64, in which amounts recovered from the recipient should not be used **to** reduce the amount of the accountable officer’s liability. A loss may result from a series of transactions spanning several years, each transaction giving rise to a separate debt. By the time the loss is discovered, recovery from the accountable officer may be **partially** barred by the **3-year** statute of limitations found in 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c). This, however, does not affect the indebtedness of the recipient which, in this situation, will exceed the liability of the accountable **officer**. Under the Federal Claims Collection Standards, a debtor owing multiple debts may specify the allocation of a voluntary partial payment. **If** the **recipient/debtor** fails **to** so **specify**, or if payment is involuntary, the collecting agency may allocate the money among the various debts in accordance with the best interests of the United States. Generally, “the best interests of the United States are clearly served by applying payments made by the recipients to the class of debt for which only the recipients are liable” (*id.* at 864), i.e., those for which recovery from the accountable **officer** is time-barred. Thus, in this type of situation, partial recoveries from the recipient should first be applied to the time-barred debt of the accountable **officer** until any such amounts have been recouped, and only thereafter used to reduce the accountable officer’s remaining liability.

A judgment obtained against some third party (improper payee, thief, etc.) is only “potential unrealized value” and does not reduce the accountable officer’s **liability** until it is **actually** collected. **B-147747**, December 28, 1961; **B-194727**, October 30, 1979 (non-decision letter),

The liability of an accountable officer does not include interest and penalties assessed against the recipient. **B-235037**, September 18, 1989.

The liability of an accountable officer resulting from the payment of fraudulent travel claims is the amount of the fraudulent payment and does not include non-fraudulent amounts paid for the same day(s). 70

**Comp.** Gem 463 (1991). Previously **GAO** had included both, under the so-called “tainted day” rule. The 1991 decision distinguishes fraudulent **payees** from fraudulent claimants, concluding that the tainted day rule does not apply to paid claims.

When determining the amount of a loss for which an accountable officer is to be held liable, the government does not “net” overages against shortages. In **GAO’s** view, such “netting” would weaken internal controls over the accounting for cash balances. **B-2** 12370, November 15, 1983; **B-199447**, March 17, 1981.<sup>9</sup> **As** noted in **B-199447**, overages must generally be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

In almost all cases, the amount of **an** accountable officer’s liability is **precisely** determinable at the outset. It maybe reduced by recoveries, but it will not increase. One exception is illustrated in **B-239387**, April 24, 1991, in which an agency held an **employee** accountable for a booklet of missing or stolen Government Transportation Requests. Because the amount of the government’s loss could not be known until the **GTRs** were actually used and the government forced to honor them, additional liability accrued as each **GTR** was used overtime.

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## 6. Effect of Criminal Prosecution

**As** we noted previously, the body of law governing the liability and relief of accountable officers is designed not only to induce proper care but also to protect against dishonesty by the officers themselves. This section summarizes the relationship between criminal prosecution and civil liability.

### a. Acquittal

Acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not extinguish civil liability and does not bar subsequent civil actions to enforce that liability as long as they are remedial rather than punitive. **Helvering v. Mitchell**, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). The reason is the difference in burden of proof. **Acquittal** means only that the government was unable to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard higher than that for **civil** liability. “That acquittal on a criminal charge **is** not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been

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<sup>9</sup>A statutorily authorized instance of “netting” gains and deficiencies in an account **is** 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c)(2) (certain check-cashing and exchange transactions), discussed later in this chapter.

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settled.” *Id.* at 397. See also **B-239134**, April 22, 1991 (non-decision letter) (conviction on only a portion of the loss).

The rules are the same for acquittal (or reversal of a conviction) by a military court-martial. *Serrano v. United States*, 612 F.2d 525 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (acquittal held not to bar agency from imposing civil liability **and** withholding pay of accountable officer).

It follows that an accountable officer’s civil liability will be unaffected by the fact that a grand jury has refused to return an indictment. **B-186922**, April 8, 1977.

b. Order of Restitution

A court may order a defendant to make monetary restitution to the victim, either as part of the sentence (18 U.S.C. § 3556) or as a condition of probation (18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3)). In either case, the relevant terms and procedures are governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3664. Restitution may be ordered in a lump sum or in installments. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f). These are general **criminal** statutes, and would apply fully where the defendant is an accountable officer and the United States is the victim as well as the prosecutor.

The statutory scheme clearly recognizes the possibility of subsequent civil proceedings by the United States as victim against the accountable officer. Any amounts paid to a victim under a restitution order must be set off against amounts recovered in a subsequent civil action. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(2). In such an action, the previously convicted defendant cannot deny the “essential allegations” of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).

Where restitution is ordered in full, payable in installments, it has been held that the victim may nevertheless obtain a civil judgment for the unpaid balance, even though there has been no default in the installment payments. *Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association v. Green*, 636 F. Supp. 415 (S. D.N.Y. 1986). “Future payments that do not fully compensate a victim in present value terms cannot be a bar to a civil judgment.” *Id.* at 418. See also **B-128437-O**. M., August 3, 1956.

Where restitution is ordered in an amount less than the full amount of the loss, civil liability for the balance would remain, subject to the statutory **setoff** requirement. See 64 **Comp. Gen.** 303 (1985), reaching this result under a **prior** version of the legislation. The

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decision further suggests that, if the record indicates that the court thought it was ordering restitution in full, it might be desirable to seek amendment of the restitution order. Obviously, the fact of conviction precludes any consideration of administrative relief. **Id.** at 304.

The preceding paragraphs are presented from the perspective of restitution by the accountable officer. Similar principles would apply with respect to restitution by a responsible party other than the accountable officer. See, **e.g., B-193673**, May 25, 1979, modified on other grounds by **B-201673** et al., September 23, 1982 (partial restitution by thief reduces amount of accountable **officer's** liability).

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## C. Physical Loss or Deficiency

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### 1. Statutory Provisions

The two principal statutes authorizing administrative relief from liability for the physical loss or deficiency of public funds are 31 U.S.C. §§ **3527(a)** and **3527(b)**. Subsection (a) applies to the **civilian** agencies and to accountable officers of the armed forces other than disbursing officers. Subsection (b) applies to disbursing officers of the armed forces.

#### a. Civilian Agencies

The physical loss or deficiency relief statute applicable to accountable officers generally, 31 U.S.C. § **3527(a)**, was originally enacted in 1947 (61 Stat. 720). Its justification, similar to that for all relief statutes, was **summarized** by the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments as follows:

“The **justification** . . . is that, at the present time, relief of the kind with which this bill is concerned is required to be granted either through passage of a special **relief** bill by the Congress or by the **filing** of suit by the responsible person in the United **States** Court of Claims, the latter to be done at the personal expense of the responsible person. Both methods are costly and time consuming.”

S. Rep. No. 379, **80th Cong., 1st Sess.**, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code **Cong. Service** 1546.

Before the actual relief mechanism is triggered, two threshold issues must be satisfied. First, the loss must be a physical loss or deficiency

and not an improper payment. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a)(2). Second, the person for whom relief is desired must be an “accountable **officer**.”<sup>10</sup> The legislative history confirms that this includes the general custodial category:

“There are many agents of the Government who do not disburse but who, nevertheless, are fully responsible for funds. . . entrusted to their charge and, for that reason, the committee bill has been broadened to include that **class** of personnel.”

S. Rep. No. 379, 1947 U.S. Code **Cong.** Service at 1547.

Once it has been determined that there has been a physical loss or deficiency of “public money, vouchers, checks, securities, or records” for which an accountable **officer** is liable, the statute authorizes the Comptroller General to grant relief from that liability if the head of the agency involved makes two administrative determinations (31 U.S.C. § 3527(a)(1)), and if the Comptroller General agrees with those determinations (§ 3527(a)(3)).

First, the agency head must determine that the accountable officer was carrying out official duties at the time of the loss, or that the loss was attributable to the actor omission of a subordinate of the accountable officer. Note that this is stated in the disjunctive. The second part, loss attributable to a subordinate, is designed to cover the situation, found in several agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Customs Service, in which the account is in the name of a supervisory official who does not actually handle the funds. In this situation, both persons are accountable, and relief of one does not necessarily **mean** relief of the other.

Second, the agency head must determine that the loss was not attributable to fault or negligence on the part of the accountable officer. This determination is necessary regardless of which part of the first determination applies. Thus, while lack of fault does not affect the automatic imposition of liability, it does provide the basis for **relief**.

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<sup>10</sup>This statute will not apply to certifying **officers** since they do not have actual custody of funds. However, a certifying **officer** could conceivably have other duties or supervisory responsibilities and thus be accountable, and **eligible** for relief under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a), in that capacity.

Generally, the requirement that the accountable officer must have been acting in the discharge of official duties does not present **problems**. Thus, in the typical case, the central question becomes whether GAO is able to concur with the administrative determination that the loss occurred without fault or negligence on the part of the accountable officer. In reviewing **relief** cases over the years, GAO has developed a number of standards, the application of which to a given case requires a careful analysis of the particular facts. Many factors may bear on the conclusion in any given case, and the result **will** be determined by the interrelationship of these factors.

Section 3527(a) applies to accountable officers of “an agency,” defined in 31 U.S.C. § 101 as any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.” Thus, section 3527(a) has been construed as applicable to the judicial branch (B-200108/B-198558, January 23, 1981; B-197021, May 9, 1980; B-191440, May 25, 1979; B-185486, February 5, 1976), and to agencies of the legislative branch (B-192503 -O. M., January 8, 1979, denying relief to a GAO employee). Whether it applies to the Senate or House of Representatives is unclear. It has also been construed as applicable to those government corporations which are subject to GAO’s account settlement authority. B-88578, August 21, 1951; B-88578 -O. M., August 21, 1951.

**b. Military Disbursing Officers**

The need for physical loss relief authority for military disbursing **officers** became highlighted during World War I when several ships were sunk with funds and records on board. The first permanent administrative relief statute was enacted in 1919 and applied only to the Navy (41 Stat. 132). The Army received similar legislation in 1944 (58 Stat. 800). The two were combined in 1955 and expanded to cover all of the military departments (69 Stat. 687). The legislation is now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b). The origins of the 1919 law are described in 7 **Comp. Gen.** 374, 377–78 (1927); the statutory evolution is detailed in B-202074, July 21, 1983. The statute applies to both civilian and military personnel of the various military departments. B-151156, December 30, 1963.

As with section 3527(a), two threshold issues must be satisfied before the relief mechanism comes into play. First, like section 3527(a), section 3527(b) applies only to physical losses or deficiencies and not to improper payments. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b)(1)(B); 7 **Comp. Gen.** 374 (1927); 2 **Comp. Gen.** 277 (1922); B-202074, July 21, 1983. The

statute was intended to authorize relief in appropriate cases for losses “such as losses by fire, ship sinkings, thefts or **physical** losses resulting from enemy action or otherwise.” **B-75978**, June 1, 1948. Thus, a loss in shipment is cognizable under section **3527(b)**. **B-200437**, October 21, 1980. However, the making of a travel advance to an employee who terminated his employment without accounting for the advance is not a physical loss but rather “a payment voluntarily made **by** the disbursing officer in the course of his duties.” **B-75978**, June 1, 1948.

Second—and here the two statutes differ—section **3527(b)** applies only to disbursing officers and not to **nondisbursing** accountable officers. **B-194782**, August 13, 1979; **B-194780**, August 8, 1979; **B-151156**, December 30, 1963; **B-144467**, December 19, 1960 (“while **all** disbursing officers are accountable officers, all accountable officers are not disbursing officers”). As each of the cited cases points out, physical **loss** relief for **nondisbursing** accountable officers of the military departments must be sought under **31 U.S.C. § 3527(a)**.

Section **3527(b)** is also similar to section **3527(a)** in that, once it has been determined that a **loss** is properly cognizable under the statute, the applicable agency head must determine that (1) the disbursing officer was carrying out official duties at the time of the loss or deficiency (prior versions of the statute, and hence many GAO decisions, use the military term “line of duty status”), and (2) the loss occurred without fault or negligence on the part of the disbursing officer. The first determination, **31 U.S.C. § 3527(b)(1)(A)**, does not expressly include the “loss attributable to subordinate” clause found in section **3527(a)**. However, it is applied in the same manner. See **B-155149**, October 21, 1964; **B-151156**, December 30, 1963.

The administrative determinations are conclusive on GAO. **31 U.S.C. § 3527(b)(2)**. Thus, once the determinations are made, the granting of relief is mandatory. Unlike section **3527(a)**, if the situation is properly cognizable under section **3527(b)**, GAO has no discretion in the matter. Agency determinations on the threshold issues—what is a physical loss and who is a disbursing officer—are not conclusive. **B-151156**, December 30, 1963.

Section **3527(b)** is not the “exclusive remedy” with respect to physical losses of military disbursing officers. It exists side-by-side

with section 3527(a). Thus, for losses cognizable under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b), the disbursing officer (or the applicable Secretary) has an option to proceed under either statute. B-151 156, December 30, 1963. Of course, for the most part there would be little to gain by electing to proceed under section 3527(a) if section 3527(b) is also available.

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## 2. Who Can Grant Relief?

### a. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a)

The statute confers the authority to grant relief on the Comptroller General. At one time, every case, no matter how small the amount, involved an exchange of correspondence—a letter from the agency to GAO requesting relief, and a letter from GAO back to the agency granting or denying it. By 1969, after 20 years of experience under the statute, a set of standards had developed, and it became apparent that there **was** no need for GAO to actually review every case. In that year, GAO inaugurated the practice of setting a dollar amount, initially \$150, below which agencies could apply the standards and grant or deny relief accordingly without the need to obtain **formal** concurrence from GAO.

GAO has raised the amount several times over the years and has used various formats to announce the increase. ” The current ceiling is \$3,000. B-243749, October 22, 1991. The authorization applies to physical losses or deficiencies and, with a few exceptions to be noted later, not to improper payments. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 646 (1982); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1979). As stated in 61 **Comp. Gen.** at 647:

“For the most part, the law governing the **physical loss** or deficiency of Government funds is clear, and most cases center around the determination of whether there was any contributing negligence on the part of the accountable officer. Our numerous decisions in this area **should** provide adequate guidance to agencies in resolving most smaller losses. ”

The \$3,000 limitation applies to “single incidents or the total of similar incidents which occur about the same time and involve the

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<sup>11</sup>The **\$150** authorization was established by B-161457, August 1, 1969 (circular letter). It **was** raised to \$500 in 1974. B-161457, August 14, 1974 (circular letter); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974). A 1983 revision to title 7 of GAO’s Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of **Federal Agencies** (7 GAO-PPM §28.14, TS No. 7-40, July 14, 1983) raised it to \$750. **Another** revision of the Policy and Procedures Manual raised it to \$1,000. 7 GAO-PPM § 8.9.C (TS No. 7-42, February 12, 1990).



same accountable officer.” GAO, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 8.9.C (1990). Thus, two losses arising from the same theft, one under the limit and one over, should be combined for purposes of relief. **B-189795**, September 23, 1977. In **B-193380**, September 25, 1979, an **imprest** fund cashier discovered a \$300 shortage while reconciling her cash and **subvouchers**. A few days later, her supervisor, upon returning from vacation, found an additional \$500 missing. Since the losses occurred under very similar circumstances, GAO agreed with the agency that they should be treated together for purposes of seeking relief. Another case, **B-187139**, October 25, 1978, involved losses of \$1,500, \$60, and \$50. Since there was no indication that the losses were related, the agency was advised to resolve the \$60 and \$50 losses administratively. (The ceiling was \$500 at the time of **B-193380** and **B-187139**.)

Thus, in cases of physical loss or deficiency, it is necessary to request relief from GAO only if the amount involved is \$3,000 or more. For below-ceiling losses, GAO’s concurrence is, in effect, granted categorically provided the matter is properly cognizable under the statute, the agency makes the required determinations, and the administrative resolution is accomplished in accordance with the standards set forth in the GAO decisions. E.g., **B-206817**, February 10, 1983; **B-204740**, November 25, 1981. Each agency should maintain a central control record of its below-ceiling resolutions, should document the basis for its decisions, and should retain that documentation for subsequent internal or external audit or review. 7 GAO-PPM § 8.9.C (1990). Also, agencies should ensure the independence of the official or entity making the relief decisions. **B-243749**, October 22, 1991.

If an agency inadvertently submits a relief request to GAO for a below-ceiling loss, GAO’s policy is simply to return the case with a brief explanation. E.g., **B-214086**, February 2, 1984. GAO will also provide any further guidance that may appear helpful.

As a practical matter, GAO’s authorization for below-ceiling administrative resolution is relevant only where the agency believes relief should be granted. In these cases, the need for an exchange of correspondence is eliminated, and the relief process is quicker, more streamlined, and less costly. If the agency believes relief should not be granted, its refusal to support relief effectively ends the matter

regardless of the amount. GAO will not review an agency's refusal to grant relief in a below-ceiling case. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113,114 (1979).

b. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b)

Like 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a), section 3527(b) also specifies the Comptroller General as the relieving authority. However, by virtue of the mandatory nature of section 3527(b), the monetary ceiling concept used in civilian relief cases has much less relevance to military disbursing **officer** losses.

By circular letter **B-198451**, February 5, 1981, GAO notified the military departments of a change in procedures under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b). Since GAO has **no** discretion with respect to the agency determinations and relief is mandatory as long as the determinations are made, there is **no** need for GAO to review any of those determinations on a case-by-case basis. Thus, there is no need for the agency to submit a formal request for relief regardless of the amount involved. As long as the case is properly cognizable under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b) (i.e., it involves a disbursing **officer** and a physical loss or deficiency), it is sufficient for purposes of compliance with the statute for the agency to make the required determinations and to retain the documentation on file for audit purposes. Of course, should there be a question as to whether a particular case is properly cognizable under the statute, GAO is available to provide guidance.

c. Role of Administrative  
Determinations

Both of the relief statutes described above require two essentially identical administrative determinations as prerequisites to granting relief. It is the making of those determinations that triggers the ability to grant relief. If the agency cannot in good faith make those determinations, the legal authority to grant administrative relief simply does not exist, regardless of the amount involved and regardless of who is actually granting relief in any given case. GAO **will** not review **an** agency's refusal to make the determinations under either statute, and has no authority to "direct" an agency to make them. In this sense, an agency's refusal to make the required determinations is final. The best discussion of this point is found in 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1979) (case arose under section 3527(a) but point applies equally to both statutes).

While GAO's role under section 3527(a) is somewhat greater than under section 3527(b), that role is still limited to concurring with determinations made by the agency. GAO cannot make those

determinations for the agency. If they are absent, whatever the reason, relief cannot be granted regardless of the apparent merits of the case. There are numerous decisions to this effect. A few of them are **B-217209**, December 11, 1984; **B-204464**, January 19, 1982; and **B-197616**, March 24, 1980. The determinations are as much required in below-ceiling cases as they are in cases submitted to GAO. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1979).

On occasion GAO has been willing to infer a determination that the loss occurred while the accountable officer was carrying out official duties where that determination was not expressly stated but the facts make it clear and there is no question that relief will be granted. E.g., **B-244723**, October 29, 1991; **B-235180**, May 11, 1989; **B-199020**, August 18, 1980; **B-195435**, September 12, 1979. However, the determination of no contributing fault or negligence will not be inferred but must be expressly stated. It is not **sufficient** to state that the investigative report did not produce affirmative evidence of fault or negligence. **B-167126**, August 9, 1976. Nor is it sufficient to state that there is “no evidence of willful misconduct.” **B-217724**, March 25, 1985.

As a practical matter, it will simplify the relief process if the agency’s request explicitly states **all** required determinations. It is best simply to follow the wording of the statute.

Agency determinations required by a relief statute must be made by an agency official authorized to do so. E.g., **B-184028**, October 24, 1975. Section 3527(a) requires determinations by the “head of the agency.” Section 3527(b) specifies the “appropriate Secretary.” Of course in most cases the authority under either statute will be delegated. It has been held that, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, the authority to make determinations under these statutes may be delegated only to officials authorized by **law** to act in place of the agency head, or to an Assistant Secretary. 29 **Comp. Gen.** 151 (1949). Many agency heads have separate statutory authority to delegate and redelegate, and this of course will be sufficient. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2658 (Secretary of State). As far as GAO is **concerned**, the form of the delegation is immaterial although it should, of course, be in writing. Documentation of delegations need not be furnished to GAO, nor need it be specified in relief requests, but should be available if requested. 7 **GAO-PPM** § 8.9.B (1990).

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If, under agency procedures, the determinations are made in the **first** instance by someone other than the designated **official** (e.g., aboard of inquiry), the relief request must explicitly state the designated official's concurrence. **B-207062**, July 20, 1982.

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### 3. Standards for Granting Relief

#### a. Standard of Negligence

Again, it is important to distinguish between liability and relief. The presence or absence of negligence has nothing to do with an accountable officer's basic liability. The law is not that an accountable officer is **liable** for negligent losses. The officer is strictly liable for all losses, but may be relieved if found to be free from fault or negligence. It has frequently been stated that an accountable **officer** must exercise "the highest degree of care in the **performance** of his duty." E.g., 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566, 567-68 (1969); **B-186922**, August 26, 1976; **B-182386**, April 24, 1975. Statements of this type, however, have little practical use in applying the relief statutes.

In evaluating the facts to determine whether or not an accountable officer was negligent, GAO applies the standard of "reasonable care." 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974); **B-196790**, February 7, 1980. This is the standard of simple or ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. 54 **Comp. Gen.** at 115; **B-158699**, September 6, 1968. The standard has been stated as what the reasonably prudent and careful person would have done to **take** care of his or her own property of like description under like circumstances. **B-209569**, April 13, 1983; **B-193673**, May 25, 1979; Malone v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 486,489 (1869). This is an objective standard, that is, it does not vary with such factors as the age and experience of the particular accountable officer.

The doctrine of comparative negligence (allocating the loss based on the degree of fault) does not apply under the relief statutes. **B-211962**, July 20, 1983; **B-190506**, November 28, 1977.

#### b. Presumption of Negligence/Burden of Proof

The mere fact that a loss or deficiency has occurred gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the accountable **officer**. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the **contrary**, but it is the accountable officer's burden to produce the evidence. The government does not have to produce evidence to establish that the

accountable **officer** was at fault in order **to** hold the **officer** liable. Rather, to be entitled to relief, the accountable officer must produce evidence to show that there was no contributing fault or negligence on his or her part, i.e., that he or she exercised the requisite degree of care.

This rule originated in decisions of the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. §2512, before any of the administrative relief statutes existed, and has been consistently followed. An early and often quoted statement is the following from Boggs v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 367,384 (1909):

“**[T]here** is at the outset a presumption of liability, and the burden of proof must rest upon the **officer** who has sustained the loss.”

A later case quoting and applying Boggs is O’Neal v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 413 (1925). More recently, the court said:

“**[T]he** Government does not have the burden of proving **fault** or **negligence** on the part of plaintiff; plaintiff has the **sole** burden of proving that he was without fault or negligence in order to qualify for [relief].”

Serrano v. United States, 612 F.2d 525, 532–33 (Ct. Cl. 1979).

GAO follows the same rule, stating it in literally dozens of relief cases. E.g., 67 **Comp. Gen.** 6 (1987); 65 **Comp. Gen.** 876 (1986); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974); 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566 (1969).<sup>12</sup>

The amount and types of evidence that will suffice to rebut the presumption vary with the facts and circumstances of the particular case. However, there must be affirmative evidence. **It** is not enough to rely on the absence of implicating evidence, nor is the mere administrative determination that there was no fault or negligence, unsupported by evidence, **sufficient** to rebut the presumption. E.g., 70 **Comp. Gen.** 12, 14 (1990); **B-204647**, February 8, 1982; **B-167126**, August 9, 1976.

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<sup>12</sup>Many decisions prior to 1970, such as 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566, deal with postal employees. Since enactment of the Postal **Reorganization** Act of 1970, responsibility for the **relief** of **postal** employees is with the United States Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. § 2601; 50 **Comp. Gen.** 731 (1971); **B-164786**, October 8, 1970. While the **Comptroller** General no longer relieves **postal** employees, the principles enunciated in the earlier decisions are nonetheless applicable to other accountable officers.

If the record clearly establishes that the loss resulted from burglary or robbery, the presumption is easily rebutted. But the evidence does not have to explain the loss with absolute **certainty**. If the evidence is not all that clear, the accountable officer may still be able to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence tending to corroborate the likelihood of theft or showing that some factor beyond his control was the proximate cause of the loss. If such evidence exists, and if the record shows that the accountable **officer** complied fully with all applicable regulations and procedures, the agency's determination of no fault or negligence will usually be accepted and relief granted.

GAO will consider the results of a polygraph (lie detector) test as an additional factor in the equation, but does not regard those **results**, standing alone, as **dispositive**. This applies whether the results are favorable (**B-206745**, August 9, 1982; **B-204647**, February 8, 1982; **B-142326**, March 31, 1960; **B-182829** -O. M., February 3, 1975) or unfavorable (**B-209569**, April 13, 1983; see also **B-192567**, August 4, 1983, aff'd upon reconsideration, **B-192567**, June 21, 1988).

Another situation in which the presumption is easily rebutted is where the accountable officer does not have control of the funds at the time of the loss. An example is losses **occurring** while the accountable **officer** is on leave or duty absence. As a practical matter, relief will be granted unless there is evidence of actual contributing negligence on the part of the accountable **officer**. **B-196960**, November 18, 1980; **B-184028**, March 2, 1976; **B-175756**-O. M., June 14, 1972. Of course, where contributing negligence exists, relief will be denied and the role of the presumption never comes into play. **B-182480**, February 3, 1975.

The presumption of negligence is occasionally criticized as **unduly** harsh. However, it is necessary both in order to **preserve** the concept of accountability and to protect the government against dishonesty as well as negligence. See **B-167126**, August 28, 1978; **B-191440**, May 25, 1979. As stated in one decision, the presumption of **negligence—**

“is a reasonable and legal basis for the denial of relief where the accountable officers have control of the **funds** and the means available for their safekeeping but the shortage nevertheless occurs without evidence of forcible entry or other conclusive explanation which would exclude negligence as the proximate cause of the loss.”

**B-166519**, October 6, 1969. Indeed, if liability is strict and automatic, a legal presumption against the accountable officer is virtually necessary as a starting point.

c. Actual Negligence

If the facts indicate negligence on the part of the accountable officer, and if it appears that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss, then relief must be denied.

One group of cases involves failure to lock a safe. It is negligence for an accountable **officer** to place money in a safe in an area which is accessible to others, and then leave the safe unlocked for a period of time when he or she is not physically present. **E.g., B-190506**, November 28, 1977; **B-139886**, July 2, 1959. **It** is also negligence to leave a safe unattended in a "day lock" position. **B-199790**, August 26, 1980; **B-188733**, March 29, 1979, **aff'd**, **B-188733**, January 17, 1980; **B-187708**, April 6, 1977. Compare **B-180863**, **April 24, 1975, in which an accountable officer who had left a safe on "day lock"** was relieved in view of her lack of knowledge or instruction regarding the day lock mechanism. Thus, an accountable officer who leaves a safe unlocked (either by leaving the door open or closing the door but not rotating the combination dial), and then leaves the office for lunch or for the night will be denied relief. **B-204173**, January 11, 1982, **aff'd**, **B-204173**, November 9, 1982; **B-183559**, August 28, 1975; **B-180957**, **April 24, 1975**; **B-142597**, **April 29, 1960**; **B-181648-O.M.**, August 21, 1974.

Merely being physically present may not be enough. A degree of attentiveness, dictated by the circumstances and common sense, is also required. In **B-17371** O-O. M., December 7, 1971, relief was denied where the cashier did not lock the safe while a stranger, posing as a building maintenance man, entered the cashier's cage ostensibly to repair the air conditioning system and erected a temporary barrier between the cashier and the safe.

Another group involves the failure to use available security facilities. As we will see in our discussion of agency security, a good rule-of-thumb for the accountable officer is: You do the best you can with what is available to you. Failure to do so, without **compelling** justification, does not meet the standard of reasonable care. **Some** examples in which relief was denied are:

- Funds disappeared from bar-locking **file** cabinet. Combination safe was available but not used. **B-192567**, June 21, 1988.
- Cashier left funds overnight in **locked** desk drawer instead of safe provided for that purpose. **B-177730-O.M.**, February 9, 1973.
- Cashier left funds in unlocked drawer while at lunch instead of locked drawer provided for that purpose. **B-161229-O. M.**, April 20, 1967.
- Accountable officer left unlocked cash box in safe to which several other persons had access. **B-172614-O. M.**, May 4, 1971; **B-167596-O. M.**, August 21, 1969.

Inattentiveness or simple carelessness which facilitates a loss may constitute negligence and thus preclude relief. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 140 (1984) (shoulder bag with money left unattended on airport counter for several minutes); **B-233937**, May 8, 1989 (bag With money set on ledge in crowded restaurant); **B-208888**, September 28, 1984 (evidence suggested that funds were placed on desk and inadvertently knocked into trash can); **B-127204**, April 13, 1956 (pay envelopes left on top of desk in cashier's cage 19 inches from window opening on hallway to which many persons had access).

The best way to know how much cash you have is to count it. Failure to do so where reasonable prudence would dictate otherwise is negligence. **B-247581**, June 4, 1992 (alternate cashier failed to count cash upon receipt from principal or upon return to principal); **B-206820**, September 9, 1982 (accountable officer handed money over to another employee without counting it or obtaining receipt); **B-193380**, September 25, 1979 (cashier cashed checks at bank and failed to count the cash received).

A deficiency in an accountable officer's account caused by the acceptance of a counterfeit note constitutes a physical loss for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a). **B-140836**, October 3, 1960; **B-108452**, May 15, 1952; **B-101301**, July 19, 1951. Whether accepting counterfeit money is negligence depends on the facts of the particular case, primarily whether the counterfeit was readily detectable. **B-239724**, October 11, 1990; **B-191891**, June 16, 1980; **B-163627-O. M.**, March 11, 1968. (Relief was granted in these three cases.) If the quality of the counterfeit is such that a prudent person in the same situation would question the authenticity of the bill, relief should not be granted. **B-155287**, September 5, 1967. Also, failure to check a bill against a posted list of serial numbers will generally be viewed as negligence. **B-155287**, September 5, 1967; **B-166514-O.M.**,



July 23, 1969. Finally, failure without compelling justification to use an available counterfeit detection machine is negligence. **B-243685**, July 1, 1991.

Other examples of conduct which does or does not constitute negligence are scattered throughout this chapter, e.g., the sections on compliance with regulations and agency security. In **all** cases, including those which cannot be neatly categorized, the approach is to apply the standard of reasonable care to the conduct of the accountable **officer** in light of all surrounding facts and circumstances. For example, in **B-196790**, February 7, 1980, a patient at a Veterans Affairs hospital, patient “X”, had obtained a cashier’s check from a bank on May 9, 1978. On September 12, 1978, another patient, patient “Y”, presented the check at the hospital for deposit to patient X’s personal funds account. On the following day, patient X withdrew the money and left. The bank refused **to** honor the check because, unknown to hospital personnel, patient X had gone to the bank on May 17, stated that he had never received the check, and the bank had refunded its face value. As noted in the decision, patient X had “cleverly managed to double his bank account by collecting the same funds twice.” The issue was whether it was negligence for the hospital cashier to accept the check dated four months earlier or to permit patient X to withdraw the funds the day after the check was deposited. **GAO** considered the nature of a cashier’s check, noted the absence of applicable regulations, applied the reasonable care standard, and granted relief, but recommended that the agency pursue further collection efforts against the bank.

d. Proximate Cause

An accountable officer maybe found negligent and nevertheless relieved from liability if it can be shown that the negligence was not the “proximate cause” of the loss or shortage. A precise **definition** of the term “proximate cause” does not exist.<sup>13</sup> The concept means that, first, there must be a cause-and-effect relationship between the negligence and the loss. In other words, the negligence must have contributed to the loss. However, as one authority notes, the cause of an event can be argued in a philosophical sense to “go back **to** the

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<sup>13</sup>“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more **disagreement**, or upon which the opinions are in such a **welter** of confusion.” **Prosser and Keeton**, The Law of Torts, § 41 (5th ed. 1984).

dawn of human events” and its consequences can “go forward to **eternity.**”<sup>14</sup> Obviously a line must be drawn someplace. Thus, the concept also means that the cause-and-effect relationship must be reasonably foreseeable; that is, a reasonably prudent person should have anticipated that a given consequence could reasonably follow from a given act.

Before proceeding, we must refer again to the accountable **officer's** burden of proof. The Court of **Claims** said, in Serrano v. United States, 612 F.2d 525, 531–32 (Ct. Cl. 1979):

“It is argued that the . . . fault or negligence involved must be the proximate cause of the loss. Thus the **Secretary** . . . could not deny relief **unless** the loss was proximately attributable to plaintiff. This argument has no merit. If such an argument were to be accepted by this court, it would shift the burden of proof. . . to the Government. . . .

“**Shifting** of the burden of proof, and forcing the Government to prove that **plaintiff's** conduct was a proximate cause of the loss, would be intolerable. This shift would negate the special responsibility that disbursing officers have in handling public funds.” (Emphasis in original.)

Thus, the government does not have to prove causation anymore than it has to prove negligence. Rather, the accountable **officer** who has been negligent must, in order to be eligible for relief, show that some other factor or combination of factors was the proximate cause of the loss, or at least that the totality of evidence makes it impossible to **fix** responsibility.

In analyzing proximate cause, it may be helpful to ask certain questions. First, if the accountable officer had not been negligent, would the loss have occurred anyway? If the answer to this question is yes, the negligence is not the proximate cause of the loss and relief will probably be granted. However, it may not be possible to answer this question with any degree of certainty. If not, the next question to ask is whether the negligence was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the loss. If this question is answered yes, relief will probably be denied. A couple of simple examples will illustrate:

(a) An accountable **officer leaves** cash visible and unguarded on a desk top while at lunch, during which time the money disappears.

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<sup>14</sup>Id.

There can be no question that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.

(b) As noted previously, failure to count cash received at a bank window is negligence. Suppose, however, that the accountable officer is attacked and robbed by armed marauders while **returning to** the office. The failure to count the cash, even though negligent, would not be the proximate cause of the loss since presumably the robbers would have taken the entire amount anyway.

A good illustration is **B-201173**, August 18, 1981. Twelve armed men in two Volkswagen minibuses broke into the West African Consolidated Services Center at the American Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria. They forcibly entered the cashier's office and proceeded to carry the safe down the stairs. The burglars dropped the safe while carrying it, the safe opened upon being dropped, and the burglars took the money and fled. The reason the safe opened when dropped was that the cashier had not locked it, clearly an act of negligence. However, even if the safe had been locked, the burglars would presumably have continued to carry it away, loaded it onto their minibus, and forcibly opened it somewhere else. Thus, the cashier's failure to **lock** the safe, while negligent, was not the proximate cause of the loss.

Proximate cause considerations are often relevant in cases involving weaknesses in agency security, and the topic is explored further under the Agency Security heading.

The following are a few additional examples of cases in which relief was granted even though the accountable officer was or may have been negligent, because the negligence was found not to be the proximate cause of the loss or deficiency.

- Accountable officer left safe combination in unlocked desk drawer. Burglars found combination and looted safe. Had this been the entire story, relief could not be granted. However, burglars also pried open locked desk drawers throughout the **office**. Thus, locking the desk drawer would most likely not have prevented the theft. **B-229587**, **January 6, 1988**.
- Accountable officer in Afghanistan negligently turned over custody of funds to unauthorized person. Money was taken by rioters in severe civil disturbance. Relief was granted because negligence was not the

proximate cause of the loss. (Whether the person holding the funds was or was not an authorized custodian was not a matter of particular concern to the rioters.) **B-144148-O**, M., November 1, 1960.

- Cashier discovered loss upon return from two-week absence. It could not be **verified** whether she had locked the safe when she left. However, time of loss could not be pinpointed, other persons worked out of the same safe, and it would have been opened daily for normal business during her absence. Thus, even if she had failed to lock the safe (negligence), proximate cause chain was much too conjectural. **B-191942**, September 12, 1979.

Even if there is a clearly identified intervening cause, relief may still be denied depending on the extent to which the accountable officer's negligence facilitated the intervening cause or contributed to the loss. In such a case, the negligence will be viewed as the proximate cause notwithstanding the intervening cause. The following cases will illustrate.

- Accountable officer failed to make daily deposits of collections as required by regulations. Funds were **stolen** from locked safe in burglary. Relief was denied because officer's negligence was proximate cause of loss in that funds would not have been in the safe to be stolen if they had been properly deposited. **B-71445**, June 20, 1949. See also **B-203726**, July 10, 1981; **B-164449**, December 8, 1969; **B-168672** -O. M., June 22, 1970.
- Accountable **officer** negligently left safe on "day lock" position (door closed, dial or **handle** partially turned but not rotated, so that partial turning in one direction, without knowledge of combination, will permit door to open). Thief broke into premises, opened safe without using force, and stole funds. Relief was denied because negligence facilitated theft by making it possible for thief to open safe without force or knowledge of combination. **B-188733**, March 29, 1979, **aff'd**, **B-188733**, January 17, 1980.

e. Unexplained Loss or Shortage

The cases cited under the Actual Negligence heading all contained clear evidence of negligence on the part of the accountable officer. Absent a proximate cause issue, these cases are relatively easy to resolve. Such evidence, however, is not necessary in order to deny relief in the situation we refer to as the "unexplained loss or shortage." In the typical case, a safe is opened at the beginning of a business day and money is found missing, or an internal audit reveals a shortage in an account. There is no evidence of negligence or

misconduct on the part of the accountable officer; there is no evidence of **burglary** or any other reason for the disappearance. **All** that is known with any certainty is that the money is gone. In other words, the loss or shortage is totally unexplained. In many cases, a formal investigation **confirms** this conclusion.

The presumption of negligence has perhaps its clearest impact in the unexplained loss situation. If the burden of proof is on the accountable officer to establish eligibility for relief, the denial of relief follows necessarily. Since there is no evidence **to** rebut the presumption, there is no basis on which to grant relief. The presumption and its application to unexplained losses were discussed in 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566, 567-68 (1969) as follows:

“While there is no positive or **affirmative** evidence of negligence on the part of [the accountable **officer**] in connection with this **loss**, we have repeatedly held that positive or **affirmative** evidence of negligence is not necessary, and that the mere fact that **an** unexplained shortage occurred **is**, in and of itself, **sufficient** to raise an inference or presumption of negligence. A Government **official** charged with the custody and handling of public moneys. . . is expected to exercise the highest degree of care in the performance of his duty and, when funds. . . disappear without explanation or evident reason, the presumption naturally arises that the responsible official was derelict in some **way**. **Moreover**, granting relief to Government officials for unexplained **losses** or **shortages** of this nature might tend to make such **officials** lax in the performance of their **duties**.”<sup>15</sup>

The rationale is fairly simple. Money does not just get up and walk away. If it is missing, there is an excellent chance that someone took it. If the accountable officer exercised the requisite degree **of** care and properly safeguarded the funds, it is unlikely that anyone else could have taken the money without leaving some evidence of forced **entry**. Therefore, where there is no evidence to explain a loss, the leading probabilities are that the accountable officer either took the money or was negligent in some way that facilitated theft by someone else. Be that as it may, denial of relief in an unexplained loss **case** is not **intended** to imply dishonesty by the particular accountable officer; it means merely that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the applicable **legal** presumption. See **B-122688**, September 25, 1956.

Despite the strictness of the rule, there are many unexplained **loss** cases in which the presumption can be rebutted and relief granted. By

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<sup>15</sup> A few additional examples are 70 **Comp. Gen.** 389 (1991); **B-213427**, December 13\* 1983, aff'd upon reconsideration, **B-213427**, March 14, 1984; **B-159987**, September 21, 1966.

**definition**, the evidence will not be sufficient to “explain” the loss, otherwise there wouldn’t be an unexplained loss to begin with. There is no simple formula to **apply** in determining the kinds or amount of evidence that will rebut the presumption. It is **necessary** to evaluate the totality of available evidence, including statements by the accountable officer and other agency personnel, investigation reports, and any relevant circumstantial evidence.

In some cases, for example, it may be possible to reasonably conclude that art negligence that may have occurred was not the proximate cause of the loss. These cases tend to involve security weaknesses and are discussed under the Agency Security heading. The evidence, in conjunction with the lack of any evidence to the contrary **and** the agency’s “no fault or negligence” determination, supports the granting of relief.

Since the burden of proof rests with the accountable officer, the accountable **officer’s** own statements take on a particular relevance in establishing due care, and relief should never be denied without obtaining and carefully analyzing them. Naturally, the more **specific** and detailed the statement is, and the more closely tied to the time of the loss, the more helpful it will be. While the accountable officer’s statement is obviously self-serving and may not be enough if there are no other supporting factors, it has been enough to tip the balance in favor of granting relief when combined with other evidence, however **slight** or circumstantial, which by **itself** would not have been **sufficient**.<sup>16</sup>

#### f. Compliance With Regulations

If a particular activity of an accountable officer is governed by a **regulation**, failure to follow that regulation will be considered negligence. If that failure is the proximate cause of a loss or deficiency, relief must be denied. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 12 (1990); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112, 116 (1974). The relationship of this rule to the standard of reasonable care discussed earlier is the premise that the prudent person exercising the requisite degree of care will become familiar with, and **will** follow, applicable regulations. Indeed, it has

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<sup>16</sup>**E.g.**, B-242830, September 24, 1991 (cashier’s statement supported by another employee; safe had been opened for **only** one transaction in early afternoon); B-214080, March 25, 1986 (cashier made sworn and unrefuted statement to local police and Secret Service); B-210017, June 8, 1983 (cashier’s statement corroborated by witness); 5188733, March 29, 1979 (forcible entry to **office** but not to safe itself; **cashier’s** statement that he locked safe on day of robbery accepted).

been stated that accountable officers have a duty to **familiarize** themselves with pertinent Treasury Department and agency rules and regulations. **B-229207**, July 11, 1988; **B-193380**, September 25, 1979.

Treasury Department regulations on disbursing, applicable to **all** agencies for which Treasury disburses under 31 U.S.C. **§3321**, are found in the Treasury Financial Manual. Treasury regulations governing cashiers are found in I **TFM** Part 4, Chapter 3000, and in the Treasury Department's **TFM** supplement entitled Manual of Procedures and Instructions for Cashiers. The **Treasury** manuals establish general requirements for sound cash control, and failure to comply may result in the denial of relief. **E.g.**, 70 **Comp. Gen.** 12 (1990) (cashier, contrary to Cashiers' Manual, kept copy of safe combination taped to underside **of** desk pull-out panel).

The same principle applies with respect to violations of individual agency regulations and written instructions. **E.g.**, **B-193380**, September 25, 1979 (cashier Violated agency regulations by placing the key to a locked cash box in **an** unlocked cash box and then leaving both in a locked safe to which more than one person had the combination). The decision further pointed out that oral instructions to the cashier to leave the cash box unlocked could not be considered to supersede published agency regulations. However, if agency regulations are demonstrably ambiguous, relief may be granted. **B-169848-O. M.**, December 8, 1971.

Negligence will not be imputed to an accountable **officer** who fails to comply with regulations where full compliance is prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. This recognizes the fact that compliance is sometimes up to the agency and beyond the control of the individual. For example, violating a regulation which requires that funds be kept in a safe is not negligence where the agency has failed to provide the safe. **B-78617**, June 24, 1949.

Also, as with other types of negligence, failure to follow regulations will not prevent the granting of relief if the failure was not the proximate cause of the loss or deficiency. **B-229207**, July 11, 1988; **B-229587**, January 6, 1988; **B-185666**, July 27, 1976; **Libby v. United States**, 81 F. **Supp.** 722, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1948). In **B-185666**, for example, a cashier kept her cash box key and safe combination in a sealed envelope in an unlocked desk drawer, in violation of the

Treasury Cashiers' Manual. Relief was nevertheless granted because the seal on the envelope had not been broken and the negligence could therefore not have contributed to the loss.

While failure to comply with regulations is generally considered negligence, the converse is not always true. To be sure, the fact that an accountable officer has complied with **all** applicable regulations and instructions is highly significant in evaluating eligibility for relief. It is not conclusive, however, because the accountable **officer** might have been negligent in a matter not covered by the regulations. In a 1979 case, an accountable officer accepted a \$10,000 personal check at a Customs auction sale and turned over the property without attempting to **verify** the existence or adequacy of the purchaser's account. The check bounced. It was not clear whether existing regulations applied to that situation. Even without regulations, however, accepting a personal check for a large amount without attempting **verification** was viewed as not meeting the standard of reasonable care, and relief was denied. **B-193673**, May 25, 1979, modified on other grounds, **B-201673** et al., September 23, 1982.

g. Losses in Shipment

Government funds are occasionally lost or stolen in shipment. The Postal Service or other carrier is the agent of the sender, and funds in shipment remain in the "custody" of the accountable **officer** who shipped them until delivered, notwithstanding the fact that they are in the physical possession of the carrier. **B-185905-O**, M., April 23, 1976. Thus, a loss in shipment is a physical loss for which an accountable **officer** is liable.

For the most part, relief for losses in shipment is the same as relief for other losses, and the rules discussed in this chapter with respect to negligence and proximate cause apply. For example, relief was denied in one case because transmitting cash by ordinary first-class mail rather than registered or certified mail was held not to meet the reasonable care standard. **B-164450-O**, M., September 5, 1968.

However, relief for losses in shipment differs from relief for other losses in one important respect. A loss in shipment is not viewed **as** an "unexplained loss" and there is no presumption of negligence. **B-164450-O**, M., September 5, 1968. The reason for this distinction is that there is no basis to infer negligence when a loss occurs while funds are totally beyond the control of the accountable officer. Thus, where funds are lost in shipment, in the absence of positive evidence



of fault or negligence, an accountable officer will be relieved if he or she conformed fully with applicable regulations and procedures for the handling and safeguarding of the funds and they were nevertheless lost or stolen. **B-142058**, March 18, 1960; **B-126362**, February 21, 1956; **B-119567**, January 10, 1955; **B-95504**, June 16, 1950.

The Government Losses in Shipment Act (**GLISA**), 40 U.S.C. §§ 721–729, authorizes agencies to **file** claims with the Treasury Department for funds or other valuables lost or destroyed in shipment. The Treasury Department has a revolving fund for the payment of these claims and **has** issued regulations, found at 31 C.F.R. Parts 361 and 362, to implement the statute. The Treasury Department will generally disallow a claim unless there has been strict compliance with the statute and regulations. See, e.g., **B-200437**, October 21, 1980. “

If a loss in shipment occurs, the agency should first consider **filing** a claim under the Government Losses in Shipment Act, and should seek relief only if this fails, **Denial** of a **GLISA** claim should prompt further inquiry since it suggests the possibility that someone at the point of shipment may have been negligent, but it will not automatically preclude the granting of relief. For example, it is possible for a claim to be denied for reasons that do not suggest negligence. In **B-126362**, February 21, 1956, the accountable officer had reimbursed the government from personal funds, and a **claim** under **GLISA** was denied because there was no longer any loss. **GAO** nevertheless granted relief and the accountable officer was reimbursed.

Disallowance of a **GLISA** claim for failure to strictly comply with the regulations carries with it an even stronger suggestion of negligence, but it is still appropriate to examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case to evaluate the relationship of the noncompliance to the loss. For example, **GAO** granted relief in **B-191645**, October 5, 1979, despite the denial of a **GLISA** claim, because there was no question that the **funds** had arrived at their initial destination although they never reached the intended recipient. Even if there had been negligence at the point of shipment, it could not have been the proximate cause of the loss. See also **B-193830**, October 1, 1979, and **B-193830**, March 30, 1979 (both cases arising from the same **loss**).

#### h. Fire, Natural Disaster

Earlier in this chapter, we noted the Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Thomas, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 337,352 (1872), that

strict liability (and hence the need for relief) would not attach in two situations: funds destroyed by an “overruling necessity” and funds taken by a “public enemy,” provided there is no contributing fault or negligence by the accountable **officer**. The Court gave only one example of an “overruling necessity”:

“Suppose an earthquake should swallow up the building and safe containing the money, is there no condition implied in the **law** by which to exonerate the receiver from responsibility?”

Id. at 348. We are aware of no subsequent judicial attempts to further **define** “overruling necessity,” although some administrative formulations have used the term “acts of God.” E.g., 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566,567 (1969). Thus, at the very least, **assuming** no contributing fault or negligence, an accountable **officer** is not **liable** for funds lost or destroyed in an earthquake, and hence there is no need **to** seek relief. Contributing negligence might occur, for example, if an accountable officer failed to periodically deposit collections and funds were therefore on hand which should not have been. See **B-71445**, June 20, 1949.

**GAO** granted relief in one case **involving** an earthquake, **B-229** 153, October 29, 1987, in which most of the funds were recovered. While arguably there was no need to seek relief in that case, it makes no difference as a practical matter since relief would be granted as a matter of routine unless there is contributing negligence, in which event the accountable officer would be liable even under Thomas.

Whatever the scope of the “overruling necessity” exception, it is clear that it does not extend to destruction by **fire**, even though money destroyed by **fire** is no longer available to be used by anyone else and can be replaced simply by printing new money. In Smythe v. United States, 188 U.S. 156, 173–74 (1903), the Supreme Court declined to apply Thomas and expressly rejected the argument that an accountable officer’s liability for notes destroyed by **fire** should be limited to the cost of printing new notes. See also 1 **Comp. Dec.** 191 (1895), in which the Comptroller of the Treasury similarly declined to apply the Thomas exception to a loss by **fire**. Thus, a loss by **fire** is a physical loss for which the accountable officer is liable, but for which relief will be granted under 31 U.S.C. § 3527 if the statutory conditions are met. Examples are **B-212515**, December 21, 1983, and **B-203726**, July 10, 1981.

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i. Loss by Theft

If money is taken in a burglary, robbery, or other form of theft, the accountable officer will be relieved of liability if the following conditions are met:

1. There is sufficient evidence that a theft took **place**;<sup>17</sup>
2. There is no evidence implicating, or indicating contributing negligence by, the accountable officer; and
3. The agency has made the administrative determinations required by the relief statute.

The fact patterns tend to fall into several well-defined categories.

(1) Burglary: forced entry

Forced entry cases tend to be fairly straightforward. In the typical case, a government office is broken into while the office is closed for the night or over a weekend, and money is stolen. Evidence of the forced entry is clear. As long as there is no evidence implicating the accountable officer, **no** other contributing fault or negligence, and the requisite administrative determinations are made, relief is granted. A few examples **follow**:<sup>18</sup>

- Burglars broke into the **welding** shop at a government **laboratory**, took a blowtorch and acetylene tanks to the administrative **office** and used them to cut open the safe. **B-242773**, February 20, 1991.
- Cashier's office was robbed over a weekend. Office had been forcibly entered, but there was no evidence of forced entry into the safe. Federal Bureau of Investigation found no evidence of negligence or breach of security by **any** government personnel associated with the office. **B-193174**, November 29, 1978.
- Persons unknown broke front door lock of Bureau of **Indian Affairs** office in Alaska and removed safe on **sled**. Sled tracks led to an abandoned building in which the safe was found with its door removed. **B-182590**, February 3, 1975.

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<sup>17</sup>The mere designation of a loss as a "burglary" without Supporting evidence **is not enough** to remove it from the "unexplained loss" category. **E.g., B-210358**, July 21, 1983.

<sup>18</sup>There are numerous forced entry cases in which GAO **granted relief** under similar circumstances. A few additional examples are 5230607, June 20, 1988; **B-205428**, December 31, 1981; 8-201651, **February** 9, 1981.

- Unsecured bolt cutters found on premises used to remove safe padlock. No contributing negligence because there was no separate facility in which to secure the tools. **B-202290**, June 5, 1981.

The same principles apply to theft from a hotel room. 69 **Comp. Gen.** 586 (1990); **B-229847**, January 29, 1988.

(2) Armed robbery

In this situation, one or more individuals, armed or credibly pretending to be armed, robs an accountable officer. Again, as long as there is no evidence implicating the accountable officer and no contributing negligence, relief is readily granted. The accountable officer is not expected to risk his or her life by resisting. Some illustrative cases follow:<sup>19</sup>

- Gunman entered cashier's office, knocked cashier unconscious, and robbed safe. **B-235458**, August 23, 1990.
- Man entered cashier's office in a veterans hospital and handed cashier a note demanding **all** of her \$20 bills. Although he did not display a weapon, he said he was armed. **B-191579**, May 22, 1978. A very similar case is **B-237420**, December 8, 1989 (man gave cashier note indicating bomb threat; upon running off with the money, he left a second note saying "no bomb").

Depending on the circumstances, it is not **necessary** that the thief be, or pretend to be, armed. An example is the common purse-snatching incident. **B-197021**, May 9, 1980; **B-193866**, March 14, 1979.

(3) Riot, public disturbance

This category includes the popular pastime of ransacking American embassies. The Supreme Court's second exception in United States v. Thomas (see Fire, Natural Disaster heading) to an accountable **officer's** strict liability is funds taken by a "public enemy." That case concerned the Civil War. As with the "overruling necessity" exception, we are aware of no further definition of "public enemy" in this context, and the cases cited here have consistently been treated as accountable officer losses. In any event, relief is routinely granted

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<sup>19</sup>Some other examples are **B-217773**, March 18, 1985; **B-211945**, July 18, 1983; **B-201126**, January 27, 1981.

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unless there is contributing negligence. Thus, GAO granted relief in the following cases:<sup>20</sup>

- Funds taken during attack on American Embassy in **Tehran, Iran**. **B-229753**, December 30, 1987; **B-194666**, August 6, 1979 (separate attacks, both occurring in 1979).
- Armed soldiers forced entry into U.S. Information Agency compound in Beirut, Lebanon, and looted safe. **B-195435**, September 12, 1979.
- Safes looted by Cuban detainees during prison riot. **B-232252**, January 5, 1989; **B-230796**, April 8, 1988.

(4) Evidence less than certain

In all of the cases cited above dealing with forced entry, armed robbery, or rioting, the fact that a theft had taken place was beyond question. However, there are many cases in which the evidence of theft is not all that clear. The losses are unexplained in the sense that what happened cannot be determined with any certainty. The problem then becomes whether the indications of **theft** are **sufficient** to classify the loss as a theft and to rebut the presumption of negligence.

These tend to be the most difficult cases to resolve. The **difficulty** stems from the fact, which we have noted previously, that the accountable officer laws are designed to protect the government against dishonesty as well as negligence. On the one hand, an accountable officer who did all he or she could to safeguard the funds should be relieved of liability. But on the other hand, the application of the relief statutes should not provide a blueprint for (or absolution from) dishonesty. Recognizing that complete certainty is impossible in many if not most cases, the decisions try to achieve a balance between these two considerations. Thus, **GAO** gives weight to the administrative determinations and to statements of the individuals concerned, but these factors cannot be conclusive and the decision will be based on all of the evidence. Other relevant factors include how and where the safe combination was stored, when it was last changed, whether the combination dial was susceptible of observation while the safe was being opened, access to the safe and to the facility itself, and the safeguarding of keys to cash boxes.

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<sup>20</sup>Further examples are **B-249372**, August 13, 1992 (Somalia); **B-230606.2**, September 6, 1988 (Iran); **B-227422**, June 18, 1987 (Tripoli); **B-207059**, July 1, 1982 (Chad); **B-190205**, November 14, 1977 (Zaire).

For example, in **B-198836**, June 26, 1980, funds were kept in the bottom drawer of a four-drawer **file** cabinet. Each drawer had a separate key lock and the cabinet itself was secured by a steel **bar** and padlock. Upon arriving at work one morning, the cashier found the bottom drawer slightly out of alignment with several pry marks on its edges. A police investigation was inconclusive. GAO viewed the evidence as sufficient to support a conclusion of burglary and, since the record contained no indication of negligence on the part of the cashier, granted relief.

In another case, a safe was found unlocked with no signs of forcible entry. However, there was evidence that a thief had entered the office door by breaking a window. The accountable officer stated that he had locked the safe before going home the previous evening, and there was no evidence to contradict this or to indicate any other negligence. GAO accepted the accountable officer's **uncontroverted** statement and granted relief, **B-188733**, March 29, 1979. See also **B-210017**, June 8, 1983.

In **B-170596-O**. M., November 16, 1970, the accountable officer stated that she had found the padlock on and locked in reverse from the way she always locked it. Her statement was corroborated by the agency investigation. In addition, the lock did not conform to agency specifications, but this was not the cashier's responsibility. She had used the facilities officially provided for her. Relief was granted.

Relief was also granted in **B-170615-O**. M., November 23, 1971, reversing upon reconsideration **B-170615 -O**. M., December 2, 1970. In that case, there was some evidence that the office lock had been pried open but there were no signs of forcible entry into the safe. This suggested the possibility of negligence either in failing to lock the safe or in not adequately safeguarding the combination. However, the accountable **officer's** supervisor stated that he (the supervisor) had locked the safe at the close of business on the preceding workday, and two safe company representatives provided statements that the safe was vulnerable and could have been opened by anyone with some knowledge of safe combinations.

The occurrence of more than one loss under similar circumstances within a relatively short time **will** tend to corroborate the likelihood of theft. **B-199021**, September 2, 1980; **B-193416**, October 25, 1979. In **B-1 99021**, two losses occurred in the same building within several

weeks of each other. **All** agency security procedures had been **followed** and the record indicated that the cashier had exercised a very high degree of care in safeguarding the funds. In **B-193416**, the **first** loss was totally unexplained and the entire cash box disappeared a week later. The safe combination had been kept in a sealed envelope in a “working safe” to which other employees had access. Although the seal on the envelope was not broken, an investigation showed that, while the combination could not be read by holding the envelope up to normal light, it could **be** read by holding it up to stronger light. In neither case was there any evidence of forcible entry or of negligence on the part of the accountable officer. Balancing the various relevant factors in each case, **GAO** granted relief.

The disappearance of an entire cash box will also be viewed as an indication of theft. However, this factor standing alone will not be conclusive since there is nothing to prevent a dishonest employee from simply taking the whole box rather than a handful of money from it. Signs of forced entry to the safe or **file** cabinet will naturally reinforce the theft **conclusion**. **E.g.**, **B-229136**, January 22, 1988; **B-186190**, May 11, 1976. Far more **difficult** are cases in which a cash box disappears with no signs of forcible entry to the container in which it was kept. Note the various additional factors viewed as relevant in each of the following cases:

- **B-223602**, August 25, 1986. Police were able to open **file** cabinet with a different key, and other thefts had occurred around the same time. Relief granted.
- **B-189658**, September 20, 1977. Safe was not rated for burglary protection and could have been opened fairly easily by manipulating the combination dial. Relief granted.
- **B-189896**, November 1, 1977. Supervisor’s **secretary** maintained a log of **all** safe and bar-lock combinations, a breach of security which could have resulted in the compromise of the combination. Relief granted.
- **B-173133-O. M.**, December 10, 1973. Cashier locked safe and checked it in the presence of a guard. Several other employees had access to the safe combination. Relief granted. Multiple access also contributed

to the granting of relief in **B-217945**, July 23, 1985, and **B-212605**, April 19, 1984.<sup>21</sup>

- **B-183284**, June 17, 1975. Safe was malfunctioning at time of loss. Relief granted.
- **B-211649**, August 2, 1983. Extensive security violations attributable to agency. Relief granted. A similar case is **B-197799**, June 18, 1980.
- **B-185666**, July 27, 1976. Some evidence of forced entry to door of cashier's office but not to safe or safe drawer. Cash box later found in men's room. Negligence by cashier in improperly storing keys and safe combination in unlocked desk drawer not proximate cause of loss since seal on envelope was found intact. Relief granted.
- **B-191942**, September 12, 1979. Cash box disappeared during two-week absence of cashier. Even **assuming** cashier negligently failed to lock safe prior to her absence, there was no way to establish this as the proximate cause of the loss since box had been kept in a "working safe" which would have been opened daily in her absence. Relief granted.
- **B-182480**, February 3, 1975. Cashier went on leave without properly securing key to file cabinet or entrusting it to an alternate. Relief denied.
- **B-184028**, March 2, 1976. Cashier had been experiencing **difficulty** trying to lock the safe and stated she might have **left** it unlocked inadvertently. Relief denied.

To **summarize** the "cash box" cases, the disappearance of an entire cash box suggests theft but is not conclusive. In such cases, even though the cause of the loss cannot be definitely attributed, relief will probably be granted if there is **uncontroverted** evidence that the safe was locked, no other evidence of contributing fault or negligence on the part of the accountable officer, and especially if there are other factors present tending to corroborate the likelihood of theft. In no case has relief been granted based solely on the fact that a cash box disappeared; without more, it is simply another type of unexplained loss for which there is no basis for relief.

#### (5) Embezzlement

The term "embezzlement" means the fraudulent misappropriation of property by someone to whom it has lawfully been entrusted. Black's

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<sup>21</sup>A key inquiry in this type of case, and a crucial factor in deciding whether to grant or deny relief, is the extent to which the accountable officer is responsible for the non-exclusive access to the safe combination.



Law Dictionary 522 (6th ed. 1990). Losses due to embezzlement or fraudulent acts of subordinate finance personnel, acting alone or in collusion with others, are treated as physical **losses** and relief **will** be granted if the statutory conditions are met. **B-202074**, July 21, 1983, at 6; **B-21 1763**, July 8, 1983; **B-133862-O. M.**, November 29, 1957; **B-101375 -O. M.**, April 16, 1951.

An illustrative group of cases involves the embezzlement of tax collections, under various schemes, by employees of the Internal Revenue Service. In each case the IRS pursued the perpetrators, and most were prosecuted and convicted. The IRS recovered what it **could** from the (now former) employees, and sought relief for the balance for the pertinent supervisor in whose name the account was held. In each case, GAO agreed with the “no fault or negligence” determination and granted relief. **B-2441 13**, November 1, 1991; **B-226214 et al.**, June 18, 1987; **B-215501**, November 5, 1984; **B-192567**, November 3, 1978; **B-191722**, August 7, 1978; **B-191781**, June 30, 1978.

The accountable officer in each of the IRS cases was a supervisor who did not actually handle the funds. The approach to evaluating the presence or absence of negligence when the accountable **officer** is a supervisor is to review the existence and adequacy of internal controls and procedures and to ask whether the accountable officer provided reasonable supervision. If internal controls and management procedures are reasonable **and** were being followed, relief will be granted. As noted in **B-2262 14**, the standard does not expect perfection and recognizes that a clever criminal scheme can outwit the most carefully established and supervised system.

Losses resulting from the fraudulent acts of other than subordinate finance personnel (e.g., payments on fraudulent vouchers) are not physical losses but must be treated as improper payments. 2 **Comp. Gen.** 277 (1922); **B-202074**, July 21, 1983; **B-76903**, July 13, 1948; **B-133862 -O. M.**, November 29, 1957.

j. Agency Security

In evaluating virtually any physical loss case, physical security—the existence, adequacy, and use of safekeeping facilities and procedures—is a crucial consideration. The Treasury Department’s Manual of Procedures and Instructions for Cashiers sets forth many of the requirements. For example, the cashiers’ manual provides that

safe combinations should be changed annually, whenever there is a change of cashiers, or when the combination has been compromised, and prescribes procedures for safeguarding the combination. It also reflects what is perhaps the most fundamental principle of sound cash control—that an employee with custody of public funds should have exclusive control over those funds. In addition, agencies should have their own specific regulations or instructions tailored to individual circumstances.

The first step in analyzing the effect of a security violation or deficiency is to determine whether the violation or deficiency is attributable to the accountable officer or to the agency. Two fundamental premises drive this analysis: (1) the accountable officer is responsible for safeguarding the funds in his or her custody; and (2) the agency is responsible for providing adequate means to do so. Adequate means includes both physical facilities and administrative procedures.

Basically, if the accountable officer fails to use the facilities and procedures that have been provided, this failure will be viewed as negligence and, unless some other factor appears to be the proximate cause of the loss, will preclude the granting of relief. Several examples have been previously cited under the Actual Negligence heading.

Another element of the accountable officer's responsibility is the duty to report security weaknesses to appropriate supervisory personnel. E.g., 63 Comp. Gen. 489,492 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 65 Comp. Gen. 876 (1986). If the agency fails to respond, a loss attributable to the reported weakness is not the accountable officer's fault. E.g., B-235147.2, August 14, 1991; B-208511, May 9, 1983.

Ultimately, an accountable officer can do no more than use the best that has been made available, and relief will not be denied for failure to follow adequate security measures which are beyond the accountable officer's control. E.g., B-226947, July 27, 1987 (U.S. Mint employees stole coins from temporarily leased facility which was incapable of adequate security); B-207062, May 12, 1983 (agent kept collections in his possession because, upon returning to office at 4:30 p.m., he found all storage facilities locked and all senior officials had left for the day); B-210245, February 10, 1983 (lockable gun cabinet was the most secure item available); B-186190, May 11, 1976 (funds kept in safe with padlock because combination safe, which had been

ordered, had not yet arrived); **B-78617**, June 24, 1949 (agency failed to provide safe). Of course, the accountable officer is expected to act to correct weaknesses which are subject to his or her control. **B-127204**, April 13, 1956.

The principle that relief will be granted if the agency fails to provide adequate security and that failure is viewed as the proximate cause of the loss manifests itself in a variety of contexts. One group of cases involves multiple violations. In **B-182386**, April 24, 1975, **imprest** funds were found missing when a safe was opened for audit. The accountable officer was found to be negligent for **failing** to follow approved procedures. However, the agency's investigation disclosed a number of security **violations** attributable to the agency. Two cashiers operated from the same cash box; transfers of custody were not documented; the safe combination had not been changed despite several changes of cashiers; at least five persons knew the safe combination. The agency, in recommending relief, concluded that the loss was caused by "pervasive laxity in the protection and administration of the funds . . . on all levels." **GAO** agreed, noting that the lax security "precludes the definite placement of responsibility" for the loss, and granted relief.

In several later unexplained loss cases (no sign of forcible entry, no indication of fault or negligence on the part of the accountable officer), **GAO** has regarded overall **lax** security on the part of the agency, similar to that in **B-182386**, as the proximate cause of the loss and thus granted relief. **B-243324**, April 17, 1991; **B-229778**, September 2, 1988; **B-226847**, June 25, 1987; **B-217876**, April 29, 1986; **B-211662**, December 10, 1985; **B-211649**, August 2, 1983. All of these cases involved numerous security violations beyond the accountable officer's control, and several adopt the "pervasive laxity" characterization of **B-182386**.

However, in order for relief to be granted, security weaknesses **attributable** to the agency need not rise to the level of "pervasive laxity" encountered in the cases cited in the preceding paragraph. Thus, relief will usually be granted where several persons other than the accountable **officer** have access to the funds through knowledge of the safe combination since "multiple access" makes it impossible to attribute the loss to the accountable officer. **B-235072**, July 5, 1989; **B-228884**, October 13, 1987; **B-214080**, March 25, 1986; **B-211233**, June 28, 1983; **B-209569**, April 13, 1983; **B-196855**,

December 9, 1981; **B-199034**, February 9, 1981. Additional cases are cited in our earlier discussion of missing cash boxes.

If multiple access to a safe will support the granting of relief for otherwise unexplained losses, it follows that multiple access to a cash box or drawer will have the same effect. The Treasury cashiers' manual provides that cashiers should never work out of the same cash box or drawer. Violation of this requirement, where beyond the control of the accountable officer, is a security breach which, in appropriate cases, has supported the granting of relief. **B-227714**, October 20, 1987; **B-204647**, February 8, 1982. If it is necessary for more than one cashier to work out of the same safe, the safe should preferably have separate built-in locking drawers rather than removable cash boxes. **B-191942**, September 12, 1979.

The following security deficiencies have **also** contributed to the granting of relief:

- Safe malfunctioning, defective, or otherwise not secure. **B-221447**, June 1, 1987; **B-215477**, November 5, 1984; **B-183284**, June 17, 1975.
- Cash box could be opened with other keys. **B-203646**, November 30, 1981; **B-197270**, March 7, 1980.
- Failure to change safe combination as required by Treasury regulations, **B-211233**, June 28, 1983; **B-196855**, December 8, 1981. (Both cases also involve multiple access.)
- Safe combination and key to cash drawer were kept in an unlocked desk drawer. **B-177963-O. M.**, March 21, 1973. (The result would most likely be different if the violation were the **fault** of the accountable officer or if the accountable officer passively acquiesced in the breach. See **B-185666**, July 27, 1976.)
- Crimping device used to **seal** cash bags did not use sequentially numbered seals and was accessible to several employees. **B-246988**, February 27, 1992.

The preceding cases are mostly unexplained losses. It **naturally** follows that security violations of the type noted **will** contribute to rebutting the presumption of negligence in cases where there is clear evidence of theft. In **B-184493**, October 8, 1975, for example, there was evidence of forced entry to the **office** door but not to the safe. The record showed that, despite the accountable officer's best efforts, it was impossible for him to shield the dial from observation while

opening the safe. In view of the office layout, the position of the safe, and the number of persons allowed access to the office, GAO granted **relief**.<sup>22</sup> Other examples are **B-180664-O**. M., April 23, 1974 (multiple access to safe), and **B-170251 -O**. M., October 24, 1972 (insecure safe).

If there is evidence of negligence on the part of the accountable officer in **conjunction** with security deficiencies attributable to the agency, the accountable officer's negligence must be **balanced** against the agency's negligence. Relief may be granted or denied based largely on the proximate cause analysis. As with the unexplained loss cases, relief has been granted in a number of cases where the agency's violations could be said to amount to "pervasive laxity." **B-235147.2**, August 14, 1991; **B-197799**, June 19, 1980; **B-182386**, April 24, 1975; **B-169756 -O**. M., July 8, 1970. Similarly, agency security violations which do not amount to pervasive laxity may support the granting of relief. Such violations must either be the proximate cause of the loss or make it impossible to attribute the loss to the accountable officer. In a 1971 case, for example, a cashier kept the combinations to three safes on an adding machine tape in her wallet. The agency failed to change the combinations after the wallet was stolen. Also, safe company representatives stated that one safe was vulnerable and could readily have been opened. The fact that only the vulnerable safe had been robbed supported the conclusion that the stolen combinations had not been used. **B-170615-O**. M., November 23, 1971. Other cases in which agency security violations were found to override negligence by the accountable officer are **B-232744**, December 9, 1988 (safe combination not changed despite several requests by accountable officer following possible compromise); **B-205985**, July 12, 1982 (multiple access, safe combination not changed as required); **B-199128**, November 7, 1980 (multiple access); **B-191440**, May 25, 1979 (two cashiers working out of same drawer).

The result in these cases should not be taken too far. Poor agency security does not guarantee relief; it is merely **another** factor to consider in the proximate cause equation. Another relevant factor is the nature and extent of the accountable officer's efforts to improve the situation.

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<sup>22</sup>An explanation of this type may or may not be sufficient, depending on the Particular facts. See **B-170012**, August 11, 1970; **B-127204**, April 13, 1956.

Where security weaknesses exist, a supervisor will normally be in a better position to take or initiate corrective action, and a supervisor who is also an accountable **officer** maybe found negligent for failing to do so. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 489 (1984), reversed upon reconsideration (new evidence), 65 **Comp. Gen.** 876 (1986); 60 **Comp. Gen.** 674,676 (1981). However, anew supervisor should not be held immediately responsible for the situation he or she inherited. **B-209715**, April 4, 1983 (supervisor relieved in pervasive **laxity** situation where loss occurred only a week after he became accountable).

A close reading of the numerous security cases reveals the somewhat anomalous **result** that an accountable **officer** who works in a sloppy operation stands a much better chance of being relieved than one who works in a well-managed office. True as this may be, it would be wrong to hold accountable officers liable for conditions beyond their control. Rather, the solution lies in the proper recognition and implementation of the responsibility of each agency, mandated by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1), to safeguard its assets against loss and misappropriation.

k. Extenuating Circumstances

Since relief under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(a) and (b) is a creature of statute, it must be granted or denied solely in accordance with the statutory conditions. When Congress desires that "equitable" concerns be taken into consideration, it expressly so states. **Examples** are waiver statutes such as 5 U.S.C. § 5584 and 10 U.S.C. § 2774. In contrast, the physical loss relief statutes do not authorize the granting of relief **on** the basis of equitable considerations or extenuating or mitigating circumstances.

Thus, where an accountable officer has been found negligent, the following factors have been held not relevant, nor are they sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence:

- **Heavy work load.** 67 **Comp. Gen.** 6 (1987); 48 **Comp. Gen.** 566 (1969); **B-241201**, August 23, 1991.
- **Good work record; long period of loyal and dependable service; evidence of accountable officer's good reputation and character.** **B-204173**, November 9, 1982; **B-170012**, August 11, 1970; **B-158699**, September 6, 1968.
- **Inexperience; inadequate training or supervision.** 70 **Comp. Gen.** 389 (1991); **B-189084**, January 3, 1979; **B-191051**, July 31, 1978.

- Financial hardship of **having to** repay loss. **B-241478**, April 5, 1991; **B-216279.2**, December 30, 1985.
  - Acceptance of extra duties by the accountable **officer**; shortage of personnel. **B-186127**, September 1, 1976.
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## D. Illegal or Improper Payment

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### 1. Disbursement and Accountability

In order to understand the laws governing liability and relief for improper payments, and how the application of those laws has evolved over the last quarter of the **20th century**, it is helpful to start by **Summarizing**, from the accountability perspective, a few points relating to how the federal government disburses its money.

#### a. Statutory Framework: Disbursement Under Executive Order 6166

For most of the **19th** century and the early decades of the **20th** century, federal disbursement was decentralized. Each agency had **its** own disbursing office(s), and the function was performed by a small army of disbursing officers and clerks (who were accountable **officers**) scattered among the various agencies and throughout the country. In part, the reason for this was the primitive state of communication and transportation then existing. One of the weaknesses of this system was that, in many cases, **vouchers** were prepared, examined, and paid by the same person. 20 **Comp.** Dec. 859,869 (1914). This resulted in the growth of large disbursing offices in several agencies, some of which exceeded in size that of the **Treasury** Department. Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939, at 98.

From the perspective of accountability for improper payments, the modern legal structure of federal disbursing evolved in three **major** steps. First, Congress enacted legislation in 1912 (37 Stat. 375), the remnants of which are found at 31 U.S.C. § 3521(a), to prohibit disbursing officers from preparing and auditing their own vouchers. With this newly mandated separation of voucher preparation and examination from **actual** payment, payment was accomplished by having some other administrative official “**certify**” the correctness of the voucher to the disbursing **officer**. The 1912 legislation was thus the genesis of what would later become a new class of accountable officer-the certifying officer.

Disbursing officers remained accountable for improper payments, the standard now reflecting the more limited nature of the function. Since the 1912 law was intended to prohibit the disbursing officer from duplicating the detailed voucher examination already performed by the “certifying officer,” disbursing officers were held **liable** only for errors apparent on the face of the voucher, as well as, of course, payments prohibited by law or for which no appropriation was available. 20 **Comp. Dec.** 859 (1914). In a sense, the 1912 statute operated in part as a relief statute, with credit being allowed or disallowed in the disbursing officer’s account based on the application of this standard. E.g., 4 **Comp. Gen.** 991 (1925); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 441 (1924).

The second major step in the evolution was section 4 of Executive Order No. 6166, signed by President Roosevelt on June 10, 1933. The first paragraph of section 4, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321(a), consolidated the disbursing function in the Treasury Department, eliminating the separate disbursing offices of the other executive departments. The second paragraph, 31 U.S.C. § 3321(b), authorizes Treasury to delegate disbursing authority to other executive agencies for purposes of efficiency and economy. The third paragraph gave new emphasis to the certification function:

“The Division of Disbursement [Treasury Department] shall disburse moneys only upon the certification of persons by law duly authorized to incur obligations upon behalf of the United States. The function of accountability for improper **certification** shall be transferred to such persons, and no disbursing officer shall be held accountable **therefor**.”

The following year, Executive Order No. 6728, May 29, 1934, exempted the military departments, except for salaries and expenses in the District of Columbia, from the centralization. This exemption, and an exemption for the United States Marshals Service which originated in a 1940 reorganization plan, are codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321(c). Executive Order 6166 provided the framework for the disbursing system still in effect today. Apart from the specified exemptions, the **certifying** officer is now an employee of the spending agency, and the disbursing officer is an employee of the Treasury Department.

Disbursing officers continued to be liable for their own errors, as under the 1912 legislation. E.g., 13 **Comp. Gen.** 469 (1934). However, a major consequence of Executive Order 6166 was to make



the certifying officer an accountable officer as well. The **certifying** officer became liable for improper payments “caused **solely** by an improper certification as to matters not within the knowledge of or available to the disbursing officer.” 13 **Comp. Gen.** 326,329 (1934). See also 15 **Comp. Gen.** 986 (1936); 15 **Comp. Gen.** 362 (1935).

Over the next few years, confusion and disagreement developed as to the precise relationship of certifying officers and disbursing **officers** with respect to liability for improper payments. In the Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1940, at pages 63–66, GAO **summarized** the problem and recommended legislation to **specify** the allocation of responsibilities “to provide the **closest** possible relationship between liability and fault” (id. at 64).

The third major evolutionary step was the enactment of Public Law 77-389, 55 Stat. 875 (1941) to implement GAO’s recommendation. Section 1, 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a), reflects the substance of the third paragraph of Executive Order 6166, § 4, quoted above. It requires that a disbursing officer disburse money only in accordance with a voucher **certified** by the head of the spending agency or an authorized certifying officer who, except for some interagency transactions, will also be an employee of the spending agency. As with the amended Executive Order 6166 itself, section 3325(a) does not apply to disbursements of the military departments except for salaries **and** expenses in the District of Columbia. 31 U.S.C. § 3325(b). The rest of the statute, which we will discuss in detail later, delineates the responsibilities of certifying and disbursing officers, and provides a mechanism for the administrative relief of **certifying officers**. (Comparable authority to relieve disbursing **officers** from liability for improper payments was not to come about until 1955.) Further detail on the federal disbursement system may be found in I Treasury Financial Manual, Chapter 4, and GAO’s Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, **title** 7, chapter 6.

It should be apparent that control of the public treasury must repose in the hands of federal officials. However, this does not mean that every task in the disbursement process must be performed by a government employee. For example, GAO has advised that the Bureau of Indian Affairs is authorized as a matter of law to contract with a private bank to perform certain ministerial or operational aspects of disbursing Indian trust fund money, such as printing checks,

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delivering checks to **payees**, and debiting amounts from accounts. However, in order to comply with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3321 and 3325, a federal disbursing officer must retain managerial and judgmental responsibility. 69 **Comp. Gen.** 314 (1990). The decision concluded:

“[W]e see no reason to object to a contractual arrangement whereby a private contractor provides disbursement services, so long as a government disbursing **officer** remains responsible for reviewing and overseeing the disbursement operations through agency installed controls designed to assure accurate and proper disbursements.” *Id.* at 278.

To intrude further into this responsibility would require clear statutory authority. *E.g., B-210545-O*. M., June 6, 1983 (Indian Health Service would need statutory authority to use **fiscal** intermediaries to pay claims by providers; memorandum cites examples of such authority in Medicare Legislation).

b. Automated Payment Systems

The statutory framework we have just described came into existence at a time when **all** disbursing was done manually. The **certifying officer** and his or her staff would review the supporting documentation for each payment voucher. The certifying officer would then sign the voucher, certifying to its legality and accuracy, and send it on to the disbursing officer. Many disbursements are still processed manually. However, the increased use of automated payment systems has changed the way **certifying officers** must operate. Perhaps the clearest example is payroll certification. A certifying officer may be asked to certify a grand total accompanied by computer tapes containing payrolls involving millions of dollars. There is no way the certifying officer can verify that each payment is accurate and legal. Even if it were reasonably possible, the cost of doing it would be prohibitive.

**With** the onslaught of the computer age, it was natural and inevitable to ask how accountability would function in a computerized environment. Since many of the assumptions of a manual system were unrealistic under an automated system, something had to change. **GAO** reviewed the impact of computerization in a report entitled *New Methods Needed for Checking Payments Made by Computers*, **FGMSD-76-82** (November 7, 1977). The report recognized that, while the **certifying officer's** basic legal liability remains, the conditions under which a certifying officer maybe relieved under an automated payment system must be different to reflect the new realities. The

approach to relief in this context stems from the following premises discussed in the report:

(1) In automated systems, evidence that the payments are accurate and legal must relate to **the system** rather than to **individual** transactions.

(2) **Certifying** and disbursing officers should be provided with information showing that the system on which they **are** largely compelled to **rely** is functioning properly.

(3) Reviews should be made at least annually, supplemented by interim checks of **major** system changes, to determine that the automated systems are operating effectively and can be relied on to produce payments that are accurate and legal.

The report then concluded:

“In the future, when a certifying or disbursing **officer** requests relief from an illegal, improper, or incorrect payment made using an automated system, **GAO will** continue to require the officer to show that he or she was not negligent in certifying payments later determined to be illegal or inaccurate. However, consideration will be given to whether or not the officer possessed evidence at the time of the payment approval that the system could be relied on to produce accurate and legal payments. In cases **in** which the designated assistant secretary or comparable official provides the agency head and GAO with a written statement that effective system controls could not be implemented prior to voucher preparation and certifies that the payments are otherwise proper, GAO will not consider the absence of such controls as evidence of negligence in determining whether the certifying official should be held **liable** for **any** erroneous payment prior to receipt of an advance decision. Of course, the traditional requirements that due care be exercised in making the payments and that diligent effort be made to recoup any erroneous payments will still be considered in any requests for waiver of liability. Also, should the **certifying official** fail to take reasonable steps to establish adequate **controls** for future **payments**, the **reasons** for such failure will be taken into account in any requests for waiver of liability concerning such future payments.” **FGMSD-76-82** at 17–18.

A few years later, the concepts and premises of the **GAO** report were explored and reported, with implementing recommendations, in a key study by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program

entitled Assuring Accurate and Legal Payments-The Roles of Certifying Officers in Federal Government (June 1980).<sup>23</sup> Further guidance from the internal control perspective may be found in OMB Circulars **A-123** and **A-127**, title 7 of the GAO Policy and Procedures Manual, and a GAO pamphlet entitled Critical Factors in Developing Automated Accounting and Financial Management Systems (1987).

Thus, in considering requests for relief under an automated payment system where verification of individual transactions is impossible as a practical matter, the basic question will be the reasonableness of the certifying officer's reliance on the system to continually produce legal and accurate payments. **B-178564**, January 27, 1978 (confirming the conceptual feasibility of using automated systems to perform preaudit functions under various child nutrition programs). See also **B-201965**, June 15, 1982. Contexts in which system reliance is relevant are discussed in 69 **Comp. Gen.** 85 (1989) (automated "ZIP plus 4" address correction system) and 59 **Comp. Gen.** 597 (1980) (electronic funds transfer program).

Regardless of what system is used, there is of course no authority to make known overpayments. **B-205851**, June 17, 1982; **B-203993-O. M.**, July 12, 1982.

c. Statistical Sampling

Statistical sampling is a procedure whereby a random selection of items from a universe is examined, and the results of that examination are then projected to the entire universe based on the laws of probability. In 1963, the Comptroller General held that reliance on a statistical sampling plan for the internal examination of vouchers prior to certification would not operate to relieve a certifying officer from liability for improper or erroneous payments. 43 **Comp. Gen.** 36 (1963). GAO recognized in the decision that an adequate statistical sampling plan could produce overall savings to the government, but was forced to conclude that it was not authorized under existing law.

In response to this, Congress enacted legislation in 1964, now found at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3521(b)–(d). The statute authorizes agency heads, upon determining that economies will result, to prescribe the use of adequate and effective statistical sampling procedures in the

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<sup>23</sup>The JFMIP is a joint undertaking of GAO, the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury Department, and the Office of Personnel Management.

prepayment examination of disbursement vouchers. GAO has **applied** this authority, for example, to conclude that agencies may use statistical sampling for the long-distance telephone call certifications required by 31 U.S.C. § 1348(b), which are a necessary prerequisite to **certifying** the payment vouchers. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 241 (1984); 57 **Comp. Gen.** 321 (1978).

As originally enacted, 31 U.S.C. § 3521(b) was limited to vouchers not exceeding \$100. A 1975 amendment to the statute removed the \$100 limit and authorized the Comptroller General to prescribe maximum dollar limits. The current limit is \$2,500. GAO Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 7.4.E (1990). For further guidance, see the Policy and Procedures Manual, title 7, Appendix III, and GAO, Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, Using Statistical Sampling (April 1986). For vouchers over the prescribed limit, unless GAO has approved an exception (7 **GAO-PPM App. HI**, sec. B), 43 **Comp. Gen.** 36 would continue to apply.

The relevance of all this to accountable officers **is** spelled out in the statute. A **certifying** or disbursing officer acting in good faith and in conformity with an authorized statistical sampling procedure **will** not be held liable for any certification or payment on a voucher which was not subject to specific examination because of the procedure. However, this does not affect the liability of the payee or recipient of the improper payment, and relief may be denied if the agency has not diligently pursued collection action against the recipient. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3521(c), (d).

GAO has approved the use of statistical sampling to test the reliability of accelerated payment or “fast pay” systems. E.g., 60 **Comp. Gen.** 602,606 (1981). In 67 **Comp. Gen.** 194 (1988), GAO for the **first** time considered the use of statistical sampling for post-payment audit in conjunction with “fast pay” procedures. The question arose in connection with a General Services Administration proposal to revise its procedures for paying and auditing utility invoices. GAO approved the proposal in concept, subject to several conditions: (1) the economic benefit to the government must exceed the risk of loss; (2) the plan must provide for a **meaningful** sampling of all invoices not subject to 100 percent audit; and (3) the plan must provide a reliable and defensible basis for the certification of payments. GAO then considered and approved GSA’s **specific** plan in 68 **Comp. Gen.**

618 (1989). As a general proposition, however, approaching the problem through system improvements is preferable to an alternative that involves relaxing controls or audit requirements. 7 **GAO-PPM § 7.4.F** (1990).

d. Provisional Vouchers and  
Related Matters

Apart from questions of automation or statistical sampling, proposals arise from time to time, prompted by a variety of legitimate concerns, to expedite or simplify the payment process. Proposals of this type invariably raise the potential for overpayments or erroneous payments. Therefore, their consequences in terms of the liability and relief of certifying and disbursing officers must always be considered.

A 1974 case involved a proposal by the Environmental Protection Agency for the certification of “provisional vouchers” for periodic payments under cost-type contracts. Under the proposal, monthly vouchers certified for payment would be essentially unaudited except for basic mathematical and cumulative cost checks, subject to **adjustment** upon audit when the contract is completed. Under this system, as with statistical sampling, some errors could escape detection. However, certifying officers **would** not have the benefit of the protection afforded by the statistical sampling legislation. Since there would be a complete audit upon contract completion, the provisional vouchers could be **certified** upon a somewhat lesser standard of prepayment examination, but **GAO** pointed out that any such system should provide, at a minimum, for periodic audit of the provisional vouchers. To better protect the certifying officers, **GAO** suggested following a Defense Department procedure under which “batch audits” of accumulated vouchers are conducted as frequently as deemed necessary based on the reliability of each contractor’s accounting and billing procedures, but not **less** than annually, again subject to final audit upon contract completion. **B-180264**, March 11, 1974.

In **order** to meet processing deadlines, time and attendance forms are **often** “certified” by appropriate supervisory personnel before the end of the pay period covered, raising the possibility that information for the latter days of the pay period may turn out to be erroneous. Since necessary **adjustments** can easily be made in the subsequent pay period and since the risk of loss to the government is viewed as remote, the provisional certification of payroll vouchers based on these “provisional” time and attendance records is acceptable. **B-145729**, August 17, 1977 (internal memorandum).

Simplification plans may be prompted by nothing more exotic than **understaffing** of audit resources. In **B-201408**, April 19, 1982, an agency proposed an “audit resources utilization plan” whereby it would (1) attempt to **identify** high risk contractors through **preaward questionnaires**; (2) for low risk contracts below a monetary limit, substitute desk audits for field contract audits; and (3) encourage the use of systems audits where possible. **GAO** found no “conceptual objection” to the proposal, noting that the final audits discussed in **B-180264** did not necessarily have to be field audits, but emphasized that high risk contractors should be subject to contract audits in **all** cases. The decision also discusses the certifying officer’s role.

Another type of simplification proposal involves lessening the degree of scrutiny on small payments. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs is authorized to reimburse certain low-cost supplies furnished to veterans under statutory training and rehabilitation programs. Experience taught the VA that participants **could** reasonably be expected to incur at least \$35 of reimbursable supply expenses. The VA proposed to waive documentation and review requirements on invoices of up to \$35 for miscellaneous supplies, and to pay essentially unsupported invoices up to that **amount**.<sup>24</sup> **GAO** concurred, but added that the **VA** should be able to demonstrate that prior audits have not revealed a significant number of false or inappropriate claims, and that it has internal controls adequate to detect multiple claims for the same individual. **B-221949**, June 30, 1987. An unstated consequence of the decision is that a certifying officer who relied on the system, assuming it was setup in accordance with the specified criteria, would be relieved from **liability** should any of the payments turn out to be erroneous.

One of the precedents relied on in **B-221949** is **B-179724**, January 14, 1974, holding that, in certain circumstances, a cash register checkout tape identifying at least the general category for each item is **sufficient** documentation for small purchase **certifications**. The rationale was the reality of commercial practice:

“Certain businesses selling consumer type products, such as grocery stores and hardware stores, whose sales frequently comprise small numbers of items having low unit costs, do not as a matter of **ordinary** business practice provide customers

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<sup>24</sup>**Invoices may be used in place** of vouchers to support disbursements **as long as they** <sup>com-</sup> **all** required information. *GAO Policy and procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies*, title 7, § 6.2.C (1990); 1 *Treasury Financial Manual* §4-2025.20.

receipts containing detailed descriptions for each item. It is impractical to develop more detailed descriptive type receipts for such purchases.”

As with **B-221949**, the unstated consequence is that an accountable **officer** relying on the decision and otherwise exercising due care would be relieved from liability for improper payments.

e. Facsimile Signatures and  
Electronic Certification

Signature devices other than the traditional pen-and-ink signature are called “facsimile signatures.” The term has been defined as “an impression of a signature made by a rubber stamp, metal plate, or other mechanical contrivance.” **B-194970**, July 3, 1979. As a general proposition, there is no prohibition on the use of facsimile signatures on financial documents as long as adequate controls and safeguards are observed. The rule was stated as follows in **B-481 23**, November 5, 1965 (non-decision letter):

“Generally, an acceptable facsimile of a signature may be made by a rubber stamp impression or maybe reproduced on a metal plate or by other mechanical contrivances, the validity of which is derived from a signed original. An otherwise proper document may be so authenticated mechanically with the knowledge and consent or under an express delegation of authority from the signer of the original provided that appropriate safeguards are observed in those respects.”

The rule has statutory recognition. In any federal statute unless otherwise specified, the term “signature” includes “a mark when the person making the same intended it as such.” 1 U.S.C. s 1; 65 **Comp. Gen.** 806,810 (1986).

When facsimile signatures are to be used by government officials, the safeguards should include:

- Standards for the authorization of the use of facsimile signatures.
- An enumeration of the types of documents on which facsimile signatures may be used.
- Physical control of the signature device to prevent unauthorized use.
- **Notification to officials** authorized to use facsimile signatures that use of a signature device in no way lessens their responsibility or liability.

**B-140697**, October 28, 1959 (approving use of facsimile signatures in the execution of contracts). Other cases approving the use or acceptance of facsimile signatures are 40 **Comp. Gen.** 5 (1960) (use by Air Force on purchase orders for small purchases); 33 **Comp. Gen.** 297 (1954) (**certification** of invoice bearing only rubber stamp



signature of vendor); **B-194970**, July 3, 1979 (certification of voucher/purchase order bearing only facsimile signature of contracting officer); **B-150395**, December 21, 1962 (use by Navy on purchase orders); **B-104590**, September 12, 1951 (use on vouchers in federal educational grant programs); **B-126776-O.M.**, March 5, 1956 (use by Army on certificates of availability of government quarters and/or mess in support of **military** travel vouchers) .25

A more recent case held that payment could be **certified** on the basis of a contractor's facsimile ("fax") invoice, again provided that the agency has adequate internal controls to guard against fraud and overpayments. **B-242185**, February 13, 1991, citing several cases authorizing the acceptance of carbon copies.

One place where facsimile signatures are not permitted is the Standard Form 210, the signature/designation card for certifying **officers** which must be filed with the Treasury Department and which must bear the **certifying** officer's original, manual signature. I Treasury Financial **Manual** § 4-2040 .30e.

Most of the cases cited thus far have involved relatively primitive devices such as rubber stamps or signature machines. When we move into the realm of computerized data transmission, the equipment is far more sophisticated but the underlying principles are the same--there is no prohibition but there must be adequate safeguards.

In the **1980s**, **GAO** and the Treasury Department began to consider the feasibility of electronic certification of payment vouchers. In a 1984 memorandum to one of **GAO's** audit divisions, **GAO's** General Counsel agreed with the Treasury Department that there is no **specific** legal requirement that a certifying officer's **certification** be limited to writing on paper. Then, applying the precedent of the earlier rubber stamp cases, the memorandum concluded that electronic **certification**, with adequate safeguards, was not legally objectionable. The "signature" could be an appropriate symbol adopted by the certifying officer, which should be unique, within the **certifying officer's** sole control or custody, and capable of verification by the disbursing officer. **B-216035-O. M.**, September 20, 1984. Treasury subsequently developed a proposal for a prototype electronic certification system,

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<sup>25</sup> An early case, **B-36459**, April 6, **1944**, suggesting that use of facsimile signatures somehow required **GAO** approval has not been followed and should be **disregarded**.

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which GAO found to adequately satisfy the statutory requirements for voucher certification and payment. **B-216035-O.M.**, **September 25, 1987.**<sup>20</sup>

f. GAO Audit Exceptions

“Taking an exception” is a device GAO uses to **formally** notify an accountable officer of a fiscal **irregularity** which may result in personal liability. Today, this device is very rarely used. At one time, accountable officers had to submit **all** of their account documents to GAO, and GAO “settled” the accounts (31 U.S.C. § 3526(a)) by physically examining each piece of paper. Exceptions were common during that era. The nature of the process has evolved in recent decades in recognition of the increased responsibility of agencies in establishing their own financial systems and controls. Account settlement now is more a matter of systems evaluation and the review of administrative surveillance and the effectiveness of collection and disbursement procedures. Examination of individual transactions by GAO is minimal. See 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.5** (1990). However, **fiscal** irregularities still come to GAO’s attention in various ways (through its normal audit activities, agency irregularity reports, etc.), and **GAO** may invoke the exception procedure when warranted by the circumstances. The process is summarized in 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.6** (1990). Examples are noted in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858,861 (1986) (massive travel fraud scheme), and **B-194727**, October 30, 1979 (fraudulent misappropriation of mass transit grant funds by government employee).

The first step in the exception process is the issuance of a “Notice of Exception” to the agency concerned. The issuance of a Notice of Exception does not itself constitute a definite determination of liability. It has been described as “in the nature of a challenge to the propriety of a certifying officer’s action in certifying the voucher for payment.” **B-69611**, October 27, 1947, The **certifying** or disbursing officer, through his or her agency, then has the opportunity to respond to the exception. It is the accountable officer’s responsibility to establish the propriety of the payment. 13 **Comp. Gen.** 311 (1934). If the reply to the exception is satisfactory, the exception is withdrawn. E.g., **B-78091**, November 2, 1948. If the reply does not

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<sup>20</sup>A related issue is the use of electronic technology in creating obligations under 31 U.S.C. §1501. The topic is covered, with citations, in Chapter 7.

provide a **satisfactory** basis to remove the exception, the item is “disallowed” in the account.

Technically, the term “disallowance” applies only to disbursing **officers** since a certifying **officer** does not have physical custody of funds and does not have an “account” in the same sense that a disbursing officer does. Thus, strictly speaking, **GAO** “disallows an expenditure” in the account of a disbursing officer and “raises a charge” against a **certifying officer**. See 32 **Comp. Gen.** 499, 501 (1953); **A-48860**, April 14, 1950. For account settlement purposes, a **certifying officer’s** “account” consists of the certified vouchers and supporting documents on the basis of which payments have been made by a disbursing officer and included in the disbursing **officer’s** account for a particular accounting period. **B-147293-O. M.**, February 21, 1962.

The taking of an exception does not preclude submission of a relief request under applicable relief legislation. As a practical matter, if the agency has been unable to respond satisfactorily to the Notice of Exception, the likelihood of there being adequate basis for relief is diminished correspondingly. However, as in 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858, it can happen, and the possibility should therefore not be dismissed.

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## 2. Certifying Officers

### a. Duties and Liability

As we have seen, a certifying officer is the **official** who **certifies** a payment voucher to a disbursing officer. The responsibility **and** accountability of **certifying officers** are **specified** in 31 U.S.C. § 3528(a), **part** of the previously noted 1941 legislation enacted to **clarify** the roles of accountable **officers** under Executive Order 6166. The certifying **officer** is responsible for (1) the existence and correctness of the facts stated in the **certificate**, voucher, and supporting documentation; (2) the correctness of computations on the voucher; and (3) the **legality** of a proposed payment under the appropriation or fund involved. The statute **further** provides that a certifying officer will be accountable for the amount of any “illegal, improper, or incorrect” payment resulting from his or her false or misleading certification, as well as for any payment prohibited by law or which does not represent a legal obligation under the appropriation or fund involved.

There is a recurring appropriation act provision, discussed in Chapter 4 under the heading “Employment of Aliens,” which bars the use of appropriated funds to pay the compensation of a government employee who is not a United States citizen, subject to certain exceptions. The provision applies only to employees whose post of duty is in the continental United States. Thus, a certifying officer (or disbursing officer) in the continental United States must be a U.S. citizen unless one of the exceptions applies. There is no comparable requirement applicable to employees outside the continental United States. **B-206288** -O. M., August 4, 1982.

A certifying officer must normally be an employee of the agency whose funds are being spent, but may be an employee of **another** agency under an authorized interagency transaction or agreement. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 471 (1980); 44 **Comp. Gen.** 100 (1964).

A certifying officer is liable the moment an improper payment is made as the result of an erroneous or misleading certification. **E.g.**, 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112, 114 (1974). This is true whether the certification involves a matter of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 297, 298 (1975) (citing several other cases). As a general proposition, the government looks first to the **certifying** officer for reimbursement even though some other agency employee may be liable to the certifying officer under administrative regulations. 32 **Comp. Gen.** 332 (1953); 15 **Comp. Gen.** 962 (1936). Also, the certifying officer’s liability does not depend on the government’s ability or lack of ability to recoup from the recipient of the improper payment. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 17 (1951); 28 **Comp. Gen.** 17, 20 (1948). What this means is that the government is not obligated to seek first to recoup from the recipient, although it frequently does so, and of course any recovery from the recipient will reduce the **certifying** officer’s liability, at least in most cases.

Occasionally there may be two **certifying** officers involved with a given payment, so-called “successive certifications.” The rule is that the responsibility of the **certifying** officer certifying the basic voucher is not diminished by the subsequent action. GAO stated the principle **as** follows in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, **B-142380**, March 30, 1960, quoted in 67 **Comp. Gen.** 457,466 (1988):

“Where the certifying officer who certifies the voucher and schedule of payments is different from the certifying officer who certifies the basic vouchers, . . . the certifying officer who certifies the basic vouchers is responsible for the correctness of such

vouchers and the certifying **officer** who **certifies** the voucher-schedule is responsible only for errors made in the preparation of the voucher-schedule.”

An illustration of how this principle may apply is 55 **Comp. Gen.** 388 (1975), involving the liability of General Services Administration certifying officers under interagency service and support agreements with certain independent agencies. Under the arrangement in question, the agency would assume certification responsibility for the basic expenditure vouchers, but they would be processed for final payment through **GSA**, with **GSA** preparing and certifying a master voucher and schedule to be accompanied by a master magnetic tape. Again quoting the above passage from **B-142380**, **GAO** concluded that the legal liability of the **GSA** certifying **officer** would be limited to errors made in the final processing.

Similarly, the statutory accountability does not apply to an **official** who certifies an “**adjustment** voucher” used to make **adjustments** between accounts or funds in the Treasury in respect of an obligation already paid and which therefore does not involve paying money out of the Treasury to discharge an obligation. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 953 (1944). Although certification even in this situation should not be reduced to a “matter of form,” the accountability would attach **to** the certifying officer who certified the basic payment voucher. See 23 **Comp. Gen.** 181, 183–84 (1943).

The function of certification is not **perfunctory**, but involves a high degree of responsibility. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 297,299 (1975); 20 **Comp. Gen.** 182, 184 (1940). This responsibility is not alleviated by the press of other work. **B-147747**, December 28, 1961.<sup>27</sup> It also involves an element of verification, the extent of which depends **on** the circumstances. For example, a voucher for goods or services should be supported by evidence that the goods were received or the services performed, 39 **Comp. Gen.** 548 (1960). Generally, an independent investigation of the facts is not contemplated. **E.g.**, 28 **Comp. Gen.** 571 (1949). Similarly, where proper administrative safeguards exist, **certifying** officers need not examine time, attendance, and leave

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<sup>27</sup>But see **B-138601**, January 18, 1960, in Which the volume of work- taken into consideration in a somewhat extreme case.

records in order to certify the correctness of amounts shown on payrolls submitted to them. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 17 (1951 ).<sup>28</sup> A 1982 decision, 61 **Comp. Gen.** 477, reviewed the safeguards proposed by a Bonneville Power Administration certifying officer for certifying recurring payments to a regional planning body, and found them adequate to satisfy 31 U.S.C. 53528.

Whatever else the certifying officer's verification burden may or may not involve, it certainly involves questioning items on the face of vouchers or supporting documents which simply do not look right. For example, a certifying officer who certifies a voucher for payment in the full amount claimed, disregarding the fact that the accompanying records indicate an outstanding indebtedness to the government against which the sum claimed is available for offset, is accountable for any resulting overpayment. 28 **Comp. Gen.** 425 (1949). Similarly, certifying a voucher in the full amount within a prompt payment discount period without taking the discount will result in liability for the amount of the lost discount. However, a certifying officer is not liable for failing, even if negligently, to certify a voucher within the time discount period. 45 **Comp. Gen.** 447 (1966).

A clear illustration of a certifying officer's responsibility and liability occurred when a Department of Transportation employee fraudulently misappropriated more than \$850,000 in 1977. The fraud was discovered by virtue of the employee's ostentatious purchases, including several luxury automobiles and a "topless" bar in Washington, D.C. The employee was found guilty and sent to jail. However, investigation revealed negligence on the part of a Department certifying officer. The employee had perpetrated the fraud by inserting his own name on six payment vouchers for Urban Mass Transportation Administration grants. Each voucher contained a list of approximately ten payees with individual amounts, and the total amount, and each had been certified by the certifying officer. The negligence occurred in one of two ways. If the employee inserted his own name and address on the voucher before presenting it to the certifying officer, the certifying officer was negligent in not spotting the name of an individual (whose name he should have known) with

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<sup>28</sup>Many of the cases noted in the text, such as 31 **Comp. Gen.** 17, arose under manual systems.

While they would still apply under a manual system, it is important to keep in mind the previously discussed differences in approach between manual and automated systems.

an address in suburban Maryland on a list of **payees** the rest of which were mass transit agencies. If the employee presented a partial voucher and added his own name after it was certified, the total as presented to the **certifying** officer could not have agreed with the sum of the individual amounts, and the certifying officer was negligent in not **verifying** the computation. **GAO** raised exceptions to the **certifying** officer's account, and advised the Department of Transportation that it must proceed with collection action against the certifying **officer** for the full amount of the excepted payments **less** any amounts recovered from the employee or through the sale of assets, like the topless bar, which the Justice Department seized. See **B-194727**, October 30, 1979. Apparently **in** view of the clear negligence, relief was never requested.

At this point, it should be noted that no one involved in the process remotely expects that the government **will** be able to recover several hundred thousand dollars from a certifying officer, or from any other accountable officer, except perhaps one who has **him(her)self** stolen the money. However, the burden of having to repay even a portion in cases of losses of this size sends an important message and reinforces the certain if indeterminable deterrent effect of the statute.

Certifying officers should not certify payment vouchers that are unsupported by pertinent documentation indicating that procedural safeguards regarding payment have been observed. Vouchers that are deficient in this regard should be returned to the appropriate administrative officials for proper approvals and supporting documents. **B-179916**, March 11, 1974.

An area in which a **certifying** officer's duty to question is minimal is payments to a contractor determined under a statutory or contractual disputes procedure. In the absence of fraud or bad faith **by** the contractor, a payment determination made under a disputes clause procedure is final and conclusive and may not be questioned by a **certifying** officer, **GAO**, or the Justice Department. **S&E Contractor, Inc. v. United States**, 406 US. 1 (1972); **B-201408**, April 19, 1982. It does not follow that any administrative settlement is entitled to the same effect. In **B-239592**, August 23, 1991, **GAO** found that an "informal settlement" of a personnel action between an agency and one of its employees was without legal authority, and found the certifying officer liable for the unauthorized payments. (A subsequent letter, **B-239592.2**, September 1, 1992, clarified that this meant the

authorized certifying officer, not an official who had signed certain documents as “approving official” but was not responsible for determining the legality of the payment.)

A different issue involving an administrative settlement arose in 67 **Comp. Gen.** 385 (1988). After an investigation by federal and state **officials**, the Forest Service determined that it was responsible for a fire in a national forest in Oregon, and reimbursed the state for fire suppression expenses incurred under a cooperative agreement. Subsequently, a private landowner **sued** for damages resulting from the same fire, and the court made a finding of fact that the Forest Service was not liable. The certifying officer was concerned that the court’s finding might have the effect of invalidating the prior payment to Oregon and making him liable for an erroneous payment. The decision concluded that the payment was proper when made, and that the court finding did not impose any duty on the certifying officer to reopen and reexamine it.

A certifying officer has the statutory right to seek and obtain an advance decision from the Comptroller General regarding the lawfulness of any payment to be certified. 31 U.S.C. §3529. This procedure will insulate against liability. Following the advice of agency counsel, on the other hand, does not guarantee protection against liability. **E.g.**, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 297 (1975). Having said this, we do not wish to imply that consulting agency counsel is a pointless gesture. On the contrary, it is to be encouraged. Seeking internal legal advice prior to certification of matters on which the certifying officer is unsure will in many cases obviate any need for an advance decision. In other cases it may help define those situations in which consulting GAO may be desirable.

As a final note, the Treasury Department has published a supplement to the Treasury Financial Manual entitled Now That You’re a Certifying Officer (1983). Written expressly for **certifying** officers, it **provides** a good overview of the importance of the job and the responsibilities which accompany it.

b. Applicability of 31 U.S.C.  
§ 3528

There are two **major** exceptions to 31 U.S.C. § 3528(a). First, it applies only to the executive branch. While section 3528(a) is not limited by its terms to the executive branch, 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a), the basic requirement that disbursing officers disburse only upon duly certified vouchers, is expressly limited to the executive branch, and sections



**3325(a) and 3528(a)** originated as sections 1 and 2 of the same 1941 enactment. Thus, GAO has concluded that 31 U.S.C. § **3528(a)** does not apply to the legislative branch. 21 **Comp. Gen.** 987 (1942); **B-191036**, July 7, 1978; **B-236141.2**, February 23, 1990 (internal memorandum). See also **B-39695**, March 27, 1945. It has also been held that 31 U.S.C. § **3325(a)** does not apply to the judicial branch. **B-6061/A-51607**, April 27, 1942. It follows that section **3528(a)** would be equally inapplicable to the judicial branch. **B-236141.2**, cited above.

The second **major** exception, previously noted, is the exemption contained in 31 U.S.C. § **3528(d)** for the military departments except for salaries and expenses in the District of Columbia.

Some legislative branch agencies now have their own legislation patterned after 31 U.S.C. § **3528**. Those that do not, as well as the **military** departments, nevertheless have the authority, within their discretion, to create their own **certifying officers** and to make them accountable by administrative regulation. The degree of accountability is up to the agency. The 1990 memorandum cited above, **B-236141.2**, contains a detailed discussion. An arrangement of this type can include a mechanism for administrative relief. *Id.* However, relief would have to be granted or denied by the **agency itself**, not by GAO. 21 **Comp. Gen.** at 989; **B-191036**, July 7, 1978. Also, a system of **certifying** officer accountability established by **an** agency exempt from 31 U.S.C. § **3528** would not automatically eliminate the statutory accountability of the disbursing **officer**, who remains the primary accountable officer. 22 **Comp. Gen.** 48, 51 (1942); 21 **Comp. Gen.** at 988–89; **B-213720**, October 2, 1984.

Notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. § **3528(d)**, it is possible for section 3528 to apply to military departments, albeit only in rare situations. The exemption “was intended to relate to the functions of actually disbursing funds—to the paying of vouchers, etc.” **B-24356**, March 18, 1942, quoted in 44 **Comp. Gen.** 818,820 (1965). Thus, **if a** situation were to occur in which a military disbursing officer were functioning as a certifying officer with the actual disbursement to be made by another agency, such as Treasury, section 3528 would apply. For example, prior to the Treasury Department’s recertification procedures for replacement checks, discussed later in this chapter, the military departments issued their own replacement checks by virtue of a specific delegation from Treasury under 31 U.S.C.

**§ 3331(f)**. Replacement checks beyond the scope of the delegation had to be issued by Treasury, with the military disbursing officer functioning essentially as a certifying officer. Relief for losses in these cases was handled under 31 U.S.C. 33528. The case with the most detailed discussion is **B-215380** et al., July 23, 1984.

c. Relief

Informally known as the **Certifying Officers' Relief Act**, 31 U.S.C. **§ 3528(b)** establishes a mechanism for the administrative relief of **certifying** officers governed by 31 U.S.C. **§ 3528(a)**. There are two standards for relief. The Comptroller General may relieve a **certifying** officer from liability for **an** illegal, improper, or incorrect payment upon determining **that—**

(1) the certification was based on **official** records and the **certifying officer** did not know, and by reasonable diligence and inquiry could not have discovered, the actual facts; or

(2) the obligation was incurred in good faith, the payment was not specifically prohibited by statute, and the United States received value for the payment.

Under either standard, relief may be denied if the agency fails **to** diligently pursue collection action against the recipient of the improper payment. 31 U.S.C. **§ 3528(b)(2)**.

Unlike the physical loss relief statutes previously discussed, 31 U.S.C. **§ 3528(b)** does not require administrative determinations by the agency as a prerequisite to relief. The determinations under section **3528(b)** are made by the Comptroller General. Also, the relief standards under section **3528(b)** are stated in the alternative; relief may be granted if either of the two standards can be established. It makes no difference whether the improper payment is discovered by **GAO** or the agency concerned. **B-137435-O**. M., October 14, 1958. **Relief** is discretionary (the statute says “may relieve”), although no case has been discovered in which a certifying **officer** who met either of the standards was not relieved.

There is no special form of request under 31 U.S.C. **§ 3528(b)**. Relief may be requested by the agency on behalf of the certifying officer, or directly by the **certifying** officer. See, **e.g.**, 31 **Comp. Gen.** 653 (1952) for an example of the latter. Relief requests must present sufficient

information to permit GAO to make one of the required findings. E.g., B-191900, July 21, 1978.

One of the objectives of 31 U.S.C. § 3528(b) was to reduce the volume of private relief legislation recommended on behalf of certifying officers. The legislative history of the statute indicates that an agency should seek relief from GAO before considering relief legislation. As to those “less meritorious cases” in which relief may be denied, relief legislation remains an available option. 30 Comp. Gen. 298 (1951).

The first relief standard, 31 U.S.C. § 3528(b)(1)(A), relates essentially to the certification of incorrect facts, and permits relief if the certification was based on official records and if the certifying officer did not know, and could not reasonably have learned, the actual facts. GAO has never attempted to formulate a general rule as to what acts may support relief from the certification of incorrect facts. Rather, the approach is as stated in 55 Comp. Gen. 297, 299–300 (1975):

“[W]e have sought to apply the relief provisions by considering the practical conditions and procedures under which certifications of fact are made. Consequently, the diligence to be required of a certifying officer before requests for relief under the act will be considered favorably is a matter of degree dependent upon the practical conditions prevailing at the time of certification, the sufficiency of the administrative procedures protecting the interest of the Government, and the apparentness of the error.”

For example, Social Security Administration certifying officers who certify large numbers of awards each month may, apart from obvious errors, rely on the award documents presented for certification. B-119248-O. M., April 14, 1954.

In B-237419, December 5, 1989, relief was granted to a Forest Service certifying officer who certified the refund of a timber purchaser’s cash bond deposit without knowing that the refund had already been made. The certifying officer had followed proper procedures by checking to see if the money had been refunded, but did not discover the prior payment because it had not been properly recorded. Also, the agency was pursuing collection efforts against the payee.

Another case in which relief was granted under subsection (b)(1)(A) is B-246415, July 28, 1992. A certifying officer paid a contract invoice to a financing institution to which payments had been assigned under

the Assignment of Claims Act without discovering that the contract file contained a prior assignment. The contracting **officer** had erroneously acknowledged the second assignment when he should have either rejected it or invalidated the **first** one. The **agency** remained liable to the **first** assignee and was unable to recover the improper payment from the second. The **certifying** officer had checked the contract **file**, and neither agency procedures nor reasonable diligence required her to keep looking once she found what appeared on its face to be a properly acknowledged assignment. The case also illustrates how an agency (the Panama Canal Commission in this case) should respond to a loss-by reviewing its procedures to determine if they can be improved, within reason, to prevent recurrence. In this instance, the agency began requiring that contract **files** include a “milestone” log, and that assignments be tabbed in the file and reviewed prior to acknowledgment.

As a general rule, a certifying officer may not escape liability for losses resulting from improper **certification** merely by stating either that he was not in a position to determine that each item on a voucher was correctly stated, or that he must depend on the correctness of the computations of his subordinates. A **certifying** officer who relies upon statements and computations of subordinates must assume responsibility for the correctness of their statements and computations, unless it can be shown that neither the certifying officer nor his or her subordinates, in the reasonable exercise of care and diligence, could have known the true facts. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 297, 299 (1975); 26 **Comp. Gen.** 578 (1947); 20 **Comp. Gen.** 182 (1940).

In 49 **Comp. Gen.** 486 (1970), a certifying officer asked if he would be held accountable where his own agency would not tell him exactly what he was being asked to certify. The agency took the position that the expenses in question were confidential and could be disclosed only to those with a need to know, which did not include the certifying officer. **GAO** disagreed. The situation would be different if the agency were operating under “**unvouchered** expenditure” authority such as 31 U.S.C. § 3526(e)(2). Under that type of authority, a **certifying officer** who is not informed of the objector purpose of the expenditure is not accountable for its legality. 24 **Comp. Gen.** 544 (1945). In the case at hand, however, the agency had no such authority. Therefore, the certifying **officer** would not be protected against liability if he certified a voucher without knowing what it represented. As **GAO** pointed out several years later, any other answer

would defeat the purpose of the **certification** requirement, which is to protect the United States against **illegal** or erroneous payments. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 297,299 (1975). Except for statutorily authorized **unvouchered** expenditures, “I don’t know and they wouldn’t tell me” cannot be **sufficient**.

The second relief standard, 31 U.S.C. § 3528(b)(1)(B), contains three elements, **all** of which must be satisfied—obligation incurred in good faith, payment not **specifically** prohibited, United States received **value** for the payment. If a certifying officer **qualifies** for relief under this standard, it becomes irrelevant whether he or she could also have qualified under the first standard. This is particularly useful because, in many cases, what would constitute reasonable diligence and inquiry for purposes of the first standard is far from clear.

There is no simple formula for determining good faith. One authority attempts to define the term as follows:

“Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud. . . . Honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.”

Black’s Law Dictionary 693 (6th ed. 1990). An important factor in evaluating good faith for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3528 is whether the certifying officer had, or reasonably should have had, doubt regarding the propriety of the payment and, if so, what he or she did about it. Whether the **certifying** officer reasonably should have been in doubt depends on a weighing of all surrounding facts and circumstances and cannot be resolved by any “hard and fast rule.” 70 **Comp. Gen.** 723, 726 (1991). In many cases; good faith is found simply by the absence of any evidence to the contrary. *Id.*

At one time, the failure to obtain an advance decision from GAO on matters considered doubtful was viewed **as** an impediment to establishing good faith. *E.g.*, 14 **Comp. Gen.** 578,583 (1935). Depending on the circumstances, following the advice or instructions of some administrative official in lieu of seeking an advance decision may not constitute “reasonable inquiry” under the first relief standard of 31 U.S.C. § 3528. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 653 (1952). However, it has become increasingly recognized that consulting agency counsel is a

relevant factor in demonstrating good faith under the second standard. **B-191900**, July 21, 1978; **B-127160**, April 3, 1961.

To understand the second **element**— “no law **specifically** prohibited the **payment**”—it is helpful to note the language of the original 1941 enactment, which was “the payment was not contrary to any statutory provision **specifically** prohibiting payments of the character involved” (55 Stat. 875–76). This means statutes which expressly prohibit payments for **specific** items or services. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 723,726 (1991); **B-191900**, July 21, 1978. An example would be 40 **U.S.C. § 34**, which prohibits the rental of space in the District of Columbia without **specific** authority. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 135 (1966).<sup>29</sup> Other examples are 31 **U.S.C. § 1348(a)** (telephones in private residences) and 44 **U.S.C. § 3702** (newspaper advertisements).

Under this interpretation, the phrase “no law **specifically** prohibited the payment” is not the same as the more general “payment prohibited by law.” It does not include violations of general **fiscal** statutes such as the **Antideficiency Act** (31 **U.S.C. § 1341**) or the general purpose statute (31 **U.S.C. § 1301(a)**). **B-142871** -O. M., September 15, 1961.<sup>30</sup>

The third **element**, value received, normally implies the receipt of goods or services with a readily determinable dollar value. **E.g.**, **B-241879**, April 26, 1991 (automatic data processing equipment maintenance contract extended without proper delegation of procurement authority, services were performed). However, in appropriate **circumstances**, an intangible item may constitute value received where the payment in question has achieved a desired program result. **B-191900**, July 21, 1978; **B-127160**, April 3, 1961.

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<sup>29</sup>Although the statute is no longer construed as prohibiting the rental of short-term conference facilities, it is still an example of a **specific** prohibition as contemplated by 31 **U.S.C. 33528**.

<sup>30</sup>One case **B-222048**, February 10, 1987, implying that an **Antideficiency Act** violation would preclude relief under 31 **U.S.C. § 3528(b)(1)(B)**, is inconsistent with the weight of authority as discussed in the text.

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### 3. Disbursing Officers

#### a. Standards of Liability and Relief

As with certifying officers, the responsibilities and accountability of disbursing **officers** are mandated by statute. A disbursing **officer** in the executive branch must (1) disburse money only in accordance with vouchers certified by the head of the spending agency or an authorized certifying officer, and (2) examine the vouchers to the extent necessary to determine that they are (a) in proper form, (b) certified and approved, and (c) correctly computed on the basis of the facts certified. The disbursing **officer** is accountable for these functions, except that accountability for the correctness of computations lies with the certifying officer. 31 U.S.C. s 3325(a).<sup>31</sup> Disbursing **officers** render their accounts quarterly. 31 U.S.C. § 3522(a)(1).

The administrative relief provision for disbursing officers is 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c), enacted in 1955 (69 Stat. 687). The Comptroller General is authorized to relieve present or former disbursing officers from liability for deficiencies in their accounts resulting from illegal, improper, or incorrect payments, upon **determining** that the payment was not the result of bad faith or lack of reasonable care by the disbursing officer. The determination may be made by the agency and concurred in by GAO, or it may be made by GAO on its own initiative. “As in the case of certifying officers, relief may be denied if the agency concerned fails to diligently pursue collection action against the recipient of the improper payment.

The statute further provides that the granting of relief under section 3527(c) does not affect the liability or authorize the relief of the beneficiary or recipient of the improper payment, nor does it diminish the government’s duty to pursue collection action against the beneficiary or recipient. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d)(2).

In contrast with the **certifying** officer relief statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c) is **not** limited to the executive branch. E.g., B-200108/B-198558,

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<sup>31</sup>Since 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a) originated as part of the 1941 legislation designed to clarify responsibilities under 31 U.S.C. § 3321(a) (Executive Order 6166), and since section 3321(a) does not apply to the **military** departments except for **salaries** and expenses in the District of Columbia, section 3325(a) has the same exemption, found at 31 U.S.C. § 3325(b). **Military** disbursing officers are nevertheless **fully** accountable.

January 23, 1981 (judicial **branch**). **Within** the executive branch, it applies to military and civilian agencies **alike**.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the relief **authority** of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c) is not limited only to those disbursing officers whose duties are prescribed by 31 U.S.C. § 3325(a).

The relief statute contemplates the consideration of individual cases and does not authorize the blanket relief of unknown disbursing officers for unknown amounts. **B-165743**, May 11, 1973.

Once it is determined that there has been an improper payment for which a disbursing officer is accountable, and that relief is desired, the primary issue is whether the payment was or was not the result of bad faith or lack of reasonable care on the part of the disbursing officer. "Bad faith" is difficult to define with any precision. It is somewhere between negligence and actual dishonesty, and closer to the latter. One authority gives us the following:

"The opposite of 'good faith,' generally implying or involving **actual** or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to **fulfill** some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. Term 'bad faith' is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . ."

Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990). Bad faith cases tend to be relatively uncommon. Far more common are cases invoking the reasonable care standard. This standard-whether the disbursing officer exercised reasonable care under the circumstances-is the legal definition of negligence, **and** is the same standard applied in physical loss cases. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858, 861-62 (1986); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112 (1974).

The determination of whether a payment was or was not the result of bad faith or lack of due care must be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular payment in question. A high error rate in the disbursing office involved does not automatically establish lack of due care in the making of a particular payment, nor does a low error rate and a record of an exemplary operation automatically establish due care. **B-141038-O. M.**, November 17,

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<sup>32</sup> Apart from the absence of any limiting language in the statute itself, this is clear from references to Defense Department input in the legislative history. S. Rep. No. 1185, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955); H.R. Rep. No. 996, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).



1959; **B-136027-O. M.**, June 13, 1958. The continued existence of an “inherently dangerous” procedure, however, does indicate **lack** of due care on the part of the responsible disbursing officer. **B-162629-O.M.**, November 9, 1967.

It is **difficult**, if not impossible, to state hard and fast rules applicable inflexibly to **all** cases involving relief under the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c). What maybe considered good faith and the exercise of due care in one set of circumstances may not be so considered in another. However, it maybe stated generally that **GAO will grant** relief where (1) the agency has made proper efforts to collect from the recipient of the improper payment, (2) the agency has determined that the payment was not the result of bad faith or lack of due care on the part of the disbursing **officer**, and (3) no evidence to the contrary is available. Also, relief may be granted without the administrative determination where due care and the absence of bad faith are evident from the facts.

Actual negligence which contributes to an improper payment will, of course, preclude the granting of relief. For example, making a payment on the basis of documents which have been obviously altered, without **first** seeking clarification, is not the exercise of due care. **B-233276**, October 31, 1989, **aff'd** upon reconsideration, **B-233276**, June 20, 1990; **B-138593-O.M.**, February 18, 1959; **B-13591 O-O. M.**, July 14, 1958. Similarly, relief was denied in the following cases:

- Disbursing officer made duplicate payments on voucher schedule covering payments already **made**. Disbursing **officer** had requested guidance on new procedures, **and** “duplicate” schedule with instructions had been sent to her in response to that request, with a cover letter clearly stating that the schedule covered payments previously made. The payment could only have been due to lack of due care. **B-142051**, March 22, 1960.
- Disbursing officer continued to pay New Mexico gasoline tax after State Attorney General and Judge Advocate General had both concluded that the United States was not liable for the tax. Although the disbursing officer was aware of the rulings, he claimed that he had not received specific instructions to stop paying. **B-135811**, May 29, 1959.

- Disbursing officer reimbursed imprest fund on the basis of fictitious requisitions not supported by dealers' invoices or delivery slips. **B-137723-O.M.**, December 10, 1958.

As with physical losses, failure to follow applicable regulations is generally regarded as negligence, and if an improper payment is attributable to that failure, relief will be denied. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112, 116 (1974); 44 **Comp. Gen.** 160 (1964). Compliance with regulations will help establish due care, but the mere fact of compliance with regulations which are clearly insufficient may not always satisfy the standard. **B-192558**, December 7, 1978.

The concept of proximate cause is also applicable, and relief is appropriate where any negligence that may have existed was not the proximate cause of the improper payment. In one case, for example, local operating procedures at a military installation were found inadequate because they permitted personal checks to be cashed without checking identification cards. However, since the cashiers checked ID cards on their own initiative, and did so in the case for which relief was sought, the inadequacy could not have contributed to the loss. **B-221415**, March 26, 1986. For other examples, see **B-227436**, July 2, 1987, and **B-217663**, July 16, 1985.

The essence of negligence is the existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care in a particular situation and the violation of that duty. In **B-188744**, July 15, 1977, a Bureau of Indian Affairs disbursing officer erroneously made a payment to the wrong heir. Unknown to him, the probate and title determinations on which he had based the payment had been reopened and revised. Under established procedures, the disbursing officer was neither required nor expected to verify inheritance determinations. Since the verification was not within the scope of his duty, and was not something anyone in his position would reasonably be expected to do, there was no lack of due care. See also **B-137223-O. M.**, January 18, 1960. Thus, negligence will generally not be imputed to a disbursing officer where payment is made on the basis of facts of record upon which the disbursing officer is or reasonably can be expected to rely, even though such facts are subsequently found to be erroneous. This assumes that there is nothing on the face of the documents presented to the disbursing officer which should reasonably have alerted him or her that something appeared to be wrong.

A disbursing **officer** is accountable for payments made by his or her subordinates. However, relief may be granted under 31 U.S.C. **§ 3527(c)** if the improper payment was not the result of bad faith or lack of due care attributable to the disbursing officer personally. **B-141038-O.M.**, November 17, 1959. Where the actual disbursement is made by a subordinate, relief for the supervisory disbursing officer requires a showing that the disbursing officer exercised adequate supervision. Adequate supervision in this context means that the disbursing officer (1) maintained an adequate system of controls and procedures to avoid errors, and (2) took appropriate steps to ensure that the system was effective and was being followed at the time of the payment in question. E.g., 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476,480 (1983). A relief request must contain **sufficient** information to enable an independent evaluation. **B-235037**, September 18, 1989.

**GAO** has not attempted to define the elements of an adequate supervisor system. There can in fact be no fixed formula, as the system will vary based on such factors as the size of the disbursing operation and the types of payments or transactions involved. Nevertheless, several elements which commonly appear in good systems can be identified (although no single case lists them as such):

(1) Compliance with agency regulations. For example, a military disbursing **office** will need to ensure compliance with any pertinent directives of the Defense Department, the particular military department involved, **and** the parent command.

(2) Locally developed instructions (often called standard operating procedures or SOPS) tailored to the needs of the particular disbursing office. Relief requests should include copies of any relevant SOPS. While SOPS are extremely helpful, the lack of a written SOP will not in and of itself cause a system to “flunk” the relief standard. E.g., **B-215226**, April 16, 1985.

(3) Training. This includes both initial training for new personnel and periodic refresher training, again tailored to the needs of the particular office. Training in this context does not **necessarily** mean formal classroom training, but may be in the form of on-the-job training and may include such devices as reading **files** which are circulated periodically and especially when pertinent changes occur.

(4) Periodic review or inspection by the supervisor. The forms this may take will vary with the size and nature of the operation.

The adequacy of a supervisory system is not, nor could it realistically be, measured against a zero-error standard. Many cases have made the point that a skillfully executed **criminal** scheme can occasionally **outwit** an adequate and well-supervised system. E.g., B-241880, August 14, 1991; B-202911, June 29, 1981. Similarly, human error will occur even in the most carefully established and supervised system. The best system cannot be expected **to** eliminate or detect every clerical error by a subordinate. E.g., B-224961, September 8, 1987; B-212336, August 8, 1983.

The cases also recognize that, in a large operation, the supervisory disbursing **officer** cannot reasonably be expected to personally review every check that is issued or every cash payment that is made. E.g., B-215734, November 5, 1984 (check cashed with fraudulent endorsement); B-194877, July 12, 1979 (amounts of two payments inadvertently switched, resulting in overpayment to one payee); B-187180, September 21, 1976 (wrong amounts inserted on checks). Thus, it is possible for a supervisor to be relieved for an error by a subordinate which, if attributable to the disbursing **officer** personally, would have resulted in the denial of relief. We previously cited several cases denying relief for payments made on the basis of obviously altered documents. These were cases in which the disbursing **officer** saw or should have seen the documents. Relief has been granted for similar losses occurring in otherwise adequate systems under which the supervisor was not required to see, and in fact did not see, the altered document. B-141038-O. M., November 17, 1959.

Where the subordinate who made the payment is also an accountable officer (a cashier, for example), the standard for relieving the subordinate is whether the individual complied with established procedures and whether anything occurred which should reasonably have made the individual suspicious that something was wrong. E.g., B-233997.3, November 25, 1991; B-241880, August 14, 1991. Depending on the particular facts, in cases involving two disbursing officers accountable for a payment, one a supervisor and the other a subordinate, it is possible for relief to be granted to both, denied **to** both, or granted to one and denied to the other. Examples of cases applying the above standards in which relief was granted to the supervisor but not the subordinate are B-231503, June 28, 1988

(cashier failed to observe annotations on voucher), and **B-214436**, April 6, 1984 (agency declined to seek relief for subordinate who had failed to follow established procedures).

In our coverage of physical loss cases, we emphasized the importance of statements by the accountable officer. The principle applies equally in improper payment cases. The existence of adequate controls and procedures is usually documented, but this is not always the case, and the passage of time may make it impossible to locate a copy of the specific version of the SOPS in effect at the time of the payment. Also, testimony of the accountable **officer(s)** and other involved persons is often the only way of establishing how the controls and procedures were being implemented at the time of the payment. While the disbursing officer's own statement is obviously not disinterested and cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is always given appropriate weight and, as with unexplained loss cases, has often been enough to tip the balance in favor of relief where the record contains no controverting evidence or where **documentary** evidence is no longer available. Examples are **B-234962**, September 28, 1989; **B-215226**, April 16, 1985; **B-217637**, March 18, 1985; **B-216726**, January 9, 1985; **B-215833**, December 21, 1984; and **B-212603** et al., December 12, 1984.

Finally, a disbursing officer has the same statutory right as a **certifying** officer to obtain an advance decision from the Comptroller General. 31 U.S.C. §3529. Obviously, if the decision is to serve the purpose of protecting the disbursing officer, the request must include the facts which gave rise to the doubt. 20 **Comp. Gen.** 759 (1941). Following administrative advice in lieu of seeking a **GAO** decision may, depending on the circumstances, bear upon the issue of whether the disbursing officer exercised due care. **E.g.**, 49 **Comp. Gen.** 38 (1969). We previously noted that consulting agency counsel will help a certifying officer establish good faith. There is no reason why it should not equally help a disbursing officer establish good faith and **due care**, although it may not be enough if the advice received flies in the face of contrary information in the hands of the disbursing officer. **E.g.**, 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858 (1986), **aff'd upon reconsideration**, **B-217114.5**, June 8, 1990. Whichever course of action is chosen, the disbursing officer faced with a doubtful payment needs to do something. The road to relief will be very **difficult** if a disbursing officer who is admittedly in doubt proceeds to make the payment

without consulting either GAO or appropriate agency officials. See 23 Comp. Gen. 578 (1944).

b. Some **Specific** Applications

The federal government disburses money in an immense variety of situations—payments to employees (salary, allowances, awards), payments to contractors, payments under assistance programs, payments to various claimants, etc. Every situation in which proper payments can be made presents the potential for improper payments, resulting from such things as fraud, government error, or the misapplication of legal authority or limitations. To illustrate some of the situations that may arise, we present here a selection of improper payments for which relief has been sought under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c). In each case, the relief question was approached by applying the principles and standards discussed in Section D.3.a.

In view of the differences in disbursement systems between the military departments and the civilian agencies, a large proportion of the cases involve military disbursing officers, and several would be **certifying** officer cases if they occurred in civilian agencies. A few of the situations can arise only in the military departments.

(1) Fraudulent travel claims

Cases under this heading range from single payments to massive schemes. They involve two distinct situations—fraudulently obtained travel advances **and** payments based on fraudulent travel vouchers.

In B-240654, February 6, 1991, an **imposter**, using falsified travel orders and a phony military identification card, obtained travel advances at six Air Force bases **totalling** nearly \$74,000. The Air Force was able to identify the **imposter** and he was arrested, but committed suicide before trial. In another case, an individual stole an identification card from an athletic locker at the Pentagon and used it to obtain travel advances at several Army installations. The fraud was successful because the thief bore a sufficient resemblance to the card's owner. B-217440/B-217440.2, April 16, 1985; B-217440, February 13, 1985. The losses in these cases were attributed to skillfully executed criminal activities. Other cases involving fraudulently obtained travel advances include B-246371, June 23, 1992; B-234962, September 28, 1989; B-221395, March 26, 1986; and B-210648, March 15, 1984.

The second group of cases is similar except that the fraudulent document is a travel voucher rather than a travel order. Several related cases involve a conspiracy carried out over several years by employees of the Army Corps of Engineers. Basically, the employees presented vouchers based on fraudulent lodging receipts, often provided by friends or relatives. The scheme eluded detection for several years until it was discovered that the providers of the receipts, who had “verified” the accuracy of the receipts to the Corps, were themselves participants in the fraud. The disbursing **officer** in one district was relieved in part, but relief was denied for payments made after he had received information putting him on notice of the possibility of fraud. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 858 (1986). In another district, the disbursing officer stopped making payments immediately upon being advised of the investigation, and was relieved in full. **B-217114.2**, February 3, 1988,

A simpler situation is **B-215737**, November 5, 1984, in which **an** individual presented to an Army cashier a travel voucher which had been issued to someone else. Relief was granted to the Finance and Accounting **Officer**, but denied to the cashier because she failed to compare the name on the presenter’s identification card with the (different) name on the voucher. Some additional fraudulent travel voucher cases are **B-229274**, January 15, 1988; **B-222915**, September 16, 1987; **B-213824**, July 13, 1987; and **B-224832**, July 2, 1987.

## (2) Other cash payments fraudulently obtained

It maybe noted, somewhat cynically, that if there is a way to obtain cash from the federal government, someone **will** try to do it fraudulently. In some cases, losses can be prevented by the exercise of due care. In 68 **Comp. Gen.** 371 (1989), for example, an individual deposited two “Greenback Money Drafts” in the patients’ account at a VA hospital. These are drafts, resembling checks, which the issuing bank provides to various public places. A person with an account in the issuing bank can sign one of the forms and cash it elsewhere. The back of the form explicitly states, “You must call [the issuing bank] before cashing,” so that the bank can **verify** the existence of the account and the sufficiency of funds. In this instance, the cashier accepted the drafts without calling the issuing bank, the patient withdrew the funds shortly thereafter, and it was subsequently discovered that the drafts had been fraudulently negotiated. Relief was

denied because of the cashier's negligent failure to follow the explicit printed instructions.

In another case, relief was denied to a cashier who made a cash payment to a courier without requiring any identification. The courier turned out to be an **imposter. B-178953**, August 2, 1973.

In many cases, due care will not prevent the loss, and relief is granted. Illustrative cases involving miscellaneous military cash payments, similar to the travel advance cases noted above, are **B-245127**, September 18, 1991 (**transient/reaccession** payment); **B-226174**, June 18, 1987 (casual payment); **B-215226**, April 16, 1985 (special reenlistment bonus); and **B-209717.2**, July 1, 1983 (military pay voucher with separation orders). Relief was denied to a cashier in another casual payment case, **B-227209**, August 5, 1987, for neglecting to spot inconsistencies on the face of the voucher.

### (3) Military separation vouchers

The cases under this heading involve overpayments on military separation vouchers attributable to government error rather than fraud on the part of the recipient. In each case, the supervisory disbursing officer was relieved, illustrating the previously noted proposition that even a well-established and carefully supervised system of controls and procedures cannot be expected to totally eliminate human error.

In **B-230842**, April 13, 1988, and **B-227412**, July 2, 1987, a cashier made an overpayment by using the amount from the wrong block on the voucher. In **B-228946**, January 15, 1988, the cashier **failed** to clear a previous transaction from her adding machine. In all three cases, the agency sought relief for the supervisor while holding the cashier liable. Similar cases are **B-222685**, June 20, 1986; **B-221453**, June 18, 1986; and **B-212293**, November 21, 1983. Relief has been granted to the cashier in cases where the cashier followed applicable procedures and the error was attributable to someone else. E.g., **B-226614**, May 6, 1987; **B-221471**, January 7, 1986.

### (4) Assignment of contract payments

Under the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 and 41 U.S.C. § 15, when a contractor assigns future contract payments to a



financing institution (assignee), the assignee must **file** written notice of the assignment and a copy of the assignment with the pertinent disbursing officer. Once this is done, the government's obligation is to make future payments to the assignee, and payments made directly to the contractor are erroneous.

In **B-213720**, October 2, 1984, an assignment under an Army Corps of Engineers contract was properly **filed** with the disbursing officer, who acknowledged receipt but neglected to retain a copy. Also, a copy was inexplicably not placed in the contract **file**. A few months later, **an** invoice was submitted clearly stating that payment should be made to the assignee bank. A voucher examiner functioning as a **certifying** officer failed to make appropriate inquiry to confirm the existence of the assignment, and instead followed the advice of the purchasing agent to pay the contractor. The disbursing officer then made payment to the contractor, notwithstanding the information on the face of the invoice indicating the existence of an assignment. Since the Army voucher examiner was not a statutory **certifying officer**, primary liability remained with the disbursing officer. Given the disbursing officer's failure to retain a copy of the assignment and to verify the proper payee, relief was denied.

In other cases in which a military finance and accounting officer is responsible for both certifying and disbursing functions, relief has been granted where the errors are solely those of subordinates and there is no lack of due care attributable to the disbursing **officer** personally. **B-216246**, May 22, 1985 (voucher examiner/certifying officer failed to follow standard operating procedures, nothing on face of voucher to suggest existence of assignment); **B-214273**, December 11, 1984 (unknown clerk had **misfiled** notice of assignment, office processed over 3,000 vouchers a month and could **pre-audit** only on random basis).

(5) Improper purpose/payment beyond scope of **legal** authority

Most improper purpose and similar cases will be **certifying** officer cases. Those that involve disbursing officers are either military cases or disbursements by **imprest** fund cashiers. The point to remember is that relief is governed by the standards of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c), and the fact that a payment is unauthorized does not automatically indicate lack of due care.

Several **imprest** fund cashiers have been relieved where the vouchers were proper on their face and included approvals by appropriate agency officials, including a contracting **officer. B-221940**, October 7, 1987 (refreshments at seminar); **B-211265**, June 28, 1983 (air purifier); **B-203553**, February 22, 1983 (air purifier). Prior approvals of similar purchases may also be relevant in establishing due care. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 634,637 (1982). Note that the purchase in each case was not plainly illegal. (Refreshments may be authorized under the Government Employees Training Act and air purifiers are authorized in some situations.)

In **B-217668**, September 12, 1986, relief was denied to an Army Finance and Accounting Officer who purchased beer for troops engaged in a joint military exercise. While the beer could have been purchased with **nonappropriated** funds (or—dare we suggest—paid for by the individuals who drank it), it is not an appropriate **use** of the taxpayers' money. The decision recognized that relief might nevertheless be possible if the standards for relief of a supervisor under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c) were met, but the record did not contain sufficient information to enable **an** independent judgment.

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## 4. Check Losses

### a. Check Cashing Operations

Check cashing by disbursing **officers** is governed by 31 U.S.C. §3342. Subsection (a) authorizes disbursing officers to:

“(1) cash and negotiate negotiable instruments payable in United States currency or currency of a foreign country;

“(2) exchange United States currency, coins, and negotiable **instruments** and currency, coins, and negotiable instruments of foreign countries; **and**

“(3) cash checks drawn on the Treasury to accommodate **United States** citizens in a foreign country [only **if presented** by a payee who is a United States **citizen** and satisfactory local banking facilities are not available].”

Transactions under subsections **(a)(1)** and **(a)(2)** are authorized for official purposes or to accommodate certain classes of persons, **including** government personnel, hospitalized veterans, contractors working on government projects, and authorized **nongovernment** agencies operating with government agencies. 31 U.S.C. § 3342(b). These are sometimes called “accommodation transactions.” The

statute applies to legislative branch (and presumably judicial branch) agencies as well as executive branch agencies. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 152 (1984). The **Treasury** Department is authorized to issue implementing regulations and may delegate that authority to other agencies. 31 **U.S.C. § 3342(d)**.

Of particular relevance here are 31 **U.S.C. §§ 3342(c)(2)** and **(c)(3)**:

**“(2) The** head of an agency having jurisdiction over a disbursing **official** may offset, within the same **fiscal** year, a deficiency resulting from a **transaction** under subsection (a) of this section with a gain from a transaction under subsection (a). A gain in the account of a disbursing official not used to offset deficiencies under subsection (a) shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

**“(3) Amounts** necessary to adjust for deficiencies in the account of a disbursing official because of **transact’ions** under subsection (a) of this section are authorized to be appropriated.”

One important application of the offsetting authority of 31 **U.S.C. § 3342(c)(2)** is losses resulting from certain foreign **currency** exchange transactions, and cases involving this application are noted later in this chapter. However, nothing in the statute **limits** it to foreign exchange transactions. The offsetting authority applies by its terms to “a deficiency resulting from a transaction under subsection (a),” and this includes check cashing operations as authorized by subsections **(a)(1)** and (b).

Decisions rendered shortly after the statute was enacted applied it to uncollectible checks cashed over forged endorsements and explicitly recognized the statute as a form of relief. The first such case was 27 **Comp. Gen.** 211 (1947), stating at 213:

“Since the cashing of a check is an operation authorized under the act, any loss arising out of such transaction properly may be considered as coming within the purview of the term ‘**any** deficiencies’ for which relief is contemplated under the act.”

This holding was followed in 27 **Comp. Gen.** 663 (1948). The original version of 31 **U.S.C. 53342**, enacted in 1944 (58 Stat. 921), did not include the offsetting authority. See **B-39771**, September 26, 1950. It was added in 1953 (67 Stat. 62). Thus, the “relief” referred to in 27 **Comp. Gen.** 211 and 27 **Comp. Gen.** 663 was simply the authority to use agency appropriations to **adjust** the deficiencies. Both cases involved the Army, which at the time received annual appropriations

for this purpose. The Army was thus in a position to invoke the statute, and the **adjustments** had the **effect** of relieving the disbursing officers.

For the next four decades, the principles established by 27 Comp. Gen. 211 saw little use, and check cashing losses during that period were mostly treated as improper payments requiring relief under whatever authorities were available (31 U.S.C. § 3527(c) since 1955). A 1991 decision to the Air Force, 70 Comp. Gen. 616, changed this and, in effect, reverted to the approach of 27 Comp. Gen. 211, now augmented by the offsetting authority. After reviewing precedent and legislative history, the decision concluded that-

“section 3342 may be applied to check cashing losses. Thus, an agency may use section 3342 to offset losses from cashing uncollectible checks with gains from other section 3342(a) activities.”

Offsetting under section 3342(c)(2) is done on a fiscal-year basis. Art uncollectible check becomes a deficiency not when it is cashed by the disbursing officer, but when it is dishonored and returned to be charged to the disbursing officer’s account. If these events occur in different fiscal years, the deficiency is chargeable to the latter year. B-120737, December 27, 1954. If an item is charged as a deficiency in one year and collected in a subsequent year, the collection should be charged to the fiscal year account in which the collection is made regardless of the fiscal year in which the deficiency was charged. *Id.*

For checks cashed within the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 3342, following the procedures of that statute eliminates the need to pursue relief under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c). If there is a net gain in an account for a given fiscal year, the net gain is deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, and that ends the matter. If there is a net loss, and the agency is able to make an adjustment from an available appropriation, the adjustment clears the disbursing officer’s account and similarly ends the matter. A net loss resulting from the application of 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c) is not an Antideficiency Act violation. 61 Comp. Gen. 649 (1982).

It must be emphasized that 31 U.S.C. § 3342 does not make an agency’s appropriations available for these adjustments. It merely authorizes appropriations for that purpose. For disbursing officers within the Department of Defense, permanent authority exists to use appropriated funds for “losses in the accounts of disbursing officials

government issues a replacement check, and (3) both checks are negotiated.

Replacement checks are issued under the authority of 31 U.S.C. §3331. If an original check “is lost, stolen, destroyed in any part, or is so defaced that the value to the owner or **holder** is impaired,” the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a replacement check, and may delegate that **authority to** other agencies. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3331(b), (f). The Secretary has discretionary authority to require an indemnification agreement from the owner or holder prior to issuing the replacement check. *Id.* § 3331(e).

The current system for issuing replacement checks, developed by the Treasury Department in the mid- **1980s**, is reflected in 31 C.F.R. Parts 245 and 248, I Treasury Financial Manual Chapter 4-7000, and **TFM** Bulletin No. 83-28 (August 2, **1983**).<sup>33</sup> In brief, upon receipt of a claim for loss or **nonreceipt** of an original check, the spending agency may certify anew payment. 31 C.F.R. §245.5. In agencies for which Treasury disburses, an agency certifying officer **certifies** the replacement check to a Treasury disbursing officer. For agencies which do their own disbursing, most notably the military departments, the “recertification” is an internal procedure based on agency as well as Treasury regulations. The replacement check, which has a different serial number from the original check, is called a “recertified check.” Formerly, most replacement checks were “substitute checks” with the same serial number as the original check. With the implementation of the recertification procedure, Treasury announced that substitute checks would generally no longer be available. **TFM** Bulletin No. 83-28, **para. 2**.<sup>34</sup>

The Treasury regulations specify the **responsibilities** of the payee. If the original check shows up before the claimant receives the replacement check, the claimant should notify the agency and follow the agency’s instructions. 31 C.F.R. §245.8(a). If the original check shows up after receipt of the replacement check, the claimant is to return the original to the issuing agency. “Under no circumstances

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<sup>33</sup>Prior approaches had produced **Complex** problems and were **unsatisfactory**. See 62 **Comp. Gen.** 91 (1982) and GAO report Millions Paid Out in Duplicate and Forged Government Checks, **AFMD-81-68** (October 1, 1981).

<sup>34</sup>The regulations now use the term “substitute check” only in 31 C.F.R. p@ 248 in the context of “depository checks,” checks drawn or **accounts** maintained in depository banks in U.S. territories or foreign countries.

- Thief steals someone else's personal checks and cashes them in **conjunction** with stolen or fraudulent identification. **B-246418**, February 3, 1992; **B-240440**, March 27, 1991; **B-212588**, August 14, 1984.
- Thief cashes checks from a fraudulently established checking account in the name of some other real or fictitious person. **B-229827**, January 14, 1988; **B-221415**, March 26, 1986; **B-220737/B-220981**, December 10, 1985.

2. Fraudulent endorsement of government check. In this situation, a thief steals a legitimately issued government check (paycheck, tax refund check, etc.) and cashes it with the aid of stolen or fraudulent identification. E.g., **B-227436**, July 2, 1987; **B-216726**, January 9, 1985; and **B-214436**, April 6, 1984.

3. Fraudulent alteration of amount on government check. If the amount is fraudulently raised by the payee, the liability of the disbursing **officer** is the difference between the original amount and the fraudulent amount. **B-228859**, September 11, 1987. If the amount is altered and the check cashed by someone other than the payee, the disbursing officer's liability is the **full** amount of the payment. **B-221 144**, April 22, 1986.

The opportunity for fraudulent alteration of amounts naturally decreases when the amount is also spelled out in words on the face of the check. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476, 481 (1983). However, spelling the amount out in words is not required on government checks, and Treasury checks generally do not do so. See I Treasury Financial Manual § 4-5050.45c (T/L 496). If a disbursing officer is in compliance with the **TFM** and applicable agency regulations, relief will not be denied solely because the amount is not written out in words. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 299 (1986); **B-209697**, November 21, 1983.

4. Postal money order. The authority of 31 U.S.C. § 3342(a)(1) is not limited to checks but applies to "negotiable instruments" generally, which includes postal money orders. E.g., **B-217663**, July 16, 1985 (fraudulent alteration of amount); **B-213874**, September 6, 1984 (forged endorsement).

#### b. Duplicate Check Losses

A duplicate check loss, as we use the term here, is a loss resulting when (1) a payee claims **nonreceipt** of an original check, (2) the

chapter for improper payments generally. As with other relief situations, lack of due care, failure to follow established procedures for example, **will** not preclude relief if it was not the proximate cause of the loss. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 298 (1991); **B-225932**, March 27, 1987.

Treasury regulations encourage, but do not require, the agency to obtain a signed statement from the claimant before issuing or certifying a replacement check. **1 TFM § 4-7060.20a**. If the agency's own regulations require the statement, failure to obtain it will generally be regarded as lack of due care. Relief is granted or denied based on application of the proximate cause concept. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 298 (1991); **B-225932**, March 27, 1987. If the statement is obtained but turns out to be a misrepresentation, it is not the accountable officer's fault. **B-247062**, June 9, 1992. In 70 **Comp. Gen.** 9 (1990), **GAO** advised the Navy that it could waive its own requirement for claimant statements where a box containing over 4,600 checks was lost en route to the Philippines, and obtaining individual statements prior to issuing replacement checks would have caused undue delay and hardship.

**GAO** has expressed concern over issuing replacement checks prematurely, that is, without giving the original check a reasonable time to arrive. While the timing is essentially a matter of agency discretion, it is also a factor which may bear upon the issue of due care. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 337 (1984). Timing should include risk assessment. Thus, a shorter waiting period maybe appropriate where the payee has a continuing relationship with the agency and recoupment by offset is therefore presumably easier. **1 TFM § 4-7060.20e**; **B-226116**, February 20, 1987. As a general proposition, **GAO** will not question awaiting period of at least 3 working days. 63 **Comp. Gen.** 337; **1 TFM § 4-7060.20a**. For checks mailed prior to the actual payment date, the 3-day period may include mailing days. **B-230658**, June 14, 1988. Awaiting period of less than 3 days needs to be **specifically justified**. See **B-215433/B-215515**, July 2, 1984. A good example is **B-246369**, February 3, 1992 (payee who was in Virginia could not have received original check inadvertently mailed to Florida).

It is possible, although the cases are (and should be) rare, for duplicate check losses to occur with checks issued to a bank under direct deposit procedures. Recoupment efforts should be directed against the bank which made the error, leaving it to the bank to then

should both the original and replacement checks be cashed.” *Id.* § 245.8(b).

**Payees** do not always read Treasury regulations, however, and sometimes cash both checks. Since the agency’s obligation is to make payment once, cashing both checks results in an erroneous payment for which some accountable officer is liable unless relieved. In the most common situation, the payee cashes both checks. The **first** check satisfies the government’s original obligation, and issuing the replacement check is an authorized transaction. Thus, the loss occurs “when the second check is wrongfully presented and paid. (The actual sequence in which the payee negotiates the original check and the replacement check is immaterial.)” 62 **Comp. Gen.** 91,94 (1982). Depending on the agency and the nature of the error, the proper relief statute will be either 31 U.S.C. § 3528 (**certifying officer**) or 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c) (disbursing officer). For the military departments, even though they may employ a “recertification” procedure, the proper statute is section 3527(c). 66 **Comp. Gen.** 192, 194 (1987).

GAO’s frost relief decision under the recertification procedure was 65 **Comp. Gen.** 811 (1986). **Relief** for a duplicate check loss is granted if (1) the accountable officer followed applicable regulations and procedures, (2) there is no indication of bad faith, and (3) the agency has pursued or is pursuing adequate collection action to recover the overpayment. *Id.* at 812. This is essentially the same standard that had been applied under the former “substitute check” system. *E.g.*, 65 **Comp. Gen.** 812,813 (1986); 62 **Comp. Gen.** 91,97 (1982). A few more recent cases applying this standard are 70 **Comp. Gen.** 298 (1991) (Navy); **B-237343**, January 23, 1991 (Army); and **B-232773**, January 12, 1989 (Defense Logistics Agency). Of course, **relief** cannot be granted until a loss actually occurs. 70 **Comp. Gen.** 9, 12 (1990); 66 **Comp. Gen.** 192, 194 (1987). The documentation required to support a relief request in a duplicate check case is spelled out in **B-221720**, May 8, 1986, and includes such things as copies of both checks, the claim of **nonreceipt**, the agency’s stop payment request, Treasury’s debit voucher, and documentation of collection efforts.

If the disbursing officer is a supervisor and the duplicate check is actually issued by a subordinate, both are accountable **officers** for purposes of liability and relief. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476, 479–80 (1983); **B-213471** et al., January 24, 1984; **B-212576** et al., December 2, 1983. The relief standards are those set forth in Section D.3.a of this



(military).<sup>35</sup> Section C.2 of this chapter contains more detail on how the \$3,000 limit operates.

In the cases cited and discussed thus far, it was the payee who negotiated both checks. Where the original check is fraudulently negotiated by someone else, the situation is a bit different. Here, the replacement check rather than the **original** check satisfies the government's obligation to the payee, and the loss results from negotiating the original check. 66 **Comp. Gen.** 192, 194 (1987). More precisely, the loss results from payment on the original check since there is nothing improper or incorrect in issuing it. *Id.* If forgery is established, Treasury will seek to recover from the **bank** which negotiated the check. See **B-232772**, October 17, 1989.

c. Errors in Check Issuance Process

The October 1991 decisions just cited authorizing administrative resolution of duplicate check losses not exceeding \$3,000 extended the authorization to another category of erroneous payments—those resulting from “mechanical **and/or** clerical errors during the check issuance process.” Thus, agencies may grant or deny relief for losses in this category within the monetary ceiling, as with duplicate check losses, in accordance with applicable statutes, regulations, and **GAO** decisions. **B-243749**, October 22, 1991 (civilian); **B-244972**, October 22, 1991 (military). The relief standards are the same as those previously discussed for other types of improper or erroneous payments.

Cases under this heading may result from any type of check payment—salary payments, payments to contractors, benefit payments, etc.—and include a variety of fact patterns. A few cases **involving** erroneous tax refund checks will illustrate. In each case, the disbursing officer was a director of one of Treasury's regional financial centers (formerly called disbursing centers), a supervisory official. In **B-241098/B-241137**, December 27, 1990, the printing system rejected two checks and automatically produced substitutes; the printing operator failed to remove and void the original checks; the originals and substitutes were issued and cashed by the **payees**. In **B-187180**, September 21, 1976, a keypunching error transposed two numerals, resulting in issuance of a check for \$718 instead of the

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<sup>35</sup>The process actually started with a limited authorization for the Army, **B-214372**, October 9, 1987, revoked by the more inclusive **B-244972**.

recover from the individual depositor as an independent transaction. **B-215431/B-215432**, January 2, 1985. Related decisions arising from the same set of losses are **B-215432.3**, August 22, 1991 (finally granting relief upon documentation of collection efforts), and **B-215432 et al.**, July 6, 1984.

An agency's internal controls and procedures form an important line of defense against duplicate check losses. One agency, for example, will issue a recertified check prior to obtaining the status of the original check only if the employee has sufficient funds in his or her retirement account to cover a potential loss, and requires specific clearances upon termination of employment. These procedures, **GAO** commented, "will better safeguard federal funds." **B-232615**, September 28, 1988. Agencies should also develop guidelines for dealing with persons requesting several replacement checks within a relatively short time period. Three replacement check requests within an 11-month period, for example, should trigger some concern. **B-221398**, September 19, 1986. Guidelines may include such things as counseling employees to take advantage of direct deposit procedures and delaying recertification until the status of the original check has been determined. The exact content of any such guidelines is up to the agency. **B-217947/B-226384**, March 27, 1987; **B-220500**, September 12, 1986. Indemnification agreements may be desirable in some circumstances, even where not required. See 66 **Comp. Gen.** 192, 194–95 (1987). **Chargeback** data received from Treasury should be processed and forwarded to the pertinent finance office as promptly as possible. **B-226316 et al.**, April 9, 1987.

Cases occasionally present variations on the factual theme, but the basic relief approach is the same. **E.g.**, **B-226769**, July 29, 1987 (agency issued replacement for wrong check); **B-195396**, October 1, 1979 (agency inadvertently issued two replacement checks).

In our coverage of physical losses, we discussed the dollar amount **GAO** has established, currently \$3,000, below which agencies may grant relief without the need for **GAO** involvement. In October 1991, **GAO** started extending the limit selectively to certain categories of improper payments, one of which is duplicate check losses. For duplicate check losses not exceeding \$3,000, agencies may grant or deny relief administratively, without the need for **GAO** concurrence, in accordance with applicable statutes, regulations, and **GAO** decisions. **B-243749**, October 22, 1991 (civilian); **B-244972**, October 22, 1991

type that will occasionally escape even in a well-established and carefully supervised system. **B-195106**, July 12, 1979.

- Malfunction of feed mechanism on printing machine caused one check to skip, printing the inscription on the next check. The **first** check was replaced without noticing the duplicate; both checks were issued. Relief was granted on the same basis as in **B-195106**. **B-212431**, November 21, 1983.

“Clerical error” means human error without contributing mechanical malfunction. Relief standards remain the same. The cases noted in the following groupings, as with the last three tax refund cases cited above, are intended to illustrate factual variations.

1. Payment of wrong amount. The person preparing a check for a military separation voucher misread a dollar sign as the number “8,” and printed a check for \$899 instead of the correct amount of \$99. **B-238863**, July 11, 1991. A voucher examiner preparing a partial payment to a contractor erroneously used the total amount due on the contract instead of the amount of the partial payment. **B-227410**, August 18, 1987.

2. Payment to wrong person. A clerk consolidating two contract payment vouchers in a single check payable to a credit union erroneously listed only one account number, causing an overpayment to one contractor and necessitating a replacement check to the other. **B-238802**, December 31, 1990. Further examples are **B-234197**, March 15, 1989 (misreading of documents resulted in payment to subcontractor instead of prime contractor); **B-229126**, November 3, 1987 (keypunch error generated payment to wrong contractor); **B-212336**, August 8, 1983 (voluntary child support allotment paid to wrong person due to error in assignment of organization code); **B-192109**, June 3, 1981 (check issued to wrong person with slightly different name than correct payee); **B-194877**, July 12, 1979 (amounts of two checks inadvertently switched).

3. Duplicate payment. Treasury Financial Center was issuing replacements for a batch of mutilated checks. One mutilated check became separated from the rest and was erroneously released along with its replacement. A computer operator had failed to **verify** each replacement check against the corresponding mutilated check. Because controls were in place which would have prevented the error had they been followed, and considering the large volume of work at

correct amount of \$178. In **B-235037**, September 18, 1989, an overpayment was made due to an error during the “typing operation and proof reading process.” Relief was granted in the first two cases by applying the standards for relieving a supervisor; in the third, it was denied because the request contained neither a description of relevant controls and procedures nor statements by the individuals concerned.

One more **tax** refund case illustrates the immutable law that anything that can happen will happen. A tax refund check intended for John and Ruth **Puncsak** of San Francisco was drawn payable to “**J. and R. Puncsak**,” and erroneously sent to Joe and Rose **Puncsak**, also of San Francisco, who were not entitled to a refund but instead owed money to the Internal Revenue Service. The check was cashed, Joe and Rose claiming that they endorsed the check but then lost it. GAO advised the IRS to raise a charge against the account of the responsible accountable officer. **B-1 12491**, April 17, 1953. (Since this case predated the enactment of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c), there was no way to consider administrative relief.)

As **B-241098/B-241 137** demonstrates, most mechanical errors are not purely mechanical, but involve human error as well, such as failure to spot the error during a verification process. Also, many of these cases involve the issuance of duplicate checks, the difference between these and the previously discussed duplicate check losses being that these losses do not result from a claim of **nonreceipt** but from the simultaneous issuance of duplicate checks attributable to government error. Similar cases involving other types of payments are **B-239371**, June 13, 1990; **B-239094**, June 13, 1990; **B-237082** et al., May 8, 1990; **B-235044** et al., March 20, 1990; and **B-235036**, October 17, 1989. Some factual variations follow:

- Machine that stuffs checks into envelopes was misaligned, obscuring the names and addresses. Treasury decided to shred the original **checks** and reissue them. One of the originals was inadvertently delivered rather than shredded, causing a duplicate payment. **B-245586**, November 12, 1991.
- Due to mechanical failure, a **check printing** machine failed to advance a voucher schedule and a second check was issued to a person with the same name but different middle initial than the correct payee. A clerk failed to notice the error during verification. In view of the volume of work at the disbursing center, the error was viewed **as** the

September 15, 1982. Once an accountable officer's liability has been timely established, section 3526(c) does not limit the government's recovery from that officer. 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c)(4)(B).

The statute of limitations of 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c) applies only to improper payments and not to physical losses or deficiencies. 60 **Comp. Gen.** 674 (1981). An accountable officer's liability for a physical loss or deficiency is wholly independent of anyone's "raising a charge" against that officer's account.

The original version of 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c) was enacted at a time when all accounts were physically transmitted to GAO for settlement, GAO reviewed every piece of paper, and then issued a certificate of settlement to the accountable officer, "disallowing" credit for questionable items. As a result of changes in audit methods, this is no longer done. Rather, accounts are now retained by the various agencies, and an account is regarded as settled by operation of law at the end of the 3-year period except for unresolved items. GAO Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 8.7.

To reflect these changes in audit procedures, the date a "substantially complete" account is in the hands of the agency and available for audit is now generally considered as the point from which the 3-year period begins to run. E.g., B-181466, July 10, 1974 (non-decision letter). Assuming that supporting documents are available at the end of the time period covered by an accountable officer's statement of accountability, this will usually mean the date on which that statement of accountability is certified. 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.7**. There are situations, however, in which the 3-year period does not begin to run until some later date. Where a loss is due to fraud, the period begins when the loss is discovered and reported to appropriate agency officials. **B-239802**, April 3, 1991; **B-239122**, February 21, 1991. Where an agency has no way of knowing that an improper payment has occurred until it receives a debit voucher from the Treasury Department (duplicate check losses, for example), the 3-year period begins to run when the agency receives the debit voucher. **B-226393**,

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the disbursing center, relief was granted to the disbursing officer, the center's director. (The computer operator is not an accountable officer.) **B-231551**, September 12, 1988.

Most duplicate payments are recovered, but many either are not or involve the expense of collection action or litigation. Especially in the area of payments to contractors, duplicate payment losses can involve large amounts. GAO surveyed a number of agencies in the mid- 1980s, and emphasized the importance of adequate internal controls. E.g., General Services Administration Needs to Improve its Internal Controls to Prevent Duplicate Payments, GAO/AFMD-85-70 (August 20, 1985); Strengthening Internal Controls Would Help the Department of Justice Reduce Duplicate Payments, GAO/AFMD-85-72 (August 20, 1985). A case involving a duplicate payment to a contractor in which relief was granted on the basis of adequate controls is **B-24 1019.2**, February 7, 1992.

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## 5. Statute of Limitations

The accounts of accountable officers must be settled by GAO within three years "after the date the Comptroller General receives the account." 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c)(1). Once this 3-year period has expired, no charges may be raised against the account except for losses due to fraud or criminal action on the part of the accountable officer. Id. § 3526(c)(2). Enacted in 1947 (61 Stat. 101), this legislation effectively operates as a limitation on establishing an accountable officer's liability for improper expenditures. As the Defense Department pointed out in recommending the legislation, a time limitation is desirable because passage of time diminishes the chances of recovering from the payee or recipient, leaving the liability solely with the accountable officer. S. Rep. No. 99, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1075, 1077-78.

Unlike other statutes of limitations which merely affect the remedy (for example, by barring the commencement of legal proceedings), 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c) completely eliminates the debt. **B-181466**, November 19, 1974 (non-decision letter). Once an account has been settled, it cannot be reopened (except for fraud or criminality, as noted above), and the authority to grant or deny relief no longer exists. Thus, an accountable officer can escape liability for an improper expenditure if the government does not raise a charge against the account within the 3-year period. E.g., 62 Comp. Gen. 498 (1983); **B-223372**, December 4, 1989; **B-198451.2**,

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## E. Other Relief Statutes

The relief statutes discussed thus far—31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(a), (b), (c), and 3528—are the ones most commonly encountered and will cover the vast majority of cases. Several others exist, however. Our listing here is not intended to be complete.

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### 1. Statutes Requiring Affirmative Action

The statutes in this group are similar to 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527 and 3528 in that they require someone to **actually** make a relief decision.

#### a. United States Claims Court

The relief authority of the Claims Court is found in two provisions of law:

“The United States **Claims** Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim by a disbursing **officer** of the United States or by his administrator or executor for relief from responsibility for **loss**, in line of duty, of Government funds, vouchers, records, or other papers in his charge, ” 28 U.S.C. §1496.

“Whenever the United States Claims Court finds that any loss by a disbursing **officer** of the United States was without his fault or negligence, it shall render a judgment setting forth the amount thereof, and the General Accounting **Office** shall allow the **officer** such amount as a credit in the settlement of **his** accounts. ” 28 U.S.C. §2512.

These provisions, which originated together in legislation enacted in 1866 (14 Stat. 44), predate **all** of the other relief statutes and were once the only relief mechanism available apart from private relief legislation. The Supreme Court has termed the Claims Court legislation “a very curious provision” in that it permits a disbursing **officer** to establish a defense to a claim which “the government can only establish judicially in some other court.” United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 37, 43 (1877). In effect, it authorizes the **Claims** Court to render a **declaratory** (as opposed to money) judgment. Ralcon, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 294,300 (1987). Now, in view of the comprehensive scheme of administrative relief Congress has enacted, the Claims Court statute is rarely used.

#### b. Legislative Branch Agencies

Since 31 U.S.C. §3728, the primary **certifying** officer relief statute, does not apply to the legislative branch, Congress has enacted specific statutes for several legislative branch agencies authorizing or requiring the designation of certifying **officers**, establishing their accountability, and authorizing the Comptroller General to grant relief. Patterned after 31 U.S.C. §3728, they are: 2 U.S.C. §142b (Library of Congress); 2 U.S.C. §142e (Congressional Budget **Office**);

April 29, 1988. If the date of receipt cannot be determined, the date of the debit voucher is used. Id.<sup>36</sup>

If an irregularity has not been resolved by the agency within two years from the time the statute of limitations begins to run, the irregularity should at that time be reported to GAO. This may be in the form of a relief request or a copy of the agency's irregularity report. This is designed to provide adequate time to consider a relief request or to otherwise prevent expiration of the statute of limitations where necessary. 7 GAO-PPM § 8.4.C. See also, e.g., 62 Comp. Gen. 476, 480 (1983); B-227538, July 8, 1987; B-217741, October 15, 1985. Of course, nothing prevents an agency from seeking relief sooner if appropriate.

As noted above, the 3-year limitation does not apply to losses attributable to fraud or other criminal action by the accountable officer. 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c)(2). It is automatically suspended during war. Id. § 3526(c)(3). And it may be suspended by the Comptroller General with respect to a specific item to get additional evidence or explanation necessary to settle an account. Id. § 3526(g). This may be in the form of a timely Notice of Exception (B-226176, May 26, 1987), or other written notification (B-239592, August 23, 1991; B-239140, July 12, 1991). The mere submission of a relief request within the 3-year period, however, is not enough. 62 Comp. Gen. 91, 98 (1982); B-220689, September 24, 1986.

Finally, 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c) deals solely with the liability of an accountable officer. It has no effect on the liability of the payee or recipient of an improper payment. It does not establish a limitation on recoveries against the improper payee or recipient, nor does it affect the agency's obligation to pursue collection action against the payee or recipient. 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c)(4)(A); Arnold v. United States, 404 F.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1968); B-205587, June 1, 1982.

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<sup>36</sup>Prior decisions had not been entirely clear on precisely which date to use. E.g., B-220689, September 24, 1986 (date of debit voucher); B-213874, September 6, 1984 (inclusion in statement of accountability). B-226393 established the propositions stated in the text and modified prior decisions accordingly.



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b. Compromise of  
Indebtedness

Under the Federal Claims Collection Act, if a debt claim is compromised in accordance with the statute and implementing regulations, no accountable officer will be held liable for the portion unrecovered by virtue of the compromise. 31 U.S.C. § 371 l(d).

c. Foreign Exchange  
Transactions

Earlier in this chapter we discussed 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c), which authorizes, with respect to activities authorized under section 3342(a), losses to be offset against gains on a fiscal-year basis, and also authorizes appropriations to make **adjustments** for net losses. Our prior discussion was in the context of check cashing operations. Another important use of 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c) is accounting for certain foreign exchange losses. To implement this authority in the foreign exchange area, the Treasury Department has issued regulations (Treasury Department Circular No. 830 and I Treasury Financial Manual Chapter 4-9000), and has established an account entitled “Gains and Deficiencies on Exchange Transactions” (I **TFM** § 4-9090.10). As with the check cashing context, the relevant point here is that the use of 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c) accomplishes the necessary account **adjustment** and obviates the need to seek relief for any accountable officer.

One use of the Gains and Deficiencies account is the adjustment of losses due to exchange rate fluctuations. **E.g.**, 64 **Comp. Gen.** 152 (1984) (restoration of losses in Library of Congress foreign currency accounts attributable to currency devaluations); 61 **Comp. Gen.** 649 (1982) (determination of proper exchange rate); **B-245760**, January 16, 1992 (devaluation of Laotian currency). However, in order to use the Gains and Deficiencies account, losses must result from “disbursing officer transactions” of the type authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 3342(a). 45 **Comp. Gen.** 493 (1966). In that case, the American Embassy in Cairo had made a payment for certain property in Egyptian pounds. The sales agreement was not executed and the money was refunded. At the time of the refund, the exchange rate had changed and the same amount of Egyptian pounds was worthless in U.S. dollars, resulting in a loss to the account. **GAO** agreed with the Treasury Department that the loss resulted from an administrative collection and not from a disbursing officer transaction, and should therefore be borne by the relevant program appropriation rather than the Gains and Deficiencies account.

**GAO** has also considered the use of the Gains and Deficiencies account in a number of cases invoking Vietnamese and Cambodian currency

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2 U.S.C. § 142f (Office of Technology Assessment); and 44 U.S.C. § 308 (Government Printing Office).

c. Savings Bond Redemption Losses

Losses resulting from the redemption of savings bonds are replaced from the fund used to pay claims under the Government Losses in Shipment Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3126(a). The statute further provides that “an officer or employee of the Department of the Treasury is relieved from liability to the United States Government for the loss when the Secretary [of the Treasury] decides that the loss did not result from the fault or negligence of the . . . officer, or employee.” Relief is mandatory if the government does not give the officer or employee written notice of his or her liability or potential liability within 10 years from the date of the erroneous payment. *Id.*

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2. statutes Providing  
“Automatic” Relief

The statutes in this group either (1) provide that taking a certain authorized action which might otherwise be regarded as creating a loss will not result in accountable officer liability, or (2) authorize the resolution of certain losses in such a manner as not to produce liability.

a. Waiver of Indebtedness

Many statutes authorize the government to waive the recovery of indebtedness resulting from various overpayments or erroneous payments if certain conditions are met. Waiver statutes commonly include a provision to the effect that accountable officers will not be held liable for any amounts waived. For example, the statutes authorizing waiver of overpayments of pay and allowances require that full credit be given in the accounts of accountable officers for any amounts waived under the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 5584(d) (civilian employees); 10 U.S.C. § 2774(d) (military personnel); 32 U.S.C. § 716(d) (National Guard). Once waiver is granted, the payment is deemed valid and there is no need to consider the question of relief. *E.g.*, B-184947, March 21, 1978. This result applies even where relief has been denied under the applicable relief statute. B-1 77841 -O. M., October 23, 1973.

Examples of comparable provisions in other waiver statutes are 5 U.S.C. § 8129(c) (overpayments under Federal Employees Compensation Act), 38 U.S.C. § 5302(d) (overpayment of veterans' benefits) and 42 U.S.C. § 404(c) (Social Security Act).

noted that the plaintiff's participation in the proceeds would preclude recovery from the Check Forgery Insurance Fund. 467 **F.2d** at 930.

The bank presenting a check to the Treasury for payment guarantees the genuineness of prior endorsements. 31 **C.F.R.** §240.5. Thus, in many cases, the government will be able to recover from the presenting bank. E.g., *Olson v. United States*, 437 **F.2d** 981, 986–87 (Ct. Cl. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939.

There is no mention of accountable officers in 31 U.S.C. §3343. However, a payment from the Check Forgery Insurance Fund means that only one payment is charged to the appropriations of the agency incurring the original obligation, with the effect that no accountable officer of that agency incurs any liability. See **B-10929**, February 1, 1972.

e. Secretary of the **Treasury**

Enacted in 1947 (61 Stat. 730), 31 U.S.C. § 3333 provides that the **Secretary** of the Treasury will not be liable for payments made “in due course and without negligence” of checks drawn on the Treasury or a depository, or other obligations guaranteed or assumed by the United States, and that the Comptroller General “shall credit” the appropriate accounts for such payments. At one time, many duplicate check losses were handled under 31 U.S.C. §3333. See 62 **Comp. Gen.** 91 (1982). It was Treasury's practice to accumulate the cases and submit them in groups, e.g., *B-1 15388*, October 12, 1976, and **B-71585**, February 24, 1948, with credit being allowed as a matter of routine. With the development of Treasury's previously discussed recertification procedure, much of the need to invoke 31 U.S.C. § 3333 evaporated. While many of the earlier cases involved an exchange of correspondence between Treasury and GAO, nothing in the statute requires it, especially since GAO no longer maintains accounts and “relief” is mandatory anyway.

f. Other Statutes

There are several other statutes affecting the liability of accountable officers in a variety of contexts. A few of them are:

- 5 U.S.C. §8321. Accountable officers are not liable for payments in violation of statutes prescribing forfeiture of retirement annuities or retired pay as long as the payments are made “in due course and without fraud, collusion, or gross negligence.” The reason for this statute **was** to avoid having to deny relief under 31 U.S.C. § 3528(b) for

after the American evacuation from those countries in the **mid-1970s**. 56 **Comp. Gen. 791** (1977), overruled in part by 61 **Comp. Gen. 132** (1981) (**piaster** currency physically abandoned or left in accounts in Vietnam chargeable to Gains and Deficiencies); **B-197708**, April 8, 1980 (Vietnamese and Cambodian currency received by Treasury from U.S. disbursing officers at exchange rate in effect at time of evacuation subsequently became valueless; loss held to be of the type contemplated by 31 U.S.C. § 3342(c)). However, U.S. currency which was thought to have been burned but **which** subsequently turned up in the United States had to be treated as a physical loss. 56 **Comp. Gen.** at 793–96. (Relief was granted for this loss under 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a) in **B-209978**, July 18, 1983.)

d. Check Forgery Insurance Fund

The Check Forgery Insurance Fund is a revolving fund the purpose of which is to make replacement payments to **payees** whose Treasury checks have been lost or stolen and cashed over a forged endorsement in limited situations. 31 U.S.C. § 3343. Before the Fund may be used, four conditions must be satisfied: (1) the check is lost or stolen without fault of the payee; (2) the check is subsequently negotiated over the payee's forged endorsement; (3) the payee did not participate in any part of the proceeds of the check; and (4) recovery from the forger or other liable party has been or will be delayed or **unsuccessful**.<sup>37</sup> **Id.** § 3343(b). Any recoveries are restored to the **Fund**. **Id.** § 3343(d).

A forged endorsement for purposes of the statute has been held to include an unauthorized endorsement purported to be made in a representative capacity. **Strann v. United States**, 2 Cl. Ct. 782 (1983) (plaintiffs attorney endorsed tax refund check without authority). The third condition, participation in the proceeds, does not require a knowing participation. **Koch v. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare**, 590 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1978); **Duden v. United States**, 467 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1972). In **Duden**, for example, the plaintiffs former husband endorsed her name on a tax refund check and subsequently paid her part of the proceeds for support. She had no way of knowing that the payment came from those proceeds. While the endorsement was held not to be a forgery under the facts involved, the court also

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<sup>37</sup>To facilitate prosecution, GAO has advocated the enactment of a federal misdemeanor law "or forged Treasury checks. Forgery of U.S. Treasury Checks—Federal Misdemeanor Law Needed, GAO/GGD-84-6 (November 17, 1983).

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all; above-ceiling losses should be reported only if unresolved at the end of the **2-year** period. Of course, the agency may request relief sooner if desired.

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## **2. Obtaining Relief**

The GAO official designated to exercise the Comptroller General's authority under the various relief statutes is the Associate General Counsel, Accounting and Financial Management Division, **Office of General Counsel**. Relief requests where **GAO** action is necessary should be addressed to **GAO's** Office of General Counsel. The request may be in simple letter format and should include all items **specified** in 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.12.C**. These include a copy of the irregularity report, a description of collection actions taken, and any required administrative determinations. Of particular importance is a written statement by the accountable **officer** or a notation that the accountable officer chooses not to submit a separate statement. Relief will be granted or denied in the form of a letter addressed to the official who submitted the request.

In any case in which **GAO** has denied relief, the agency, or the accountable officer through appropriate administrative channels, may ask **GAO** to reconsider. **GAO** will not hesitate to reverse a decision shown to be wrong. Any request for reconsideration should set forth the errors which the applicant believes have been made, and should include evidence (not mere unsupported allegations) to support the basis for relief, for example, that the original denial failed to consider certain evidence or to give it appropriate weight or relied too heavily on other evidence in the record. Denials of relief are often based not so much on the merits of the case but simply on the failure of the original request to include sufficient information to enable an independent evaluation. Of course, if the agency cannot or is unwilling to make a required statutory determination, there is nothing **GAO** can do and a request for reconsideration is pointless.

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## **3. Payments of \$100 or Less**

In **B-161457**, July 14, 1976, a circular letter to all department and agency heads, disbursing and certifying officers, the Comptroller General advised as follows:

"[I]n lieu of requesting a decision by the Comptroller General for items of \$25 or less, disbursing and **certifying** officers may **hereafter** rely upon written advice from an agency **official** designated **by** the head of each department or agency. A copy of the document containing such advice should be attached to the voucher and the propriety

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payments made in good faith solely because the payments are specifically prohibited by law. **B-122068**, March 18, 1955.

- **31 U.S.C. § 3521(c)**. Previously noted, this statute protects accountable officers from liability for losses under an authorized statistical sampling procedure.
- **42 U.S.C. § 659(f)**. Disbursing officers are not liable for payments under garnishment process which is “regular on **its** face” and in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 659. See 61 **Comp. Gen.** 229 (1982).

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## F. Procedures

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### 1. Reporting of Irregularities

Agencies are required to document each fiscal irregularity that affects the account of an accountable officer, regardless of how it is discovered. The report is retained as part of the account records and a copy provided to the accountable officer and, in certain situations, to **GAO**. **GAO**, Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 7, § 8.4.B. **The contents of the report are set forth in 7 GAO-PPM § 8.12.A**, and include such things as a description of how the irregularity occurred and a description of any known procedural deficiencies and corrective action.

The agency’s next job is to attempt to resolve the irregularity, most importantly by pursuing collection action against the improper payee or recipient where possible. Recovery of the funds of course ends the matter. If the funds cannot be recovered and the case is one in which the agency may grant relief without **GAO** involvement, consideration of relief is the next step. If the matter is resolved administratively in either of these ways, the record should be further documented as specified in 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.12.B** (required administrative determinations, etc.). There is no need to report resolved **irregularities to GAO**.

If the irregularity cannot be resolved administratively within two years after the date the account is available for audit, and **if** the loss exceeds the monetary limit established for administrative resolution, the agency should then submit to **GAO** either a copy of the updated irregularity report or a relief request if appropriate. 7 **GAO-PPM § 8.4.C**. This **2-year** guideline is especially important for improper payments in view of the **3-year** statute of limitations of 31 U.S.C. § 3526(c). Thus, below-ceiling losses need not be reported to **GAO** at

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## G. Collection Action

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### 1. Against Recipient

A person who receives money from the government to which he or she is not entitled, however innocently, has no right to keep it. The recipient is indebted to the government, and the agency making the improper or erroneous payment has a duty to attempt to recover the funds, wholly independent of any question of liability or relief of an accountable officer. The duty to aggressively pursue collection action and the means of doing so are found primarily in the Federal Claims Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. ch. 37, subch. II, and the Federal Claims Collection Standards, 4 C.F.R. Parts 101 – 105, the details of which are covered elsewhere in this publication. Indeed, many of the statutes we have previously discussed emphasize that the relief process does not diminish this duty. E.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3333(b), 3343(e), 3526(c)(4), 3527(d)(2).

Recovery from the improper payee or recipient removes the accountable officer's liability regardless of whether relief **has** or has not been sought because there is no longer any loss. However, merely "flagging" the retirement account of an employee who has received an overpayment, for possible collection at some unpredictable future time, is not enough as it would delay indefinitely the final settlement of the account. 31 **Comp. Gen.** 17 (1951).

In a sense, the recipient and the unrelieved accountable **officer** share an element of joint liability. The occasional decision has referred to this as "joint and several" liability, but it has been pointed out that this is incorrect. E.g., **B-228946**, January 15, 1988. If two debtors are "jointly and severally" liable, the creditor has the option of collecting the full amount from either, with the debtor who pays then having a right of contribution against the remaining debtor(s). Certainly no one would suggest that someone who has defrauded the government and repays the debt has any **right** of contribution against the accountable officer. Also, under joint and several liability, the creditor may seek to collect a portion from each debtor. The agency in an accountable officer loss has no such option. **B-212602**, April 5, 1984. The agency's **first** obligation is to seek recovery from the recipient. The recipient of an improper payment is liable for the full amount, with any amounts collected used to reduce the accountable **officer's** liability. Id.; 30 **Comp. Gen.** 298,300 (1951). See also 62 **Comp. Gen.** 476, 478–79 (1983); 54 **Comp. Gen.** 112,114 (1974).

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of any such payment **will** be considered conclusive on the **General Accounting Office** in its settlement of the accounts involved.”

The amount has since been raised to \$100.7 **GAO-PPM § 8.3**. This does not preclude a **certifying** or disbursing officer from seeking a decision if deemed necessary since the entitlement to advance decisions is **statutory**, but it does provide a means for simplifying the payment of very small amounts. An accountable officer is not liable for a payment made under this authority even if the payment is subsequently found to be improper or erroneous. The \$100 threshold applies equally to questions arising after payment has been made. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 646,648 (1982).

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#### **4. Relief vs. Grievance Procedures**

Federal employees have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with respect to conditions of employment. 5 U.S.C. §7102. Collective bargaining agreements may include negotiated grievance procedures, which may **in turn provide** for dispute resolution by binding arbitration. *Id.* §7122. The Federal Labor Relations Authority decides questions **over** an agency’s duty to bargain in good faith under 5 U.S.C. §7105(a)(2)(E). Agencies have a duty to bargain in good faith to the extent not inconsistent with federal law. *Id.* §7117. The **FLRA** also decides appeals alleging that an **arbitration award** is contrary to federal law. *Id.* §7122.

Since the **authority** to relieve accountable officers is provided by statute, both **GAO** and the **FLRA** have determined that negotiated grievance procedures may not be used as a substitute for making the relief decision. **B-213804**, August 13, 1985; National Treasury Employees Union and Internal Revenue Service, 14 F. **L.R.A.** 65 (No. 15, 1984). The same **result** applies to the State Department’s separate statutory grievance procedures. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 457 (1988).

However, a grievance procedure may encompass an agency head’s **determination** that an accountable **officer** is negligent, as distinguished from the actual relief decision. National Treasury Employees Union and Internal Revenue Service, 33 F. **L.R.A.** 229 (No. 26, 1988), citing 59 **Comp. Gen.** 113 (1979) for the proposition that **GAO’s** statutory role does not arise until after the agency head has made the requisite determination.



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however diligent, does not by itself provide the basis for relieving the accountable officer. **B-141838**, February 8, 1960; **B-14042**, October 31, 1956.

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## 2. Against Accountable Officer

**If** a loss cannot be recovered from the thief or other improper payee or recipient, and relief cannot be granted to the accountable officer, the accountable **officer** becomes indebted to the government for the amount involved. At that point, it is the agency's responsibility to initiate collection action against the accountable **officer** in accordance with the Federal Claims Collection Act and Standards. **E.g.**, **B-177430**, October 30, 1973.

**If** the accountable **officer** is still employed by the government, additional statutes come into play. Offset against salary is prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a):

"The pay of an individual in arrears to the United States shall be withheld until he has accounted for **and paid** into the Treasury of the United States all sums for which he is liable."

This statute does not apply to ordinary **debtors** but only to accountable **officers**. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 344 (1957); 23 **Comp. Gen.** 555 (1944); 26 Op. **Att'y Gen.** 77 (1906). It has also been held that the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a) are mandatory and cannot be waived. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 606 (1985); 39 **Comp. Gen.** 203 (1959); 19 **Comp. Gen.** 312 (1939).

The application of 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a) to certain military accountable officers is limited by 37 U.S.C. § 1007(a), which prohibits withholding the pay "of an **officer**" under section 5512 **unless** the indebtedness is "admitted by the officer or shown by the judgment of a court, or upon a special order issued in the discretion of the Secretary concerned." Subsection 1007(a) applies to "officers," meaning commissioned or warrant **officers**, and not to enlisted **personnel** or civilian accountable officers. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 344,348 (1957). The admission maybe oral or written but, if oral, should be clear and unequivocal and preferably witnessed. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 83 (1962). The discretion to apply 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a) exists only in the absence of an admission or court judgment. *Id.*

The original version of 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a), enacted in 1828 (4 **Stat.** 246), provided that "**no** money shall be paid" to the person in arrears

So strong is this duty to seek recovery from the improper payee or recipient that the two primary relief statutes for improper payments explicitly authorize GAO to deny relief if the agency has failed to diligently pursue collection action against the recipient. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(c) (disbursing officers), 3528(b)(2) (certifying officers). GAO is extremely reluctant to deny relief solely on the basis of inadequate collection action because often the failure is attributable to the agency rather than the accountable officer. However, it has been done. E.g., B-234815, October 3, 1989 (disbursing officer failed to initiate collection action despite repeated advice from agency counsel).

Adequate collection action means compliance with the Federal Claims Collection Act and Standards. 62 Comp. Gen. 476, 478–79 (1983); B-233870, May 30, 1989. A single demand letter is not enough. 62 Comp. Gen. 91,98 (1982). Resort to the Federal Claims Collection Act and Standards includes those collection measures, as and to the extent authorized, which result in collection of less than the full amount, for example, compromise. A compromise, including one by the Justice Department, not only resolves the claim against the recipient but operates as well to relieve the accountable officer for any amounts unrecovered because of the compromise. 31 U.S.C. § 371 l(d); 65 Comp. Gen. 371 (1986). Whether or not the accountable officer is entitled to relief does not affect the compromise authority. B-154400-O. M., January 29, 1968; B-156846-O. M., October 25, 1967. However, 31 U.S.C. § 371 l(d) does not apply to any liability which may fall upon one who is not an accountable officer. B-235048, April 4, 1991. The authority to suspend or terminate collection action is also available, but only in accordance with the claims collection act and regulations. 67 Comp. Gen. 457, 464 (1988); B-212337, February 17, 1984; B-21 1660, December 15, 1983. Unlike compromise, the termination of collection action against the recipient does not eliminate the accountable officer's liability for any unrecovered balance. 67 Comp. Gen. at 464.

Adequate collection action also requires referral of the claim to the appropriate collection office within the agency without undue delay. GAO has advised the Army, for example, that a delay of more than three months will generally not be regarded as diligent. 65 Comp. Gen. 812 (1986).

While diligent collection action is a necessary element of the relief equation, the fact that collection efforts have been unsuccessful,

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## H. Restitution, Reimbursement, and Restoration

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### 1. Restitution and Reimbursement

In the present context, restitution means the repayment of a loss by **an** accountable officer from personal funds; reimbursement means the refunding to an accountable officer of amounts previously paid in restitution. Prior to 1955, there was no statutory authority to permit the reimbursement of an accountable officer who had made restitution to the government for a physical loss. Once an accountable **officer** made restitution (if, for example, the agency required it), the decisions held that there was no longer a deficiency in the account for which relief could be considered. 27 **Comp. Gen.** 404 (1948); **B-101301**, July 19, 1951.

Legislation in 1955 (69 Stat. 626) amended what is now 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a) and 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b) to expressly authorize reimbursement of the accountable **officer** for any amounts paid in restitution, if relief is granted. Accordingly, restitution by the accountable officer in physical loss cases is no longer an impediment to the granting of relief. **E.g.**, **B-155149**, October 21, 1964; **B-126362**, February 21, 1956. The 1955 legislation amended **only the** physical loss relief statutes. There is no comparable reimbursement authority in the improper payment relief statutes, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(c) and 3528. **B-226393**, April 29, 1988; **B-223840**, November 5, 1986; **B-128557**, September 21, 1956.

An obvious limitation **on** the reimbursement authority was illustrated in **B-187021**, January 19, 1978. An **imprest** fund cashier sought reimbursement, **claiming** that she had discovered money missing from her cash box and replaced it from personal funds. However, by virtue of her actions in initially concealing the loss, she was unable to show that the loss had in fact ever occurred. Since the **loss** could not be established, reimbursement was denied. Thus, an accountable officer should always report a loss before making restitution.

until the debt is repaid. Thus, several early decisions exist for the somewhat barbaric proposition that the statute requires complete stoppage of pay. E.g., 9 **Comp. Gen.** 272 (1930); 7 **Comp. Gen.** 4 (1927). While these and similar **early** decisions have not been explicitly overruled, the current view is that the statute will be satisfied by withholding in reasonable installments. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 606 (1985); **B-180957-O**, M., September 25, 1979. Collection in installments is also authorized when operating under 37 U.S.C. **§1007(a)**. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 83,85 (1962). For employees no longer on the payroll, offset under 5 U.S.C. **§5512(a)** has been held to embrace collection from retirement funds to the extent authorized. Parker v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 553,559 (1969); 39 **Comp. Gen.** 203,206 (1959). GAO has also approved “flagging” the retirement account of an accountable officer **still** on the payroll. **B-217114**, February 29, 1988.

When applying 5 U.S.C. **§5512(a)** or 37 U.S.C. **§1007(a)**, the procedures to be followed are those prescribed by 4 C.F.R. **§§ 102.3** and 102.4 for administrative offsets under 31 U.S.C. ~~**§3716.64**~~ **Comp. Gen.** 142 (1984).

If pay is withheld under 5 U.S.C. **§5512(a)**, the statute provides a means to obtain judicial review of the indebtedness. Under 5 U.S.C. **§5512(b)**, GAO is required, upon the request of the individual or his or her agent or attorney to immediately report the balance due to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General is required within 60 days to order suit to be commenced against the individual. This provision was part of the original 1828 legislation, several decades prior to either the Tucker Act or the establishment of the Court of Claims, at a time when there was no other means available for the accountable officer to initiate judicial proceedings. It now exists as one way among several. Installment deductions are not required to stop during the litigation; if the accountable **officer** prevails, amounts collected are refunded. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 606, 608 (1985). Sample referrals under 5 U.S.C. **§5512(b)** are 64 **Comp. Gen.** 605 (1985); **B-217114.7**, May 6, 1991; and **B-220492**, December 10, 1985.

226. Such **adjustments** could then be considered as part of the costs of the disbursing function for purposes of determining charges assessed against the user agencies and thus distributed to all user agencies in the same manner as other **costs**. *Id.* **Twenty** years later, GAO reached the same result with respect to **losses** of United States currency incident to the 1975 evacuation from Vietnam. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 791, 796–97 (1977).

b. Other Situations

If a loss is due to fault or negligence by an accountable officer, and the agency head determines that the loss is uncollectible, the amount of the loss maybe restored by a charge to the appropriation or fund available for the expenses of the accountable function. 31 U.S.C. **§ 3530(a)**. Uncollectible includes uncollectible from the accountable officer. *E.g.*, **B-177910**, February 20, 1973. As with **adjustments** under 31 U.S.C. **§ 3527(d)**, section **3530(a)** requires the loss to be charged to the appropriation available for the **fiscal** year in which the **adjustment** is made (appropriation “currently available”). This authority applies (1) where relief is denied, or (2) where the agency does not seek relief, the **uncollectibility** determination being required in either event. Representative cases are **B-235405**, March 19, 1990; **B-219246**, September 9, 1985; **B-188715**, January 31, 1978; and **B-167827**, February 4, 1975.

Assuming the statutory conditions are met, **adjustments under 31 U.S.C. § 3530** are made directly by the agency with no need for specific authorization or concurrence from GAO. 7 GAO-PPM **§ 8.14.D**. Restoration under section 3530 is merely an accounting **adjustment** and does not affect the accountable officer’s personal liability. 31 U.S.C. **§ 3530(b)**. Thus, although the adjustment is premised on a determination of **uncollectibility**, collection efforts should resume if warranted by future developments.

The statutes described above, 31 U.S.C. §§ **3527(d)** and **3530**, will cover most situations in which restoration is needed in that relief is mostly either granted or denied or not sought. There are, however, situations in which neither statute applies. For example, a thief fraudulently obtained over \$10,000 from the patients trust account at a **VA** hospital. He was convicted and ordered to make restitution. The restitution order was lifted 3 years later, but the **VA** had by then recovered only a small portion of the loss. The VA decided that pursuing the thief any further **would** be fruitless, and it had previously

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## 2. Restoration

Restoration of an account suffering a loss or deficiency—an accounting adjustment to restore the shortage with funds from some other source—is authorized under two provisions of law, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527(d) and 3530. The Comptroller General is required by 31 U.S.C. § 3530(c) to prescribe implementing regulations. These are found in title 7 of GAO’s Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, § 8.14.

### a. Adjustment Incident to Granting of Relief

If relief is granted under either 31 U.S.C. § 3527(a) or 31 U.S.C. § 3527(c), GAO may authorize restoration of the account. Restoration is accomplished by charging either an appropriation specifically available for that purpose or, if there is no such appropriation, the appropriation or fund available for the accountable function. The charge is made to the fiscal year in which the adjustment is made, and not the fiscal year in which the loss occurred. 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d). Subsection (d) applies only to subsections (a) and (c), and not to subsection (b) (military disbursing officers). However, the military departments have separate authority in 10 U.S.C. §§ 2777(b) and 2781. There is no restoration provision in 31 U.S.C. ~~§ 3528~~.

Whenever account adjustment is deemed necessary, the agency should include in its relief request a citation (account symbol) to the appropriation it proposes to charge. 7 GAO-PPM § 8.14.A. In cases where agencies are authorized to grant relief without GAO involvement, they may also exercise the restoration authority of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d) without GAO involvement. Id. § 8.14.C.

A 1957 decision, 37 Comp. Gen. 224, considered the application of 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d) where one agency is disbursing funds on behalf of other agencies. State Department disbursing officers overseas, acting under delegations from the Treasury Department, were authorized to receive and disburse funds on behalf of other government agencies as well as the State Department. If the services were sufficiently extensive to warrant reimbursement, State charged the “user” agencies. Construing 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d), the Comptroller General held that losses in such a situation for which relief was granted but which could not be related to the functions of any particular agency or agencies should be charged to State Department appropriations because they were the appropriations available for the accountable function. “This phraseology clearly is intended to mean the appropriation of the department or agency to which the expenses of carrying on the particular disbursing function are chargeable.” Id. at

# Federal Assistance: Grants and Cooperative Agreements

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determined that there had been no fault or negligence by the accountable officer.

The VA was faced with a dilemma. Clearly the loss had to be restored since the trust account consisted of money belonging to patients, and just as clearly VA's operating appropriations were the only available source. The problem was how to get there. Since the **3-year** statute of limitations on account settlement (31 U.S.C. § 3526(c)) had expired, relief could no longer be considered, so 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d) could not be used. Equally unavailing was 31 U.S.C. § 3530 since the loss did not result from the accountable officer's fault or negligence. However, since the **VA** had an undisputed obligation as trustee to return the trust funds to their rightful owners upon demand, the loss could be viewed as an expense of managing the trust fund. The solution therefore was to restore funds from the unobligated balance of VA's operating appropriation for the fiscal year in which the loss occurred. 68 Comp. Gen. 600 (1989). The authority to make **adjustments** from the unexpended balances of prior years' appropriations is now found in 31 U.S.C. § 1553(a). Once an account has been closed, generally 5 **fiscal** years after expiration, 31 U.S.C. § 1553(b) requires that the **adjustment** be charged, within certain limits, to current appropriations. Thus, the authority now found in 31 U.S.C. § 1553 may provide an alternative if neither 31 U.S.C. § 3527(d) nor 31 U.S.C. § 3530 is available. Of course, if the account to be restored has itself been **closed** pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §§ 1552(a) or 1555, restoration is no longer possible.



# Federal Assistance: Grants and Cooperative Agreements

## A. Introduction

The federal government provides assistance in many forms, financial and otherwise. Assistance programs are designed to serve a variety of purposes. Objectives may include fostering some element of national policy, stimulating private sector involvement, or furnishing aid of a type or to a class of beneficiaries the private market cannot or is unwilling to otherwise accommodate. A broad definition of “assistance” in this context is found in 31 U.S.C. § 6101(3) (Federal Program Information Act)— “the transfer of anything of value for a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by [law].” A similar definition occurs in 31 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968).

A federal grant maybe defined as a form of assistance authorized by statute in which a federal agency (the grantor) transfers something of value to a party (the grantee) usually, but not always, outside of the federal government, for a purpose, undertaking, or activity of the grantee which the government has chosen to assist, to be carried out without substantial involvement on the part of the **federal** government. The “thing of value” is usually money, but may, depending on the program legislation, also include property or **services**.<sup>1</sup> The grantee, again depending on the program legislation, may be a state or local government, a nonprofit organization, or a private individual or business entity. Programs administered by state governments comprise the largest category, involving federal outlays of over \$100 billion a **year**.<sup>2</sup>

The 1990 edition (24th ed.) of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, **updated** as of December 1990,<sup>3</sup> lists 1,183 assistance programs **administered** by 52 federal agencies. To be sure, a large number of these are not grant programs since the catalog includes loan and loan guarantee programs plus certain types of non-financial assistance. Nevertheless, it is a safe statement that there are hundreds

<sup>1</sup>The, **earliest** grant programs were land grants. Monetary grants appear to have entered the stage in 1879 **although** they are largely a **20th** century development. Madden, The Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Federal **Grants**, in Federal Grant Law 9 (M. Mason ed. 1982).

<sup>2</sup>HR Rep No. 696, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) (report “**the House Committee**” on Government Operations on the Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990). For a summary listing of federal assistance programs for state and local governments, cross-referenced to the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, see Federal Aid: Programs Available to State and Local Governments, GAO/HRD-91-93FS (May 1991).

<sup>3</sup>The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance is published annually by the **General Services Administration** and the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 6104 and OMB Circular No. A-89.

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McGee v. **Mathis**, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143, 155 (1866). See also United States v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 256 U.S. 51,63-64 (1921).

Lower courts applied the contract theory in various contexts, often to enforce grantee compliance with grant **conditions**,<sup>5</sup> to determine jurisdiction under the Tucker **Act**,<sup>6</sup> or to analyze the nature of the government's obligations under a particular grant statute or **agreement**.<sup>7</sup>

GAO followed suit. E.g., 68 **Comp. Gen.** 609 (1989); 50 **Comp. Gen.** 470 (1970); 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289,294 (1962); 41 **Comp. Gen.** 134, 137 (1961); **B-232010**, March 23, 1989; **B-167790**, January 15, 1973. In 50 **Comp. Gen.** 470, for example, a medical teaching facility, recipient of a reimbursement-type construction grant under the **Public Health Service Act**, was caught in a cash flow crisis because disbursement of grant funds was much less frequent than its contractor's need for progress payments. The question was whether the grant could be regarded as a "contract or claim" so the recipient could assign future **grant** proceeds to a bank in return for an interim loan, pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act. Noting that the accepted grant constituted a "valid contract," and that assignment was not prohibited by the program legislation, regulations of the grantor agency, or the terms of the grant agreement, GAO concluded that assignment under the Assignment of Claims Act was permissible.

Thus, the researcher will find a body of case law standing for the proposition that there are certain contractual aspects to a grant relationship. What this does is provide a known body of law which, together with the relevant **program** legislation and regulations, is

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<sup>5</sup>E.g., United States v. Frazer, 297 F.Supp. 319, 322-23 (M.D. Ala. 1968); United States v. Sumter County School Dist. No. 2, 232 F. Supp. 945,950 (E. D.S.C. 1964); United States v. County School Bd., 221 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (E.D.Va. 1963).

<sup>6</sup>E.g., Missouri Health and Medical Org., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.2d 870 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Texas v. United States, 537 F.2d 466 (Ct. Cl. 1976); County of Suffolk v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 295 (1990); Kentucky ex rel. Cabinet for Human Resources v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 755, 762 (1989); Rogers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 39,44 (1987); Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 85, 88-89 (1985). While most of these cases, Missouri Health for example, use language carefully crafted to avoid confusion between a grant agreement and a "traditional," i.e., procurement, contract, the **essence** of the jurisdictional finding is that the claim is based on some form of "contract."

<sup>7</sup>E.g., City of Manassas Park v. United States, 633 F.2d 181 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (claim found to be **noncontractual**, but agreement referred to as "**grant** contract" and grantor-grantee relationship as "**privity** of contract"); Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285 (ct. cl. 1974).

of federal grant programs **administered** by dozens of agencies. Many of the programs are governed by detailed legislation and even more detailed regulations, and many of the cases, since they hinge on specific statutory or regulatory provisions, **are** not amenable to treatment in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is still possible **to** extract a number of principles of “grant law” from the perspective of the availability **and** use of appropriated **funds**.

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## B. Grants vs. Procurement Contracts

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### 1. Nature of a Grant

From the perspective of legal analysis, what precisely is a grant? Not too long **ago**, it was commonplace to discuss the grant relationship in contract terms with little further analysis. Under this approach, the acceptance of a grant of federal funds subject to conditions which must be met by the grantee creates a contract between the United States **and** the grantee. The need to clearly distinguish grants from procurement contracts, however, has given rise **to** an emerging body of opinion which attempts to reject the **analogy**.<sup>4</sup> Thus far, although the contract analogy has not been abandoned, the courts have become increasingly cautious in their characterizations, and elements of both approaches will be found, depending on the precise issue involved.

The “grant as a type of contract” approach evolved from early Supreme Court decisions. **In** what maybe the earliest case on the issue, the government had made a-t of land to a **state** on the condition that the state would use the land, or the proceeds from its sale, for certain reclamation purposes. The Court stated:

“It is not doubted that the grant by the United States to the State upon conditions, and the acceptance of **the** grant by the State, constituted a contract. AU the elements of a contract met in the **transaction**,—**competent** parties, proper subject-matter, **sufficient** consideration, and consent of minds.”

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<sup>4</sup>E.g., *Federal Grant Law* (M. Mason ed. 1982) at 2. For further discussion, see P. Dembling & M. Mason, *Essentials of Grant Law Practice*, Chapter 1 (1991).

GAO concluded that the amendments were authorized, noting that the “consideration” flowing to the government under these grants-in-sharp contrast with procurement contracts-consisted only of ‘the benefits to accrue to the public and the United States” through use of the funds to construct the desired facilities. *Id.* at 137.

In recognition of the essential distinctions between a “grant contract” and a “procurement contract,” the Supreme Court has stated:

“Although we agree. . . that. . . grant agreements had a contractual aspect, . . . the **program cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a discrete transaction.** . . . Unlike normal contractual **undertakings**, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public **policy.**”<sup>8</sup>

Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656,669 (1985). The state in that case had argued that, since the grant was “in the nature of a **contract**,”<sup>9</sup> the Court should apply the principle, drawn from contract law, that ambiguities in the grant agreement should be resolved against the government as the drafting party. Based on the analysis summarized in the quoted passage, the Court declined to do so, at least in that case.

Similarly, the contractual doctrine of “impossibility of performance” **has** been held inapplicable to a grant. Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 762 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1985). In that case, the government had imposed a zero error standard on states under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The state argued that error-free administration was impossible. While agreeing with that factual proposition, the court nevertheless held that the zero tolerance level was **permissible** under the governing statute and regulations. The impossibility of performance doctrine “relates to commercial contracts and not to grant in aid programs.” *Id.* at 409.

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<sup>8</sup>This passage is a good illustration of the **difficulties** one can encounter trying to resolve the “grant vs. contract” debate, at least pending further evolution of the **case** law. On the basis of this passage, which side does the Supreme **Court** now support? Seth to some extent, it would seem.

<sup>9</sup>Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 638 (1985), quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17 (1981).

available to be applied in **determining** basic rights and obligations. It does not have to follow, nor **has** GAO or, to our knowledge, any court suggested, that **all** of the trappings of a procurement contract somehow attach.

The problem, perhaps, is not so much whether a grant relationship can or cannot be said to contain certain “contractual” elements, but in failing to recognize that the analogy is a limited one. Clearly, proponents of the “**grant contract**” theory must tread cautiously **to** avoid untenable positions. As we will see in our discussion of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, going too far with the analogy bred confusion which led the Commission on Government Procurement to recommend, and the Congress to enact, legislation **to** attempt to distinguish between the two types of relationship.

Where all of this will go will be determined in future litigation. For now, in any event, it must be emphasized that whatever one’s views on the contractual nature of a grant relationship, a grant and a procurement contract are two **very** different things.

Take, for example, the issue of consideration. While the typical grant agreement may well include **sufficient** legal consideration from the standpoint of supporting a legal obligation, it maybe quite different from the consideration found in procurement contracts. As we noted in our introduction to this chapter, a grant is a form of assistance to a designated class of recipients authorized by statute to meet recognized needs. Grant needs, by definition, are not needs for goods or services required by the federal government itself. The needs are those of a nonfederal entity, whether public or private, which the Congress has decided to assist as being in the public interest.

An illustration of where this distinction can lead is 41 **Comp. Gen.** 134 (1961). A provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorized grants to states for the construction of sewage treatment works, up to a stated percentage of estimated costs, with the grantee to pay all remaining costs. Strong demand for limited funds meant that grants were frequently awarded for amounts less than the **permissible** ceiling. The question was whether these **grants could** be amended in a subsequent fiscal year to increase the amount to, or at least closer to, the statutory ceiling. If a straight “grant equals contract” approach had been applied, the answer would have been no, **unless** the government received additional consideration. However,

Community Relations-Social Development Commission v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 723, 725 (1985). Thus, **if a** grantee does what it has committed itself to do and incurs allowable costs, **the** government is obligated to pay. **E.g., B-181332**, December 28, 1976.

Conversely, the government has a right to expect that the grantee will use the grant funds only for authorized grant purposes and only in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289,294 (1962); 41 **Comp. Gen.** 134, 137 (1961). The right of a grantor agency to oversee the expenditure of funds by the grantee to ensure that the money is used only for authorized purposes, and the grantee's corresponding duty to account to the grantor for **its** use of the funds, are implicit in the grant relationship and are not dependent upon specific language in the authorizing legislation. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 582 (1985).

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## 2. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act

Along-standing confusion between grant relationships and procurement relationships led the **Commission on Government Procurement**, in its 1972 report, to recommend the enactment of legislation **to** distinguish assistance from procurement, and to further refine the concept of assistance by clearly distinguishing grants from cooperative **agreements**.<sup>10</sup> While Congress did not enact **all** of the Commission's recommendations in this area, it did enact these two, in the form of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977,<sup>31</sup> **U.S.C. §§ 6301–6308**.

Prior to the enactment of this statute, most relationships between the federal government and **organizations** that received direct federal assistance funding were characterized simply as "grants" or "**grants-in-aid**."<sup>11</sup> As is still the case, it had always been understood that an agency could make grants only if it was authorized by statute to do so. Prior to the Act, however, it was generally felt that the

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<sup>10</sup>Report of the **Commission on Government Procurement**, **Volume 3**, Chapters **1-3** generally (December 1972).

<sup>11</sup>Although the terms are often used interchangeably, there is a technical distinction. A "grant-in-aid" is a grant to a state or local government. The term "grant" is broader and includes nongovernmental recipients. See GAO, **A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process**, **PAD-81-27** (March 1981), at 61-62. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act was intended to eliminate the term "grant-in-aid" in favor of the simpler "grant," regardless of the identity of the recipient. S. Rep. No. 449, **95th Cong., 2d Sess.** 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 11, 18.

A 1971 decision, 51 **Comp. Gen.** 162, illustrates another distinction. In that case, the Comptroller General concluded that an ineligible grantee **could** not be reimbursed for expenditures under quantum meruit principles. In the typical grant situation, the grantee's activities are not performed solely for the direct benefit of the government and the government does not receive any measurable, tangible benefit in the traditional contract sense.

Still another distinction is the reluctance of the courts to apply the "contract implied in fact" concept in the grant context. E.g., Somerville Technical Services v. United States, 640 **F.2d** 1276 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The reasoning in part is that a grant is a sovereign act binding the government only to the extent of its express **undertakings**.

In American Hospital Association v. Schweiker, 721 **F.2d** 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 **US** 958, the court rejected the contention that otherwise valid regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services impaired contractual rights of grantees under the Hill-Burton hospital assistance program.

"[T]he relationship between the government **and** the hospitals here cannot be wholly captured by the term 'contract' and the analysis traditionally associated with that term. . . . The contract analogy thus has only limited application."

Id. at 182–83. Finally, the court in United States v. Kensington Hospital, 760 **F. Supp.** 1120 (**E.D.** Pa. 1991), refused to apply the Anti-Kickback Act to government claims for fraud under the Medicare and Medicaid programs, finding that the government's relationship with its grantees under these programs could not be characterized as "prime contracts" for purposes of the Act.

In sum, it seems clear that many of the rules and principles of contract law will not be automatically applied to grants. Nevertheless, whether one prefers to regard a grant as a **type** of contract, or "in the nature of" a contract, or as a generically different creature, it is equally clear that the creation of a grant relationship results in certain legal obligations flowing in both directions, enforceable by the application of basic contract rules. As the Claims Court has stated:

"[A] notice of a federal grant award in return for the grantee's performance of services can create cognizable obligations to the extent of the government's undertakings therein."



must be used, using the statutory definitions for guidance as to which instrument is appropriate. The Office of Management and Budget is authorized to provide guidance on the implementation of the Act. 31 U.S.C. §6307. OMB published “final guidance” on August 18, 1978 (43 Fed. Reg. 36860).

It is important **to** note that the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act does not expand an agency’s substantive authority. While the Act provides the basis for **examining** whether an arrangement should be a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, determinations of whether an agency has authority to enter into the relationship as spelled out in the instrument, whatever its label, must be based on the agency’s authorizing or program legislation, not the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act. Unless legislatively prohibited, every agency has inherent authority to enter into contracts to procure goods or services for **its** own use, as long as the purpose of the procurement is reasonably related **to** the agency’s mission. However, there is no comparable inherent authority to give away the government’s money or property, either directly or by the release of vested rights, to benefit someone other than the government; this must be authorized by Congress. **E.g.**, 51 **Comp. Gen.** 162, 165 (1971). Therefore, the agency’s basic legislation must be studied to determine whether an assistance relationship is authorized at all, and if so, under what circumstances and conditions.

Where an agency has authority to enter into both a procurement **and** an assistance relationship to **carry** out the particular program, it has authority **to** exercise discretion in choosing which relationship to form in each particular case, but must use the instrument which suits the relationship, as provided in the Act. **In** this sense, the analysis of an agency’s program **authority** is not really a matter of discretion-the statutory authority either is there or is not there, regardless of agency preference. The significance of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act is that it emphasizes the substance of an agency’s program authority rather than the particular labels used or not used.

In this connection, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has stated:

“[The Federal Grant and **Cooperative** Agreement Act] was never intended to be an independent grant of authority to agencies to enter into assistance or contractual relationships where no such authority can be found in authorizing legislation. Rather, it was and is intended to force agencies to use a legal instrument that, according to

legislation pretty much had to mention “grants” explicitly in order to confer that authority.

The Act established standards that agencies are to use in selecting the most appropriate funding vehicle—a procurement contract, a grant, or a cooperative agreement. The standards are contained in sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 6303–6305, summarized below:

- Procurement contracts An agency is to use a procurement contract when “the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government.” 31 U.S.C. §6303.
- Grant agreements. An agency is to use **a grant** agreement when “the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value [money, property, services, etc.] to the . . . recipient to **carry** out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government,” and “substantial involvement is not expected” between the agency and the recipient when carrying out the contemplated activity. 31 U.S.C. §6304.
- Cooperative agreements. An agency is to use a cooperative agreement when “the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to the . . . recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government,” and “substantial involvement is expected” between the agency and the recipient when carrying out the contemplated activity. 31 U.S.C. §6305.

Under the Act, grants **and** cooperative agreements are more closely related to one another than either is to a procurement contract. The essential distinction between a grant and a cooperative agreement is the degree of federal involvement.

Each agency’s program authority must be analyzed to identify the type of relationships authorized, and the circumstances under which each authorized relationship can be entered into without regard to the presence of specific words such as “grant” in the program legislation. Once authority is found, the legal instrument (contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) that fits the arrangement as contemplated

In several more recent cases, GAO's analysis of the relationship **and** of relevant legislation **and** legislative history **led it to** conclude that a contract, rather than a grantor cooperative agreement, was the proper instrument. 67 **Comp. Gen.** 13 (1987), affirmed upon reconsideration, **B-227084.6**, December 19, 1988 (operation of research and training programs at government facility funded by Maritime **Administration**); 65 **Comp. Gen.** 605 (1986) (proposed study, sponsored by Council on Environmental Quality, of risks and benefits of certain pesticides, intended for use by federal regulatory agencies); **B-222665**, July 2, 1986 (awards to Indian tribes by Interior Department under Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which contained an express exemption from the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act); **B-210655**, April 14, **1983** (funding by Department of Energy of college campus forums on nuclear energy). In 61 **Comp. Gen.** 428 (1982), however, GAO agreed with the Department of **Energy's** use of a cooperative agreement **to** design and construct a "prototype solar parabolic dish/sterling engine system module," finding that the proposal's primary purpose was to encourage development and early market entry rather than to acquire the particular item for **its** own use, although it would eventually have governmental applications.

These questions are important because procurement contracts are subject to **a** variety of statutory and regulatory requirements which may not be generally applicable to assistance **transactions**. If the type of relationship is not determined properly, assistance arrangements could be used to evade **otherwise** applicable legal requirements. Conversely, legitimate assistance awards should not be burdened by all of the formalities of procurement contracts.

The analysis required by the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act may also be relevant in determining the applicability of other laws. See, **e.g.**, Hammond v. Donovan, 538 F. **Supp.** 1106 (**W.D. Mo.** 1982) holding that the relationship between the Labor Department and a state employment office was a grant, and therefore not subject to a statute which required that **certain** procurement contracts contain an **affirmative** action for veterans provision.

Another situation that has generated some controversy is the so-called "third party" or "intermediary" situation—where a federal agency provides assistance to **specified** recipients by using an intermediary. Again, it is necessary to **examine** the agency's program authority to

the criteria established by the Act, matches the intended and authorized relationship—regardless of the **terminology** used in existing legislation to characterize the **instrument** to be used in the **transaction**.”<sup>12</sup>

Further discussion may be found in **B-196872 -O.M.**, March 12, 1980 and a GAO report entitled **Agencies Need Better Guidance for Choosing Among Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements**, **GGD-81-88**, September 4, 1981.<sup>13</sup>

The approach used in the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act is illustrated in several decisions. In one case, the Interior Department asked whether it could use its appropriation for expenses of the American Samoan Judiciary for certain expenses, including **entertainment** and the purchase of motor vehicles. Using the guidelines of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, the Comptroller General reviewed the relationship between the Interior Department and the American Samoan Judiciary and concluded that it was essentially a grant relationship. (Congress **confirmed** this interpretation by inserting the word “grant” in the next year’s appropriation.) Therefore, restrictions such as those relating to **entertainment** and motor vehicles, which would apply to the direct expenditure of appropriations by the federal government or through a contractor did not apply to expenditures by the grant recipient, absent some provision to the contrary in the appropriation, agency regulations, or grant agreement. **B-196690**, March 14, 1980.

In 59 **Comp. Gen.** 424 (1980), the Environmental Protection **Agency’s** public participation program of providing **financial** assistance to certain interveners was viewed as essentially a grant relationship rather than a contractual one. Accordingly, 31 U.S.C. § 3324 was held not to preclude participants from receiving funds in advance of the completion of participation, subject to the provision of adequate **fiscal** controls.

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<sup>12</sup>S. Rep. No. 180, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3,6. While this is not direct legislative **history with** respect to the 1977 statute, it is nevertheless important as a clear statement from one of the **relevant jurisdictional** committees.

<sup>13</sup>**Controversy over** whether the **Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act constituted an** independent source of authority stemmed from an ambiguous provision in the original enactment. See Pub. L. No. 95-224, § 7(a), 92 Stat. 5. When the statute was moved to **Title 31** as part of the 1982 **recodification** of that title, section 7(a) was omitted as duplicative. Thus, while the proposition discussed in the text remains valid, many of the authorities cite to a provision which is no longer found in the U.S. Code.

technical assistance to certain block grant recipients. While HUD's authority to provide technical assistance to the block grant recipients was clear, there was no authority to provide assistance **to the intermediary organization**. The essence of the intermediary transaction was the acquisition of services for **ultimate** delivery to authorized recipients. Thus, GAO concluded that a procurement contract should have been used. The decision largely repudiated (although it did not expressly overrule) **B-194229**. 61 **Comp. Gen. at** 641.

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in its 1981 report mentioned earlier in this discussion, also addressed the intermediary issue and agreed with GAO's interpretation:

"The choice of instrument for an intermediary relationship depends solely on the principal federal purpose in the relationship with the intermediary. The fact that the product or service produced by the intermediary may benefit another party is irrelevant. What is important is whether the federal government's principal purpose is to acquire **the** intermediary's services, which may happen to take the form of producing a product or carrying out a service that is then delivered to an assistance recipient, or if the government's principal purpose is to assist the intermediary to do the same thing. Where the recipient of an award is not receiving assistance from the federal agency but is merely used to provide a service to another entity which is eligible for assistance, the proper instrument is a procurement contract."

S. Rep. No. 180 at 3; 1982 U.S. Code **Cong. & Admin. News** at 5.

Most of the cases discussed in the remainder of this chapter are expressed in "grant" terms. However, the principles discussed in the cases should generally apply to cooperative agreements as well.

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### 3. Competition for Discretionary Grant Awards

Grant programs are either mandatory or discretionary. In a mandatory grant program, Congress directs awards to one or more classes of prospective recipients who meet **specific** criteria for eligibility, in **specified** amounts. These grants, sometimes called "entitlement" grants, are often awarded on the basis of statutory formulas. While the grantor agency may disagree on the application of the formula, it has **no** basis to refuse to make the award altogether. City of Los Angeles v. Coleman, 397 F. **Supp.** 547 (D.D.C. 1975). Thus, questions of grantee selection, and hence of competition, do not arise. The concept of competition can only apply when the grantor has discretion to choose one applicant over another. Therefore, the following discussion is limited to discretionary grants.

determine the authorized forms of assistance. The agency's relationship with the intermediary should normally be a procurement contract if the intermediary is not itself a member of a class eligible to receive assistance from the government. In other words, if an agency program contemplates provision of technical advice or services to a **specified** group of recipients, the agency may provide the advice or services itself or hire an intermediary to do it for the agency. In that case, the proper vehicle to fund the intermediary is a procurement contract. The agency is "buying" the services of the intermediary for its own purposes, to relieve the agency of the need to provide the advice or services with its own staff.

On the other hand, if the program purpose contemplates support to certain types of intermediaries to provide consultation or other **specified** services to third parties, GAO has approved the agency's choice of a grant rather than a contract as the preferred funding vehicle. Thus, in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 785 (1979), GAO found that the Department of Commerce's Office of Minority Business Enterprise (now the Minority Business Development Agency) could properly award a noncompetitive grant to an intermediary organization to provide management and technical assistance to **minority** business firms. Although the point was not detailed in the decision, the agency clearly had the requisite program authority to provide grant assistance to the intermediary.

Sometimes the program legislation is much less clear about the status of an **intermediary** as a grantee. GAO, applied 58 **Comp. Gen.** 785 in another 1979 case, **B-194229**, September 20, 1979, upholding the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's authority to provide grant assistance to an intermediary to in turn provide technical assistance to public schools. There, however, it was doubtful that HEW had the requisite program authority to deal with the intermediary by grant rather than procurement contract. The decision appears to have interpreted the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act as independently enlarging HEW's program authority.

While GAO has not explicitly stated that **B-194229** was wrongly decided, subsequent items, starting with GAO's analysis in **GGD-81-88** and **B-196872** -O. M., previously cited, have cast considerable doubt on that decision's validity. In a 1982 decision, 61 **Comp. Gen.** 637, the Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded a cooperative agreement to a nonprofit organization to provide

grant rather than the recipient to whom it was actually awarded. **B-203096**, May 20, 1981; **B-199247**, August 21, 1980; **B-199147**, June 24, 1980; **B-190092**, September 22, 1977. This does not affect the Comptroller General's jurisdiction to render decisions on the legality of federal expenditures, however, so **GAO can and will** render decisions on the legality of grant awards in terms of compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.

GAO **has** adopted a similar position with respect to cooperative agreements. GAO will not consider a "protest" against the award of a cooperative agreement unless it appears that a conflict of interest exists or that the agency is using the cooperative agreement to avoid the competitive requirements of the procurement **laws** (i.e., in violation of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act) and regulations. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 669 (1985); 61 **Comp. Gen.** 428 (1982); **B-216587**, October 22, 1984. Again, this refers to review under GAO's "bid protest" jurisdiction and does not affect review under **GAO's** other available authorities.

In **summary**, assuming the proper instrument has been selected, **GAO will** not question **funding** decisions in discretionary federal assistance programs. **B-228675**, August 31, 1987 (denial of application for funding renewal held to be a policy matter within grantor agency's discretion where nothing in program legislation provided otherwise and agency had complied with applicable procedural requirements). See also City of Sarasota v. Environmental Protection Agency, 813 **F.2d** 1106 (11th Cir. 1987) (court declined jurisdiction over issue which it characterized as a grant funding decision); Massachusetts Department of Correction v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 605 **F.2d** 21 (1st Cir. 1979) (court upheld agency's refusal to award grant, finding that procedural deficiencies, even though they amounted to "sloppiness," were not **sufficiently** grave as to deprive applicant of fair consideration).

**The law** in this area is still developing in terms of the kinds of issues the courts will look at and the standards and remedies they will apply. Trends and case law are discussed in detail in Richard B. **Cappalli**, Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements-Law, Policy, and Practice, Chapter 3 (1982). **Cappalli** sees an emerging "**right** to fair process" at least to the extent of requiring agencies to follow applicable procedures (**id.** at § 3:26), although its precise scope and parameters await further legislative or judicial definition.

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act encourages competition in assistance programs where appropriate, in order to identify and fund the best possible projects to achieve program objectives. 31 U.S.C. § 6301(3). This, however, is merely a statement of purpose, and there are few other legislative pronouncements specifying how this objective is to be achieved, certainly nothing approaching the detail and specificity of the legislation applicable to procurement contracts, such as the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. Statutory requirements for competition in grantee selection do exist in certain contexts, but they tend to be very general and do not **specify actual** procedures. Examples are 10 U.S.C. § 2361(a) (competitive procedures required for Defense Department research grants), and 10 U.S.C. § 2196(i) (ditto for Defense Department manufacturing engineering education grants).

At the request of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the General Accounting Office surveyed the administrators of 355 discretionary grant programs listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, and studied the award processes for 26 of those programs, to determine the extent of competition. The 355 programs represented about 98,000 awards in **fiscal** year 1984 to state and local **governments** and other organizations and individuals, amounting to about \$12 billion. GAO found that nearly 2/3 of the programs attempted to solicit applications **from** all eligible applicants; public interest groups expressed overall satisfaction with agency solicitation practices. Over 3/4 of the programs consistently used persons outside the program office to provide an independent perspective in reviewing applications. Nevertheless, GAO did note some departures from the competitive process which did not appear to have been subjected to internal review and justification. GAO recommended that the President's Council on Management Improvement (established by Executive Order No. 12479, May 24, 1984) work with the agencies in a **governmentwide** effort to improve managerial accountability for discretionary grant programs. GAO's report is Discretionary Grants-Opportunities to Improve Federal Discretionary Award Practices, GAO/HRD-86-108 (September 1986).

In view of the essential differences between grants and procurement contracts, GAO has declined to use its bid protest mechanism, prescribed to assure the fairness of awards of contracts, to rule on the propriety of individual grant awards—that is, GAO will not consider a complaint by a rejected applicant that it should have received the



has declined to apply the Bradley presumption to grant law. In a 1985 decision, the Court held:

“[A]bsent a clear indication to the contrary in the relevant **statutes** or legislative history, changes in the substantive **standards** governing federal **grant** programs do not alter **obligations** and liabilities arising under earlier grants.”

Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 641 (1985). Thus, for purposes of grant law, “obligations generally should be determined by reference to the law in effect when the **grants** were made.” *Id.* at 638.

b. The Grant **as an** Exercise of Congressional Spending Power , when Congress enacts grant legislation and provides appropriations to fund the grants, it is exercising the spending power conferred upon it by the Constitution.<sup>14</sup> **Assuch**, it **is** clear that Congress **has the** power to attach terms and conditions to the **availability** or receipt of grant funds, either in the grant legislation **itself or in** a separate enactment. Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (provision of **Hatch Act** prohibiting political activity by employees of state or **local** government agencies receiving federal grant funds upheld as within congressional power).

In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 imposing minority set-aside requirements on purchases by state and **local** grantees. The Court said:

“**Congress** has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of **federal** moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal **statutory** and administrative **directives**. This **Court has** repeatedly upheld **against** constitutional **challenge** the use of **this** technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate **voluntarily** with federal policy.”

*Id.* at 474. See also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1981); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968). It follows that, under the Supremacy Clause, valid federal legislation will prevail over inconsistent state law. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (state statute inconsistent with

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<sup>14</sup>It may be acting under other enumerated powers as well. “Congress is not required to identify the precise source of its authority when it enacts legislation.” Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 449 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070.

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## C. Some Basic Concepts

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### 1. General Rules

A number of principles have evolved that are unique to grant law. These will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Many cases, however, involve the application of principles of law which are not unique to grants. As a general proposition, the fundamental principles of appropriations law discussed in preceding chapters apply to grants just as they apply to other expenditures. This section is designed to highlight a few of these areas, each of which is covered in detail elsewhere in this publication, and to show how they may apply in assistance contexts.

#### a. Statutory Construction

Established principles of statutory construction apply equally to grant legislation. Examples are: 49 **Comp. Gen.** 411 (1970) (resolution of conflicting elements of legislative history); 49 **Comp. Gen.** 104 (1969) (principle that meaning should be given to every word in a statute used to construe language in **disaster** relief assistance legislation); 46 **Comp. Gen.** 699 (1967) (use of legislative **history** to clarify reapportionment of unused funds under a formula grant program); **B-133001**, January 30, 1979 (construing the term “unexpected urgent need” in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act).

Sometimes they may not apply equally. Under traditional thinking, statutes were viewed as applying prospectively only, **unless** retroactive application was indicated by the **statutory** language or legislative history. In most contexts, grant law followed this approach. See, **e.g.**, 32 **Comp. Gen.** 141 (1952); 30 **Comp. Gen.** 86 (1950). There were occasional exceptions. For example, in 50 **Comp. Gen.** 750 (1971), **GAO** held that an amendment to a program statute which eased certain restrictions could be applied retroactively with respect to funds previously awarded but not yet obligated by the grantees. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that a court should “apply the **law** in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest **injustice** or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.” *Bradley v. Richmond School Board*, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). Post-*Bradley* litigation has produced a fairly complex pattern of analysis and, as discussed in Chapter 2, the precise scope of *Bradley* is unsettled. In any event, the Supreme Court

(1) Purpose

Appropriations may **be** used only for the purpose(s) for which they were made. 31 U.S.C. §1301(a). One of the ways in which this fundamental proposition manifests itself in the grant context is the principle that grant funds may be obligated and expended only for authorized grant purposes. What is an ‘authorized grant purpose’ is determined by **examining** the relevant program legislation, legislative history, and appropriation acts.

Disaster relief assistance legislation, found at 42 U.S.C. Chapter 68, authorizes, among other things, federal financial contributions to state and **local** governments for the repair or replacement of public facilities damaged by a **major** disaster. Decisions under a prior version of this legislation had construed public facilities as including municipal airports (42 **Comp. Gen.** 6 (1962)), including airport facilities which had been leased to private parties for the purpose of generating income for airport maintenance (49 **Comp. Gen.** 104 (1969)). Assistance could also extend to a sewage treatment plant, but not one which was not completed, and thus not in operation, at the time of the damage. 45 **Comp. Gen.** 409 (1966). Unlike the earlier legislation, the current statute defines “public facility,” 42 U.S.C. § 5122(8), and specifically includes airport and sewage treatment facilities. Some other examples are:

- Airport development **grants** under Federal Airport Act may include runway sealing projects which are shown **to be** part of reconstruction or repair rather than normal maintenance. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 588 (1956). See also **B-60032**, September 9, 1946 (grants under same legislation may be made for acquisition of land or existing privately owned airports, to be used as public airports, regardless of whether construction or repair work is immediately contemplated).
- Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration is authorized to make grants to a labor union to fund emergency medical technician training program for coal miners since the proposal bears a sufficiently close relationship to coal mine safety to come within the scope of the governing program legislation. **B-170686**, November 8, 1977.
- Public Health Service grants for support of research training were found authorized under the Public Health Service Act. **B-161769**, June 30, 1967.

eligibility criteria of Aid to Families with Dependent Children legislation held **invalid**).<sup>15</sup>

More recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the power of Congress to attach conditions to grant funds, provided that the conditions are (1) in pursuit of the general welfare, (2) expressed unambiguously, (3) reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure, and (4) not in violation of other constitutional provisions. *New York v. United States*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2426 (1992); *South Dakota v. Dole*, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). *Dole* upheld legislation directing the Department of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states which do not adopt a minimum drinking age of 21. Similarly, legislation conditioning the receipt of federal highway funds on state adoption of the national speed limit has been upheld. *Nevada v. Skinner*, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070.

Where Congress has imposed an otherwise valid condition on the receipt of grant funds by states, the condition is, in effect, a “condition precedent” to a state’s participation in the program. Unless permitted under the program legislation, the condition may not be waived or omitted even though a given state may not be able to participate because state law or the state constitution precludes compliance. *North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano*, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E. D.N.C. 1977), aff’d mem., 435 U.S. 962; 43 Comp. Gen. 174 (1963).

Of course, it is also within the power of Congress to authorize the making of unconditional grants. See **B-80351**, September 30, 1948.

#### c. Availability of Appropriations

As with obligations and expenditures in general, a federal agency may provide financial assistance only to the extent authorized by law and available appropriations. Thus, the three elements of legal **availability—purpose**, time, and amount—apply equally to assistance funds.

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<sup>15</sup>It has also been recognized that the regulations of a grantor agency, if otherwise valid, may preempt state law. *S.J. Groves & Sons v. Fulton County*, 920 F.2d 752, 763–64 (11th Cir. 1991).

(2) Time

Funds must be obligated by the grantor agency within their period of obligational availability. This includes **all** actions necessary to constitute a valid obligation. For example, an “offer of grant” made by the Economic Development Administration to a Connecticut municipality in 1983 was accepted by a town **official** who did not have authority to accept the grant; and the funds expired for obligational purposes before the town was able to ratify the unauthorized acceptance. Under these circumstances, **GAO** concluded that a valid grant never came into existence. **B-220527**, December 16, 1985. The town later submitted a **claim** for reimbursement of its expenses, based on an “equitable **estoppel**” argument. Since the non-existence of the grant was attributable to the town’s actions and not those of the **EDA**, the claim could not be allowed, **B-220527**, August 11, 1987. See also **B-206244**, June 8, 1982.

The “bona fide needs” rule applies to grants and cooperative agreements just as it applies to other types of obligations or expenditures. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 359 (1985); **B-229873**, November 29, 1988. In 64 **Comp. Gen.** 359, obligation of **fiscal** year appropriations for **3-year** biomedical research grants was found improper where not authorized by statute and where the **grants** did not contemplate a required outcome or end product.

(3) Amount

Restrictions on the availability of a lump-sum appropriation are not legally binding unless incorporated expressly or by reference in the appropriation act **itself**. Thus, a plan to fund National Institutes of Health biomedical research grants, funded under a lump-sum appropriation, in a number less than that **specified** in committee reports was not unlawful, as long as all funds were properly obligated for authorized grant purposes. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 359 (1985). See also **B-157356**, August 17, 1978.

Minimum earmarks (e.g., “not less than” or “**shall** be available only”) in an authorization act were found controlling where a later-enacted appropriation act provided a lump sum considerably less than the amount authorized but nevertheless sufficient to meet the earmark requirements. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 388 (1985). The grantor agency will have more discretion where the earmark is a maximum (“not to

A grant for unspecified purposes would, unless expressly authorized by Congress, be improper. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1059, 1062 (1976).

A case from the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates the proposition that an agency may reallocate discretionary funds within a lump-sum appropriation **as** long as it uses those funds for other authorized purposes of the appropriation and does not violate the applicable program legislation. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency may prescribe plans to implement air quality standards for states which fail to submit adequate plans. The Act also authorizes air pollution control grants to states, funded under EPA's lump-sum Abatement, Control, and Compliance appropriation. Under its regulations, EPA divides available funds into **nonmandatory** annual allotments for each state. The regulations also authorize EPA to set aside a portion of the **unawarded** allotments to support federal implementation programs where required because of the absence of adequate state programs. One state argued that the set-aside policy amounted **to** a diversion of funds from their intended purpose and therefore violated 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). The court **first** upheld the regulation as a permissible interpretation of EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act. The court then found that there was no purpose violation because (a) the relevant appropriation act did not earmark any **specific** amount for grants to states, and (b) EPA was still using the set-aside funds for air pollution abatement programs, which was their intended purpose. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. United States EPA, 947 F.2d 283 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991).

This is essentially the same reasoning the Comptroller General had applied in **B-157356**, August 17, 1978. The (then) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare received a lump-sum appropriation for its Office of Human Development Services covering a number of grant programs. The Department wanted to make what it termed "cross-cutting" grants to fund research or demonstration projects which would benefit more than one target population (e.g., aged, children, Native Americans). To do this, each office receiving grant funds under the lump-sum appropriation was asked to set aside a portion of its grant funds. This pool would then be used for approved cross-cutting grants. Since the lump-sum appropriation did not restrict the Department's internal allocation of funds for any given program, GAO approved the concept, provided that the grants were limited to projects within the scope or purpose of the appropriation, a condition necessary to assure compliance with 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a).

These regulations, if properly promulgated and within the bounds of the agency's statutory authority, have the force and effect of law and may not be waived on a retroactive or ad hoc basis. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 662 (1978) (eligibility standards); **B-163922**, February 10, 1978 (grantee's liability for improper expenditures); **B-130515**, July 17, 1974; **B-130515**, July 20, 1973 (matching share requirements). However, the prohibition against waiver does not necessarily apply to regulations which are merely "internal administrative guidelines" as long as the government's interests are adequately protected. See 60 **Comp. Gen.** 208,210 (1981).

The operation of several of these principles is illustrated in **B-203452**, December 31, 1981. The Federal Aviation Administration revised its regulations to permit indirect costs to be charged to Airport Development Aid Program grants. A grantee **filed a** claim for reimbursement of indirect costs incurred prior to the change in the FAA regulations, arguing that the charging of indirect costs was required by a Federal Management Circular even before **FAA** recognized it in its own regulations. **GAO first** pointed out that Federal Management Circulars are internal management tools. They do not have the binding effect of law so as to permit a third party to assert them against a non-complying agency. This being the case, there was **no** impediment to FAA's revising its regulations without making the revision retroactive, as long as both the old and the new regulations were within the scope of FAA's legal authority. See also Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services, 720 **F.2d** 622, 625–26 (10th Cir. 1983) (**HHS** Grant Application Manual was an internal agency publication rather than a regulation with force and effect of law, such that deviation by agency—in this case use of an ineligible member on a funding review panel—did not require reversal of agency action).

Regulations of the grantor agency will generally be upheld, even if they are not specifically addressed in the program legislation, as long as **they** are within the agency's statutory authority, issued in compliance with applicable procedural requirements, and not arbitrary or capricious. For example, courts have upheld the authority of the Department of Agriculture to impose by regulation strict liability on states for lost or stolen food stamp coupons. Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 **F.2d** 788 (10th Cir. 1989); Louisiana. Bergland, 531 **F. Supp.** 118 (M.D. La. 1982), **aff'd** sub nom. Louisiana. Block, 694 **F.2d** 430 (5th Cir. 1982); Hettelman v. Bergland, 642 **F.2d** 63 (4th

exceed”), or where it is expressed only in legislative history.  
**B-171019**, March 2, 1977.

Similar rules apply to expenditures by grantees. In the absence of an earmark or other controlling provision in the applicable program statute, regulations, or the grant agreement, there is no basis to object to a grantee’s allocation of grant funds as long as the funds were spent for **eligible** grant activities. 69 **Comp. Gen.** 600 (1990).

The concept of augmentation of appropriations also applies to assistance funds. One illustration is the rule that a federal institution is generally not eligible to receive grant funds from another federal institution unless the program legislation expressly so provides. The reason is that the grant funds would improperly augment the appropriations of the receiving institution. For example:

- Federal grant funds for nurse training programs could not be allotted to St. Elizabeth Hospital since it was already receiving appropriations to maintain and operate its nursing school. 23 **Comp. Gen.** 694 (1944).
- **Haskell** Indian Junior College, fully funded by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was not eligible to receive **grant** funds from federal agencies other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs, since Congress had already provided for its needs by direct appropriations. **B-114868**, April 11, 1975,
- The **Office** of Education could not make a library support grant under the Higher Education Act of 1965 to the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science as it would be an improper augmentation of the Commission’s appropriations. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 662,664 (1978).

The appropriations which would be augmented by the grant do not have to be specific appropriations for the prohibition to apply. **B-69616**, November 19, 1947. Of course, Congress may legislatively authorize exceptions. E.g., **B-217093**, January 9, 1985.

#### d. Agency Regulations

##### (1) General principles

Legislation establishing an assistance program frequently will define the program objectives and leave it to the administering agency to **fill** in the details by regulation. Thus, agency regulations are of paramount importance in assessing the parameters of grant authority.



thereby bound to follow the notice and comment procedures of the **APA**. Id. at 1188. The court also rejected the government's contention that the guidelines were "procedural" and therefore exempt. "Although an agency's label is **relevant**, it is not **dispositive** of the true character of the agency statement." Id. Accordingly, the court held the guidelines "invalid unless and **until** they are promulgated in compliance with the procedures required by the **APA**." Id. at 1189.

(2) The "common rules"

The importance of agency regulations and management guidance from the Office of Management and Budget is apparent throughout this chapter. Since the structure of that material changed drastically in the late **1980s**, a summary of the new structure maybe helpful.

For a number of years, uniform administrative requirements from **OMB** have been contained in two key circulars, **A-102** (assistance to state, local, and Indian tribal governments) and **A-1 10** (institutions of higher education, hospitals, and other nonprofit organizations). The structure of each circular was similar-a brief introduction followed by more than a dozen attachments with detailed guidance on specific topics.

In 1987, a memorandum from the President directed **OMB** to revise Circular **A-102** to specify uniform, **governmentwide** terms and conditions for grants to state and local governments, and directed executive branch departments and agencies to propose and issue common regulations adopting these terms and conditions verbatim, **modified** where necessary to reflect inconsistent statutory requirements. 23 Weekly **Comp. Pres. Dec.** 254 (March 12, 1987).

A proposed common rule was published on June 9, 1987 (52 Fed. Reg. 21819), and the final common rule was published on March 11, 1988 (53 Fed. Reg. 8033), generally effective as of October 1, 1988. **The** rule was adopted by over 20 agencies, including all of the major grantor agencies. The title is identical for each agency: Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments. The revised Circular **A-102** was issued on March 3, 1988. It is much **simplified** from its predecessor, much of the detail having been shifted to the individual agency regulations.

Cir. 1981). Similarly, it was within the discretion of the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act to prescribe regulations making **wastewater** treatment grants available only for the construction of new facilities and not for the acquisition of preexisting facilities. Cole County Regional Sewer District v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. **551** (1991). “The EPA, like **all** government agencies, is subject to funding constraints and must effectuate policy objectives with available resources.” *Id.* at 557. Another illustration is American Hospital Association v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958, upholding regulations imposing community service and uncompensated care requirements on recipients of Hill-Burton hospital construction grants.

Wholly apart from what the courts might or might not do, an agency’s discretion in funding matters is subject to congressional oversight as well. Congress, if it disfavors an agency’s actual or proposed exercise of otherwise legitimate discretion, can statutorily restrict that discretion, at least prospectively, either by amending the program legislation or by inserting the desired restrictions in appropriation acts. For an example of the latter, see **B-238997.4**, December 12, 1990.

The informal **rulemaking** requirements (notice and comment) of the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply to grant regulations. 5 U.S.C. § **553(a)(2)**. Several agencies, however, have published statements committing themselves to compliance with the **APA** and have thereby effectively waived the exemption. Where regulations are required to **be** published in the Federal Register, failure to do so may render them ineffective. The issue has been before the courts on several occasions. See, *e.g.*, **B-130515**, July 17, 1974. (See Chapter 3 for further elaboration and case citations.)

A case not cited in Chapter 3 which applies several important Administrative Procedure Act principles in the grant context is Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. **Supp.** 1172 (**W.D. Wis.** 1990). A grantee university and one of its professors challenged a set of scientific misconduct investigation guidelines which the National Institutes of Health had published **in** a grants **administration** manual but not in the Federal Register. The court **first** found that the guidelines met the **APA’s** definition of a ‘rule.’” *Id.* at 1187. The court then noted that the Department of **Health and Human Services** had voluntarily waived the exemption in 5 U.S.C. § **553** for rules relating to grants, and was

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Suspension is a temporary exclusion, usually pending the completion of an investigation involving one or more of the causes for debarment. See generally Common Rule Subpart D, 53 Fed. Reg. 19208–09.

The General Services Administration is responsible for compiling and distributing a list of debarred or suspended persons. Id. § \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>500,53</sup> Fed. Reg. 19209. The list, entitled Lists of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Nonprocurement Programs, is issued monthly by GSA’s **Office** of Acquisition Policy **and** is also available electronically.

Another common rule, in the form of an “interim final **rule**” adopted by 28 grantor agencies, was issued on February 26, 1990 (55 Fed. Reg. 6736) to implement restrictions on grantee lobbying enacted in late 1989 and described in our section on lobbying in Chapter 4.

Still another common rule was issued on May 25, 1990 (55 Fed. Reg. 21681) to implement the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. § 702), which requires that grant recipients, including individuals, **certify** as a precondition of receiving federal funds that they have taken certain anti-drug abuse measures. Violation of the statute or regulations may result in suspension of grant payments, suspension or termination of the grant, and/or suspension or debarment of the grantee for a period of up to 5 years. 41 U.S.C. § 702(b); Common Rule § \_\_\_\_\_.<sup>620,55</sup> Fed. Reg. at 21689.

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## **2. Contracting by Grantees**

Grantees commonly enter into contracts with third parties in the course of performing their grants. While the United States is not a party to the contracts, the grantee must nevertheless comply with any requirements imposed by statute, regulation, or the terms of the grant agreement, in awarding federally assisted contracts. 54 **Comp. Gen.** 6 (1974). Violation of applicable procurement standards may result in the loss of federal funding. E.g., Town of Fallsburg v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 633 (1991).

For a period of nearly 10 years, GAO undertook a limited review of the propriety of contract awards made by a grantee in furtherance of grant purposes, upon request of a prospective contractor. This limited review role was announced in 40 Fed. Reg. 42406 (September 12, 1975). (GAO called these “complaints” rather than “protests.”) GAO

Under the common rule, the pertinent Code of Federal Regulations title and part number will, of course, vary with the agency. Section numbers, however, are identical for each agency. For example, the definition section is \_\_\_\_3 and the provision dealing with program income is \_\_\_\_25.

The common rule itself is published at 53 Fed. Reg. 8087–8103. Pages 8042–8087 give the preambles and variations of the adopting agencies. References to the common rule in this chapter will cite the rule itself and not the regulations of any particular agency. The reader is therefore cautioned to check individual agency regulations for possible variations,

The common rule is intended to supersede unmodified manuals and handbooks unless required by statute or approved by the Office of Management and Budget. Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.5, 53 Fed. Reg. 8090. **With** respect to grants and grantees covered by the common rule, additional administrative requirements are to be in the form of **codified** regulations published in the Federal Register. *Id.* §\_\_\_\_.6(a).

In addition to the **A-102** implementation, the “common rule” format has been used in several other grant-related contexts.

On February 18, 1986, as part of the government’s effort to combat fraud, waste, and abuse, the President signed Executive Order No. 12549, which directed the establishment of a system for debarment and suspension in the assistance context. **OMB** implemented the executive order by publishing a common rule, this one entitled “**Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement)**,” adopted by over 25 grantor agencies and patterned generally on comparable provisions for procurement contracts in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 53 Fed. Reg. 19160 (May 26, 1988). A person (including business entities and units of government) who is debarred is excluded from federal assistance and benefits, financial and nonfinancial, under federal programs and activities for a period of up to three years, possibly longer. Common Rule §§\_\_\_\_.100(a) (purpose), \_\_\_\_105(n) (definition of person), \_\_\_\_320 (period of debarment), 53 Fed. Reg. at 19204–05, 19208. Causes of debarment are listed in §\_\_\_\_.305, 53 Fed. Reg. at 19207. They include certain criminal convictions, antitrust violations, a history of unsatisfactory performance, and failure to pay a single substantial debtor a number of outstanding debts owed to the federal government.

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### 3. Liability for Acts of Grantees

It is often said that the federal government is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents, “agents” in this context referring to the government’s own officers and employees. If this is true with respect to those who clearly are agents of the government, it logically must apply with even greater force with respect to those who are not its agents. Grantees, for purposes of imposing legal liability on the United States, are not “agents” of the government. While the demarcation is not perfect, we divide our discussion into two broad areas, contractual liability and **tortious** conduct.

#### a. Contractual Liability to Third Parties

In order for the United States to be contractually liable to some other **party, there** must be “**privity** of contract,” that is, a direct contractual relationship, between the parties. When a grantee under a federal grant enters into a contract with a third party (contractor), there is **privity** between the United States and the grantee, and **privity** between the grantee and the contractor, but no **privity** between the United States and the contractor and hence, as a general proposition, no liability.

Perhaps the leading case in this area is D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835. The plaintiff contractor had entered into a highway construction contract with the state of Ohio. The project was **funded** on a cost-sharing basis, with 90 percent of **total** costs to come from federal-aid highway funds. The contractor lost nearly \$3 million on the project, recovered part of its loss from the state of Ohio, and then sued the United States to recover the unpaid balance. The contractor argued that Ohio was really the agent of the United States for purposes of the project because, among other things, the contract had been drafted pursuant to federal regulations, the United States approved the contract and all changes, and the United States was funding 90 percent of the costs.

The court disagreed. Since there was no **privity** of contract between the United States and the contractor, the government was not liable. The involvement of the government in various aspects of the project did not make the state the agent of the federal government for purposes of creating contractual liability, express or implied. The court stated:

“The National Government makes many hundreds of grants each year to the various states, to municipalities, to schools and colleges and to other public **organizations** and

applied the same limited review to contracts awarded under cooperative agreements. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 758 (1980).

GAO's review was designed primarily to ensure that the "basic principles" of competitive bidding were applied. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 390, 393 (1975). Numerous decisions were rendered in this area. E.g., 57 **Comp. Gen.** 85 (1977) (non-applicability of Buy American Act); 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1254 (1976) (state law applicable when indicated in grant); 55 **Comp. Gen.** 413 (1975) (non-applicability of Federal Procurement Regulations).

By 1985, many agencies had developed their own review procedures, and the number of complaints filed with GAO steadily decreased. Determining that its review of grantee contracting was no longer needed, GAO discontinued its limited review in January 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 3978 (January 29, 1985); 64 **Comp. Gen.** 243 (1985). The body of decisions issued during the 1975–1985 period should nevertheless remain useful as guidance in this area.

In a 1980 report, GAO reviewed the procurement procedures of selected state and local government grantees and nonprofit organizations in five states. The report concluded that the state and local governments generally had and followed sound procurement procedures (somewhat less so for the nonprofit), but also found a number of weak spots, many of which are now addressed in OMB directives. The report is Spending Grant Funds More Efficiently Could Save Millions, PSAD-80-58 (June 30, 1980).

With respect to state and local governments, standards for grantee procurement are set forth in §—.36 of the Common Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 8096. Grantor agencies are authorized, but not required, to establish formal review procedures for grantee procurements. See id. §§—.36(b)(1), (12); Supplementary Information Statement, 53 Fed. Reg. 8034, 8039 (March 11, 1988).

An agency which establishes a review procedure for grantee procurement will be held to established precepts of administrative law in applying those procedures. For example, in Niro Atomizer, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 682 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Fla. 1988), the court instructed EPA to either follow its established procedures or announce that it was changing them, giving the parties notice and an opportunity to rebut.

and the grantee's contractor had incurred expenses in reliance on the approval. There clearly was no **privity** between the contractor and the United States. However, GAO recognized a procedural device drawn from the law of procurement contracts, and accepted a claim **filed** by the grantee (with whom the United States did have **privity**) "for and on behalf of" the contractor, in which the grantee acknowledged **liability** to the contractor only if and to the extent that the government was liable to the grantee. In effect, the contractor was prosecuting the claim in the name of the grantee. This device is potentially useful only where the government's liability to the grantee can be established. See also 68 **Comp. Gen.** 494, 495–96 (1989); 9 **Comp. Gen.** 175 (1929).

A different type of contract, an employment contract, was the subject of 66 **Comp. Gen.** 604 (1987), in which GAO concluded, applying Smalley, that the United States was not liable to a former employee of a grantee for unpaid salary. The grantor agency had funded all allowable costs under the grant, and the grantee's transgression was not the liability of the United States,

As if to prove the adage that anything that can happen will happen, a 1983 case combined **all** of the elements noted above. The Agency for International Development made a rural development **planning grant** to Bolivia. Bolivia contracted with a private American company to perform certain functions under the grant, and the company in turn entered into employment contracts with various individuals. The contract with the private company (but not the grant itself) was terminated, the company terminated the employment contracts, and the individuals then sought to recover benefits provided under Bolivian law. Clearly, AID was not **legally** liable **to** the individual claimants. However, some of the benefits to some of the claimants could qualify as allowable costs under the grant and could be paid, if approved by AID and the grantee, to the extent grant funds remained available. **B-209649**, December 23, 1983.

#### **b. Tortious Conduct**

A number of cases have **involved** attempts to impose liability on the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act or similar situations. The Federal Tort Claims Act makes the United States liable, with various exceptions, for the **tortious** conduct of **its** officers, employees, or agents acting within the scope of their employment. As a general proposition, a grantee is not an agent or agency of the government for purposes of tort liability.

agencies for many kinds of public works, including roads and highways. It requires the projects to be completed in accordance with certain standards before the proceeds of the grant will be paid. Otherwise the will of Congress would be thwarted and taxpayers' money would be wasted. . . . It would be farfetched indeed to impose liability on the Government for the acts and omissions of the parties who contract to build the projects, simply because it requires the work to meet certain standards and upon approval thereof reimburses the public agency for a part of the costs."

Id. at 507. Some later cases applying the Smalley concept are Somerville Technical Services v. United States, 640 F.2d 1276 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Housing Corporation of America v. United States, 468 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Cofan Associates, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 85 (1983); 68 Comp. Gen. 494 (1989).

The Cofan case presented an interesting variation in that the claimant was a disappointed bidder rather than a contractor, trying to recover under the theory, well-established in the law of procurement contracts, that there is an implied promise on the part of the government to fairly consider all bids. This did not help the plaintiff, however, since again there was no **privity** with the government.

"[I]t is now **firmly** established that a person who enters into a contract with a [grantee] to perform services on a project funded in part by loans or grants-in-aid from the United States may not thereby be deemed to have entered into a contract with the United States. Nor is the result any different because the United States has imposed guidelines or restrictions on the use of the funds, including procurement procedures." 4 CL Ct. at 86.

Another variation occurred in 47 Comp. Gen. 756 (1968). A contractor had succeeded in recovering increased costs from a state grantee. Under Smalley, it was clear that the government **could** not be held legally liable for a proportionate share of the recovery. However, it was apparent that the increased costs were due to the fact that erroneous soil profile information furnished by the state had contributed to an unrealistically low bid by the contractor. Under these circumstances, GAO advised that the grantor agency and the state could enter into a voluntary modification of the grant agreement to recognize the damage recovery as a project cost. See also B-167310, July 31, 1969.

In limited circumstances, there is a device that may be available to a contractor to have its claim considered by the federal government, illustrated by B-181332, December 28, 1976. In that case, an agency had erroneously refused to fund a **grant** after it had been approved



exception to Federal Tort Claims Act liability. Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, followed in Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970), and Rayford v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 1051 (M.D. Term. 1976).

In areas not covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act, such as the so-called constitutional tort, the potential for individual liability cannot be disregarded. For example, an official of the Indian Health Service, acting jointly with a state official, told a nonprofit intermediary that further funding would be conditioned on the dismissal of an employee whom they thought was performing inadequately. The intermediary fired the employee, who then sued the state official and the federal official in their individual capacities. The suit against the federal defendant was based directly on the Fifth Amendment, for deprivation of a property interest (the plaintiff's job) without due process. The court first found that there had been a due process violation, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct exceeded the scope of their authority. Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987). The court noted that there was no basis for imposing liability on the United States. Id. at 1373-74. In the second published appellate decision in the case, the court affirmed a monetary damage award and an award of attorney's fees against the individual officials. The federal official was personally liable for the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because he had acted in concert with a state official. Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1991).

Finally, a case deserving brief mention, although not involving the monetary liability of the United States, is Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that two officers of a private, nonprofit corporation, who were assigned to administer two federal community development block grants awarded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the city of Peoria, were "public officials" who could be prosecuted under the federal bribery statute.

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#### **4. Types of Grants: Categorical vs. Block**

A categorical grant is a grant to be used only for a specific program or for narrowly defined activities. A categorical grant maybe allocated on the basis of a distribution formula prescribed by statute or regulation ("formula grant"), or it may be made for a specific project ("project grant"). A block grant is a grant given to a governmental

An important Supreme Court case is United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976), holding that a community action agency funded under the Economic Opportunity Act is not a “federal agency” for purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act. The case arose from a motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff Orleans and an individual acting on behalf of a grantee. The Court **first** noted that the Federal Tort Claims Act “was never intended, and has not been construed by this Court, to reach employees or agents of all federally funded programs that confer benefits on people.” Id. at 813. The Court then stated, and answered, the controlling **test**:

“[T]he question here is not whether the [grantee] receives federal money and must comply with federal standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government.

....

“... The Federal Government in no sense controls ‘the detailed physical performance’ of **all** the programs and projects it finances by gifts, grants, contracts, or loans.” Id. at 815–16.

Thus, the general rule is that the United States is not liable for torts committed by its grantees. Neither the fact of federal funding nor the degree of federal involvement encountered in the typical grant (**approval**, oversight, inspection, etc.) is **sufficient** to make the grantee an agent of the United States for purposes of tort liability. Liability could result, however, if the federal involvement reached the level of detailed supervision of day-to-day operations noted in Orleans. An example is Martarano v. United States, 231 F. **Supp.** 805 (D. **Nev.** 1964) (state employee under cooperative agreement working under direct control and supervision of federal agency).

The same rules apply for purposes of determining the liability of the United States for a taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment. **E.g., Hendler v. United States**, 11 Cl. Ct. 91, 98–99 (1986). For actions which may have taking implications, agencies should also be familiar with the policies and requirements of Executive Order No. 12630, March 15, 1988.

In another group of cases, attempts have been made to **find** the United States liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the allegedly negligent performance of its oversight **role** under a grant. The courts have found these claims covered by the “discretionary function”

Stat. 893, 42 U.S.C. Ch. 94, Subch. II).<sup>17</sup>

Block grants do reduce federal involvement in that they transfer much of the decision-making to the grantee and reduce the number of separate grants that must be administered by the federal government. However, it is a misconception to think that block grants are “free money” in the sense of being totally free from federal “strings.”

Restrictions on the use of block grant funds may derive from the organic legislation itself. For example, several of the **OBRA** programs include such items as limitations on allowable administrative expenses, prohibitions on the use of funds to purchase land or construct buildings, “maintenance of effort” provisions, and anti-discrimination provisions. Other **OBRA** provisions of general applicability (Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 1741–1745, 95 Stat. 762–64) impose reporting and auditing requirements, and require states to conduct public hearings as a prerequisite to receiving funds in any fiscal year.

Applicable restrictions are not limited to those contained in the program statute itself. Other federal statutes applicable to the use of grant funds must **also** be followed. See, e.g., **Ely v. Velde**, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), holding that the **National Historic Preservation Act** and the **National Environmental Policy Act** applied to a block grant made by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to Virginia under the Safe Streets Act. A later and related decision in the same case is 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974). See also **Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services**, 854 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1988) (requirement for apportionment by Office of Management and Budget applicable to funds under Social Services Block Grant); 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 605 (1982) (Uniform Relocation Assistance Act applicable to Community Development block grant); 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 83 (1982) (various

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<sup>17</sup>GAO has issued a number of studies and reports on the **OBRA** block grants. Some of them are Early Observations on Block Grant Implementation, GAO/GGD-82-79 (August 24, 1982); Lessons Learned From Past Block Grants: Implications for Congressional Oversight, GAO/IPE-82-8 (September 23, 1982); A Summary and Comparison of the Legislative Provisions of the Block Grants Created by the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, GAO/IPE-83-2 (December 30, 1982); Block Grants: Overview of Experiences to Date and Emerging Issues, GAO/HRD-85-46 (April 3, 1985); and Community Development: Oversight of Block Grant Needs Improvement, GAO/RCED-91-23 (January 30, 1991). GAO has also **published a** comprehensive catalog of formula grants, intended for use as a resource document. It is: Grant Formulas: A Catalog of Federal Aid to States and Localities, GAO/HRD-87-28 (March 1987).

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unit, usually a state, to be used for a variety of activities within a broad functional **area**.<sup>16</sup> Block grants are usually formula grants. Under a block grant, the state is responsible for further distribution of the money. States naturally prefer block grants because they increase the states' spending flexibility and at least in theory reduce federal control.

During the **1960s** and **1970s**, although some block grant programs were in existence, the emphasis was largely on categorical grants. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (**OBRA**), Public Law 97-35, attempted to put a halt to this trend. The statute merged and consolidated several dozen categorical grant programs into **block** grants. The **following** programs stem from, or were significantly revised by, the 1981 **OBRA** (the **OBRA** title and page citation and U.S. Code location are indicated parenthetically for each program):

- **Community** Development Block Grant (Title III, 95 Stat. 384,42 U.S.C. **Ch. 69**).
- Elementary and Secondary Education Block Grant (Title V, 95 Stat. 463. The law was overhauled in 1988; the successor version is found at 20 U.S.C. **Ch. 47**).
- Community Services Block Grant (Title VI, 95 **Stat. 511**, 42 U.S.C. **Ch. 106**).
- Preventive Health and Health **Services** Block Grant (**Title IX**, 95 Stat. 535,42 U.S.C. **Ch. 6A, Subch. XVII**, Part A).
- Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services Block Grant (Title IX, 95 Stat. 543,42 U.S.C. **Ch. 6A, Subch. XVII**, Part B).
- Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant (**Title XXI**, 95 Stat. 818,42 U.S.C. **Ch. 7, Subch. V**).
- Social Services Block Grant (Title XXIII, 95 Stat. 867,42 U.S.C. **Ch. 7, Subch. XX**).
- Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Block Grant (Title XXVI, 95

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<sup>16</sup>GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, PAD-81-27, at 61-62 (March 1981).

As a general proposition, a state or local government which receives at least \$100,000 in federal financial **assistance**<sup>19</sup> in any fiscal year must have an audit, of the type prescribed in the statute, performed for that **fiscal** year by an independent auditor. The requirement differs if federal financial assistance is **less** than \$100,000.<sup>31</sup> U.S.C.

§§ 7502(a)(1) and (c). Audits are to be conducted annually. However, biennial audits are permissible if the grantee has, prior to January 1, 1987, so provided in its constitution or statutes. *Id.* § 7502(b). The audit is to be conducted “in accordance with **generally** accepted government auditing standards.” *Id.* § 7502(c). These standards are found in GAO’s publication Government Auditing Standards (1988), informally known as GAO’s “yellow book,” The **Office** of Management and Budget, in consultation with **GAO**, is required to prescribe “policies, procedures, and guidelines” to implement the Single Audit Act. 31 U.S.C. § 7505(a). These are found in **OMB Circular No. A-128, Audits of State and Local Governments** (1985).

The audit may be a single comprehensive audit covering the entire state or local government or a series of audits of individual agencies, and may be limited to those agencies which **actually** received or administered federal financial assistance. 31 U.S.C. §§ 7502(d)(1), (d)(6).

The audit required by the Single Audit Act is essentially a financial and compliance audit and does not include “economy and efficiency audits, program results audits, or program evaluations.” *Id.* § 7502(c).<sup>20</sup> The statute prescribes the **major components** of the audit:

- Determinations that the grantee’s financial statements fairly present its financial position and the results of its financial operations, and that it has complied with laws and regulations that may materially affect its financial statements.
- Evaluation of the recipient’s internal control systems.

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<sup>19</sup>While we have framed our discussion in terms of grants, “federal financial assistance” or purposes of the Single Audit Act includes “grants, contracts, loans, loan guarantees, property, cooperative agreements, interest subsidies, insurance, or direct appropriations,” but excludes direct federal cash assistance to individuals. 31 U.S.C. § 7501(4).

<sup>20</sup>The different types of government audits are described in GAO’s Government Auditing Standards, Chapter 2.

anti-discrimination statutes applicable to Elementary and Secondary Education and Social Services block grants).

Thus, the block grant mechanism does not totally remove federal involvement nor does it permit the circumvention of federal laws applicable to the use of grant funds. In this latter respect, a block grant is legally no different from a categorical grant.

The common rule for uniform administrative requirements does not **apply** to the **OBRA** block grants. Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.4(a), 53 Fed. Reg. 8089.

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## 5. The Single Audit Act

We noted in our Introduction to this chapter that federal grants to state and local governments exceed \$100 billion a year. **With** expenditures of this magnitude, it is essential that there be some way to assure accountability on the part of the grantees. The traditional means of assuring accountability has been the audit.

Prior to 1984, there were no statutory uniform audit requirements for state and local government grantees. Audits were performed on a grant or program basis and requirements varied with the program legislation. Under this system, gaps in audit coverage resulted because some entities were audited infrequently or not at all. **Also**, overlapping requirements produced duplication and **inefficiency** with multiple audit teams visiting the same entity and reviewing the same financial records. Congress addressed the problem by enacting the Single Audit Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-502, codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7507.<sup>18</sup> An informative discussion of the need for the legislation, with references to several reports by GAO and the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, may be found in the report of the House Committee on Government Operations, **H.R. Rep. No. 708, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.**, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code **Cong. & Admin. News** 3955.

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<sup>18</sup>For an early review of the law's implementation, see **Single Audit Act: Single Audit Quality Has Improved but Some Implementation Problems Remain**, GAO/AFMD-89-72 (July 1989).

**As** noted above, the Single Audit Act applies only to state and local governments. The need for reliable and comprehensive auditing, however, applies equally to **all** grantees. In recognition of this, the Office of Management and Budget issued **OMB Circular No. A-133, Audits of Institutions of Higher Education and Other Nonprofit Institutions** (1990), which establishes auditing requirements for **nonprofits** similar to those of the Single Audit Act. Regardless of the identity of the grantee, whether a governmental organization or a nonprofit institution, sound auditing practices of the type envisioned by the Single Audit Act and the **OMB Circulars** are indispensable to assuring the efficient use of audit resources and to improving the financial management of federal assistance programs. See, **e.g.**, GAO report **Promoting Democracy: National Endowment for Democracy's Management of Grants Needs Improvement**, **GAO/NSIAD-91-162** (March 1991).

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## **D. Funds in Hands of Grantee: Status and Application of Appropriation Restrictions**

Expenditures by grantees for grant purposes are not subject to **all** of the same restrictions and limitations imposed on direct expenditures by the federal government. For this reason, grant funds in the hands of a grantee have been said to largely lose their character and identity **as** federal funds. The Comptroller General has stated the principle as follows:

“It consistently has been held with reference to Federal grant funds that, when such funds are granted to and accepted by the grantee, the expenditure of such funds by the grantee for the purposes and objects for which made [is] not subject to the various restrictions and limitations imposed by Federal statute or our decisions with respect to the expenditure, by Federal departments and establishments, of appropriated moneys in the absence of a condition of the grant **specifically** providing to the contrary.” **43 Comp. Gen.** 697,699 (1964).

Thus, except as otherwise provided in the program statute, regulations, or the grant agreement, the expenditure of grant funds by a state government grantee is subject to the applicable laws of that state rather than federal laws applicable to direct expenditures by federal agencies. **16 Comp. Gen.** 948 (1937). The rule applies “with equal if not greater force” when the grantee is another sovereign nation. **B-80351**, September 30, 1948.

This does not mean that an agency can circumvent a statutory restriction by making a grant to do something it could not do directly. What it does mean is that when an agency makes a grant for a valid

- Compliance With laws and regulations that may have a material effect upon applicable **major** federal assistance programs. This includes the testing of a representative number of transactions from each **major** program. (“**Major**” programs are determined under criteria specified in 31 U.S.C. § 7501( 12).)

31 U.S.C. § 7502(d)(2)–(d)(4); H.R. Rep. No. 708 at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3964. The state or local government must submit to the appropriate federal officials a **plan** for corrective action to address any material noncompliance with applicable laws and regulations or material weakness in internal controls uncovered by the audit. 31 U.S.C. § 7502(g).

The “single audit” replaces financial or financial and compliance audits which state or local governments are required to conduct under various program statutes. 31 U.S.C. § 7503(a). Thus, for example, absent a statutory exception to the Single Audit Act, the Environmental Protection Agency is not authorized to require a state to provide a separate financial or financial and compliance audit of its water pollution revolving fund in addition to the “single audit.” B-241096, January 30, 1991 (internal memorandum). However, the Act does not limit the authority of any federal agency to conduct additional audits or evaluations authorized by federal law or regulation, including economy/efficiency and program audits. 31 U.S.C. §§ 7503(c), (e).

The cost of a single audit is to be shared by the state or local government and the federal government, generally in the same proportion that federal financial assistance bears to the recipient’s total expenditures for the fiscal year(s) covered by the audit. 31 U.S.C. § 7505(b); OMB Circular No. A-128, § 16. The federal government’s share, determined under this formula, becomes an allowable cost to the relevant programs. Federal agencies which conduct additional audits or evaluations as authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 7503(c) are responsible for their funding. *Id.* § 7503(e).

The **law** also directs the Comptroller General to monitor provisions in bills and resolutions reported by committees of the Senate and House of Representatives that require financial or financial and compliance audits, and to report to appropriate congressional committees any such provisions which are inconsistent with the Single Audit Act. 31 U.S.C. § 7506.



was funded by a federal grantee. Similarly, a state tax on the income of a person paid from federal grant funds involves no question of federal tax immunity. 14 **Comp. Gen.** 869 (1935).

The following is a sampling of other restrictions which have been found inapplicable to grantee expenditures:

- Adequacy of Appropriations Act (41 U.S.C. § 11) and prohibition on entering into contracts for construction or repair of public buildings, or other public improvements, in excess of amount **specifically** appropriated for that purpose (41 U.S.C. § 12). **B-173589**, September 30, 1971.
- Prohibition in 31 U.S.C. § 1343 on purchasing aircraft without **specific statutory** authority. 43 **Comp. Gen.** 697 (1964) (permissible for grantee under National Science Foundation research grant). See also **B-196690**, March 14, 1980 (purchase of motor vehicles). However, an agency may not acquire excess aircraft or passenger vehicles by transfer for use by its grantees. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 348 (1975).
- Prohibition in 31 U.S.C. § 1345 on payment of nonfederal persons' travel and lodging expenses to attend a meeting. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 750 (1976).
- Requirement for **specific** authority in order to establish a revolving fund. (Federal agency would need specific authority in view of 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b)). 44 **Comp. Gen.** 87 (1964).
- A grantee's entertainment expenses maybe allowable if incurred in furtherance of grant purposes and if not otherwise prohibited by statute, regulation, or the grant agreement. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 582, 587 (1985); **B-196690**, March 14, 1980; **B-187150**, October 14, 1976. Having said this, however, it should be the rare occasion when entertainment expenses are in fact allowable, assuming agencies follow the Office of Management and Budget's instructions to treat them as unallowable. (See OMB Circulars **A-21**, **A-87**, **A-122**.)

Where assistance funds are provided to the District of Columbia under a program of assistance to the states which defines "state" as including the District of Columbia, statutory restrictions expressly applicable to the District of Columbia remain applicable with respect to the assistance funds **even** though they would not necessarily apply to the assistance funds in the hands of the other states. 34 **Comp. Gen.** 593 (1955); 17 **Comp. Gen.** 424 (1937); **A-90515**, December 23, 1937.

grant purpose, the grantee has a measure of discretion in choosing the means to implement the grant, subject to applicable statutes, regulations, and the terms of the grant agreement. In exercising that discretion, restrictions that would apply to direct expenditures by the grantor agency do not necessarily apply to the grantee. Of course, the expenditure must be for an otherwise valid grant purpose and must not be prohibited by the terms of the grant agreement.

One group of **cases**<sup>21</sup> involves restrictions on employee compensation and related payments. Examples are:

- Provision in Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act, 1948, prohibiting use of federal funds to pay salaries of persons engaging in a strike against the United States Government, did not apply to funds granted to states to assist in enforcing Fair Labor Standards Act and **Walsh-Healey** Public Contracts Act. The funds were not “salaries” as such; they were grant funds to reimburse states for services of state employees, and therefore were state rather than federal funds. 28 **Comp. Gen.** 54 (1948). See also 39 **Comp. Gen.** 873 (1960).
- Requirement for specific authorizing legislation to use public funds to pay employer contributions for federal employees’ health and life insurance benefits does not apply to use of federal grant funds to contribute to state group **health** and life insurance programs for state employees. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 221 (1956).
- Restrictions on retired pay not applicable to retired military officer working on grant-funded state project. 14 **Comp. Gen.** 916 (1935), **modified** on other grounds by 36 **Comp. Gen.** 84 (1956).
- Federal restrictions on dual compensation for federal employees are inapplicable to grantee employees. **B-153417**, February 17, 1964.

The rule has been applied in a variety of other contexts as well. One example is the area of state and local taxes. Thus, federal immunity from payment of certain sales taxes does not apply to a state grantee since the grantee is not a federal agent. The grant funds lose their **federal** character and become state funds. Therefore, the state grantee may pay a state sales tax on purchases made with federal grant funds if the tax applies equally to purchases made from **all** nonfederal funds. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 85 (1957). See also **B-177215**, November 30, 1972, applying the same reasoning for purchases made by a contractor who

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<sup>21</sup>Some of the decisions cited may involve statutory restrictions on **federal** expenditures which have been changed **or** repealed since the decisions were issued. The cases are cited solely to illustrate the application of the grant rule and thus remain valid to that extent.

Statements in some of the cases to the effect that grant funds upon being paid over to the grantee are no longer federal funds should not be taken out of context. The fact that grant funds in the hands of a grantee are no longer viewed as federal **funds** for certain purposes does not mean that they lose their character as federal funds for all purposes. It has been held that the government retains a “**property interest**” in grant funds until they are actually spent by the grantee for authorized purposes. This **property** interest may take the form of an “equitable lien,” stemming from the government’s right to ensure that the funds are used only for authorized purposes, or a “reversionary interest” (funds that can no longer be used for grant purposes revert to the government). By virtue of this property interest, the funds-and property purchased with those funds to the extent unrestricted title has not vested in the grantee-are not subject to judicial process without the government’s consent. E.g., Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 308–09 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 us. 1074.

The concept is illustrated in two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Palmiter v. Action, Inc., 733 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1984), the court rejected the argument that grant funds lose their federal character when placed in the grantee’s **bank** account, and held that federal grant funds in the hands of a grantee are not subject to garnishment to satisfy a debt of the grantee. The holding would presumably not apply where the grantee had actually spent its own money and the federal funds were paid over as reimbursement. Id. at 1249. More recently, the court considered a similar issue in the context of a bankruptcy petition filed by a grantee under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The issue was whether **grant** funds in the hands of the grantee, as well as personal property purchased with grant money, were assets of the bankrupt and therefore subject to the control of the trustee in bankruptcy. Directing the trustee to abandon the assets, the court held that they remained the property of the federal government. In the course of reaching this result, the court noted that unpaid creditors of the bankrupt could, to the extent their claims were within the scope of the grant, be paid by the grantor agency out of the recovered funds. In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency, 847 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1988).

A case discussing both Palmiter and Joliet-Will, and reaching a similar result, is In re Southwest Citizens’ Organization for Poverty Elimination, 91 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988). A grantee, which

When applying the general proposition that grantee expenditures are not subject to the same restrictions as direct federal expenditures, it is important to keep in mind that grantees are obligated upon acceptance of grant funds to spend them for the purposes and objectives of the grant, subject to any statutory or special conditions imposed on the use of assistance funds. See, *e.g.*, 42 **Comp. Gen.** 682 (1963); 2 **Comp. Gen.** 684 (1923). These conditions may include implied requirements, such as the implied requirement of the “basic principles” of open and competitive bidding in the case of grantee contracts. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 390 (1975). They also include statutorily authorized requirements, as in the case of the Office of Personnel Management’s authority to establish merit standards for grantees under 42 U.S.C. § 4728(b) (Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970). **Statutory** restrictions on lobbying with public funds may also apply to grantee expenditures.

In addition, several federal statutes prohibit various types of discrimination.” Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, *as* amended in 1978 (29 U.S.C. § 794), similarly prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 extends the prohibition to discrimination on the basis of age (42 U.S.C. § 6102).

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681) prohibits sex discrimination under certain education programs, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) would prohibit employment discrimination by grantees on the basis of sex as well as race, color, religion, or national origin. In addition, several block grant statutes contain their own anti-discrimination provisions and include sex discrimination. As of the date of this publication, however, the editors have found no general statutory prohibition against sex **discrimination** in the awarding of federal assistance funds. (The extent to which the equal protection clause of the Constitution might come into play is a question **left to the courts.**)

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<sup>22</sup>For a detailed Justice Department opinion on the applicability of the major anti-discrimination statutes to federal assistance funds, with particular emphasis on block **grants**, see 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 83 (1982).

In each of these cases, the court rejected the argument that the statute did not apply because the funds or property were no longer federal funds or property. It makes no difference whether the funds are paid to the grantee in advance or by reimbursement (Montoya, 716 F.2d at 1344), or that the funds may have been commingled with nonfederal funds (Hayle, 815 F.2d at 882). The holdings are based on the continuing responsibility of the federal government to oversee the use of the funds. E.g., Hayle, 815 F.2d at 88>; Hamilton, 726 F.2d at 321. The result would presumably be different in the case of grant funds paid over outright with no continuing federal oversight or supervision. E.g., Smith, 596 F.2d at 664.

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## E. Grant Funding

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### 1. Advances of Grant/Assistance Funds

The statutory prohibition on the advance payment of public funds, 31 U.S.C. §3324, does not apply to grants. Since assistance awards are made to assist authorized recipients and are not primarily for the purpose of obtaining goods or services for the government, the policy behind the advance payment prohibition has much less force in the case of assistance awards than in the case of procurement contracts. Accordingly, it has been held that 31 U.S.C. § 3324 does not preclude advance funding in authorized **grant** relationships. Unless restricted by the program legislation or the applicable appropriation, the authority to make grants is sufficient to **satisfy** the requirements of 31 U.S.C. §3324.60 **Comp. Gen.** 208 (1981); 59 **Comp. Gen.** 424 (1980); 41 **Comp. Gen.** 394 (1961). As stated in 60 **Comp. Gen.** at 209, “[t]he policy of payment upon receipt of goods or services is simply inconsistent with assistance relationships where the Government does not receive anything in the usual sense.”

This does not mean that there can never be an advance payment problem in a grant case. Two cases involving **violations—56 Comp. Gen.** 567 (1977) and **B-159715**, August 18, 1972—are discussed in Chapter 5. Also, since the authority to advance funds must, at least in a general sense, be founded on the program legislation, advance payments would probably not be authorized under an assistance program that provided for payment by reimbursement.

had purchased a number of motor vehicles with Head Start grant funds, **filed** a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The Department of Health and Human Services sought turnover of the property, contending that the bankrupt's title was subject to the government's right to require transfer to another grantee under the program legislation and regulations. The trustee argued that the motor vehicles were property of the bankruptcy estate, and that the trustee's interest superseded any interest of the government. After a detailed review of precedent, the court directed turnover of the vehicles, concluding that the government's rights amounted to a reversionary interest.

Another theory occasionally encountered but which appears to have received little in-depth discussion is the trust theory—that a grantee holds grant funds, and property purchased with those funds, in the capacity of a trustee. In Joliet-Will, for example, the court found that the grantee was essentially “a trustee, custodian, or other intermediary, who . . . is merely an agent for the **disbursal** of funds belonging to another,” and that the grantee's “ownership” was nominal, like that of a trustee. 847 F.2d at 432. The trust concept finds support in an early Supreme Court decision, Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900), a land grant case in which the Court discussed the grant in trust terms. Id. at 243,249. Some agencies have incorporated the trust **concept** in their program regulations. Examples are cited in **B-239907**, July 10, 1991 (Economic Development Administration), and United States v. Rowen, 594 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1979) (former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). See also 64 Comp. Gen. 103, 106 (1984).

A final area in which grant funds in the hands of a grantee continue to be treated as federal funds is the application of federal criminal statutes dealing with theft of money or property belonging to the United States. There are numerous cases in which the courts have applied various provisions of the Criminal Code, such as 18 U.S.C. § 641, to the theft or embezzlement of grant funds or grant property in the hands of grantees. Examples involving a variety of grant programs are Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Harris, 729 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hamilton, 726 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 596 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rowen, 594 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1979).

receipts, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3335(b) and (c). The legislative history stresses that this penalty authority is to be “restricted to cases of egregious or repeated noncompliance, and [not to] be used in a routine manner to finance interest costs incurred by the Federal Government.” H.R. Rep. No. 696, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).

If an agency could pay its noncompliance penalty to the Treasury simply by reducing awards under its assistance programs, the **penalty** would effectively “cost” the agency nothing, the program beneficiaries **would** suffer, **and** little would be accomplished. The legislation addresses this by requiring that penalties be paid from administrative rather than program appropriations, “to the maximum extent practicable.” 31 U.S.C. § 3335(d); H.R. Rep. No. 696 at 7.

Regulations applicable to all assistance recipients are found in Treasury Department Circular No. 1075 (31 C.F.R. Part 205) and pertinent Office of Management and Budget circulars. The essence of the government’s policy is stated in 31 C.F.R. § 205.4(a):

“Cash advances to a recipient organization **shall** be limited to the minimum amounts needed and shall be timed to be in accord only with the **actual**, immediate cash requirements of the recipient organization in carrying out the purpose of the approved program or project. The timing and amount of cash advances shall be as close as is administratively feasible to the actual disbursements by the recipient organization for direct program costs and the proportionate share of any allowable indirect costs.”

Thus, it is within the discretion of the Social Security Administration to determine that a period of 15 months between **drawdown** and disbursement for state employee retirement contributions is excessive, and to make an appropriate disallowance. **B-244617**, December 24, 1991. The requirement to minimize the time elapsing between transfer of funds to the recipient and disbursement by the recipient is also stated in OMB Circulars **A-102 (para. 7a)** and **A-110** (Attachment I, **para. 1**). It is also reflected in the Common Rule §§ **—.0(b)(7)** and **—.21(b)**, 53 Fed. Reg. 8091.

Until the Cash Management Improvement Act is fully implemented, current Treasury regulations provide that, if annual advances to a grantee **total** less than \$120,000, or there is no continuing grantor-grantee relationship for at least one year, advances are made by direct Treasury check scheduled to make funds available only immediately prior to grantee disbursement. 31 C.F.R. § 205.4(c).

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## 2. Cash Management Concerns and Requirements

One problem with the advance funding of assistance awards is that the recipient may draw down funds before they are actually needed. This is a matter of concern for several reasons. For one thing, advances under an assistance program are intended to accomplish the program purposes and not to profit the recipient other than in the manner and to the extent specified in the program.

But there is **another** reason. When money is drawn from the Treasury before it is needed, or in excess of current needs, the government loses the use of the money. The principle was expressed **as** follows in B-146285, October 2, 1973:

“When Federal receipts are insufficient to meet expenditures, the difference is obtained through borrowing; when receipts exceed expenditures, outstanding debt can be reduced. Thus, advancing funds to organizations outside the Government before they are needed either unnecessarily increases borrowings or decreases the opportunity to reduce the debt level and thereby increases interest costs to the Federal Government.”

Thus, premature **drawdown** not only profits the recipient, but does so at the expense of the rest of the taxpayers. GAO has made the same point in several reports, such as Improving Medicaid Cash Management Will Reduce Federal Interest Costs, HRD-81-94 (May 29, 1981), and Better Cash Management Can Reduce the Cost of the National Direct Student Loan Program, FGMSD-80-5 (November 27, 1979).<sup>23</sup>

Congress has recognized these concerns in several ways, one of **which** was the October 1990 enactment of section 4 of the Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-453, 104 Stat. 1058, 31 U.S.C. §3335. This legislation requires executive agencies to provide for the “timely disbursement” of federal funds in accordance with Treasury Department regulations.

If an agency’s failure to comply with Treasury disbursement regulations results in increased cost **to** the General Fund of the Treasury (for example, increased interest expenses resulting from increased borrowing needs), the Secretary of the Treasury may collect this amount from the offending agency for credit as miscellaneous

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<sup>23</sup>This principle is not limited to premature **drawdown** but applies equally to other types of premature or excess payments. E.g., GAO report entitled Unnecessary Interest Costs Incurred by the Government Because of Excess Progress Payments to Contractors (B-118662, March 22, 1965).



August 30, 1973. See also Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.21(i), 53 Fed. Reg. 8091. If the grantee is unable to document the actual amount of interest earned on the grant advances, the grantor agency should use the “Treasury tax and loan account” rate prescribed by 31 U.S.C. § 3717 for debts owed to the United States. 69 **Comp. Gen.** 660 (1990).

Except for states, discussed separately later, the rule applies whether the grantee is a **public** or private agency. The rationale for the rule is that unless expressly provided otherwise, funds are paid out to a grantee to accomplish the grant purposes, not for the grantee to invest the money and earn interest at the expense of the Treasury. Thus, funds paid out to a grantee are not to **be** held, but are to be applied promptly to the grant purposes. 1 **Comp. Gen.** 652 (1922).

In 40 **Comp. Gen.** 81 (1960), the Comptroller General held that interest on foreign currencies advanced by the Department of Agriculture under cooperative agreements, earned between the time the funds were advanced and the time they were used, could not be retained for program purposes but had to be returned to the Treasury for deposit as miscellaneous receipts.

In 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289 (1962), the rule was applied with respect to State Department grants to American-sponsored schools **and** libraries overseas. The Comptroller General stated, “[t]here can be no doubt that only the Congress is legally empowered to give away the property or money of the United States.” *Id.* at 293. The decision further concluded that the enabling **legislation** did not provide sufficient authority to use the grant funds to establish a permanent interest-bearing endowment fund. In **B-149441**, February 17, 1987, GAO found that since the National Endowment for the Humanities had no authority in its program legislation to permit its grantees to establish an endowment fund with grant moneys, it could not authorize its grantees to accomplish the same purpose with matching funds.

Citing both 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289 and **B-149441**, the Comptroller General held in 70 **Comp. Gen.** 413 (1991) that legislative authority would be required for a proposal whereby the United States Information Agency would purchase discounted foreign debt from commercial lenders and transfer the notes to grantees in the foreign country, who would in turn exchange the notes for local currency or

If annual advances aggregate \$120,000 or more and the relationship is expected to continue for at least one year, advances are made by “letter of credit.” 31 C.F.R. § 205.4(b). A letter of credit is an instrument (Standard Form 1193A) executed by an authorized **certifying officer** of the grantor agency permitting a grantee to draw funds needed for immediate disbursement. A letter of credit is irrevocable and is the equivalent of cash “to the extent the recipient organization has obligated funds in good faith thereunder in executing the authorized Federal program in accordance with the grant, contract, or other agreement.” 31 C.F.R. § 205.5. The Treasury Department’s letter of credit procedures are found in the Treasury Financial Manual, Vol. I, Part 6, Chapters 2000 and 2500. Disbursements under most letters of credit are made by electronic fund transfer to a financial institution designated by the recipient organization.

If a recipient is unwilling or unable to establish procedures to minimize the gap between **drawdown** and disbursement, advance funding may be terminated and payments made only on a reimbursement basis. 31 C.F.R. § 205.7.

In Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 854 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff state argued that it should receive its entire annual Social Services Block Grant allotment at once at the beginning of the fiscal year. The court disagreed, upholding quarterly apportionment by the **Office** of Management and Budget under 31 U.S.C. § 1512.

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### 3. Interest on Grant Advances

#### a. In General

The Comptroller General has consistently held that except as otherwise provided bylaw, interest earned by a grantee on funds advanced by the United States under an assistance agreement pending their application to grant purposes, belongs to the United States rather than to the grantee. All such interest is required to be accounted for as funds of the United States, and must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts under 31 U. SC. § 3302(b). 71 Comp. Gen. 387 (1992); 69 Comp. Gen. 660 (1990); 42 Comp. Gen. 289 (1962); 40 Comp. Gen. 81 (1960); B-203681, September 27, 1982; B-192459, July 1, 1980; B-149441, April 16, 1976; B-173240,

need. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 96 (1984). Both decisions **followed** the approach set forth in **B-192459**, summarized above.

In evaluating the disposition of interest income, an important determinant is whether the interest was earned before or after the grant funds were applied to authorized grant purposes. The keyword here is “authorized.” For example, under the Community Development Block Grant program, grantees may use the funds to make loans for certain community projects. Grantees may retain interest earned on those loans as a type of “program income.” However, if a loan is later found to be ineligible under the program, the funds were never used for an authorized grant purpose, and interest earned by the grantee must be paid over to the United States for deposit as miscellaneous receipts, 71 **Comp. Gen.** 387 (1992).

Congress can, of course, legislatively make exceptions to the rule, by providing assistance in the form of an unconditional gift or by other appropriate statutory provisions. See, e.g., 44 **Comp. Gen.** 179 (1964) (provision in appropriation act exempting educational institutions from liability for interest under certain **Public Health Service Act** grants); **B-175155**, June 11, 1975 (interest rule not applicable with respect to “grants” to Amtrak); **B-202116-O.M.**, February 12, 1985 (Legal Services Corporation **grantees**).<sup>24</sup>

b. Grants to State Governments

Prior to 1968, the prohibition on retention of interest income applied to states as well as to other grantees. 20 **Comp. Gen.** 610 (1941); 3 **Comp. Gen.** 956 (1924); 26 **Comp. Dec.** 505 (1919); 24 **Comp. Dec.** 403 (1918); **A-46031**, January 16, 1933. There was no reason to draw a distinction. This, of course, was premised on the absence of any statutory guidance.

The treatment of interest on grant advances to state governments is now governed by the so-called Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (**IGCA**), as amended, 31 U.S.C. Chapter 65. The law evolved in two stages. The original **IGCA** created what was to be, for 22 years, the **major** exception to the rule that interest on grant advances belongs to the United States. The law first codified the requirement for agencies to schedule the transfer of grant funds so as to minimize

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<sup>24</sup> A conceptually related case is 71 **Comp. Gen.** 310 (1992), upholding a **Small Business Administration** regulation providing for a reasonable profit to grantees under the **Small Business Innovation Development Act**.

local currency denominated bonds and use the income for program activities. However, since USIA has statutory authority to accept conditional gifts, it could accept a donation of foreign debt and use the principal and income for authorized activities in accordance with the conditions specified.

Once grant funds are applied by the grantee to the accomplishment of the purpose of the grant, the rule no longer applies. Thus, in **B-230735**, July 20, 1988, where use of grant funds to establish an endowment trust was authorized bylaw, GAO concluded that the grantee could use income from the endowment as nonfederal matching funds on other grants, as long as such use was consistent with the terms and conditions of the grant agreement.

In **B-192459**, July 1, 1980, a grantee transferred grant funds to a trustee under a complex construction financing arrangement. The trustee was independent rather than an agent of the grantee and the grantee could not get the funds back upon demand. GAO determined that the transfer to the trustee was in the nature of a disbursement for grant purposes. Therefore, interest earned by the trustee after the transfer could be treated as grant income and retained under the terms of the grant agreement. However, interest on grant funds placed in bank accounts and certificates of deposit by the grantee prior to transfer had to be returned to the Treasury. The grantor agency lacked the authority to permit the grantee to retain interest earned on grant funds prior to their application to grant purposes.

In 64 **Comp. Gen.** 103 (1984), the Agency for International Development advanced grant funds to the government of Egypt, which in turn advanced them to certain local and provincial elements of that government. Since the purpose of the grant was to assist Egypt in its efforts to decentralize certain governmental functions by developing experience at the local level in managing and financing selected projects, GAO concluded that the advances of funds by the government of Egypt to the **local** and provincial entities could legitimately be viewed as disbursements for grant purposes. Thus, the **subgrantees** could retain interest earned on those advances. However, in another 1984 case also involving the Agency for International Development, GAO found that **subgrantees** could not retain interest on funds advanced to them by the recipient under a cooperative agreement whose purpose was to help develop certain technologies, where the funds had been advanced prior to any legitimate program

of the Treasury for this purpose. Id. § 6503(d). Interest in both directions is to be paid annually, **at a** rate based on the **yield** of **13-week** Treasury bills, using offset to the extent provided in Treasury regulations. Id. §§ 6503(c), (d), and (i). The interest provisions of the **CMIA** take effect during the second half of 1993. Pub. L. No. 101-453, § 5(e), **as** amended by Pub. L. No. 102-589, § 2 (1992).

The original **IGCA** applied only to states and their agencies or “instrumentalities.” It did not extend to governments of “political subdivisions” of states such as cities, towns, counties, or special districts created by state law. The **CMIA** revision applies to “an agency, instrumentality, or fiscal **agent**” of a state, including territories and the District of Columbia, but retains the exclusion for “a local government of a State.” 31 U.S.C. § 6501(9), amended by **CMIA** § 5(a), 104 Stat. at 10.59. Thus, decisions under the 1968 law should remain relevant in determining which entities and situations are now covered by the **CMIA** and which remain subject to the decisional rules.

In 56 **Comp. Gen.** 353 (1977), the Comptroller General considered the basis for determining which state entities were covered by the **IGCA**, concluding as follows:

“[A] Federal grantor agency is not required by the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 and its legislative history to accept the Bureau of the Census’ classification of an entity . . . in determining whether that entity is a State agency or instrumentality or a political subdivision of the State. It is bound by the **classification** of the entity in State law. Only in the absence of a clear indication of the status of the entity in State law may it make its own determination based on reasonable standards, including resort to the Bureau of the Census’ **classifications.**” Id. at 357.

If the classification under state law is not clear and unambiguous, the grantee may be required to obtain a legal opinion from the state Attorney General in order to assist in making the determination. Id.

The **exception** for states in the 1968 **IGCA** was held to apply to pass-through situations where states **are** the primary recipients of grant funds which are then passed onto **subgrantees**. In **B-171019**, October 16, 1973, the Comptroller General concluded that the exception applied to political subdivisions which were **subgrantees** of states. The Justice Department reached the same conclusion in 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 127 (1982). Subsequent decisions applied the exception to nongovernmental **subgrantees** as well, recognizing that

the time elapsing between transfer and grantee **disbursement**.<sup>25</sup> It then provided: “A State is not accountable for interest earned on grant money pending its disbursement for program purposes.” 31 U.S.C. § 6503(a) (1988).

The theory behind the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act was to control the release of grant funds **and** thereby preclude situations from arising in which state grantees would be in a position to earn excessive interest on **grant** advances. If funds were properly released, interest the state might earn would be too small to be a matter of concern. The statutory exception was not intended to create a windfall for state grantees. The situation did not prove satisfactory, however. Grantor agencies complained of premature **drawdown** of grant advances; states complained of slow federal payment in reimbursement situations. Congress responded by amending the **IGCA** by section 5 of the Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (**CMIA**), Pub. L. No. 101-453, 104 Stat. 1058, 1059.

The revised 31 U.S.C. § 6503 retains the general requirement to minimize the time elapsing between transfer of funds from the Treasury and grantee disbursement for program purposes. *Id.* § 6503(a). It then requires the **Secretary** of the Treasury to **enter** into an agreement with each state which receives federal grant funds prescribing fund transfer methods and procedures, as chosen by the state and approved by the Secretary. *Id.* § 6503(b). If an agreement cannot be reached with a particular **state**, the Secretary is authorized to establish procedures for that state by regulation, *Id.* § 6503(b)(3).

For advance payment programs, unless inconsistent with program purposes, the state must pay interest to the United States from the time the funds are transferred to the state’s account to the time they are paid out by the state for program purposes. Interest payments are to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. *Id.* § 6503(c). For reimbursement situations, the United States must pay interest to the state from the time of payout by the state to the time the **federal** funds are deposited in the state’s bank account. The law includes a permanent, indefinite appropriation from the general fund

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<sup>25</sup>In B-146285, April 10, 1978, GAO concluded that this provision did not **repeal** by implication a statute which prescribed both the timing schedule and the amount of payments under a particular assistance program, but rather was geared **primarily** to programs without statutory payment schedules.

(1962); **B-192459**, July 1, 1980; **B-191420**, August 24, 1978. In 44 **Comp. Gen.** 87, the Comptroller General concluded that a grantee could establish a revolving fund with grant income in the absence of a contrary provision in the grant agreement. However the initial amount of a revolving fund established from either the principal of a grant or the income generated under the grant, when returned to the grantor agency upon completion of the grant, may not be considered a return of grant funds for further use by the grantor but must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. **B-154996**, November 5, 1969.

There are three generally recognized methods for the treatment of program income:

- (1) Deduction. Deduct program income from total allowable costs to determine net costs on which grantor and grantee shares will be based. This approach results in savings to the federal government because the income is used to reduce contributions rather than to increase program size.
- (2) Addition. Add income to the funds committed to the project, to be used for program purposes. This approach increases program size.
- (3) Cost-sharing. Use income to meet any applicable matching requirements. **Under** this approach, the federal contribution and program size remain the same.

Both **OMB** and **GAO** have expressed preference for the deduction method since it results in savings to the federal government and to grantees, and it is the preferred method under **OMB Circular A-102**, although grantor agencies have a measure of discretion. See **OMB Circular A-102, para. 7.e**; Supplementary Information Statement on revised circular, 53 Fed. Reg. at 8029; Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.25(g), 53 Fed. Reg. at 8093; Supplementary Information Statement on common rule, 53 Fed. Reg. at 8038. See **also GAO** report entitled Improved Standards Needed for Managing and Reporting Income Generated Under Federal Assistance Programs, **GAO/GGD-83-55 (July 22, 1983)**. (This report was issued several years prior to the revision of **OMB Circular A-102** and issuance of the Common Rule).

Some types of program income are subject to special rules:

there was **no** basis to distinguish between governmental and nongovernmental **subgrantees**. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 218 (1980), **aff'd**, **B-196794**, February 24, 1981.

The authority of a state to require its own grantees to account to it for funds it makes available to them is a matter within the discretion of the state. See **B-196794**, January 28, 1983 (non-decision letter).

Other cases under the **pre-CMIA** version of the **IGCA** may remain relevant **as** well. For example, the statute does not necessarily apply to funds in contexts other than those specified. Thus, in 62 **Comp. Gen.** 701 (1983), the Comptroller General concluded that a **subgrantee** under a Labor Department grant to a state was not entitled to retain interest it had earned by investing funds received from the Internal Revenue Service as a refund of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (social security) taxes. In North Carolina v. Heckler, 584 F. **Supp.** 179 (E. D.N.C. 1984), the court found the statute inapplicable in a situation where the state had wrongfully obtained federal funds and earned interest on them pending repayment to the government.

#### 4. Program Income

Once grant funds have been applied to their grant purposes, they still can generate income, directly or indirectly, in various ways. This—as distinguished from interest on grant advances—is called “program income.”

Program income may be defined as “gross income received by the grantee or **subgrantee** directly generated by a grant supported activity, or earned only as a result of the grant agreement during the grant period.” Common Rule §—.25(b), 53 Fed. Reg. 8093. It may include such things as income from the sale of commodities, fees for services performed, and usage or rental fees. Id. §—.25(a); OMB Circular No. A-110, Attachment D. Grant **generated** income may also include investment income, although this will be uncommon. See **B-192459**, July 1, 1980.

In contrast with income earned on grant advances, program income does not automatically acquire a federal character and is not required to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. It may, unless the grant provides otherwise, be retained by the grantee for grant-related use. 44 **Comp. Gen.** 87 (1964); 41 **Comp. Gen.** 653



a. Local or Matching Share

(1) General principles

A matching share provision is one under which the grantee is required to contribute a portion of the total project cost. The “match” maybe 50-50, or any other mix specified in the governing legislation. A matching share provision typically prescribes the percentages of required federal and nonfederal shares. However, the legislation need not provide explicitly for a nonfederal share. A statute authorizing assistance not in excess of a specified percentage of project costs **will** normally be interpreted as requiring a local share of nonfederal funds to makeup the difference. (The rest of the money has to come from someplace.) **B-214278**, January 25, 1985 (construing a provision of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act authorizing water and waste disposal grants).

When a federal agency enters into an assistance agreement with an **eligible** recipient, an entire project or program is approved. Where a local share is required, this agreement includes an estimate of the total costs, that is, a total which will exceed the amount to be borne by the federal government. The additional contribution which is needed to supply **full** support for the anticipated costs is the local or nonfederal matching share. Once the agreement is accepted, the assistance recipient is committed to provide the nonfederal share if it wishes to continue with the grant. E.g., B-130515, July 20, 1973. Failure to meet this commitment may result in the disallowance of **all** or part of otherwise allowable federal share costs.

Matching share requirements are often intended to “assure local interest and involvement through financial participation.” 59 **Comp. Gen.** 668,669 (1980). They may also serve to hold down federal costs. The theory behind the typical matching share requirement may be summarized as follows:

“In theory, the fiscal lure of Federal grants entices State and local governments into allocating new resources to satisfy the non-Federal match for program they otherwise would not have funded **on** their own. While State and local jurisdictions may not be willing or able to fully fund a program from their own resources, they would most **likely** agree to spend new resources on the same project if most of the project costs were paid by the Federal Government.”

GGD-81-7 at 9. This approach has been termed “cooperative federalism.” E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,316 (1968). It is also

- Rules relating to proceeds from the sale of real and personal **property** provided by the federal government or purchased in whole or in part with federal funds are set forth in the Common Rule §§  .25(f), —.31, and —.32, 53 Fed. Reg. 8093–95. See also OMB Circular **A-1** 10, Attachment N.
- Royalties received as a **result** of copyrights or patents produced under a grant maybe treated as other program income if **specified** in applicable agency regulations or the grant agreement. Common Rule §  .25(e), 53 Fed. Reg. 8093. See also **B-186284**, June 23, 1977; GAO report entitled Administration of the Science Education Project “Man: A Course of Study”(MACOS), **MWD-76-26** (October 14, 1975).

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## 5. Cost-Sharing

When the federal government chooses to provide financial assistance to some activity, it **may** also choose to fund the entire cost, but it is not required to do so. City of New York v. Richardson, 473 **F.2d** 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950. “[T]he judgment whether to [provide assistance], and to what degree, rests with [Congress].” Id. Thus, a program statute may provide for full funding, or it may **provide** for “cost-sharing,” that is, financing by a mix of federal and nonfederal funds. Reasons for cost-sharing range from budgetary considerations to a desire to stimulate increased activity on the part of the recipient. The two primary cost-sharing devices are “matching share” provisions and “maintenance of effort” provisions. For a detailed analysis and critique of both devices, see GAO’s report Proposed Changes in Federal Matching and Maintenance of Effort Requirements for State and Local Governments, **GGD-81-7** (December 23, 1980) (hereafter cited as “**GGD-81-7**”).

Federal grant funds constitute a **significant** portion of the total expenditures of state and local governments. Thus, cost-sharing clearly has an impact on the relationship between the federal government and the states, and on the executive-legislative relationship at the state level. This gives rise to many interesting **problems**,<sup>26</sup> **discussed in detail in** GAO’s report Federal Assistance System Should Be Changed to Permit Greater Involvement by State Legislatures, **GGD-81-3** (December 15, 1980).

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<sup>26</sup>For example, can a state legislature appropriate federal **grant** funds? State courts have **split** on the issue. See **GGD-81-3** at 27-30.

contractual commitments) that the **local** share will be forthcoming. 60 **Comp. Gen.** 208 (1981). See also 23 **Comp. Gen.** 652 (1944) (payment by federal agency of local share under cooperative agreement, subject to contractual agreement to reimburse).

Where the statute authorizing federal assistance specifies the federal share of an approved program as a specific percentage of the total cost, the grantor agency is required to make awards to the extent specified and has no discretion to provide a lesser (or greater) amount. *Manatee County v. Train*, 583 **F.2d** 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1978); 53 **Comp. Gen.** 547 (1974); **B-197256**, November 19, 1980. However, where the federal share is defined by statutory language which **specifies** a maximum federal contribution but no minimum, the agency can provide a lesser amount. 50 **Comp. Gen.** 553 (1971).

Although most cost-sharing programs are in terms of a **fixed** federal share, some programs may provide for a declining federal share. Under a declining share program in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, GAO concluded that the federal share could be determined in the year the grant was made, notwithstanding the fact that the grantee would not actually incur the costs until the following fiscal year. **B-175155**, July 29, 1977. Another cost-sharing variation is the “aggregate match,” in which the nonfederal share is determined by cumulating the grantee’s contributions from prior time periods. An example is discussed in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 524 (1979).

#### (2) Hard and soft matches

The program statute may define or limit the types of assets which may be applied to the nonfederal share. A provision limiting the nonfederal share to cash contributions is called a “hard match.” In 31 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1952), the matching share was described in the appropriation act that required it as an “amount available.” In the absence of legislative history to support a broader meaning, GAO concluded that the matching share must be in the form of money and that the value of other non-monetary contributions could not be considered. A more explicit “hard match” requirement is discussed in 52 **Comp. Gen.** 558 (1973), in which GAO concluded that the matching share, while it must be in the form of money, could include donated funds as well as grantee funds. While the program discussed in 52 **Comp. Gen.** 558 no longer exists, the case remains useful for this

known as the “federal carrot.” See City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d at 928.

Matching requirements are most commonly found in the applicable program legislation. However, they may also be found in appropriation acts. E.g., 58 **Comp. Gen.** 524 (1979); 31 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1952). A matching provision in an appropriation act, like any other provision in an appropriation act, will apply only to the **fiscal** year(s) covered by the act to the appropriation to which it applies, unless otherwise specified. 58 **Comp. Gen.** at 527.

If a program statute authorizes grants but neither provides for nor prohibits cost-sharing, the grantor agency may in some cases be able to impose a matching requirement administratively by regulation. The test is the underlying congressional intent. If legislative history indicates an intent for full federal funding, then the statute will generally be construed as requiring a 100 percent federal share. **B-226572**, June 25, 1987; **B-169491**, June 16, 1980. However, cost-sharing regulations have been regarded as valid where the statute was silent and it could reasonably be concluded that Congress left the matter to the judgment of the administering agency. **B-130515**, July 17, 1974; **B-130515**, July 20, 1973. Such regulations may be waived uniformly and prospectively, but may not be waived on a retroactive and ad hoc basis. Id.

Matching funds, as with the federal assistance funds themselves, can be used only for authorized grant purposes. **B-230735**, July 20, 1988; **B-149441**, February 17, 1987. In the latter **case**, GAO concluded that the National Endowment for the Humanities could not divert state matching funds to establish private endowments which, under existing authorities, could not have been created by a direct award of NEH funds. See also 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289,295 (1962).

Unless otherwise specified in the governing legislation, a grantee may match only a portion of the funds potentially available to it, and thereby receive a correspondingly smaller grant. 16 **Comp. Gen.** 512 (1936).

Under a cost-sharing assistance program funded by advance payments of the federal contribution, the Comptroller General has held that the advances may be made prior to the disbursement of the nonfederal share as long as adequate assurances exist (e.g., by

which authorizes community development block grant funds to be used as the nonfederal share under any other grant undertaken as part of a community development program. See 59 **Comp. Gen.** 668 (1980); 56 **Comp. Gen.** 645 (1977); **B-239907**, July 10, 1991. The latter opinion concluded that community development block grant regulations no longer apply once the funds have been applied **as** a match under another grant program, at least where applying the regulations would substantially interfere with use of the funds under the receiving grant. For other **examples**, see 52 **Comp. Gen.** 558,564 (1973) and 32 **Comp. Gen.** 184 (1952).

In 59 **Comp. Gen.** 668, GAO considered a conflict between two statutes—the Housing and Community Development Act which, as noted, permits federal grant funds to **fill** a nonfederal matching requirement, and the Coastal Zone Management Act, which provides for cost-sharing grants but expressly prohibits the use of federal funds received from other sources to pay a grantee’s matching share. Finding that the **statutory** language could not be reconciled, and noting further that there was no helpful legislative history under either statute, the Comptroller General concluded, as the most reasonable result consistent with the purposes of both statutes, that community development block grant funds were available to pay the nonfederal share of Coastal Zone Management Act grants for projects properly incorporated as part of a grantee’s community development program. See also **B-229004-O. M.**, February 18, 1988, which essentially followed 59 **Comp. Gen.** 668 and concluded that community development block grant funds could be used for the matching share of certain grants under the Stewart **B. McKinney** Homeless Assistance Act of 1987.

A somewhat less explicit exception is discussed in 57 **Comp. Gen.** 710 (1978), holding that funds distributed to states under Title II of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§6721-6736 (called the “**countercyclical** revenue sharing program”), maybe applied to the states’ matching share under the Medicaid program. GAO agreed with the Treasury Department that Title II payments amounted to “general budget support as opposed to categorical or block **grants** or contracts” (57 **Comp. Gen.** at 711)—a form of revenue sharing—and thus should be construed in the context of the (since repealed) General Revenue Sharing Program. General Revenue Sharing was characterized by a “**no** strings on local expenditures” policy, evidenced by the fact that a provision in the original legislation

point and for the detailed review of legislative history illuminating the purpose and intent of the ‘hard match’ provision.

The program legislation may expressly authorize the inclusion of assets other than cash in the nonfederal contribution. See 56 **Comp. Gen.** 645 (1977). If the legislation is silent with respect to the types of assets which may be counted, the statute will generally be construed as permitting an “in-kind” or “soft” match, that is, the matching share may include the reasonable value of property or services as well as cash. 52 **Comp. Gen.** 558, 560 (1973); **B-81321**, November 19, 1948. The valuation of in-kind contributions can get complicated. An example is 31 **Comp. Gen.** 672 (1952) (value of land could not include the cost or value of otherwise unallowable improvements to the land previously added by the grantee). Current valuation standards for state and local governments are found in the Common Rule, § 24.53 Fed. Reg. 8092.

(3) Matching one grant with funds from another

An important and logical principle is that neither the federal nor the nonfederal share of a particular grant program maybe used by a grantee to match funds provided under another federal grant program, unless specifically authorized by law. In other words, a grantee may not (1) use funds received under one federal grant as the matching share under a separate grant, nor may it (2) use the same grantee dollars to meet two separate matching requirements. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 645 (1977); 47 **Comp. Gen.** 81 (1967); 32 **Comp. Gen.** 561 (1953); 32 **Comp. Gen.** 141 (1952); **B-214278**, January 25, 1985; **B-212177**, May 10, 1984; **B-130515**, July 20, 1973; **B-229004** -O. M., February 18, 1988; **B-162001** -O. M., August 17, 1967. See also Common Rule § 24(b), 53 Fed. Reg. 8092. A contrary rule would largely nullify the cost-sharing objective of stimulating new grantee expenditures.<sup>27</sup>

Normally, exceptions to the rule are in the form of express statutory authority. A prominent example is section 105(a)(9) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)(9),

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<sup>27</sup>By way of contrast, the rule that funds received under one federal grant may not, absent congressional authorization, be used to finance the local match under another federal grant, does not apply to federal loans. The reason is that loans, unlike grants, are expected to be repaid and the recipient is thus, at least ultimately, using its own funds. Of course, the proposed use of the funds must be authorized under the loan program legislation. **B-207211**-O. M., July 9, 1982. See also **B-214278**, January 25, 1985.

grantee or grant beneficiary under some other agency's program. The cases fall into two groups.

The **first** situation involves **services** performed by an assistance beneficiary to an agency other than the grantor agency. Under the College Work-Study Program, not to exceed 70 percent of the student's salary is paid by the college under a Department of Education grant, with the remainder paid by the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2753(b)(5). The "employer" maybe another federal agency. 46 **Comp. Gen.** 115 (1966). In addition to the salary contribution, the employing agency may pay **unreimbursed** administrative costs such as social security taxes and compensation insurance. 50 **Comp. Gen.** 553 (1971); 46 **Comp. Gen.** 115. However, an agency may not, without statutory authority, participate in a work-study program authorized by state law and not coordinated with the federal program. **B-159715**, December 18, 1978.

The authority to pay administrative costs under the work-study program is based on the cost-sharing nature of that program. Absent cost-sharing, there is no comparable authority. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 242 (1982) (agency to which employee had been assigned under former Comprehensive Employment and Training Act lacked **authority** to reimburse grantee for retirement contributions).

The second group of cases involves projects which benefit other federal facilities. Under program legislation which does not give the grantor agency discretion to reduce the federal share, the grantor agency is not authorized to exclude from total cost a portion of an otherwise eligible project solely because that portion would provide service to another federal facility. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 1 (1979). Where the grantor agency has reduced its contribution because a portion of the project would serve another federal facility, the "benefited agency" normally **would** not be authorized to make up the shortfall without receiving additional consideration above and beyond the improved service it would have received anyway. **B-189395**, April 27, 1978. However, if Congress chooses to appropriate funds to the benefited agency to make up the shortfall, the benefited agency may make otherwise proper contributions without requiring additional legal consideration as long as its contribution, when added to the amount contributed by the grantor agency, does not exceed the statutorily specified federal share. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 1; **B-198450**, October 2, 1980; **B-199534/B-200086**, October 2, 1980.

barring the use of funds as the nonfederal share in other federal programs had been repealed. Stressing the strong analogy between Title II and General Revenue Sharing, the decision concluded that implicit in the “no strings” policy was the authority to apply Title II funds to a state’s matching share under Medicaid.

It should also be noted that where any federal assistance funds are used as nonfederal matching funds for another grant, such use must be consistent with the grant under which they were originally awarded as well as the grant they are intended to implement. 59 **Comp. Gen.** 668 (1980); 57 **Comp. Gen.** at 715; **B-230735**, July 20, 1988.

Funds received by a property owner from a federal agency as just compensation for property taken by eminent domain belong to the owner outright and do not constitute a “grant.” Therefore, they may be used as the nonfederal share of a grant from another federal agency, even where the taking and the grant relate to the same project. **B-197256**, November 19, 1980.

(4) Relocation allowances

Federally assisted programs which result in the displacement of individuals and business entities may, apart from eminent domain payments, result in the payment of relocation allowances under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Under the statute, authorized relocation payments provided by a state incident to a federally assisted project which results in relocations are to be treated in the same manner as other project costs. Thus, under a program statute which provides for a 90 percent federal contribution, 90 percent of authorized relocation payments will be reimbursable as an allowable program cost. In other words, any applicable matching share requirement will apply equally to the relocation payments. **B-215646**, August 7, 1984.

(5) Payments by other than grantor agency

Of course there is nothing wrong with grantees receiving funds under more than one grant for which they are eligible. If the grants are administered by different agencies, each agency is making payments under its own program. Occasionally, an agency is asked to make payments not associated with any of its own assistance programs, to a



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b. Maintenance of Effort

Suppose the state of New Euphoria spends around a million dollars a year for the control of noxious pests. After several years, the continued proliferation of noxious pests leads Congress to conclude that the program is not going as well as everyone might like, and that federal financial assistance is in order. Congress therefore enacts legislation and appropriates funds to provide annual pest-control grants of half a million dollars to each affected state.

New Euphoria applies for and receives its grant. Like most other states, however, New Euphoria is strapped for money and faced with various forms of taxpayer revolt. While the state government certainly believes that noxious pests merit control, it would, if it had free choice in the matter, rather use the money on what it regards as higher priority programs. The state uses the \$500,000 federal grant for its pest control program—it has no choice because it has contractually committed itself with the federal government to do so as a condition of receiving the grant. However, it then takes \$500,000 of its own money away from pest control and applies it to other programs. If the purpose of the federal grant legislation is simply to provide general financial support to New Euphoria, that purpose has been accomplished and the state has clearly benefited. But if the federal purpose is to fund an increased level of pest control activity, the objective has just as clearly been frustrated.

When Congress wants to avoid this result, a device it commonly uses is the “maintenance of effort” requirement. Under a maintenance of effort provision, the grantee is required, as a condition of eligibility for federal funding, to maintain its financial contribution to the program at not less than a stated percentage (which maybe 100 percent or less) of its contribution for a prior time period, usually the previous fiscal year. The purpose of maintenance of effort is to ensure that the federal assistance results in an increased level of program activity, and that the grantee, as did New Euphoria, does not simply replace grantee dollars with federal dollars. GAO has observed that maintenance of effort, since it requires a specified level of grantee spending, “effectively serves as a matching requirement.” **GGD-81-7** at 2.

GAO has also observed that a grant for something the grantee is already spending its own money on is, without maintenance of effort, little more than another form of revenue sharing.

“When **Federal** grant money is used to substitute for ongoing or planned State **and local** expenditures, the ultimate effect of the Federal program **funds is to** provide **fiscal** relief for recipient States and localities rather than to increase service **levels** in the program area. When **fiscal** substitution occurs, narrow-purpose categorical **Federal** programs enacted to augment service **levels** are transformed, in effect, into broad purpose **fiscal assistance** like revenue sharing Maintenance of effort provisions, if effective, can prevent substitution and ensure that the **Federal** grant is used by the grantee for the **specific** purpose intended by the Congress.” GGD-81-7 at 48–49.

One type of maintenance of effort requirement is illustrated by the following provision from the Clean Air Act:

“No [air **pollution** control] agency shall receive any grant under this section during any **fiscal** year when **its** expenditures of non-Federal funds for recurrent expenditures for air pollution **control** programs **will** be less than its expenditures were for such programs during the preceding **fiscal** year. . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 7405(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 802(e), 104 Stat. 2399,2688 (1990).

A variation is found in 20 U.S.C. § 2971, applicable to certain education grants, which we chose because it includes most of the points we will note in this discussion. The basic requirement is subsection (a)(1):

“[A] State is **entitled** to receive its **full** allocation of funds. . . for any **fiscal** year if the Secretary finds that either the combined **fiscal** effort per student or the aggregate expenditures within the State with respect to the provision of free **public** education for the preceding **fiscal** year was not less than 90 percent of such combined **fiscal** effort or aggregate expenditures for the second preceding **fiscal** year.”

Maintenance of effort statutes will invariably provide fiscal sanctions if the grantee does not meet its commitment. Sanction provisions are of two types. Under one version, the grantee’s allocation of federal funds is reduced in the same proportion as its contribution fell below the required level. For example, 20 U.S.C. § 2971(a)(2) provides:

“The Secretary **shall** reduce the amount of the allocation of funds under this division in any **fiscal** year in the exact proportion to which the State fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) by **falling below** 90 percent of both the **fiscal** effort per student and aggregate expenditures . . . .”

The second and more draconian version is illustrated by the Clean Air Act provision quoted above and discussed in B-209872 -0. M., March 23, 1984, an internal GAO memorandum. Under this version,

the grantee falling short of **its** maintenance of effort commitment **loses all** grant funds under the program for that fiscal year. GAO has endorsed the enactment of legislation making proportionate reduction the standard rather than total withdrawal. **GGD-81-7** at 71.

Some maintenance of effort statutes authorize the administering agency to waive the requirement for a specified time period if some natural disaster or other unforeseen event caused the funding shortfall. An illustration is 20 U.S.C. § 2971(a)(3):

“The Secretary may waive, for 1 **fiscal** year only, the requirements of this subsection if the Secretary determines that such a waiver would be equitable due to exceptional or uncontrollable circumstances such as a natural disaster or a precipitous and unforeseen decline in the financial resources of the State.”

**If** a grantee **fails** to meet its commitment and the noncompliance cannot be waived, any disbursement of federal funds in excess of the amount permitted by the program statute must generally be recovered. 51 **Comp. Gen.** 162 (1971). Failure to require repayment of such funds “would, in effect, constitute the giving away of United States funds without authority of law.” *Id.* at 165.

A variation of the maintenance of effort provision is the so-called “**nonsupplant**” provision, which requires that federal funds be used to supplement, and not supplant, nonfederal funds which would otherwise have been made available. **Nonsupplant** is sometimes used in **conjunction** with maintenance of effort, an example again being the education statute, 20 U.S.C. § 2971(b):

“A State or **local** educational agency may use and allocate funds received under this division only so as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of Federal funds made available under this division, be made **available** from non-Federal sources, and in no case may such funds be used so as to supplant funds from non-Federal sources.”

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The Clean Air Act provision, quoted in part above, also includes a **nonsupplant** clause. GAO's 1980 study concluded that **nonsupplant** provisions were largely unenforceable, and recommended against their use. GGD-81-7 at 71.<sup>29</sup>

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## F. Obligation of Appropriations for Grants

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### 1. Requirement for Obligation

**As** with any other type of expenditure, the expenditure of federal assistance program funds requires an obligation that is proper in terms of purpose, time, and amount, and the obligation must be properly recorded. The purpose, time, and amount requirements are essentially the same for grants as for other expenditures. With respect to recording of the obligation, 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5) requires that the obligation be supported by documentary evidence of a grant **payable—**

“(A) from appropriations made for payment of, or contributions to, amounts required to be paid in **specific** amounts **fixed** by law or under formulas prescribed by law;

“(B) under an agreement authorized by law; or

“(C) under plans approved consistent with and authorized by law.”

What constitutes an obligation in the grant context, and what will or will not **satisfy** 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(5), are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

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<sup>29</sup>“Most Federal program officials we contacted agreed that **nonsupplant is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce** because it calls for an **external judgment** on what grantees would have **done** if Federal funds were not available. Basically, this **calls for a Federal** agency to assess the motives behind particular changes in State and local plans or budgets and to judge whether the presence of Federal grant funds drove the particular State or local action.” GGD-81-7 at 54.

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## 2. Changes in Grants—Replacement Grants vs. New Obligations

### a. The Replacement Grant Concept

Changes in grants may come about for a variety of reasons—the original grantee may be unable to perform, the grant amount maybe increased, there may be a **redefinition** of objectives, etc. If the change occurs in the same fiscal year (or longer period if a multiple-year appropriation is involved) in which the original grant was made, there is no obligation problem as long as the amount of the appropriation is not exceeded. If, however, the change occurs in a later **fiscal** year, the question becomes whether the amended grant remains chargeable to the appropriation initially obligated or whether it constitutes a new obligation chargeable to appropriations current at the time the change is made.

As a general proposition, a grant amendment which changes the scope of the grantor which makes the award to an entirely different grantee (not a successor to the original grantee), and which is executed after the appropriation under which the original grant was made has ceased to be available for obligation, may not be charged to the original appropriation. **E.g.**, 58 **Comp. Gen.** 676 (1979). If the amendment amounts to a substitute grant, it extinguishes the old obligation and creates a new one. The new obligation is chargeable to the appropriation available at the time the new obligation is created. There are also situations where a grant amendment creates a new obligation chargeable to the later appropriation without extinguishing the original obligation. In either event, if the grantor agency does not recognize that the change creates a new obligation when the change is made, there is a potential **Antideficiency** Act violation. **On** the other hand, a change which qualifies as a “replacement grant” remains chargeable to the original appropriation. Of course, an agency with the requisite program authority can change the scope of a grant if current appropriations are used. 60 **Comp. Gen.** 540 (1981).

The clearest example of a change that creates a new obligation is where the amount of the award is increased. If the grantee has no legal right stemming from the original grant agreement to compel execution of the amendment, the increase in amount is anew obligation chargeable to appropriations current when the change is made. 41 **Comp. Gen.** 134 (1961); 39 **Comp. Gen.** 296 (1959); 37 **Comp. Gen.** 861 (1958). However, an upward **adjustment** in a

“provisional indirect cost rate” contained in a grant award, which contemplated a possible increase in the indirect cost rate at a later date, does not constitute an additional or new award. Payments resulting from such an **adjustment** are chargeable to the appropriation originally obligated by the grant. 48 **Comp.Gen.** 186 (1968).

Where a change involves some other aspect of the grant, it is necessary to determine whether the change, viewed as a whole, will create a new and separate undertaking or will enlarge the scope of the grant, thereby creating a new obligation. As pointed out in 58 **Comp.Gen.** 676,680 (1979), the cases have identified three closely related areas of concern that must be satisfied before a change may be viewed as a “replacement grant” and not as creating a new obligation:

- (1) The bona fide need for the grant project must continue;
- (2) The purpose of the grant from the government’s standpoint must remain the same; and
- (3) The revised grant must have the same scope,

The “scope” of a grant, as stated in 58 **Comp.Gen.** at 681:

“grows out of the grant purposes. These purposes must be referred to in order to identify those aspects of a grant that make up the substantial and material features of a particular grant which in turn fix the scope of the Government’s obligation.”

**b. Substitution of Grantee**

As a general rule, when a recipient of a grant is unable to implement the grant as originally contemplated, and an alternative grantee is designated subsequent to the expiration of the period of availability for obligation of the grant funds, the award to the alternative grantee must be treated as a new obligation and is not properly chargeable to the appropriation current at the time the original grant was made. B-164031(5), June 25, 1976; B-114876/A-44014, January 21, 1960.

However, it is possible in certain situations to make an award to an alternative grantee after expiration of the period of availability for obligation where the alternative award amounts to a “replacement grant” and is substantially identical in scope and purpose to the original grant. 57 **Comp.Gen.** 205 (1978); B-157179, September 30, 1970. In the latter decision, the Comptroller General did not object to the use of unexpended grant funds originally awarded to the

University of Wisconsin to engage Northwestern University in a new fiscal year to complete the unfinished project. Approval was granted because the project director had transferred from the University of Wisconsin to Northwestern, University and he was viewed by all the parties as the only person capable of completing the work. The decision also noted that the original grant was made in response to a bona fide need then existing, and that the need for completing the project continued to exist.

GAO has also indicated that it might be possible in certain situations to develop procedures to designate an alternate grantee at the time an award is made to the principal grantee, provided that all of the criteria for selection of the principal and required administrative action are also met concerning the alternate, with the sole exception that the award to the alternate is not **mailed** to it pending a determination as to whether the principal actually complies with the terms of the award. The validity of any such procedure would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. **B-1 14876**, July 29, 1960; **B-1 14876**, March 15, 1960.

c. Other Changes

A shift in the community to be served by the grant has been held to constitute a new obligation. Thus, in **B-164031(5)**, June 25, 1976, the original grantee ran into financial difficulties and was unable to utilize a hospital modernization award under the Hill-Burton program. The Comptroller General found that a proposal to shift the award to another hospital would constitute a new undertaking rather than a replacement grant since the hospitals were over 100 miles apart and served essentially different communities.

An enlargement of the community to be served will not necessarily constitute a new obligation. The grant in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 676 (1979) was to set up a demonstration community service volunteer program. The grant defined the number of participants deemed necessary to generate the desired test results. The geographic site for which the grant was awarded was expected to produce the necessary number of **volunteers**, but did not. It was held that the geographical area could be expanded to produce the desired number of volunteers. The modification in these circumstances would not constitute a new and separate undertaking and could be funded from the appropriation originally obligated.

A change in the research objectives of a grant will constitute a new obligation notwithstanding that some aspects of the original grant and the modification may be related. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 459 (1978). See also 39 **Comp. Gen.** 296 (1959).

A 1969 decision involved amendments by the National Institute of Mental Health which would change the use of grant funds from construction to renovation and vice-versa beyond the period of obligational availability. Since the amendments met the statutory eligibility criteria, since they would still accomplish the original grant objectives, and since they involved neither a change in grantees nor an increase in amount, they were held permissible under the original obligations. **B-74254**, September 3, 1969.

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## G. Grant Costs

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### 1. Allowable vs. Unallowable Costs

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#### a. The Concept of Allowable costs

Recipients of assistance awards are expected to use the assistance funds for the purposes for which they were awarded, subject to any conditions that may attach to the award. Expenditures or costs that meet the grant purposes and conditions are termed “allowable costs.” An expenditure which is not for grant purposes or is contrary to a condition of the grant is not an **allowable** cost and may not be properly charged to the grant.

Where a cost is not allowable, as far as the government is concerned the recipient still has the funds. If the grant funds have already been paid over to the grantee and no allowable costs of an equal amount are subsequently incurred, the recipient is required to return the amount of the improper charge to the government. **E.g., Utah State Board for Vocational Education v. United States**, 287 **F.2d** 713 (10th **Cir.** 1961). The United States “has a reversionary interest in the unencumbered balances of such grants, including any funds improperly applied.” 42 **Comp. Gen.** 289, 294 (1962). See also **B-198493**, July 7, 1980. This requirement cannot be waived. **B-171019**, June 3, 1975. Thus, the Comptroller General has held that an agency cannot waive its statutory regulations to relieve a grantee of its liability for improper expenditures. **B-163922**, February 10, 1978.



Similarly, an agency may not amend its regulations to relieve a grantee's liability for expenditures for administrative costs in excess of a statutory limitation. **B-178564**, July 19, 1977, reaffirmed in 57 **Comp. Gen.** 163 (1977).

Guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on cost principles is found in a series of **OMB Circulars**: **A-21** (Cost Principles for Educational Institutions); **A-87** (Cost Principles for State and Local Governments); **A-122** (Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations). These circulars are expressly incorporated in the common rule adopted under **OMB Circular No. A-102**. Common Rule §—.22, 53 Fed. Reg. 8092.

Costs are of two types, direct and indirect. Direct costs are items that are specifically identifiable and attributable to a particular cost **objective**.<sup>30</sup> In other words, direct costs are obligations or expenditures of a recipient which can be tied to a particular award. For example, if a recipient purchases an item of equipment necessary to carry out a particular award, the purchase price is a direct cost under that award. Indirect costs are costs incurred for common objectives which cannot be directly charged to any single cost **objective**.<sup>31</sup> A common example is depreciation. The concept of indirect costs is essentially an accounting device to permit the allocation of overhead in proportion to benefit. See **B-203681**, September 27, 1982. Indirect cost rates are usually negotiated by the grantor and grantee.

The **overallocation** of indirect costs is unauthorized and therefore unallowable. The reason is that 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) restricts the use of appropriated funds to the purposes for which they were appropriated, and payment of the **overallocation** would not serve the purposes of the appropriation. **B-203681**, September 27, 1982.

A grantee may generally substitute other allowable costs for costs which have been disallowed, subject to any applicable cost ceiling. If additional funds become available as the result of a cost disallowance, those funds should be used to pay any "excess" allowable costs which could not be paid previously because of the ceiling. **B-208871.2**, February 9, 1989.

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<sup>30</sup>E.g., **OMB Circular No. A-87**, para. E. 1.

<sup>31</sup>GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, **PAD-81-27**, at 87 (1981).

Allowable costs are determined on the basis of the relevant program legislation, regulations, including OMB directives, and the terms of the grant agreement. First and foremost, of course, is the program statute. Thus, where the legislation and legislative history of a program clearly limited the purposes for which grant funds could be used, grantees could not use grant funds for non-specified purposes, including one for which Congress had provided funds under a separate appropriation. 35 **Comp. Gen.** 198 (1955). In 55 **Comp. Gen.** 652 (1976), however, a statute prohibiting certain costs was held to apply only to direct costs and, absent legislative **history** to the **contrary**, did not preclude use of standard indirect cost rates even though technically a percentage of the indirect cost rates could be attributed to the prohibited items.

The role of agency regulations is illustrated by California. United States, 547 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824. Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, the United States pays 90 percent of the “total cost” of certain highway construction, with “cost” being defined to include the cost of right-of-way acquisition. The Federal Highway Administration had issued a policy memorandum stating that program funds would not be used to pay interest on any portion of a condemnation award or settlement for more than 30 days after the money is deposited with the court. California challenged the restriction. The court said:

“Certainly, Congress must have intended that the statutory obligation to pay 90 percent of the total cost must include some corresponding right to impose reasonable limitations upon such costs, rather than to **leave** the **Federal** Treasury at the mercy of unfettered discretion by the State as to what expenditures may be made and charged accordingly.”

Id. at 1390. The court saw no need to decide whether the policy **memorandum** rose to the level of a “regulation.” Either way, it was a reasonable exercise of the agency’s authority to administer the program. See also Louisiana Department of Highways v. United States, 604 F.2d 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Federal Highway Administration regulation disallowing costs of grantee settlements of worthless claims).

Several GAO decisions illustrate the significance of the grant agreement. For example, where a grant application specified that certain costs would be incurred and the program legislation was ambiguous as to whether those costs should be allowed, the grantor

agency was held bound by the grant agreement, i.e., by its acceptance of the application. **B-1** 18638.101, October 29, 1979.

The familiar cost overrun is not the exclusive province of the government contractor. Assistance recipients may also incur overruns. A claim resulting from an overrun under a cooperative agreement was denied in **B-206272.5**, March 26, 1985, because, under the agreement, the agency was not obligated to fund overruns unless it chose to amend the agreement and, in its discretion, it had declined to do so. Cf. **B-209649**, December 23, 1983 (labor benefits awarded by court to employees of grantee's contractor could be regarded as indirect costs under grant terms, as long as applicable ceiling on indirect costs was not exceeded).

GAO is occasionally asked to review allowable cost determinations. Two examples are Nuclear Waste: DOE Needs to Ensure Nevada's Conformance With Grant Requirements, GAO/RCED-90-1 73 (July 1990), and Job Training Partnership Act: Review of Audit Findings Related to the Downriver Community Conference Program, GAO/HRD-90-105 (May 1990). The analytical framework employed is that outlined above.

#### b. Grant Cost Cases

Grant cost cases are extremely difficult to categorize because what is **allowable** under one assistance program may not be allowable under another. Accordingly, summaries of a number of cases are given below with no further attempt to generalize.

**Recovery** of antitrust damages by a state grantee stemming from a grant-financed project serves to reduce the actual costs of the grantee and must be accounted for to the government. This is true even where the United States has declined to participate in the cost of the antitrust action. 57 **Comp. Gen.** 577 (1978). However, the government is not entitled to share in treble damages. 47 **Comp. Gen.** 309 (1967). Out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the state in effecting the recovery should be shared by the federal government in the same proportion as the recovered damages. **B-162539**, October 11, 1967.

Where a grantee paid a nondiscriminatory sales tax on otherwise proper expenditures with grant funds, the taxes are not taxes imposed on the United States and are allowable. 37 **Comp. Gen.** 85 (1957). However, property taxes were held not allowable under a construction

grant because they represent operating costs rather than construction costs, **B-166506**, February 14, 1973.

The payment of expert witness fees was found unrelated to the purposes of a research grant. 42 **Comp.Gen.** 682 (1963).

Construction of a bridge could not be paid for out of federal aid highway funds where the construction was necessitated by a flood control project and not as a highway project. 41 **Comp.Gen.** 606 (1962).

Buses acquired by a city under a “mass transportation” grant could be used for charter service, an unauthorized grant purpose, where such use was merely incidental to the primary use of the buses for authorized mass transit purposes. **B-160204**, December 7, 1966.

The salary of an individual hired to evaluate the Upward Bound Program at a grantee college was disallowed as a grant cost, because the grant document contained no provision for such an expenditure and the applicable program guidelines specified that evaluation was not an allowable expense. **B-161980**, November 23, 1971.

The cost of a luncheon for top officials of the Department of Human Resources, District of Columbia Government, was disallowed as an improper administrative expense under a social services program grant under Title XX of the Social Security Act. **B-187150**, October 14, 1976.

Ordinarily, increased project costs resulting from grantee negligence giving rise to justified claims for damages would not be allowable. However, a damage award was viewed as a recognizable cost element where the grantee’s error had contributed to an unrealistically low initial cost, but an amendment to the grant was required before the increased costs could be allowed. 47 **Comp.Gen.** 756 (1968).

Under a Federal Airport Act program providing for federal payment of a specified percentage of allowable project costs, the fair value of land and equipment donated to the grantee could be treated as an allowable cost because failure to do so would, in effect, penalize the grantee for the contributions of “public spirited citizens.” **B-81321**, November 19, 1948.

Litigation costs incurred by grantees in suing the United States were found unallowable under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).

c. Note on Accounting

Cost principles on which a grant award is conditioned are binding on the grantee. **B-203681**, September 27, 1982. It is the grantee's responsibility to maintain adequate fiscal records to support the allowable costs claimed. With respect to state and local governments, see generally Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.20,53 Fed. Reg. 8090. Where a grantee has not kept adequate records, evidence of satisfactory progress on the grant may nevertheless justify a limited "presumption of regularity" since by inference the grantee must have incurred some allowable expenses. However, it does not follow that **all** expenses claimed should be allowed. Where a particular accounted-for time period includes disallowed costs, similar disallowable costs must be projected as present during prior unaccounted-for periods unless there is proof to the contrary, the presumption being that similar errors occurred during the prior periods. **B-186166**, August 26, 1976. Although the agency has discretion to determine the precise method of calculation, one approach is to disallow the same proportion of funds for the unaccounted-for periods as were disallowed for the period for which accounts were available. *Id.*

GAO has questioned the assessment of fiscal sanctions by a grantor agency against a grantee on the basis of error rate statistical data, such as errors imputed from a quality control system. See **B-194548**, July 10, 1979. In Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409–10 (N.D. Ga. 1977), however, the court upheld the determination of overpayments under the Medicaid program on the basis of statistical sampling, in view of the "practical impossibility" of individual claim-by-claim audit. The court also noted that, under the pertinent federal regulations, the state was given the opportunity to present evidence before the disallowance became final.

In Maryland v. Mathews, 415 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976), a case involving the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, the court held that an agency can establish by regulation a withholding of federal financial participation in a specified amount set by a tolerance level, as long as the tolerance level is reasonable and supported by an adequate factual basis. The regulation involved in the specific case, however, did not meet the test and was found to be arbitrary and therefore invalid. It has also been held that, if setting a tolerance level

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is discretionary, the agency can set it at zero. Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 762 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1985); California. Settle, 708 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1983).

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## 2. Pre-Award Costs (Retroactive Funding)

“Retroactive funding” means the funding of costs incurred by a grantee before the grant was awarded. Three separate situations arise: (1) costs incurred prior to award but after the program authority has been enacted and the appropriation became available; (2) costs incurred prior to award and after program authority was enacted but before the appropriation became available; and (3) costs incurred prior to both program authority and appropriation availability.

Situation (1): In this situation, the grantee seeks to charge costs incurred before the grant was awarded (in some cases even before the grantee submitted its application) but after both the program legislation and the implementing appropriation were enacted.

There is no rule or policy that generally restricts allowable costs to those incurred after the award of a grant. However, agencies may adopt such a policy by regulation. B-197699, June 3, 1980.

Thus, in a number of cases, grant-related costs incurred prior to award, but after the program was authorized and appropriated funds were available for obligation, have been allowed where (a) there was no contrary indication in the language or legislative history of the program statute or the appropriation, (b) allowance was not prohibited by the regulations of the grantor agency, and (c) the agency determined that allowance would be in the best interest of carrying out the statutory purpose. 32 Comp.Gen. 141 (1952); 31 Comp.Gen. 308 (1952); B-197699, June 3, 1980; B-133001, March 9, 1979; B-75414, May 7, 1948. (The above criteria are not specified as such in any of the cases cited but are derived from viewing all of the cases as a whole.)

Situation (2): In this situation, pre-award costs are incurred after program legislation has been enacted, but before an appropriation becomes available.

Prior to the Comptroller General’s decision in 56 Comp.Gen. 31 (1976), a “general rule” was commonly stated to the effect that

absent some indication of **contrary** intent, an appropriation could not be used to pay grant costs where the grantee's obligation arose before the appropriation implementing the enabling legislation became available. 45 **Comp. Gen.** 515 (1966); 40 **Comp. Gen.** 615 (1961); 31 **Comp. Gen.** 308 (1952); **A-71315**, February 28, 1936.

In 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31, the Comptroller General reviewed the earlier decisions and concluded that there was no legal requirement for a general **rule** prohibiting the use of **grant** funds to pay for costs incurred prior to the availability of the applicable appropriation. Rather, the determination should be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the decision announced:

**"We** would prefer to base each decision from now on on the statutory language, legislative history, and particular factors operative in the particular case in question, rather than on a **general** rule." **Id.** at 35.

In reviewing the earlier decisions, the Comptroller General found that each had been correctly decided on its own facts. Thus, retroactive funding was prohibited in 40 **Comp. Gen.** 615 (1961), 31 **Comp. Gen.** 308 (1952), and **A-71315**, February 28, 1936. However, in each of those cases, there was some manifestation of an **affirmative** intent that funds be used only for costs incurred subsequent to the appropriation. For example, 31 **Comp. Gen.** 308 concerned grants to states under the Federal Civil Defense Act. The committee reports and debates on a supplemental appropriation to fund the program contained strong indications that Congress did not intend that the money be used to retroactively fund expenses incurred by states prior to the appropriation. By way of contrast, there were no such indications in the situation considered in 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31 (matching funds provided to states under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965). Accordingly, 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31 did not overrule the earlier decisions, but merely modified them to the extent that **GAO** would no longer purport to apply a "general rule" in this area.

In determining whether retroactive funding is authorized, relevant factors are evidence and clarity of congressional intent, the degree of discretion given the grantor agency, and the **proximity** in time of the cost being incurred to the grant award. As in Situation (I), **significant** factors also include the agency's own regulations and the agency's determination that funding the particular costs in question will further the statutory purpose. Accordingly, the authority will be easier to **find** where an agency has broad discretion and favorable legislative

**history.** Using this approach, retroactive funding authority maybe found to exist (as in 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31), or not to exist (as in 40 **Comp. Gen.** 615).

If an agency wishes to recognize retroactive funding in limited situations in its regulations, it must, in order to avoid potential **Antideficiency** Act problems, make it clear that no obligation on the part of the government can arise prior to the availability of an appropriation. Of course, the grant itself cannot be made until the appropriation becomes available. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31, 36 (1976).

Situation (3): In this situation, the grantee seeks to charge costs incurred not only before the appropriation became available, but also before the program authority was enacted.

Costs incurred prior to both the program authorization and the availability of the appropriation may generally not be funded retroactively. See 56 **Comp. Gen.** 31 (1976); 32 **Comp. Gen.** 141 (1952); **B-11393**, July 25, 1940. GAO recognizes that there may possibly be exceptions even to this rule (56 **Comp. Gen.** at 35), but thus far there are no decisions **identifying** any.

One final situation deserves mention. In each of the retroactive funding cases cited above, the grant was in fact subsequently awarded. In **B-206244**, June 8, 1982, a state had applied for an Interior Department grant under the Youth Conservation Corps Act and later withdrew its application due to funding uncertainties. The state then filed a claim for various expenses it had incurred in anticipation of the grant. **GAO** held that payment would violate both the program legislation and the purpose statute, 31 U.S.C. §1301(a). Interior's appropriation was intended to accomplish grant purposes, but the state's expenses did not accomplish any grant purposes since the grant was never made.



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## H. Recovery of Grantee Indebtedness

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### 1. Government's Duty to Recover

This section is intended to summarize the application of “debt collection law” (covered in detail in Chapter 13) in the context of assistance programs, and to highlight a few issues in which the fact that a grant is involved maybe of special relevance. This brief discussion is intended to supplement the detailed coverage in Chapter 13; it is not a substitute.

Claims in favor of the United States against an assistance recipient may arise for a variety of reasons. As a general proposition, it has been the view of both GAO and the executive branch that the United States has not only a right but a duty to recover amounts owed to it, and that this duty exists without the need for **specific** statutory authority. This applies to assistance recipients just as it **would** apply to other debtors. The Federal Claims Collection Standards require each agency to “take aggressive action. . . to collect all **claims** of the United States for money or property arising out of the activities of, or referred to, that agency.” 4 C.F.R. § 102.1(a). See also Common Rule §\_\_\_\_.52,53 Fed. Reg. 8102.

For example, grant funds erroneously awarded to an ineligible grantee must be recovered by the agency responsible for the error, including expenditures the grantee incurred before receiving notice that the agency’s initial determination had been made in error. 51 **Comp. Gen.** 162 (1971); **B-146285/B-164031(1)**, April 19, 1972. The cited decisions recognize that there might be exceptional circumstances in which full recovery might not be required, but exceptions would have to be considered on an individual basis.

Similarly, where an agency **misapportions** formula grant funds so that some states receive excess funds, the excess must be recovered. If the **misapportionment** resulted in other states receiving less than their formula amount, the apportionments of all of the states involved must be appropriately **adjusted**. 41 **Comp. Gen.** 16 (1961).

Where, under an assistance program, the government is authorized or required to recover funds for whatever reason, the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, as amended by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (31 U.S.C. Chapter 37, Subchapter II), and the joint **GAO-Justice**

Department implementing regulations (Federal Claims Collection Standards, 4 C.F.R. Parts 101– 105) apply unless the program legislation under which the claim arises or some other statute provides otherwise. See 4 C.F.R. § 101.4; **B-163922**, February 10, 1978; **B-182423**, November 25, 1974.

Indebtedness to the United States may also result from the misuse of grant funds. E.g., Utah State Board for Vocational Education v. United States, 287 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1961); Mass Transit Grants: Noncompliance and Misspent Funds by Two Grantees in UMTA's New York Region, GAO/RCED-92-38 (January 1992). The cases usually arise when the grantor agency disallows certain costs. Here again the government's position has been that the right to recover exists independent of statute, supplemented or circumscribed by any statutory provisions that may apply. See, e.g., B-198493, July 7, 1980; **B-163922**, February 10, 1978. In this area, however, the government's right to recover has come under increasing attack by recipients, particularly during the 1980s.

What we present here is by no means an exhaustive cataloging of the cases. Our selection is designed to serve three purposes:

(1) summarize what the law appears to be as of the date of this publication; (2) reflect any discernible trends; and (3) point out some issues that may be of more general relevance. As a general proposition, the courts have looked **first** to the program legislation and, with some exceptions, have declined to rule on the government's common-law right of recovery where adequate authority could be found in, or deduced from, the enabling statute.

The cases we selected for purposes of illustration are drawn largely from two programs—Title I of the **Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)**, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (**CETA**). **ESEA** was extensively revised by the Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130); **CETA** was replaced in 1982 by the Job Training Partnership Act. Nevertheless, we chose these programs because they both generated a large volume of litigation on a variety of relevant topics. Apart from whatever value specific cases may have by analogy to other programs, the material illustrates the kinds of issues that have arisen and the approach the courts, including the Supreme Court, have taken in resolving them.

ESEA included a provision, very common in grant program legislation, requiring the states to provide adequate assurances to the Department of Education that grant funds would be used only on qualifying programs. In addition, the law was amended in 1978 to give the Secretary of Education explicit authority to direct the repayment of misspent grant funds from **non-ESEA** sources. 20 U.S.C. § 2835(b) (1982). Prior to this amendment, the statute had provided simply that payments under Title I **shall** take into account the extent to which any previous payment to the same state was greater or less than it should have been.

Two states argued that the 1978 amendments did not apply to misspent funds prior to 1978, and that the government's sole remedy with respect to **pre-1978 funds** was to withhold future grant funds, in which event the state would simply undertake a smaller Title I program. The government **argued** that the right to recover existed both under the **pre-1978** law and under the common law. The Supreme Court held that the **pre-1978** version of the law clearly gave the government the right to recover misspent funds. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983). Apart from the holding itself and its significance with respect to any program statutes with similar **language**, several other points from this decision are noteworthy:

- The existence and amount of the state's debt are to be determined administratively by the agency in the first instance, subject to judicial review. Id. at 791–92. (This is the same approach used in the Federal Claims **Collection** Standards for debt collection generally.)
- The Court rejected the argument that the government had a remedy by withholding future funds, with the state correspondingly reducing its program **level**.
- Because the Court found adequate authority in the statute, it declined to rule on the existence of a common-law right. Id. at 782 **n.7**.

In a **1981** case, a lower court had found a common-law right of recovery along with the **ESEA** statutory right. West Virginia v. Secretary of Education, 667 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1981). A 1987 case also upheld the government's common-law right of recovery, at least to the extent of **overallocations** or other erroneous payments. California Department of Education v. Bennett, 829 F.2d 795,798 (9th Cir. 1987).

Two years after Bell v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court considered another issue arising from the same litigation and held that the 1978 amendments to **ESEA** were not retroactive for purposes of determining whether funds had been misspent. Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985). What is important here is the more general rule the Court announced, namely, that substantive rights and obligations under federal grant programs are to be determined by reference to the law in effect when the grants were made. Id. at 638–41.

The Court also rejected an argument that recovery would be inequitable because the state acted in good faith. The role of the reviewing court is to determine if the proper **legal** standards are applied. If they are, a court has “no independent authority to excuse repayment based on its view of what would be the most equitable outcome.” Id. at 646. In any event, said the Court, “we **find** no inequity in **requiring** repayment of funds that were spent contrary to assurances provided by the State in obtaining the grants.” Id. at 645.

In Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656 (1985), decided on the same day as Bennett v. New Jersey, the Court **reaffirmed** the government’s right of recovery under **ESEA** Title I:

“The State gave certain assurances as a condition for receiving the federal funds, and if those assurances were not complied with, the Federal Government is entitled to recover amounts spent contrary to the **terms** of the grant agreement.” 470 U.S. at 663.

The Court further-concluded that neither “substantial compliance” by the state nor the absence of bad **faith** would absolve the state from its liability. Id. at 663–65. See also **B-229068-O**, M., December 23, 1987, applying Kentucky to grants under Title V of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.

One point in Bell v. New Jersey seems to have generated some **uncertainty**. The Court noted that the Secretary “has not asked us to decide what means of collection are available to him, but only whether he is a creditor. Since the case does not present the issue of available remedies, we do not address it.” Bell, 461 U.S. at 779 **n.4**. Thus, the Court did not approve or **disapprove** of any particular remedy. This led one court to conclude that the Bell **analysis** requires two separate questions: whether the federal government has a right of recovery and, if so, what remedies are available to it. Maryland Department of

Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1455 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (holding that **government has statutory right of recovery under Title XX of Social Security Act**). **However, another court expressed doubt** over the existence of such a dichotomy, construing the Supreme Court's silence in Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education as approval of the means of recovery employed in that case, a direct repayment order. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Brock, 769 F.2d 37,49 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 US. 1140 (right of recovery under Comprehensive Employment and Training Act). **The St. Regis** court went on to conclude that "Congress left it to the **Secretary** to establish additional remedial procedures, consistent with the purposes of the legislation, to insure compliance by prime sponsors." 769 F.2d at 50. Where this issue may lead in the future is unclear, although as noted briefly later in this chapter and discussed more fully in Chapter 13, the availability of a particular remedy sometimes is a very different question from the existence of the underlying right to recover.

Another group of cases involves the former **CETA** program. There is a strong parallel to the **ESEA** cases in that the original **CETA** included general authority to **adjust** payments to reflect prior overpayments or **underpayments**, and was amended in 1978 to explicitly authorize the Secretary of Labor to recover misspent funds by ordering repayment from **non-CETA** funds. Essentially following Bell v. New Jersey, a rather long line of cases upheld the Labor Department's right, under the **pre-1978 CETA**, to recover misspent funds and to do so by directing repayment from **non-CETA** funds. City of Gary v. United States Department of Labor, 793 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1986); St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Brock, 769 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140; Mobile Consortium. United States Department of Labor, 745 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1984); California Tribal Chairman's Association v. United States Department of Labor, 730 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984); North Carolina Commission of Indian Affairs v. United States Department of Labor, 725 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828; Texarcana Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium v. Donovan, 721 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1983); Lehigh Valley Manpower Program v. Donovan, 718 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983); Atlantic County v. United States Department of Labor, 715 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1983).

The St. Regis (769 F.2d at 47), California Tribal (730 F.2d at 1292), and North Carolina (725 F.2d at 240) courts, as had the Supreme

Court in Bell v. New Jersey, declined to comment on the existence of a common-law right of recovery. The Texarcana court noted that its decision was consistent with prior decisions recognizing the common-law right. 721 F.2d at 1164. None of the cases purported to deny that right.

Another group of CETA cases concerned a provision which required the **Secretary** of Labor to investigate any complaint alleging improprieties and to issue a **final** determination not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint. The consequences of failing to meet the **120-day** deadline became a hotly litigated issue. The lower courts split, some holding that failure to meet the deadline barred the Labor Department from attempting to recover misused funds, while others **held** that the failure did not bar further action. Using an **analysis** which should be useful in a variety of situations, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), holding that the mere use of the word “shall” in the statute did not remove the power to act after 120 days.

One additional CETA case deserves mention. In Board of County Commissioners v. United States Department of Labor, 805 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that funds embezzled by an **employee** of a CETA grantee are “misspent” for purposes of the government’s right of recovery. The grantee had argued that the funds were not “misspent” because it had never spent them. “No CETA regulation lists embezzlement as an allowable cost,” rejoined the court. Id. at 368.

Where does all this leave us? Certainly the government’s right to recover under programs with statutory provisions similar to the former ESEA Title I and CETA programs would seem to be settled. In more general terms, several lower courts have recognized the government’s basic right to recover under the common-law,” although as we shall see, the means of **recovery** has become controversial. While the Supreme Court declined to address the common law issue in Bell v. New Jersey, its later decision in West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987) seems instructive.

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<sup>32</sup>See, in addition to the cases cited in the text, Tennessee v. Dole, 461 U.S. 749 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (Federal-Aid Highway Act); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) (Food Stamp Act); Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (Medicare); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Transp. v. United States, 643 F.2d 758, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (Federal-Aid Highway Act).

The issue in West Virginia was whether the United States could recover “prejudgment interest on a debt arising from a contractual obligation to reimburse the United States for services rendered by the Army Corps of Engineers.” 479 U.S. at 306. Applying federal common law, a unanimous Court held that it **could**.<sup>33</sup> While this was not a grant case nor was the government’s right to collect the underlying debt in dispute, it would not seem to require a huge leap in logic to infer a recognition of an inherent right in the government to recover amounts owed to it.

In sum, the government’s assertion of an inherent (i.e., common law) right to recover sums owed to it under assistance programs thus far seems to have withstood assault. However, it is safe to say that the question is **by** no means as simple as it once might have seemed.

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## 2. Offset and Withholding of Claims Under Grants

Offset and **withholding** are two closely related remedies. While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they are not the same. Offset, in the context of grantee indebtedness, refers to a reduction in grant payments to a grantee who is indebted to the United States where the debt arises under a separate assistance program or is owed to an agency other than the grantor agency. Withholding is the act of holding back funds from the same grant or program in which the violation or other basis for creating the government’s **claim** occurred. In a sense, withholding maybe viewed as a type of offset.

GAO has adopted a “policy rule” that offset or withholding should not be used where it would have the effect of defeating or frustrating the purposes of the grant. E.g., B-171019, December 14, 1976; B-186166, August 26, 1976. The application of this rule depends upon the nature and purpose of the assistance program. “Individual consideration must be given to each instance.” B-182423, November 25, 1974. Naturally, this consideration must include any relevant provisions of the program legislation, agency regulations, or the grant agreement.

In 43 **Comp. Gen.** 183 (1963), for example, a farmer who was receiving payments under the Soil Bank Act, administered by the

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<sup>33</sup>Complications resulting from the Debt Collection Act of 1982, **discussed in Chapter 13**, did not apply in this case because the transaction predated the effective date of that statute. West Virginia, 479 U.S. at 312 n.6.

Department of Agriculture, was indebted to **the** United States for unpaid taxes. Since the **basic** purpose of the Soil Bank Act was to protect and increase farm income, GAO decided that whether those payments should be applied to the recovery of an independently arising debt was a matter within Agriculture's discretion, based on Agriculture's determination "as to the extent to which such withholding would tend to effectuate or defeat the purposes of the **[Soil Bank Act]**." **Id.** at 185. Similarly, relying heavily on the Treasury Department's interpretation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (general revenue sharing, since repealed), GAO concluded in **B-176781** -O. M., December 6, 1974, that offset against revenue sharing funds payable to a city was inappropriate to recover an overpayment to that city under a Federal Aviation Administration grant. Thus, agencies have some discretion in the matter.

It has been somewhat easier to conclude that offset **will** frustrate grant objectives where grant payments are made in advance of grantee performance. **E.g.**, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1329 (1976); **B-171019**, December 14, 1976. This is true to the extent the grantee is able to reduce its level of performance. Take, for example, a grant to construct a hospital. If a debt is offset against grant advances and the grantee can simply forgo the project and not build the hospital, there is no meaningful recovery. The federal government ends up keeping its own money, the grantee pays nothing, and the losers are the intended beneficiaries of the assistance, the patients who would have used the hospital. To this extent, an offset would accomplish nothing. This was the explicit grounds for rejecting offset, for example, in **B-171019**, December 14, 1976.

The problem was highlighted in a 1982 GAO report, Federal Agencies Negligent in Collecting Debts Arising From Audits, **AFMD-82-32** (January 22, 1982). The report first noted GAO's policy and its rationale:

**"[I]t is normally** inappropriate for the Government to offset debts against an advance of funds to a grantee unless there is assurance that the same level of grant performance **will** be maintained.

**"... When the offset is not replaced with non-Federal funds, there has, in effect, been no repayment. The scope of the program has simply been reduced and the intended recipient of the benefits loses by the amount of the audit disallowance."**



Id. at 26. The report then recommended that grantor agencies “**require** grantee debtors to certify that their payment of audit-related debts has not reduced the level of performance of any Federal program,” and monitor those assurances through grant management and audit follow-up. Id. at 28.

The concept also appeared in **B-186166**, August 26, 1976, in which the Department of Agriculture was exploring options to recover misapplied and unaccounted-for funds advanced to a university under research grants. Agriculture proposed crediting the indebtedness against allowable indirect grant costs. This would **be done by** requiring the university to document that it was expending the amount of earned indirect costs on approved program grants, thus maintaining the agreed-upon performance level. GAO concurred cautiously, on the condition that the grantee voluntarily agree to this approach. Should this method fail to satisfy the indebtedness, **GAO** further noted that the grantee was a state university and advised Agriculture to seek offset against other amounts owed to the state by the **federal** government.

A solution to the problem would be a rule that offset or withholding implicitly carries with it an obligation that the grantee not reduce its level of performance. As demonstrated by GAO’s caution in **B-186166**, however, GAO has been reluctant to state such a rule in the absence of solid judicial precedent. As discussed later, this precedent may now exist, at least to some extent.

Whatever impediments may exist in the case of grant advances, offset will be more readily available under reimbursement-type grants. E.g., 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1329, 1332 (1976). Nevertheless, the general policy rule still applies. Thus, in **B-163922.53**, April 30, 1979, the Comptroller General advised the Departments of Labor and Transportation that disallowed costs under a Labor Department grant could be offset against reimbursements due under a Federal Highway Administration grant, but that Transportation still “must make the determination on a case-by-case basis as to whether offset will impair the program objectives.”

When the GAO decisions cited in the preceding paragraphs were issued, the offset referred to was essentially nonstatutory. Administrative offset received a statutory basis with the enactment of section 10 of the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. §3716. The

corresponding portion of the Federal Claims Collection Standards, revised to reflect the 1982 legislation, is 4 C.F.R. §102.3.

The administrative offset provided by 31 U.S.C. § 3716 does not apply to debts owed by state and local governments. 31 U.S.C. § 3701(c). Whether common-law offset remains against state and local governments has become a highly controversial issue. The position of GAO and the executive branch is that the government's common-law right of offset has not been abrogated with respect to state and local governments. See 4 C.F.R. §102.3(b)(4); Common Rule §—.52(a)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 8103. The issue is explored more fully in Chapter 13.

As noted above, offset and withholding are technically different. Many program statutes include withholding provisions. E.g., Perales v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1985) (withholding provision in Medicaid legislation may be used to recoup overpayments from state even though state has not yet recovered from provider).

The theory behind withholding is that where a grantee has misapplied grant funds, or in other words, where a grantee's costs are disallowed, the grantee has, in effect, spent its own money and not funds from the grant. Since the issue frequently comes to light in a subsequent budget period, withholding may be viewed as the determination that an amount equal to the disallowed cost remains available for expenditure by the grantee and is therefore carried over into the new budget period. Accordingly, the amount of new money that must be awarded to the grantee to carry on the grant program is reduced by the amount of the disallowance. This may not be strictly applicable where the statutory program authority establishes an entitlement to the funds on the part of the grantee or provides other specific limitations on the use of withholding.

Under the Federal Claims Collection Standards, an agency to whom a **debt** is owed is required in all cases to explore the possibility of collecting by offset from other sources. 4 C.F.R. § 102.3(a). If offset is not available, a withholding provision may provide the basis to accomplish a similar result, at least in part. In 55 **Comp. Gen.** 1329 (1976), for example, the former Community Services Administration was statutorily authorized to suspend (withhold) grant payments to satisfy certain grantee tax delinquencies. Under this authority, the **CSA** could pay the suspended amounts over to the Internal Revenue

Service to **satisfy** a grantee's tax liability to the extent that it was incurred by the grantee in carrying out **CSA** grants. Since funds previously advanced under the grant should have been used to pay the required taxes **in the first** place, transfer of the suspended funds to the IRS amounted to payment of an authorized grant purpose. See also **B-171019**, December 14, 1976 (withholding authority of former Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).

In any event, withholding under a limited statutory withholding provision does not satisfy the requirement for the agency to seek offset from other sources to the extent of any remaining liability for which withholding is not available. **B-163922**, February 10, 1978.

Statutory withholding provisions may include procedural safeguards, most typically notice and **opportunity** for hearing. Any such procedural requirements must, of course, be satisfied. See **B-226544**, March 24, 1987; Common Rule § \_\_\_\_.**43(b)**, 53 Fed. Reg. 8102. The Common Rule authorizes withholding against advances, but cautions agencies to use sound judgment in exercising that authority. Common Rule § \_\_\_\_.**52(a)(2)**, 53 Fed. Reg. 8103; Supplementary Information statement, **id.** at 8042.

As with offset, it should be kept in mind that nothing is accomplished by withholding unless the grantee carries out its program at the same **level** as would otherwise have been the case. The Supreme Court considered this issue in Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983), upholding the statutory authority of the Department of Education to recover misspent grant funds. The Court rejected the state's suggestion that the federal government was free to reduce future grant advances, with the state then undertaking a smaller program. The Court recognized that, under this approach, the government **would** recover nothing and the states would effectively have no liability for misspent funds. Congress, said the Court, must have contemplated that the government would receive a net recovery by paying less for the same program level. **Id.** at 781 **n.5** and 783 **n.8**.

A 1985 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took the analysis one step further. The case is Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1985). After discussing the Bell analysis, the court went on to conclude:

"[W]here a statute gives the federal government a right of recovery and **also authorizes** prospective withholding [withholding funds for **services** not yet rendered] as a remedy, the state remains obligated to provide all the services that it promised to supply in return for the **funds** that were then prospectively withheld in satisfaction of the state's debt to the federal government. If a state then proceeds to **reduce the size** of **its** federally funded program, the state has committed a new and independent breach of the funding conditions, which **gives** rise to a new debt to the federal government." 763 F.2d at 1455-56.

Under this approach, the remedy is clearly a meaningful one. How far the courts will go in applying it remains to be seen. Issues **still to be** resolved are the extent to which the principle may apply **to** an offset as opposed to a withholding, or to a nonstatutory offset or withholding.

In Housing Authority of the County of King v. Pierce, 701 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1988), **modified** on other grounds, 711 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1989), the court considered the recoupment of overpayments under advance-funded Department of Housing and Urban Development housing subsidies. HUD regulations (but not the program statute) authorized recoupment by reducing future subsidy payments. The court upheld HUD's common-law right to recover in the manner specified in the regulations. The court further commented that the teachings of Bell and Maryland Department of Human Resources "might **and** perhaps should guide HUD in the course of the recovery here," but found those cases not **dispositive** because they dealt with statutory rather than common-law remedies. 701 F. Supp. at 850 n. 11.

Thus, there is a direct relationship between the appropriateness of offset or **withholding** against grant advances and the grantee's obligation to maintain the agreed-upon program level. Future litigation or legislation will determine the details of this relationship.

# Federal Assistance: Guaranteed and Insured Loans

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# Federal Assistance: Guaranteed and Insured Loans

## A. Introduction

### 1. General Description

The preceding chapter dealt with one of the **major** forms of federal financial assistance, the grant. Another major form is credit assistance, which includes direct loans and, the subject of this chapter, guaranteed and insured loans. In essence, a guaranteed loan is a loan or other advance of credit made to a borrower by a participating lending institution, where the United States Government, acting through the particular **federal** agency involved, “guarantees” payment of **all** or part of the principal amount of the loan, **PLUS** interest, in the event the borrower defaults. A statutory **definition** along these lines is found in 2 U.S.C. § 661a(3) (Supp. III 1991).<sup>1</sup> Depending on the particular program, the borrower maybe a private individual, business entity, educational institution, or a state, local, or foreign government. In some cases, the guarantee maybe created when a loan originally made by a government agency is subsequently sold by the agency to a third party with the government’s assurance of repayment,

Strictly speaking, an insured loan and a guaranteed loan are two different things. An insured loan is one made initially by the federal agency and then sold, while a guaranteed loan is a loan made by a private lender. Occasionally, the agency’s program legislation may draw the distinction. For example, the **Rural Electrification** Administration has authority both to make insured loans and to guarantee loans made by other lenders. Under 7 U.S.C. § 935, **REA can** make insured loans, defined in subsection 935(c) as loans that are “made, held, and serviced by the Administrator, and sold and insured by the Administrator hereunder.” Under 7 U.S.C. § 936, **REA can** guarantee loans which are “initially made, held, and serviced by a legally organized lending **agency**.”<sup>2</sup> Another example is the **business** and industrial loan program of the Farmers Home Administration established by 7 U.S.C. § 1932, again authorizing both insured and guaranteed loans. For purposes of this chapter, we use the term

<sup>1</sup>Similar definitions are found in GAO’S **Glossary** of Terms Used in the **Federal** Budget Process, PAD-81-27 (3d ed. 1981), and in **OMB** Circular No. A-34, Part VI (1991). **Summary** information on individual programs maybe found in the **Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance**, published annually by the General Services Administration and Office of Management and Budget.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed discussion of REA Credit assistance programs, see GAO report entitled **Financing Rural Electric Generating Facilities: A Large and Growing Activity**, CED-81-14 (November 28, 1980).

**“guarantee”** to refer to both guaranteed and insured loans unless otherwise indicated.

The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the kinds of issues and problems that arise in this area and the approaches used in resolving them. We have for the most part emphasized several of the better-known guarantee programs. Naturally, the extent to which any given case will have more general applicability will depend on the agency’s organic legislation, program regulations, and the particular circumstances. Since program statutes and regulations are subject to change, the reader should view the discussion **as** merely illustrative of the **particular issue** involved. “

The primary purpose of loan guarantees is to induce private lenders to extend financial assistance to borrowers who otherwise would not be able to obtain the needed capital on reasonable terms, if at all. Or, as a congressional subcommittee put it, loan guarantee programs are designed to redirect capital resources by intervening in the private market decision process, in order to further objectives deemed by Congress to be in the national interests. These objectives may be social (veterans’ home loan guarantees), economic (small business programs), or technological (guarantees designed to foster emerging energy **technologies**).<sup>4</sup>

When the **federal** government guarantees a loan, the guarantee is extended to the original lender supplying the funds, generally either a private lender or the Federal Financing Bank, as well as to any subsequent assignees or purchasers of the guaranteed portion of the loan. The subsequent purchase of a guaranteed loan from the original lender is called the “secondary market.” See, for example, 51 **Comp. Gen.** 474 (1972). Secondary market purchasers are frequently large investment entities such as mutual funds or pension funds.

Secondary market purchasers are not **always** waiting in the wings, checkbooks in hand. Congress has on several occasions taken action to help create, stimulate, or facilitate **secondary** markets by

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<sup>3</sup>Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Catalog of Federal Loan Guarantee Programs x (con-ml. Print 1977).

<sup>4</sup>In the **technological area**, GAO **has** suggested that the loan **guarantee device is best suited to** situations in which the technology **has** been known to work and is marginally economical, with the primary investment constraint being financial. **EMD-77-39, B-178726**, May 9, 1977 (comments on proposed legislation).



establishing privately owned but federally chartered corporations known as “government-sponsored enterprises” (**GSE**). Since a **GSE** is a creature of Congress, the actions it may take are those authorized in its enabling legislation. 71 **Comp. Gen.** 49 (1991) (Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or “Farmer Mac”). For a discussion from the **programmatic** perspective, see Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation: Issues Facing the Secondary Market for **FmHA** Guaranteed Loans, **GAO/RCED-91-138** (June 1991 ).<sup>6</sup>

Under a loan guarantee, the risk against which the guarantee is made is, for the most part, default by the borrower. In some cases, however, other risks may be covered as well, and a few examples will be noted later in this chapter.

In the typical loan guarantee program, the lender is charged a fee by the agency, prescribed in the program legislation. However, there are **statutory** exceptions. For example, 7 **U.S.C. § 936** provides that no fee shall be charged for Rural **Electrification** Administration loan guarantees. Where a fee is charged, its disposition, discussed later, is governed by (1) the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, or (2) where the Credit Reform Act does not apply, the applicable program legislation, or (3) in the absence of any guidance in the program legislation, the miscellaneous receipts statute (31 **U.S.C. § 3302(b)**).

A guarantee may extend to 100 percent of the amount of the underlying loan, or some lesser percentage as specified in the program legislation. **E.g.**, 7 **U.S.C. § 936 (REA)**, 100 percent); 42 **U.S.C. § 3142(a)** (Economic Development Administration business loan guarantees, 90 percent of outstanding unpaid balance). Unless otherwise provided, a maximum guarantee percentage applies only to restrict the **amount** the administering agency is authorized to guarantee. **E.g.**, **B-137514**, November 3, 1958 (no objection to proposal for borrower to “guarantee” portion of loan not covered by government guarantee by making “irrevocable deposit” financed by separate **loan**, thereby providing lender with 100 percent guarantee).

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<sup>6</sup>Since **GSEs** are essentially privately owned corporations, we do not address them further in this publication. Readers needing more may consult several GAO reports such as Government-Sponsored Enterprises: A Framework for Limiting the Government’s Exposure to Risks, **GAO/GGD-91-90** (May 1991); Budget Issues: Profiles of Government-Sponsored Enterprises, **GAO/AFMD-91-17** (February 1991); and Government-Sponsored Enterprises: The Government’s Exposure to Risks, **GAO/GGD-90-97** (August 1990).

Banks do not **loan** money without interest, and the **typical** loan guarantee therefore covers accrued but unpaid interest as well as unpaid principal. The program statute may set a maximum acceptable rate of interest, or may authorize the administering agency to do so by regulation. Assuming there is nothing to the contrary in the enabling legislation, an agency may, within its discretion, extend its guarantees to loans with variable interest rates (rates which rise or fall with changes in prevailing rates) as well as loans with **fixed** interest rates. **B-184857**, June 11, 1976.

Credit assistance legislation **frequently** vests considerable discretion in the administering agency. **E.g., B-202568**, September 11, 1981 (imposition of “no credit elsewhere” eligibility test to meet funding shortfall within **SBA’s** broad discretion under section **7(b)** of Small Business Act); **B-134628**, January 15, 1958 (Civil Aeronautics Board authorized within its discretion to make payments to lender immediately upon debtor’s default rather than after completion of foreclosure proceedings).

For non-entitlement programs, just as in the case of grants and cooperative agreements, GAO will not, at the request of a rejected applicant, review the exercise of an agency’s discretion in rejecting an application for a loan guarantee. **B-178460**, June 6, 1973 (non-decision letter). Nevertheless, **GAO** may become involved under its other authorities (decision, account settlement, claims settlement), and may review an agency’s conduct of a program under its general audit authority. For example, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852, specifically authorized **GAO** to audit any borrower applying for a loan guarantee, but made no mention of auditing the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board which administered the program. The issue arose in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation assistance program, carried out under this statute. **GAO** took the position that it had the authority to audit the Board’s conduct of the program to evaluate whether the Board and borrower were complying with the statutory provisions and whether the government’s interests were being adequately protected. This **authority** derives from **GAO’s** basic audit statutes and does not have to be repeated in every piece of legislation. **B-169300**, September 6, 1972; **B-169300**, September 21, 1971.

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## 2. Sources of Guarantee Authority

The authority to **guarantee the repayment of indebtedness must be derived from some statutory basis. In most cases, this takes the form of express statutory authorization. Typically, the statute will authorize the administering agency** to establish the terms and conditions under which the guarantee will be extended, but may also impose various limitations. An example is section 202(a)(1) of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(1), which authorizes the Economic Development Administration to provide financial assistance to eligible borrowers through direct business loans and loan guarantees:

“The Secretary is authorized to aid in financing, within a redevelopment area, the purchase or development of land and facilities (including machinery **and** equipment) for industrial or commercial usage. . . by (A) purchasing evidences of indebtedness, **(B)** making loans (which for purposes of this section shall include participation in loans), (C) guaranteeing loans made to private borrowers by private lending institutions, for any of the purposes referred to in this paragraph upon application of such institution and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe, except that **no** such guarantee **shall** at any time exceed 90 per centum of the amount of the outstanding unpaid **balance** of such **loan**.”

Program authority, as in the example cited, is most commonly in the form of permanent legislation authorizing an ongoing program. In addition, guarantee programs are occasionally enacted to deal with a specific crisis of limited duration, and are either not codified or removed from the United States Code when the program is completed. An example of this latter type is the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980), dropped from the 1988 edition of the U.S. Code because the authority to issue commitments and guarantees expired at the end of 1983 and all loans guaranteed were repaid in full. Guarantee programs may also be enacted as part of appropriation acts. An example is discussed in GAO's report Israel: U.S. Loan Guaranties for Immigrant Absorption, GAO/NSIAD-92-119 (February 1992).

It is also possible for loan guarantee authority to be derived by necessary implication from a **statutory** program of financial assistance, that is, under program legislation which does not explicitly use the term “guarantee” or “insure.” For example, the current version of section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a), authorizes the Small Business Administration to make loans to small business concerns as follows:

“The **Administration** is empowered **to** the extent and in such amounts as provided **in** advance in appropriation **Acts to make** loans for plant acquisition, construction, conversion, or expansion, including the acquisition of land, material, supplies, equipment, and working capital, and **to** make loans to any **qualified** small business concern. . . for purposes of this chapter. Such **financings** may be made either directly or in cooperation with banks or other **financial** institutions through agreements to participate on an immediate or deferred (guaranteed) basis.”

The statute **then goes onto list a number of limitations. A 1981 amendment (95 Stat. 357, 767) added the word ‘guaranteed.’** Even before the amendment, **GAO had concluded that a loan guarantee program was within the SBA’s discretion under section 7. 51 Comp. Gen. 474 (1972). An earlier decision, B-140673, October 12, 1959, had upheld a “deferred participation” program under section 7(a), under which SBA would purchase the agreed portion of the deferred participation loan immediately upon demand and reserve the right to recover from the lender if SBA subsequently determined that the lender had not substantially complied with the participation agreement. In view of the broad discretion granted SBA under the statute, SBA was not required to make the “substantial compliance” determination before making payment to the lender.<sup>6</sup>**

The evolution of **SBA’s** authority to conduct its disaster loan program, **15 U.S.C. § 636(b)**, followed a similar pattern. In **B-121589, October 19, 1954**, the Comptroller General tentatively approved a deferred participation program, strongly urging that the statute be amended to include “immediate or deferred participation” language patterned after the **pre-1981** version of section **636(a)**. This was done and, based on **51 Comp. Gen. 474**, was found **sufficient to** authorize **SBA** to guarantee disaster loans to eligible borrowers by participating lending institutions. **58 Comp. Gen. 138, 145 (1978)**. To remove any doubt, the same amendment which added the word “guaranteed” to section **636(a)** added it **as** well to section **636(b)** (95 Stat. at 778).

In connection with credit assistance under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, **GAO** recognized the **SBA’s** implied authority to establish a program in which **SBA** would guarantee loans made by private lending institutions to small business investment companies,

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<sup>6</sup>The primary difference between a loan guarantee program and a deferred participation loan program **is** that **the** lending institution can demand that **SBA** pay the outstanding balance of a deferred participation loan at anytime, but can demand **SBA’s** purchase of the outstanding balance of a guaranteed loan only under the conditions prescribed in the **regulations—generally** only upon **default** of the borrower.

even though the statute authorized only a direct loan program. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 146 (1962). The decision pointed out that the legislative history of a 1961 amendment to the act clearly demonstrated that Congress intended to continue the nonstatutory “standby” guaranteed loan program that had existed for several years, and concluded therefore that the absence of specific language authorizing the program was due to the apparent belief by both Congress and **SBA** that such language was unnecessary and did not reflect an intent to deny **SBA** the authority. See also **B-149685**, March 20, 1968. The guarantee program is now expressly authorized in 15 U.S.C. § 683.

Authority by necessary implication cannot be derived solely from a purpose clause, but must be supported by the operative provisions of the statute. 71 **Comp. Gen.** 49 (1991).

Regardless of whether a loan guarantee program is established under an express statutory provision or by necessary implication, the basic responsibility for administering the program clearly rests with the agency involved. This includes the authority to determine whether or not to extend a guarantee in a particular case, and the manner in which the guarantees are to be handled. The agency has considerable discretion, subject of course to any applicable statutory requirements or restrictions.

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## B. Budgetary and Obligational Treatment

When a federal agency guarantees a loan, there is no immediate cash outlay. The need for an actual cash disbursement, apart from administrative expenses, does not arise unless and until the borrower defaults on the loan and the government is called upon to honor the guarantee. Depending on the terms of the loan, this may not happen until many years after the guarantee is made. It is thus apparent that loan guarantees require budgetary treatment different from ordinary government obligations and expenditures. This treatment is prescribed generally by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (**FCRA**). Before describing the **FCRA**, it is important to first describe the pre-credit reform situation because it illustrates the objectives of credit reform and because **FCRA** does not cover all programs.

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## 1. Prior to Federal Credit Reform Act

Prior to credit reform, the authority to guarantee or insure loans generally was not regarded as budget authority. Indeed, the original enactment of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 expressly excluded loan guarantees from the statutory definition of budget authority. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(a)(2), 88 Stat. 297,299 (1974). Under this treatment, the extension of a loan guarantee was an off-budget **transaction** and was, at the extension stage, largely not addressed by the budget and appropriations process. **If** and when the government had to pay on the guarantee, i.e., upon default, the administering agency would seek liquidating appropriations, and these liquidating appropriations counted as budget authority. **Of** course, by the time a liquidating appropriation became necessary, the United States was contractually committed **to** honor the guarantee, and Congress had little choice but to appropriate the funds. This is an example of so-called “**backdoor** spending.” By the time the budget and appropriations process became involved, there was no meaningful role for it to play.

When a loan guarantee is committed or issued, it cannot be known with absolute certainty when or to what extent the government might be called upon to honor it. Accordingly, and since budget authority was not provided in advance, the making of a loan guarantee, however binding on the government the commitment may have been, was treated only as a contingent **liability** and did not result in a recordable obligation for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a). A recordable obligation did not arise until the contingency occurred (default by the borrower or other event as authorized in the program legislation), at which time it was recorded against the appropriation or fund available for liquidation. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4 (1985); 60 **Comp. Gen.** 700,703 (1981).

Under this approach, the obligation was viewed as “authorized by law” for purposes of the **Antideficiency** Act, and there was no violation if obligations resulting from authorized guarantees exceeded available budgetary resources. 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4 (1985); **B-226718.2**, August 19, 1987.

In a limited sense, there was a certain logic to this approach. Many loans are repaid in whole or in part, with the result that the government is never called upon to pay under the guarantee, the only disbursements being the administrative expenses of running the program. To require budget authority in the full amount being

guaranteed would artificially inflate the budget. The problem was that the **pre-credit** reform approach went to the opposite extreme, by reflecting the cost to the government in the year the guarantee was made as zero. Since there **was** no longer any room for discretion by the time liquidating appropriations became necessary, loan guarantee programs were not forced to compete with other programs for increasingly scarce budgetary resources. No one involved in the budget process—Congress, OMB, GAO—**particularly** liked this system, and reform became inevitable.

At an absolute minimum, GAO strongly encouraged the imposition of limits, either in the enabling legislation or in appropriation acts, on the total amount of loans to be guaranteed. E.g., Legislation Needed to Establish Specific Loan Guarantee Limits for the Economic Development Administration, FGMSD-78-62 (January 5, 1979). Ceilings of this type may limit the amount of guarantees that can be issued in a given **fiscal** year, or the total amount of guarantees that can be outstanding at any one time. An example of the former is discussed in 60 **Comp. Gen.** 700 (1981).

A device that became common in the **1980s** was the granting of loan guarantee authority only to the extent provided in advance in appropriation **acts**. The device was reinforced in 1985 when Congress (1) added to the Congressional Budget Act a definition of “credit authority” (“authority to incur direct loan obligations or to incur primary loan guarantee commitments”), and (2) subjected to a point of order any bill providing new credit authority unless it also limited that authority to the extent or amounts provided in appropriation acts. 2 U.S.C. §§ 622(10), 652(a).

While this device provided a measure of congressional control, it still did not require the advance provision of actual budget authority. For example, the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act, which predated the 1985 legislation noted above, limited the **authority to guarantee** loans to the amounts provided in advance in appropriation acts. The Comptroller General and the Attorney General both concluded that this provision did not require advance budget authority, but was satisfied by an appropriation act provision placing a ceiling on the total amount of **loans** that could be guaranteed, i.e., on contingent liability. **B-197380**, April 10, 1980; Loan Guarantees-Authority of Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board to issue Guarantees, 43 Op. **Att’y Gen.** No. 27 (April 23, 1980).

Both opinions also concluded that the appropriation act ceiling related only to outstanding loan principal, with contingent liability for loan interest being in addition to the stated amount.

Where loan guarantee authority is limited to **amounts** provided in appropriation acts—and we emphasize that we are addressing situations not governed by the Federal Credit Reform Act—those “amounts,” as noted, are not **actual** budget authority but ceilings on contingent liability. Therefore, **while** exceeding the ceiling may be illegal for other **reasons**,<sup>7</sup> it does not violate the **Antideficiency Act**. 64 **Comp. Gen.** 282, 288–90 (1985). Analogous to budget authority, loan guarantee authority must generally be used (i.e., commitments made) in the fiscal year or years for which it is provided unless the appropriation act provides otherwise. **B-212857**, November 8, 1983. Also, where advance authority in appropriation acts is statutorily required and Congress does not provide it, the agency’s authority to carry out the program may be effectively suspended for the fiscal year in question. **B-230951**, March 10, 1989.\*

Congress may set a minimum program level as well as a ceiling. Again for programs not governed by the Credit Reform Act, failure to achieve the minimum commitment level would not constitute an impoundment since the commitment amount is not budget authority. **B-195437.2**, September 17, 1986. However, under a loan insurance program where the loan itself is made by the agency, failure to achieve a mandated minimum program level would be an impoundment unless the failure results from programmatic factors. **Id.**; **B-195437.3**, February 5, 1988.

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## 2. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990

Consideration of various reform proposals during the 1980s centered on the recognition that there is a “subsidy element” to a government loan guarantee program. If all loans were repaid, there would be no cost to the government apart from administrative expenses. Were this the case, however, there would probably have been no need for the program to begin with. Since the objective of a loan guarantee

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<sup>7</sup>An “unusual” case where exceeding a ceiling was not illegal, because of rather explicit legislative history, is 53 **Comp. Gen.** 560 (1974).

<sup>8</sup>Standing alone, 2 U.S.C. § 652(a) is not a statutory requirement for advance appropriation authority. A point of order may not be raised or maybe defeated, in which event the validity of any ensuing legislation is not affected. As in the situation discussed in **B-230951**, many program statutes independently impose the requirement.



program is to enhance the availability of credit which the private lending market alone cannot or will not provide, it is reasonable to expect that there will be defaults, most likely at a higher rate than the private lending market experiences. It became apparent that credit reform had to do two things. First, it had to devise a **meaningful** way of measuring the true cost to the government; and second, it had to bring those costs fully within the budget and appropriations process. See, e.g., Budget Issues: Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit Programs, GAO/AFMD-89-42 (April 1989).

The culmination of these reform efforts was the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, enacted by section 13201(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-609, and codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 661–661f (Supp. III 1991). The approach of the FCRA is to require the advance provision of budget authority to cover the subsidy portion of a loan guarantee program, with the non-subsidy portion (i.e., the portion expected to be repaid) financed through borrowings from the Treasury. The Office of Management and Budget has issued detailed implementing instructions in OMB Circular No. A-34, Part VI, transmitted by OMB Bulletin No. 92-01, October 1, 1991. The FCRA applies to loan guarantee commitments made on or after October 1, 1991, with exceptions to be noted later.

a. **Post-1991** Guarantee Commitments

One of the **major** purposes of the FCRA is to “measure more accurately the costs [the subsidy element, in essence] of Federal credit programs.” 2 U.S.C. § 661(1). Before the budgetary and appropriations aspects of FCRA can come into play, the administering agency, working with OMB, must determine the cost of its programs. The law defines “cost” as the “estimated long-term cost to the Government. . . calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs.” Id. § 661a(5)(A). More **specifically** for purposes of this **chapter**, the cost of a loan **guarantee** is the—

“net present value when a guaranteed loan is disbursed of the cash **flow** from-

“(i) estimated payments by the Government to cover defaults and delinquencies, interest subsidies, or other payments, and

“(ii) the estimated payments to the Government including origination and other fees, penalties **and** recoveries.” Id. § 661a(5)(C).

Historical experience is obviously **a** relevant factor in determining cost. Risk assessment is also very important, and **OMB** requires agencies to develop risk categories for their credit programs. **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, § 62.3. Agencies should not blindly rely on historical experience when the risk factor has changed. See Loan Guarantees: Export Credit Guarantee Programs' Long-Run Costs Are High, GAO/NSIAD-91-180 (April 1991) at 3. For example, it **is not** unreasonable to expect the default rate under a guaranteed student loan program to increase during a recession, resulting in a higher cost. Established secondary market experience is also relevant in assessing risk. **NSIAD-91-180** at 15. .

The second major purpose of **FCRA** is **to** “place the cost of credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other Federal spending.” 2 U.S.C. § 661(2). To accomplish this, 2 U.S.C. § **661c(b)**, perhaps the key provision of **FCRA**, provides:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . new loan guarantee commitments may be made for **fiscal** year 1992 and thereafter only to the extent **that—**

“(1) appropriations of budget authority to cover their costs are made in advance;

“(2) a limitation on the use of funds otherwise available for the cost of a . . . loan guarantee program is enacted; or

“(3) authority is otherwise provided in appropriation **Acts.**”

Thus, unless Congress **specifically** provides otherwise, loan guarantees may be made only if budget authority to cover their cost has been provided in advance. The cost of a **loan** guarantee is regarded as new budget authority for the fiscal year “in which definite authority becomes available or indefinite authority is used.” 2 U.S.C. § **661c(d)(1)**.

To implement these new concepts, the law defines two new accounts for credit programs, a “credit program account” and a “financing account.” The program account is the budget account into which appropriations of budget authority are made. The financing account is a revolving, non-budget account from which the guarantees are actually administered. It receives cost payments from the program account and includes all other cash flows resulting from the guarantee commitment. 2 U.S.C. §§ **661a(6)** and (7). Administrative expenses are

shown as a separate and distinct line item within the program account. *Id.* § 661c(g).

A review of 1992 appropriation acts disclosed several variations in the way Congress made the appropriations contemplated by 2 U.S.C. § 661c.

- The Federal Housing Administration General and Special Risk Program Account received an appropriation of costs and a ceiling on the total loan principal to be guaranteed (\$55 million to support a program level of \$8.6 billion).<sup>9</sup>
- The program account for Economic Development Administration guaranteed loans received an appropriation of costs with no program ceiling specified. \*0
- The Small Business Administration Business Loans Program Account received separate cost appropriations for direct and guaranteed loans with a total loan ceiling for direct, but not guaranteed, loans.<sup>11</sup>

Each of these appropriations also includes a separate specific appropriation for administrative expenses.<sup>12</sup>

From a chronological perspective, the first step is to determine the cost of a guaranteed loan program in accordance with 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5). The President's annual budget is to reflect these costs and

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<sup>9</sup>Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-139, 105 Stat. 736,749 (1991).

<sup>10</sup>Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-140, 105 Stat. 782,806 (1991).

<sup>11</sup>Pub L No. 102-140, *supra* n.10, 105 Stat. at 815.

<sup>12</sup>A very general definition of "administrative expenses" maybe found in B-24341, March 12, 1942, at 5:

"The term 'administrative expenses' would appear to relate, generally, to those expenses necessarily incurred in administering, executing, or carrying out the primary purposes of legislative enactments. Whether a particular expense should be classified as an 'administrative expense' would appear to be governed by the particular program involved, the provisions of the act in which the term appears or to which it relates, and the intention of the legislative body in using the expression, and what might be regarded as an item of 'administrative expense' within the meaning of one statute might not be so regarded under another statute enacted for entirely different purposes."

For FCRA purposes, see also OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.5.

the planned **level** of new guarantee commitments. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(a). Congress then makes the appropriation of costs and administrative expenses to the program account.

The appropriation of costs “shall constitute an obligation of the credit program account to pay to the financing account.” *Id.* § 661c(d)(1). When a loan for which a guarantee commitment **has been** made is disbursed by the lender, the cost of the guarantee is obligated against the program account and paid into the financing account. *Id.* § 661c(d)(2). If the loan is disbursed in a single payment, **the** cost is paid into the financing account in a single payment. If the loan is disbursed in more than one payment, costs are paid into the financing account in the same proportion. OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.7(e). The cost payments are carried in the financing account as unobligated balances until obligations are incurred to make payments under the terms of the guarantee, at which time they become obligated balances until disbursed. *Id.*

The law recognizes that estimating costs is not an exact science and that cost estimates are subject to change over time. Accordingly, costs are to be reestimated annually as long as the loans are outstanding. OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.8. If a **reestimation** results in an increase to the cost estimate, the **law** provides permanent indefinite budget authority for the program account. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(f). The agency requests an apportionment of this indefinite authority from OMB, and then immediately records an obligation against the program account and pays the funds into the financing account. OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.8.

The **law** also provides for the treatment of “modifications.” For purposes of FCRA, a modification is any government action that alters the cost of an outstanding loan guarantee from the most recent estimate or reestimated, except actions permitted under the terms of existing contracts. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(D); OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.9(a). The law prohibits the modification of a loan guarantee commitment “in a manner that increases its cost unless budget authority for the additional cost is appropriated, or is available out of existing appropriations or from other budgetary resources.” 2 U.S.C. § 661c(e). Modifications include such things as forgiveness, forbearance, reductions in interest rate, prepayments without penalty, and extensions of maturity, except where permitted under an existing contract. OMB Circular No. A-34, § 62.9(a). They also include the sale

of loan assets and actions resulting from new legislation, such as a **statutory** restriction on debt collection. Id. As with reestimates, at the time a modification is made, the agency **records** an obligation of the estimated cost increase against the program account and pays the amount into the financing account. Id. § 62.9(c).

If an agency's original cost estimates, reestimates, and modification estimates have been accurate, the balances of financing accounts for loan guarantees should always be sufficient to make any required payments. However, if a balance is not sufficient, the "Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . lend to, or pay to the financing accounts such amounts as maybe appropriate." 2 U.S.C. § 661d(c). The **Secretary** is also authorized to borrow or receive amounts from the financing accounts. Id. All of these transactions between the Treasury and financing accounts are subject to the apportionment requirements of the **Antideficiency Act**. Id.

Under the FCRA structure as outlined above, there are two separate sets of "obligations"—obligations against the program account when budget authority is paid over to the financing account, and obligations against the financing account when **claims** are made for payment under a guarantee.

OMB Circular A-34, §63.2, identifies four actions that will result in **Antideficiency Act** violations:

- (1) **Overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of the amounts appropriated for costs. This includes a modification resulting in an **overobligation**.
- (2) **Overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of the credit level supported by the enacted cost appropriation.
- (3) **Overobligation** or **overexpenditure** of the amount appropriated for administrative expenses.
- (4) Obligation or expenditure of the lapsed unobligated balance of the cost appropriation, except to correct mathematical or data input errors in calculating subsidy amounts. However, error correction will be considered a violation if it exceeds the amount of the lapsed unobligated balance.

Finally, the law emphasizes that the provisions of the FCRA are not to be construed as changing or overriding the administering agency's authority to determine the terms and conditions of eligibility for, or amount of, a loan or loan guarantee. 2 U.S.C. § 661d(g).

As a result of FCRA, guarantee programs should no longer be unrestricted. Even if the applicable appropriation act does not explicitly set a maximum program level, the program level that can be supported by the enacted cost appropriation, reinforced by the Antideficiency Act, constitutes an effective ceiling. Programs not governed by FCRA may have their own ceilings. Although a loan or guarantee may not exceed a statutory ceiling, it may nevertheless be possible to extend assistance if the borrower qualifies under another program. For example, in 35 Comp. Gen. 219 (1955), the Small Business Administration could not make a disaster loan to a small business concern which had suffered damage in a flood because SBA had already used up the applicable ceiling on disaster loans. However, it could make a business loan to the same borrower if the transaction otherwise met the criteria under SBA's business loan program.

**b. Pre-1992 Commitments**

The treatment described above applies to loan guarantee commitments made on or after October 1, 1991. Commitments made prior to fiscal year 1992 were made under the rules summarized in Section B. 1. Given the varying maturities under different credit programs, pre-1992 guarantees are likely to be around for many years. Since pre-1992 guarantees were not subject to any requirement to determine subsidy costs or to obtain advance appropriations of budget authority, they require different treatment and are addressed in separate provisions of the FCRA.

Three provisions are particularly relevant. First, the law establishes "liquidating accounts," defined as budget accounts which include all cash flows to and from the government resulting from pre-1992 commitments. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(8). Second, all collections resulting from pre-1992 guarantee commitments are to be credited to the liquidating account and are available to liquidate obligations to the same extent they were under the applicable program legislation prior to enactment of FCRA. Id. § 661 f(b). At least once a year, unobligated balances in the liquidating account which are in excess of current needs are to be transferred to the general fund of the Treasury. Id.

Third, 2 U.S.C. § 661d(d) provides:

“If funds in liquidating accounts are insufficient to satisfy the obligations and commitments of said accounts, there is hereby provided permanent, **indefinite** authority to make any payments required to be made on such obligations and commitments.”

Thus, for **pre-1992** guarantees which are liquidated in accordance with the terms of the original commitment, payment will still **be** made from liquidating appropriations. The main change under **FCRA** is the provision of these liquidating appropriations on a permanent, indefinite basis.

A “**modification**” to a **pre-1992** loan guarantee-the term having the same meaning as described in Section **B.2.a** for **post-1991** guarantees-is treated differently. See **OMB** Circular No. **A-34**, §§ **62.1(c)** and **62.9** for applicable procedures.

### **c. Entitlement** Programs

A partial exemption from **FCRA** is found in 2 U.S.C. § **661c(c)**, which provides that the requirement for the advance appropriation of budget authority to cover estimated costs does not apply to (1) a loan guarantee program which constitutes an entitlement, or (2) programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation existing on **FCRA’s** date of enactment (November 5, 1990). An entitlement program is one in which the provision of assistance is mandatory with respect **to** borrowers and lenders who meet applicable statutory and regulatory eligibility requirements. The statute gives two examples-the guaranteed student loan program and the veterans’ home loan guarantee program. Since the exemption is from the appropriation requirement of 2 U.S.C. § **661c(b)** and not the entire act, other provisions of **FCRA** and **OMB** Circular **A-34** presumably apply **to** the extent not inconsistent with the exemption.

The **pre-FCRA** rules **summarized** in Section **B.1** form the starting point with respect to obligational treatment and the application of the **Antideficiency** Act. A 1985 decision, 65 **Comp. Gen.** 4, reiterated these **rules** in the context of the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. GAO advised the Department of Education that (1) a guarantee itself is **only** a contingent liability and is not recordable as an obligation; (2) an obligation must be recorded upon occurrence of one of the contingencies specified in the program legislation which will require the government to honor the guarantee (in this case, loan default or the death, disability or bankruptcy of the borrower); and (3) the **Antideficiency** Act does not require that sufficient budget **authority** be

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available at the time the obligation is recorded because, by virtue of the requirements of the program legislation, incurring the obligation is “authorized by law” for **Antideficiency** Act purposes.

For **fiscal** year 1992, **Congress** appropriated to the program accounts for both the guaranteed student loan and the veterans’ home loan programs, for costs as defined in **FCRA**, “such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the program,” together with a definite (specific dollar amount) appropriation for administrative expenses.<sup>13</sup>

d. **Certain Insurance** Programs **Another** provision Of **FCRA**, 2 U.S.C. § 661e(a)(1), exempts from the entire **act**—

“the credit or insurance activities of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit **Union** Administration, Resolution Trust Corporation, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, National Flood Insurance, National Insurance Development Fund, Crop Insurance, or Tennessee Valley Authority.”

Thus, to the extent the rules in Section **B.1** would apply to any of the programs conducted by these entities to begin with, they continue to apply unaffected by **FCRA**.

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## C. Extension of Guarantees

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### 1. Coverage of Lenders (Initial and Subsequent)

#### a. Eligibility of Lender/Debt Instrument

Program legislation may prescribe eligibility criteria for lending institutions, or may otherwise limit the types of lending institutions to which guarantees may be extended, either as the initial lender or as a subsequent transferee, or may address the manner in which the debt instrument covered by the guarantee maybe treated. The safest generalization in this area, and the common strain throughout the

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<sup>13</sup>Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-170, 105 Stat. 1107, 1132 (1991) (guaranteed student loans); Pub. L. No. 102-139, supra n.9, 105 Stat. at 737 (veterans’ home loans).



cases, is that any proposed action must be consistent with the terms and intent of the agency's statutory authority.

For example, in **B-194153**, September 6, 1979, GAO considered a proposed pilot program in which the Economic Development Administration, an agency within the Department of Commerce, would guarantee loans made to private borrowers by participating lending institutions, with the guaranteed portion of the loan to be subsequently assigned to the city of Chicago and financed through the issuance of bonds. The statutory basis for the proposal, 42 U.S.C. §3142, authorizes the Secretary of Commerce **to** guarantee up to 90 percent of the outstanding balance of loans for certain specified purposes "made to private borrowers by private lending institutions." GAO concluded that allowing the guarantee to be assigned to an entity that was neither private nor a lending institution and could not have **qualified** for a guarantee initially, would exceed **EDA's statutory** authority since **EDA** would be doing something indirectly-guaranteeing a **loan** by a non-private lender-that the statute would not permit it to do directly.

GAO revisited the issue a few years **later**, and **reaffirmed** the ineligibility of **public** lenders to participate as secondary market purchasers under the "private lending institution" requirement of 42 U.S.C. 53142. Since a secondary market purchaser effectively becomes the lender, it makes no difference whether sale to the public lender is contemplated from the loan's inception or merely occurs in the ordinary course of secondary market operations. 61 **Comp. Gen.** 517 (1982).

Another issue in **B-194153** was whether **EDA** could legally allow a guaranteed loan to be evidenced by two notes, one to be fully guaranteed and the second with no guarantee. The Comptroller General found the proposed arrangement within **EDA's administrative** discretion under the statute since the two-note arrangement **would** still conform to the statutory requirement that no more than 90 percent of a loan be guaranteed, and furthermore was apparently intended to effectuate the basic legislative purpose. The decision pointed out, however, that since the two notes represented one loan, their substantive terms such as maturity dates and interest rates must be the same, and the two-note mechanism must not increase the government's potential liability. This portion of the decision was later **modified** in 60 **Comp. Gen.** 464 (1981), to the extent that **GAO**

approved use of a “split interest rate” in which the interest on the **EDA-guaranteed** note was lower than the interest rate on the **unguaranteed** note. The split-interest scheme was consistent with programs by other agencies under similar legislation and would be more favorable to the government.

A related type of question arose under the now defunct New Community Development Program authorized by the Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970. The legislation authorized various forms of financial assistance to stimulate the development of new communities, including the guarantee of obligations of private new community developers and state development agencies. A question arose as to whether the Department of Housing and Urban Development was authorized or required to guarantee the indebtedness of a private developer to contractors and subcontractors who had supplied goods and services to the developer. Finding that the intent of the program legislation was that HUD guarantee only obligations issued to private investors, the Comptroller General concluded that HUD was neither required nor authorized to issue guarantees that would run to a developer’s contractors and **subcontractors**. **B-170971**, August 22, 1975; **B-170971**, July 22, 1975.

b. Substitution of Lender

As a general proposition, **substitution** of lenders is permissible as long as it is not prohibited by the program legislation or regulations and the “replacement lender” meets any applicable eligibility requirements.

In 60 **Comp. Gen.** 700 (1981), GAO considered the effect of a change in lenders in the Farmers Home Administration’s rural development loan guarantee program. The program operated under an annual ceiling, and the specific question was whether a guarantee could continue to be charged against the ceiling for the fiscal year in which it was initially approved, when a change in lenders took place in a subsequent fiscal year. As to the programmatic significance of the change, the decision stated:

“[T]he basic purpose of the **FmHA** rural development loan guarantee program is to provide assistance to eligible borrowers to enable them to accomplish one or more of the statutory objectives. In other words, although the guarantee is extended to the lender, it is clear that the purpose of doing so is not to provide a Federal benefit to the lending institution but to induce the lender to make the loan to the borrower. In this

sense, the lender is just a conduit or funding mechanism through which **FmHA** provides assistance to an eligible borrower so that the statutory objectives can be realized. Thus, the particular lender involved is of relatively little consequence.”

Id. at 708–09. Therefore, the decision held that where a guarantee is **charged** against the ceiling for a particular fiscal year, it can continue to be charged against the same ceiling notwithstanding a substitution of lenders in a subsequent **fiscal** year, provided that the other relevant terms of the agreement (borrower, loan purpose, loan terms) remain substantially the same. Id. at 709. The statement that the particular lender is of **little consequence** presumes, as was in fact the case, that the program legislation does not contain any specific eligibility requirements for lenders. Any such requirements (for example, the “private lender” requirement in the **EDA** cases discussed above) **would** of course have to be followed.

c. Existence of Valid  
Guarantee

In order for a loan guarantee commitment to be valid and hence binding on the government, the government official making the commitment must be authorized to do so, and the guarantee must be made to an eligible lender extending credit to an eligible borrower for an authorized purpose. Questions as to whether a valid guarantee was ever created often do not arise until the lender calls upon the government to pay under the guarantee. The answer depends on the program statute and regulations, the terms of the guarantee instrument, and the conduct of the parties.

In 54 **Comp. Gen.** 219 (1974), GAO considered the authority of the Small Business Administration to reimburse three different lenders. In each case, the borrower had applied to **SBA** for financial assistance, the lender (at the request or with the approval of an **SBA official**) had provided interim funds to the borrower, but, for various reasons, the financial assistance was ultimately not extended.

In the first case, an **SBA** official who was authorized to approve loan guarantees advised the bank in writing that the guarantee had been approved. **SBA** subsequently issued a formal loan authorization, but later canceled it because the bank did not comply with **all** of the terms and conditions of the guarantee agreement, one of which was that the bank disburse the loan within 3 months. Although the initial written approval created a valid guarantee, the bank’s noncompliance caused it to lapse, and **SBA** was therefore not obligated to purchase the interim note, i.e., to reimburse the bank for the advance.

In the second case, an authorized **SBA** official had similarly advised the bank in writing that the guarantee had been approved. Here, however, **SBA** subsequently determined that the borrower was not eligible for the guarantee, and therefore never issued a formal loan authorization. Since the bank relied on the prior approval and was not legally required to comply with the conditions of the guarantee agreement (such as payment of the guarantee fee) until **SBA** issued the formal authorization, the bank was entitled to reimbursement for the interim loan.

In the third case, **SBA** had formally approved a direct loan to a borrower and had issued a written loan authorization. Because of its inability to immediately disburse the funds, **SBA** requested a private lender to disburse the funds on an interim basis, with **SBA's** assurance of repayment. **SBA** later refused to disburse the loan funds because the borrower had disappeared and his business had become defunct. Under the circumstances, **SBA's** written commitment to reimburse the lender did constitute **SBA's** 'guarantee' of any advances the lender made in reasonable and **justified** reliance on it. Therefore, even though the direct loan by **SBA** was never disbursed, **SBA** was authorized to reimburse the lender.

The decision discussed two earlier **cases—B-178250**, August 6, 1973, and **B-164162**, September 20, 1968—involving direct rather than guaranteed loans. **GAO** had concluded in these cases that, under the **specific circumstances** involved, **SBA** could not reimburse a lender for losses suffered on interim disbursements made after **SBA** had authorized loans to the borrower. In both cases, the claimant bank was unable to adequately establish that any **SBA official** had made a promise or commitment on which the bank **could justifiably** rely.

Essentially, the primary theory of recovery in all of these cases, although not specifically identified as such, is **estoppel—conduct** by the government **sufficient** to later preclude it from denying the existence of a valid guarantee. Several similar cases have specifically raised the **estoppel theory**.<sup>14</sup> For example, the issue in **B-187445**, January 27, 1977, was whether **SBA was** legally obligated for a \$10,000 loss suffered by a **bank** on a loan made to a small business

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<sup>14</sup>**Estoppel claims against the government** can rarely succeed, and even those few cases in which **GAO** has sanctioned them would, in light of the **Supreme Court's decision in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond**, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), have to be **reassessed** before being used as precedent. **Estoppel** claims arise in many contexts and are **discussed** further in Chapter 12.

contractor under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. The bank alleged that the loan was made on the basis of assurances from an **SBA** official that the loan would be guaranteed. **GAO** found, however, that the loan was not in fact guaranteed since it was never approved in writing as required by the applicable provision in the guarantee agreement between **SBA** and the bank. Also, **SBA** had no liability to the bank under an **estoppel** theory since the bank was aware that the **SBA** official involved lacked authority to approve a loan guarantee or otherwise assure the bank of repayment. Further, the bank could not demonstrate that it had made the loan primarily in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.

In another 1977 case, a bank argued that **SBA** was liable under an **estoppel** theory to reimburse the bank for a loss suffered as a result of **SBA's** approval of a direct disaster loan to the borrower. However, the facts did not support an **estoppel** since **SBA** made no misrepresentations to the bank, and the bank did not make the loan in reliance on the representations that **SBA** did make. **B-181432**, February 4, 1977. A somewhat similar case involving the Farmers Home Administration denied the claim of a creditor who alleged that he had advanced supplies and services to a borrower on the basis of assurances from a Farmers Home employee that the borrower's obligation would be guaranteed by the government. Since **FmHA** regulations then expressly prohibited employees from guaranteeing repayment of **non-FmHA** loans, either personally or on behalf of the government, the creditor was necessarily on notice of the employee's lack of authority to make such assurances. **B-168300**, December 4, 1969; **B-168300**, December 3, 1969.

Another **estoppel** case is **B-198310**, April 23, 1981. **SBA** had sent a letter to a borrower confirming approval of a direct handicapped assistance loan. Allegedly in reliance on this letter, the claimant bank advanced funds to the borrower. **SBA** then issued its formal loan authorization, but canceled it shortly thereafter based on the borrower's failure to disclose all pertinent information on its loan application. The bank sought reimbursement on a theory of "promissory **estoppel**." The Comptroller General held that **SBA** was under no obligation to reimburse the bank for two reasons. First, **SBA's** letter had been to the borrower, not the bank. Thus, **SBA** had made no representations to the bank. Second, the bank's reliance on the letter was not reasonable because the letter contained no mention of the possibility that the loan might be used to obtain interim

financing, nor did the bank attempt to obtain any assurance from SBA that the borrower would be required to use the proceeds of the SBA loan to repay the interim loan.

The existence of a valid guarantee also was an issue in 60 **Comp. Gen.** 700 (1981) in a different context. Farmers Home Administration regulations required written notification to the lender of the approval or disapproval of a guarantee application. Based on these regulations, and citing **B-187445**, January 27, 1977, discussed above, **GAO** concluded that oral notification of a loan guarantee approval was not sufficient to create a valid guarantee for purposes of charging that guarantee against the **FmHA's** annual ceiling. 60 **Comp. Gen.** at 709–10.

d. Small Business Investment Companies

A “small business investment company” (SBIC) is a private company organized under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended (15 U.S.C. §§ 661-697 c), and licensed by the Small Business Administration. Its purpose is to provide financial assistance to small business concerns.

A series of decisions in the 1960s upheld SBA's authority to provide various forms of financial assistance to SBICs. First, SBA may guarantee loans made to SBICs by private financial institutions. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 146 (1962). While the guarantee authority was not explicit at the time of the 1962 decision, it was later added and is now found at 15 U.S.C. § 683. SBA also has “secondary guarantee” authority, authority to sell to private investors, with recourse (SBA's guarantee), debt instruments representing loans SBA had made to SBICs. 44 **Comp. Gen.** 549 (1965). The proposal considered in 44 **Comp. Gen.** 549 involved loans with a maturity of 5 or 6 years. Later that same year, SBA proposed extending its program to loans with 15-year maturities. GAO again approved, noting that the difference in maturity did not affect the basic authority. 45 **Comp. Gen.** 253 (1965). The 15-year period also is now specified in 15 U.S.C. § 683. See also 45 **Comp. Gen.** 370 (1965) (same holding for similar program under different provision of Small Business Investment Act).

The Comptroller General concluded further in 45 **Comp. Gen.** 253 that SBA could make the sales through an agent or broker with reasonable compensation if administratively determined to be necessary or more economical. However, the broker's compensation

may not be paid from the proceeds of the loan sales but must be charged to **SBA's** appropriation for administrative expenses.

A small business investment company may be either a corporation or a limited partnership. 15 U.S.C. § 681(a). The scope of authorized **SBA** assistance includes non-recourse loans to a limited partnership **SBIC** (by purchasing or guaranteeing its debentures). **B-149685**, January 12, 1978. Non-recourse **in** this context means that **SBA would** “waive” its right to recover, provided under the laws of most states, against the separate assets of the general partner.

In **B-149685**, March 25, 1971, **GAO** considered **SBA's** authority to sell guaranteed **SBIC** debentures to a group of underwriters for resale to private investors. Under this program, **SBA would first** purchase \$30 million of newly issued debentures from **SBICs** and then immediately sell them to private investors, with **SBA's** guarantee of payment of principal and interest according to the terms of the instrument. **SBA** would act as servicing agent for the holders, receiving payment on the debentures from the **SBICs** and then paying the holders in accordance with the terms of the debentures. The Comptroller General concluded that the proposed sale and guarantee of debentures in this manner was within the scope of **SBA's** statutory authority, provided **SBA** did not exceed any existing statutory program level limitations. See also **B-149685**, June 3, 1969.

Another issue is whether a **small** business investment company is eligible to participate, as a lending institution, in a government guaranteed loan program. In 49 **Comp. Gen.** 32 (1969), the Comptroller General held that **SBICs** were not eligible lenders for purposes of **SBA's** guaranteed loan program under section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a). The decision relied heavily on the legislative history of the Small Business Investment Act.

Some years later, **GAO** again considered the eligibility of **SBICs** to be guaranteed lenders in **SBA's** section 7(a) guaranteed loan program as well as the Farmers Home Administration's business and industrial loan program (7 U.S.C. § 1932). **SBA's** new proposal was somewhat different from the arrangement considered in 49 **Comp. Gen.** 32, because after originating the loan, the **SBIC** would then immediately sell the guaranteed portion to another lending institution and remain the servicing agent. **GAO's** conclusion remained the same, again based on the legislative history of the Small Business Investment Act which

indicated that Congress intended **SBICs** to operate independently of other federal loan programs. With respect to the Farmers Home Administration program, nothing in either the Small Business Investment Act or the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act or their legislative histories supported a different conclusion. 56 **Comp. Gen.** 323 (1977).

One type of small business investment company is the “minority enterprise **small** business investment company,” or “**MESBIC**.” As the name implies, a **MESBIC** is a small business investment company formed to aid minority-owned small businesses. In 59 **Comp. Gen.** 635 (1980), **aff’d** on reconsideration, **B-197439**, November 26, 1980, GAO considered **SBA’s** authority to “leverage” against federal funds invested in **MESBICs**. “Leveraging” means investing on a partial matching basis through the purchase or guarantee of debentures or the purchase of preferred securities. The specific issue was whether **SBA** could leverage against Federal Railroad Administration investments in **MESBICs**. Since the Small Business Investment Act authorizes **SBA** to leverage only against private money, the decision concluded that, absent specific statutory authority, **SBA** could not leverage against federal funds invested in **MESBICs**. The **MESBICs** took the case to court, arguing that “private” meant simply “**non-SBA**.” Based on the plain meaning of the statutory language, the court agreed with GAO. Inner City Broadcasting Corp. v. Sanders, 733 **F.2d** 154 (D.C.Cir. 1984). “[P]rivate means private and not governmental.” *Id.* at 157.<sup>15</sup>

GAO and the court had both recognized that leveraging against other federal funds would be permissible if authorized by the statute under which those other funds were provided. One such example is community development block grant funds provided under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.<sup>60</sup> **Comp. Gen.** 210 (1981).

- e. **The Federal Financing Bank** The Federal Financing Bank was created by the Federal Financing Bank Act of 1973, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2281–2296. Its purpose is to

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<sup>15</sup> A 1989 amendment added 15 U.S.C. § 683(e), providing that federal, state, or local government funds received by a small business investment company from **non-SBA** sources shall be included in determining private capital “solely for regulatory purposes, and not for the purpose of obtaining financial assistance from or licensing by [SBA], providing such funds were invested prior to November 21, 1989.”



coordinate federal credit programs with overall government economic and fiscal policies. It is a corporate **instrumentality** of the United States Government, subject to the **general** direction and supervision of the Secretary of the **Treasury**. *Id.* §2283. The Bank acts essentially as an intermediary. Its powers **include** purchasing agency debt securities and federally guaranteed borrowings. Specifically, it is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 2285 to-

“purchase and sell on terms and conditions determined by the Bank, any obligation which is issued, sold, or guaranteed by a Federal agency. Any **Federal agency** which is authorized to issue, sell, or guarantee any obligation is authorized to issue or sell such obligations directly to the Bank.”

The Bank obtains funds by issuing its own securities, almost entirely to the Treasury. *Id.* §§ 2288(b), (c). The decisions **summarized** below illustrate the **varying** roles the Bank plays in the credit **financing** arena.

In 58 **Comp. Gen.** 138 (1978), GAO considered the **SBA’s** authority to issue certificates to the Federal Financing Bank evidencing transfer of title of a number of individual loans and setting forth **SBA’s** guaranteed assurance of payment, either in cash or by loan substitution. Even though this arrangement contemplated the sale of certificates evidencing ownership of a group of **SBA loans** rather than individual loans, it was sufficiently similar to the arrangement upheld in **B-149685**, March 25, 1971, discussed above in connection with **SBICs**, and was therefore permissible. Since the certificate did refer to specific loans and, when transferred to the Bank, would represent a transfer of ownership of the loans to the Bank, the plan would not constitute borrowing by **SBA**, which would have required specific statutory authority.<sup>16</sup>

The same decision, while noting that **SBA’s** authority to sell loans to the Federal Financing Bank with its guarantee was “neither greater nor less” than its authority to sell loans to other purchasers (58 **Comp. Gen.** at 139), nevertheless concluded that **SBA** lacked the authority to **sell** direct disaster loans (15 U.S.C. § 636(b)) to the Federal Financing Bank on a guaranteed basis. Although **SBA** does have authority to guarantee disaster loans made to eligible borrowers by participating lending institutions, it is not authorized, in the

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<sup>16</sup>SBA now has such borrowing authority in 15 U. S.C. § 633(c)(5).

absence of specific statutory authority or a clear expression of congressional intent, to sell and guarantee disaster loans that it had originally made directly. Since there was at the time no statutory ceiling on the type of loans in question, the proposal would enable **SBA** to “replenish its disaster loan revolving fund so as to enable it to make new disaster loans and repeat the process indefinitely,” potentially resulting in an unlimited contingent liability against the United States with no congressional restraint. *Id.* at 146. In addition, the proposal contemplated a 100 percent **guarantee** which would have violated the statutory 90 percent maximum guarantee of disaster loans.

Another case involving the Bank as ‘guaranteed lender’ is **B-162373-O. M.**, July 31, 1979, finding that an agreement between the Rural Electrification Administration and the Bank by which the Bank made loans to borrowers that **REA** guaranteed under the authority of section 306 of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. § 936), was within the statutory authority of both agencies. The legality of the arrangement was considered from the perspectives both of **REA’s** authority to guarantee loans made by a non-private entity such as the Bank and of the Bank’s authority to act as the initial lender, making loans directly to a private nongovernmental borrower with **REA’s** guarantee. Since **REA** has authority to guarantee loans made by “any legally organized lending agency,” it could guarantee **loans** made by the Federal Financing Bank. At the same time, the Bank was acting within its statutory authority to purchase obligations guaranteed by a federal agency, since the transaction was in the form of its purchasing the borrower’s note from the borrower with payment being guaranteed by **REA**. Although the arrangement was legal, GAO was critical because it did not involve the private credit sector in the **REA** program as contemplated by the Rural Electrification Act. See GAO report, Financing Rural Electric Generating Facilities: A Large and Growing Activity, CED-81-14 (November 28, 1980), pages 16–17.

Congress subsequently confirmed the **REA-FFB** arrangement by amending 7 U.S.C. § 936 to provide that the loans, upon request of the borrower, “shall be made by the Federal Financing Bank.” Under the statute, loan servicing is the responsibility of the lender. Thus, **REA’s** funds are available to perform the **loan** servicing function as the Bank’s agent only on a reimbursable basis. 62 **Comp. Gen.** 309 (1983).

Two 1987 opinions discussed the Federal Financing Bank's role in the foreign military sales program. The Bank finances credit sales under the Arms Export Control Act, with the loans being guaranteed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. If the debtor nation defaults, **DSAA** pays the Bank. One opinion concluded that the Bank is not authorized to deliberately delay making demand on **DSAA** for payment upon default. **B-226718.2**, August 19, 1987. The second advised that two refinancing options under consideration, one involving prepayment without penalty and one involving the partial capitalization of interest, would result in a financial loss to the United States or the substantial risk of one, and should not be implemented without clear evidence of congressional approval. 66 **Comp. Gen.** 577 (1987). Congress subsequently approved a prepayment option. See Security Assistance: Foreign Military Sales Debt Refinancing, **GAO/NSIAD-89-175** (August 1989); Federal Financing Bank: The Government Incurred a Cost of \$2 Billion on Loan Prepayments, **GAO/AFMD-89-59** (August 1989).

A 1985 transaction illustrates a very different role for the Bank. In October 1985, the Treasury Department had reached its statutory public debt ceiling and was in danger of defaulting on its obligations pending congressional action to raise the ceiling. The Bank effectively borrowed \$5 billion from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund by issuing securities to the Fund and accepting Treasury obligations in payment. The Bank then used these securities to prepay part of its **outstanding** debt to Treasury. This in turn reduced Treasury's outstanding debt, enabling it to borrow an additional \$5 billion from the public to meet its obligations. Based on the Bank's statutory authority and the conclusion that **its** obligations do not count against the public debt limit set by 31 U.S.C. § 3101(73), the Comptroller General found the transaction legally unobjectionable. **B-138524**, October 30, 1985.

When the Federal Financing Bank was first created, its transactions were entirely off-budget. 12 U.S.C. § 2290(c) ("receipts and disbursements of the Bank. . . shall not be included in the totals of the budget of the United States Government"). With the budget reforms of the Congressional Budget Act and subsequent legislation, this treatment came under increasing criticism and GAO, among others, recommended that Bank transactions involving other government entities be reflected in the budget. E.g., Government Agency Transactions With the Federal Financing Bank Should Be Included on

the Budget, PAD-77-70 (August 3, 1977) (detailed analysis); **58 Comp. Gen.** 138, 142–44 (1978); **B-178726**, September 16, 1976 (pointing out that purchase by the Bank of a loan guaranteed by another agency amounts to a direct loan).

While the Federal Financing Bank Act itself has not been amended, Congress in 1985 added 2 U.S.C. § 655(b) to the Congressional Budget Act:

“AU receipts and disbursements of the Federal Financing Bank with respect to any obligations which are issued, sold, or guaranteed by a Federal agency shall be treated as a means of financing such agency for purposes of section 1105 of Title 31 [submission of President’s budget] and for purposes of [the Congressional Budget] Act.”

Under this provision, direct loans of the Bank are accounted for as loans of the guaranteeing agency. See **B-226718.2**, August 19, 1987.

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## **2. Coverage of Borrowers**

### **a. Eligibility of Borrowers**

Loan guarantee program legislation may or may not establish criteria for lender eligibility; it will almost invariably address borrower eligibility. This is because the primary purpose of a guarantee program is to enhance credit availability to a particular class of borrowers (farmers, veterans, small businesses, etc.). The significance of any such eligibility requirements is that an agency is not authorized to issue a guarantee or reimburse a lender on behalf of an ineligible borrower.

For example, one portion of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1703, authorizes the insurance of loans made to finance repairs or improvements to real property by owners or lessees. Under this statute, it is the lending institution’s responsibility to determine borrower eligibility. Thus, a lending institution making a **loan** to someone who is neither the owner nor the lessee of the property involved is not entitled to be reimbursed for losses resulting from borrower default. **B-180015**, November 28, 1973; **B-174739**, January 19, 1972.

While most eligibility requirements are found in the program statute itself, they may appear in other legislation. For example, the Military Selective Service Act provides that any person who is required to

register for the draft and knowingly and willfully fails to do so shall be ineligible for guaranteed student loan assistance. 50 U.S.C. **App. § 462(f)**. The Department of Education is authorized to issue implementing regulations, discussed in **B-210733**, February 25, 1983.

**b. Substitution of Borrowers**

Generally, the substitution of borrowers within the same fiscal year will not present problems. However, as with contracts and grants, the substitution may or may not be proper when made in a subsequent **fiscal** year. Loan guarantee authority—whether it is an advance appropriation of budget authority under the Federal Credit Reform Act or a program level ceiling in a situation not governed by the Credit Reform Act—is granted on an annual, multiple-year, or no-year basis. It thus has a period of availability analogous to a regular appropriation. Where the period of availability is a fixed time period, the authority ceases to be **available** when that period expires.

The issue in **B-164031(5)**, June 25, 1976, was the transferability of a loan guarantee and interest subsidy originally approved under a program of federal assistance for the construction and modernization of **hospitals**. The question was whether the guarantee could be transferred from one hospital to another in the following fiscal year, when the original hospital became unable to take advantage of the guarantee due to apparent financial difficulties. The Comptroller General found that, since the period of availability of the guarantee authority had expired, the transfer would be authorized only if it could be viewed as a “replacement.” Since the second hospital did not serve the same community as the first, the transfer of the loan guarantee to the new “borrower” was not merely a “replacement” and therefore could not be approved.

A few years later, the Farmers Home Administration asked whether it could continue to charge a guarantee to the annual ceiling for the fiscal year in which it was originally approved when a new borrower was substituted in a later fiscal year. As a general rule, the answer is no, and the substitution would have to be treated as a new undertaking. This is different from the substitution of lenders discussed previously in this chapter because the approval of a guaranteed loan to a particular borrower requires a specific eligibility determination. Thus, while the identity of the particular lender may be of relatively little consequence, the identity and eligibility of the borrower are essential to the transaction. However, the substitution may be treated as a continuation of the original guarantee where the

substituted borrower bears a “close and genuine relationship” to the originally approved borrower (for example, a corporation and partnership controlled by the same individuals), provided of course that the loan purpose remains substantially unchanged. **60 Comp. Gen. 700 (1981).**<sup>17</sup>

c. Loan Purpose

The authority to make a loan guarantee commitment depends not only on the eligibility of the particular borrower, but also on whether the purpose for which the guaranteed loan is to be made is consistent with the applicable program statute and regulations. The analysis is essentially an application of the “necessary expense” doctrine used in other purpose availability contexts.

A number of illustrative cases have arisen under section 301 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2091, which authorizes loan guarantees to finance the performance of contracts where deemed “necessary to expedite production and deliveries or services under Government contracts for the procurement of materials or the performance of services for the national defense.” *Id.* § 2091(a)(1). For example, **B-115791 -O.M.**, September 3, 1953, concluded that section 301, ordinarily used to provide short-term working capital, could also be used to guarantee loans for the expansion of plant facilities if determined necessary to expedite production and deliveries or services under defense contracts.

Contracts to purchase equipment for civil defense stockpiling purposes may be regarded as contracts for the national defense and therefore eligible for loan guarantees under section 301. **37 Comp. Gen. 417 (1957).** The issue in that case was whether a 1953 amendment to the act, which narrowed the definition of “national defense,” had the effect of excluding civil defense which clearly would have been covered before the amendment. **GAO** found no evidence of congressional intent to exclude civil defense, and concluded therefore that the loans could be guaranteed.

While section 301 was intended primarily to assist small and medium-size defense contractors, its language is not so limited and is

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<sup>17</sup>Both **60 Comp. Gen. 700** and **B-164031(5)** applied the basic principles of decisions “the substitution of grantees discussed in Chapter 10.

sufficiently broad to permit guarantees to large-size defense contractors **as well**. **B-170109**, July 21, 1970 (large railroad carrier).

GAO considered a different loan guarantee program in **38 Comp. Gen. 640** (1959). The question in that case was whether the Civil Aeronautics Board, under a statute authorizing the guarantee of aircraft purchase loans, could guarantee the indebtedness of an air carrier for the conversion of an existing aircraft. The case involved the conversion of piston engine aircraft to turbo-powered aircraft. **GAO** found that the conversion was such **an** extensive modification as to amount to a new type of aircraft for all practical purposes. Also, it was clear that if the manufacturer had performed the conversion and then sold the converted aircraft to the carrier, the purchase would have been eligible for the guarantee. The conversion was therefore within the statutory purpose and the guarantee was authorized.

An analogous situation occurred in **34 Comp. Gen. 392** (1955), involving the Maritime Administration's ship mortgage insurance authority under the Merchant Marine Act. Noting that purchase plus reconstruction was the equivalent of new construction for purposes of the program, the Comptroller General held that the insurance could extend to the purchase money mortgage and reconstruction costs for a vessel acquired by purchase (in this case from the government) instead of under a construction contract. This decision was amplified in **35 Comp. Gen. 18** (1955), which **held** that the Maritime Administration could insure a second-lien reconstruction mortgage to a private lending institution where the first-lien (purchase money) mortgage was held by the United States. There was nothing in the statute limiting the insurance **authority** to **first-lien** mortgages.

The Rural Electrification Administration's financial assistance programs have generated a number of purpose-related cases. Generally, **REA** may make direct loans and loan guarantees to finance rural electrification facilities for persons not already receiving central station service.

Several cases have established the proposition that **REA** can include elements in a project that are arguably beyond a literal reading of the **statutory** language, where those elements are merely incidental to accomplishing the statutory purpose. Thus, early cases on **REA's** direct loan program held that **REA** cannot make a loan where the **only** persons to be **benefitted** are already receiving central service, but it

can finance the acquisition of existing facilities which are to be incorporated into a larger system, where the acquisition is necessary for the effective operation of the overall system. **B-48590**, April 3, 1945; **B-32920**, March 12, 1943; **B-29463**, December 1, 1942. This principle applies whether the acquisition is by direct purchase or the purchase of securities to be exchanged for the physical property. **B-42486**, July 25, 1944.

**REA** loans are not intended to parallel existing facilities. Thus, where Plant A and Plant B are located less than 200 feet apart, and Plant A is receiving central service from a power supplier who **has** offered to provide adequate service to Plant B, Plant B cannot properly be considered a person not receiving central service for purposes of **qualifying** for **REA financial** assistance. **B-134138**, October 15, 1958.

In **B-195437**, February 15, 1980, GAO applied the principles of the above direct loan cases to **REA's** loan guarantee program. The issue was **REA's** authority to approve a loan guarantee to finance certain expenditures associated with the construction of a coal-fired **electric** generating plant, including cancellation charges if two contracts for components of the plant were terminated. The decision held that, since the contractors would not begin to build the components without a commitment that the cancellation costs would be paid, approval of a loan guarantee to assure funding to pay such charges was consistent with the basic statutory purpose of providing electricity to persons in **rural** areas and therefore authorized.

Finally, loans and loan guarantees to provide housing for the elderly may include the purchase of related necessary equipment such as refrigerators and laundry equipment. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 528 (1963).

#### **& Change in Loan Purpose**

A decision previously cited in the discussion of changes in lenders and borrowers, 60 **Comp. Gen.** 700 (1981), also addressed changes in loan purpose under the Farmers Home Administration rural development loan guarantee program. Again, the issue was when changes could be deemed a continuation of the original transaction, so that the guarantee would remain chargeable to the annual ceiling for the fiscal year in which it was originally approved.

Similar questions had arisen frequently in the grant context, and the Comptroller General applied the grant principles to loan guarantees, stating:



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“Applying these grant decisions to the area of loan guarantees, when a **major** change to the ‘character’ of the project supported by the guarantee is made, the revised loan guarantee must be charged against the ceiling in effect when the revision is **made**. We **believe** that just as a **significant** change in the terms and conditions under which a grant was made would be viewed as creating anew grant, a **significant** change in the terms and conditions under which a loan guarantee was approved would create a new loan.”

Id. at 707. Thus, **major** changes will result in the treatment of the **transaction** as a new guarantee. However, less substantial changes where the purpose and scope of the revised agreement are consistent with the purpose and scope of the original agreement maybe treated as a continuation as long as the need for the project continues to exist. This test must be applied on a case-by-case basis.

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### 3. Terms and Conditions of Guarantees

#### a. Introduction

Just as with any other contractual obligation, a loan guarantee has terms and conditions which the parties must follow. If a valid guarantee has been created, the borrower defaults, and the lender has complied with all applicable terms and conditions, the government is obligated to pay on the guarantee. Conversely, if the lender does not comply with applicable requirements, it may **find** that it has lost the benefit of the guarantee. The applicable terms and conditions are found in the program statute, agency regulations, and the guarantee agreement.

This section will discuss the effect of noncompliance, especially by the lender. The cases fall into two broad categories. In one group, the loan may not have been eligible for the guarantee from its inception based on a failure to satisfy applicable requirements such as a statutory limitation on the maximum amount or maturity of the loan. The result will usually be that the guarantee itself was never valid. In the second group, the loan to be guaranteed complies with **all** pertinent statutory or regulatory requirements, but the guarantee never takes effect or is **nullified** as a result of the lender’s failure to comply with one or more of the terms and conditions upon which the government’s guarantee is contingent.

To illustrate these concepts, we have selected two areas—property insurance programs under the National Housing Act and loan

guarantee programs of the Small Business Administration. The specific requirements discussed are the more common ones **and** apply of course only to the particular program. Nevertheless, our selection is intended to illustrate types of issues, approaches to problem-solving, and the crucial role of agency regulations, and from this perspective is of more general relevance. Also, program details such as maximum loan amount, whether prescribed by statute or regulation, are subject to change from time to time. Accordingly, individual cases do not necessarily reflect current program requirements, but are intended to illustrate or support propositions of continuing validity with respect to requirements of that type.

b. Property Insurance  
Programs Under the National  
Housing Act

The National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. **ch.** 13, authorizes a number of housing assistance programs. Several of the programs were formerly administered by the Federal Housing Administration (**FHA**) and were transferred to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (**HUD**) upon its creation in 1965. Although the programs are now administered by HUD's Office of Housing, they are still popularly known as "**FHA** programs."

(1) Maximum amount of loan

Under 12 U.S.C. 51703, the Secretary of HUD **is** authorized to insure lenders against losses sustained in extending loans to borrowers for various purposes, including home construction, repair, and improvement, and the purchase of manufactured (mobile) homes. The statute establishes the maximum amount of loans that maybe insured for the various authorized purposes, for example, \$25,000 for repairs and improvements to an existing single-family structure. **Id.** § 1703(b)(1) (1988 and **Supp.** III 1991). **While the specific** dollar amounts have changed several times, the basic maximum loan amount requirement has existed in one form or another since the program was established in 1934.

Where a single loan is involved, its face amount cannot exceed the statutory limitation. If a loan which is reported by the lender to HUD for insurance exceeds the statutory limitation in effect when the loan was made, the lender cannot be reimbursed for any of its losses since the loan was ineligible for insurance from its inception. **E.g.**, B-127167, July 15, 1970; B-127243, May 21, 1956.

In applying this limitation where more than *one loan* is involved, the approach of HUD's program regulations is to consider whether the total amount of all outstanding insured loans made to a borrower under Title I of the Housing Act with respect to the same property or structure exceeds the maximum permissible amount. In this situation, the ceiling applies to the outstanding aggregate **loan** balance rather than the sum of the face amounts. 24 C.F.R. §201.10 (1991). Thus, for a second loan, the ceiling is compared with the face amount of the second loan (which represents the outstanding balance of that **loan** at the time the determination **is** made) plus the outstanding balance of the **first** loan. **B-148894**, June 29, 1962; **B-137493**, November 20, 1958. The method used to compute the outstanding balance is within HUD's discretion. In considering claims, GAO **will** apply the method prescribed in the regulations. The fact that other reasonable methods may exist is irrelevant. **B-162961**, January 19, 1968.

The ceiling applies only to loans for the same property. In **B-148804**, June 7, 1962, the Comptroller General advised that a lender **could** be reimbursed for a loss it suffered when the borrower defaulted, even though the original loan of \$4,000 exceeded the then-existing \$3,500 limitation. Although only one application for a \$4,000 loan had been made, the record revealed that two separate properties were involved, with \$3,000 of the loan funds intended for the improvement of one property, and \$1,000 for the other. Therefore, the limitation which applied only to loans for the same property was not violated.

This decision points out another important provision of 12 U.S.C. §1703. The secretary Of HUD is authorized to waive a requirement **in** the regulations if in the Secretary's judgment enforcement would impose an **injustice** on an insured lender, provided that the lender has substantially complied with the regulations in good faith and waiver would not increase the government's obligation beyond what it would have been under full compliance. Id. §1703(e). Thus, in **B-148804**, the regulations required separate applications for separate properties, but GAO advised that **FHA** could waive the requirement. Prior to enactment of the waiver authority, GAO had applied the general rule that agencies have no authority to waive statutory regulations. 15 **Comp. Gen.** 869 (1936). The waiver provision was enacted three weeks after the decision. The authority has been applied in a variety of contexts. E.g., **B-127026**, March 27, 1956 (bank disbursed loan after a change **in regulations** under which loan would have been ineligible, but had approved loan in good faith before receiving notice of the

change). The **Secretary** of HUD may delegate the **waiver** authority to a “substantial compliance committee.” **B-127167**, December 17, 1968.

Several decisions have emphasized that the waiver authority applies only to regulations. It does not apply to a requirement imposed by statute, such as the maximum loan amount. A purported waiver of a statutory requirement is ineffective. **E.g., B-127243**, May 21, 1956. A waiver inconsistent with the statutory authority, for example, lack of good faith by the lender, is also unauthorized, **B-127167**, December 5, 1957.

Exercise of the waiver authority is up to HUD, not GAO. While GAO may, in settling a claim or rendering a decision, **find** a waiver invalid if it violates one of the above principles, GAO cannot positively exercise the authority where HUD has chosen not to do so. As in **B-148804**, June 7, 1962, **GAO can** only advise HUD that in its opinion waiver is authorized.

## (2) Maximum loan maturity

The Housing Act also prescribes, by category, the maximum maturity term of loans which maybe insured under 12 U.S.C. §1703. For example, the maturity of a loan for repairs and improvements to an existing single-family structure may not exceed 20 years and 32 days. **Id. § 1703(b)(3)**. As with the maximum loan amount, maturity **limitations** have existed since the program’s inception.

The maturity date is computed based on the payment due date indicated on the note. If the period exceeds the **statutory** maximum, the loan is not insurable. It is the responsibility of the lender rather than the government to make certain that notes do not have maturities in excess of the statutory **maximum**. **55 Comp. Gen. 126** (1975); **B-172121**, April 12, 1971. Thus, in **55 Comp. Gen. 126**, a bank’s claim for reimbursement was denied where a note submitted and accepted for insurance had a projected maturity date 17 days in excess of the maximum in effect when the loan was made.

The decision at **55 Comp. Gen. 126** also held that, since the statutory limitation applies to the maturity of the obligation or note underlying the loan, the date on the note is controlling, and not the date on which the note was assigned or the funds disbursed. However, this is not an absolute and there are certain circumstances in which the date on the

note has been found not controlling. For example, in **B-162542**, October 24, 1967, GAO approved a lender's claim even though the note stated a final payment due date after the existing statutory limitation. The holding was based on a letter from the lender to the borrower which agreed to move up the date of the first payment and, by implication, all of the others as well, **including** the **final** payment. As a result, the maturity date fell within the statutory period.

Somewhat similarly, **B-166521**, April 25, 1969, involved a **60-month** note which, as written, would have exceeded the statutory maximum. The note was dated June 20, 1963, but provided that the first payment was not due until July 1, 1968. Based on the borrower's actual payment record, it was obvious that the maturity date had been inadvertently entered on **the note** as the **first** payment due date. Thus, the maturity date was within the then-existing **statutory** maximum **and** the lender could be paid.

Again in **B-191660**, March 5, 1979, GAO upheld a bank's claim where the note had a projected maturity date two days in excess of the then-existing statutory limitation. The borrower's payment record and other evidence supported the bank's allegation that, due to inadvertence, the note as written did not reflect the intention of the parties at the time the loan was made. The decision emphasized that, where extraneous evidence is to be used to correct an alleged error on a note, merely changing the due date after default and after HUD has refused insurance is legally irrelevant. The extraneous evidence must establish that the allegedly correct due date is what the parties intended at the time the note was executed.

Problems may also arise when the term of the initial insured loan is within the statutory maximum but a subsequent extension agreement results in exceeding the maximum maturity period. For example, in **B-131963**, July 17, 1957, **FHA** could not reimburse a bank for a loss suffered on a defaulted loan where the bank had agreed in writing to extend the **maturity** date of the note beyond the **statutory** maximum.

As pointed out in that decision, 12 U.S.C. §1703(b)(6) permits a loan to be refinanced, but the authority does not include a mere extension of payment. Thus, a lender may extend the time for paying a note beyond the **maximum** time limitation and still retain insurability only by actually refinancing the loan, that is, by executing anew note. Short of an actual refinancing, **a** mere extension of payment beyond

the maximum will result in the loss of insurability. See also **B-164118**, November 19, 1969; **B-149800**, September 28, 1962; **B-148816**, May 21, 1962. Several cases have rejected arguments by the lender either that it had not intended to extend the **final** maturity date beyond the permissible maximum, or that it should have been allowed to subsequently rescind or reform the extension agreement to conform with the statutory limitation. **E.g.**, **B-188240**, August 10, 1977; **B-164118**, December 30, 1969; **B-164118**, August 14, 1968.

Insurability may be retained if the extension is merely a temporary deferral of certain payments, with the deferred payments to be made up prior to the original maturity date. However, if this is the case, it must be spelled out in the extension agreement. **B-164118**, December 30, 1969.

In 51 **Comp. Gen.** 222 (1971), the extension agreement was not merely an extension of time but also changed other terms such as the period of payment and the amount of the monthly installment. In these circumstances, the Comptroller General found that the terms of the extension agreement differed so substantially from those of the original note that it was “tantamount to a new note” and could be considered as a refinancing. Although the “refinancing” had not been accomplished in accordance with applicable regulations, GAO advised HUD that it could consider waiving those particular **regulatory** requirements under 12 U.S.C. § 1703(e).

### (3) Owner/lessee requirement

Another requirement of the Housing Act is that property improvement loans can be made only to borrowers who are owners of the property, or who are lessees under a lease expiring not less than six months after the maturity of the loan or other advance of credit. 12 U.S.C. § 1703(a). A loan made to a borrower who is neither the owner nor the lessee of the property involved is not insurable. For example, where the property was owned by a corporation and the loan application and note were signed by two individuals who were officers of the corporation, but with no indication that they were signing as representatives of the corporation, the loan was not made to the owner of the property and was ineligible for insurance, **B-180015**, November 28, 1973. Similarly, where the same person was president of two different corporations and signed the note as president of corporation “A” but had signed the lease on the property involved as

president of corporation “B”, the loan was not made to the lessee and was not insurable. **B-174739**, January 19, 1972.

The lease must expire “not less than six months after the maturity of the loan.” A loan to a lessee is not insurable where the lease expires before the maturity date (**B-194145**, December 12, 1980), or on the maturity date (**B-172965**, July 16, 1971). Time “after” an event is traditionally computed by excluding the date of the happening. Thus, a **loan** with a **maturity** date of July 1, 1956, to a lessee whose lease was due to expire on December 31, 1956, was not insurable. “Not less than six months after” the maturity date would have been on or after January 1, 1957. **B-129898**, December 28, 1956.

In **B-194145**, December 12, 1980, a loan was refinanced after the borrower, under a lease with option to purchase, had exercised the option. The bank argued that the loan should be insurable since the refinancing note had been executed to the owner. However, the Comptroller **General** held that a refinancing loan is insurable only where the prior loan being refinanced was itself validly insured. Since the original loans in that case were ineligible, the refinancing loan was equally ineligible. Also, the refinancing loan could not be considered an entirely new loan for purposes of insurability, since the statute authorizes insurance to finance improvements, not to repay outstanding uninsured loans.

In **B-124410**, July 25, 1955, GAO allowed a **bank’s** claim on a **loan** to a borrower who was not the owner of the property. The decision was based on **FHA** regulations which provided that a lender, acting in good faith, may in the absence of any information to the contrary, rely on statements of fact in a credit application, and the credit application in that case had been misleading. Compare, however, 17 **Comp. Gen.** 604 (1937), in which a claim was denied for a **loss** suffered when a lender advanced funds to an individual other than the borrower upon a forged authorization, where a simple comparison with the signature on the note would have disclosed the forgery.

While a bank is generally entitled to rely on statements of fact in a credit application, it is nevertheless required to exercise good credit judgment. Thus, payment was denied in **A-88143**, August 21, 1937, where the borrower had previously defaulted on a different loan with the same bank. The result applies equally to a bank with several branches where the contract of insurance is with the home office.

19 **Comp. Gen.** 92 (1939). An apparent exception occurred in **B-124438**, July 26, 1955, where a borrower listed on his credit application a prior loan with a branch of the same bank located 110 miles away, but failed to note that it was in default. The bank checked several local credit references and received favorable reports, but did not check with its branch. Since the bank had diligently checked the local references, the borrower cured the default on the prior loan, and **FHA** waived the bank's violation of regulations which prohibited accepting a loan when a prior loan was in default, **GAO** concluded that the bank could be reimbursed for its losses on the second **note**.<sup>18</sup> For **cases** on the requirement to approve the credit statement, see 16 **Comp. Gen.** 958 (1937); **A-71945**, June 16, 1937.

(4) Execution of the note

Another requirement of the regulations is that the note evidencing the indebtedness bear the genuine signature of the borrower, be valid and enforceable against the borrower, and be complete and regular on its face. 24 **C.F.R.** § 201.12 (1991). In a number of cases where either signatures were forged or terms of the note were altered—potentially making the note ineligible for insurance under the **regulations**—**GAO** has allowed claims by a lender for reimbursement based on the lender's apparent good faith and the previously discussed authority to waive regulatory requirements. **B-127167**, December 17, 1968 (forged signature); **B-127167**, December 5, 1957 (false representation as to age); **B-130955**, May 2, 1957 (alteration of amount); **B-127167**, April 10, 1956 (forged signature). Where **HUD** declines to exercise its waiver authority, it may treat the note as ineligible for insurance. *United States v. deVallet*, 152 **F. Supp.** 313 (D. Mass. 1957). "The government had the right to make such limitations on its insurance undertaking as it saw fit," *Id.* at 315.

One court has held that the **validity/regularity** requirement applies "not at the point at which a bank submits its claim, but at the point at which the loan itself is being arranged." *Guardian Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Harris*, 441 **F. Supp.** 789,791 (D.D.C. 1977). While this seems clear enough with respect to items such as the validity of the signature and the "regularity" of the note, subsequent events may affect the enforceability of a note, a situation implicitly

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<sup>18</sup>The same facts in today's computerized environment could well produce a different result.



recognized in the Harris case. In **B-127483**, April 26, 1956, it was held that the enforceability requirement was not affected by a mistrial in a suit brought by the **lender** resulting in a dismissal without **prejudice**. In 37 **Comp. Gen.** 857 (1958), GAO held that a lender could be reimbursed where the note had become unenforceable due to the passage of time notwithstanding the lender's diligent collection efforts. The result **would** at least arguably be different if a note became unenforceable through the **fault** or neglect of the lender.

(5) Reporting requirement

The four requirements discussed thus far relate to the eligibility of a loan for insurance from its inception. This one is different because the loan itself is eligible but the lender's failure to comply may result in the loss of insurability. Program regulations require lenders to report loans to HUD on a prescribed form within 31 days from the date of the **note** or the date the note was purchased. 24 **C.F.R. § 201.30(a)** (1991). HUD then accepts the loan for insurance or **rejects** it. The reporting requirement also applies to refinancing **loans**. Id.

Under present regulations, HUD has discretion **to** accept a late report **as long** as the loan is not in default. Id. **§ 201.30(b)**. Once the loan has gone into default, that discretion no longer exists and it is **too** late **to** establish coverage. An illustrative case is **B-194822**, September 24, 1980. A bank inadvertently failed to report a property improvement loan to HUD. More **than** a year later, after the loan was in default, the bank submitted its report along with its claim for **indemnification**. Concluding that the loan was never insured, HUD denied the claim, and GAO agreed. The fact that HUD had inadvertently **billed** the bank for the required premiums, which the bank paid, was not enough to establish coverage. Of course, refund of the premiums was appropriate.

Prior to 1968, **the** regulations did not limit HUD's discretion, and a late report could be accepted even after **default**. Cases addressing the **exercise** of discretion under this version of the regulations are **B-165239**, October 4, 1968, and **B-153971**, June 17, 1964.

(6) Payment of premiums

The statute requires that HUD charge the financial institution a premium for the insurance. 12 **U.S.C. § 1703(f)**. The premium is a prerequisite to **insurability**. Id. **§ 1703(b)(5)**. This is closely related to

the reporting requirement discussed above in that it is the report that triggers HUD's billing of the bank. The sequence is: (1) bank reports loan to HUD on manifest form; (2) HUD includes the loan on its monthly statement to the bank; (3) upon receipt of monthly statement, bank pays premium to HUD; (4) when HUD receives the premium, loan achieves insured status,

Subsection 1703(f) further requires that the premium charge "shall be payable in advance by the financial institution." Thus, advance payment of the premium is necessary for the loan to be eligible for insurance, at least where nonpayment is solely the fault of the bank. **B-172965**, July 16, 1971 (loan not covered where bank failed to report the loan and was thus never billed by HUD). See also **B-194822**, September 24, 1980 (no authority to accept premiums after default). For loans with a maturity in excess of 25 months, the insurance charge is payable in annual installments. 24 C.F.R. § 201.31(b)(2) (1991).

In 55 **Comp. Gen.** 891 (1976), the bank claimed that it had reported the loan to HUD. HUD, however, had no record of the report and consequently had neither requested nor received any premium payments from the bank prior to default. Apart from the fact that the advance payment requirement appears in a federal statute, the bank had actual notice that a loan is not insured until it appears on the monthly statement and the premium is paid. Adequate review of the monthly statements would have revealed that the particular loan was not listed and that therefore either HUD never received the report or failed to acknowledge it. Since it is the bank's **responsibility** to assure payment of premiums in advance, its claim was denied. The decision once again reiterated that HUD's waiver authority does not apply to **statutory** requirements.

A related case, 55 **Comp. Gen.** 658 (1976), reaffirmed the proposition that timely payment of the insurance premiums is a prerequisite to **continued** insurance coverage. The decision also held that claims by a lending institution which is currently delinquent in its premium payments may be allowed if the borrower's default occurred prior to the delinquency. However, if the lending institution was delinquent before the default occurred or became imminent, its claim may not be allowed.

The decision in 55 **Comp. Gen.** 658 was expanded (and modified with respect to matters not relevant here) in 56 **Comp. Gen.** 279 (1977), **holding** that timely payment of insurance premiums under 12 U.S.C. § 1703 is a continuing obligation of the lender and cannot be voluntarily terminated by the lender before the end of the term of the underlying loan. Unpaid insurance premiums constitute a debt presently due and payable by the lender to the United States. Therefore, HUD may offset delinquent premiums against insurance claims otherwise payable to the lender. However, estimated future premiums may not be offset against currently payable claims because they are not certain in amount. (Under the program regulations, the premium may be abated after an insurance claim has been **filed** or if the loan is paid in full prior to maturity. 24 C.F.R. § 201.31(e).)

c. **Small Business  
Administration Business Loan  
Program**

(1) Payment of guarantee fee

Like the National Housing Act insurance programs, a loan guarantee under section 7(a) of the Small Business Act is not free to the lender. The Small Business Administration is required to charge a guarantee fee, based on a percentage of the amount guaranteed, on most loans guaranteed under 15 U.S.C. § 636(a). *Id.* § 636(a) (18). The fee is payable by the participating lending **institution**, but maybe passed through to the borrower. *Id.* SBA's implementing regulations are found at 13 C.F.R. § 120.104-1 (1991).

For many years prior to the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(18) in 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 18007, 100 Stat. 82, 366), SBA charged a guarantee fee under the authority of its program regulations and guarantee agreement. Thus, **pre-1986** GAO decisions dealing with section 7(a) fees must be regarded as modified to the extent they were addressing a nonstatutory requirement. They, however, along with elements of the program regulations which **pre-date** the 1986 legislation, establish the proposition that an agency may charge a guarantee fee without specific statutory authority as long as it is not prohibited, and outline the general parameters of a nonstatutory fee requirement.

As with the Housing Act fees, a fundamental issue is the effect of nonpayment or late payment. Unlike the Housing Act, the SBA provision does not require that the fees be paid in advance. Thus, by itself, 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(18) neither makes payment of the fee an essential condition of guarantee eligibility, nor does it prohibit such

treatment. Under **SBA's** regulations, the fee is payable when the lender applies for a **guarantee** for loans with maturities of 12 months or less, and within 90 days after **SBA's** approval for loans with maturities greater than 12 months. 13 C.F.R. § 120.104-1(b). Absent statutory direction one way or the other, the effect of missing these deadlines is a matter within **SEA's** discretion to establish by regulation or terms of the guarantee agreement.

At onetime, **SBA's** guarantee agreement expressly provided that a **loan** is not guaranteed until the fee has been paid. Under this provision, payment of the fee was a condition precedent to coverage. **SBA** had the discretion to accept late payment provided the loan was not in default, but the loan was not protected by the guarantee until the fee was paid. **B-181432**, November 12, 1975; **B-181432**, March 13, 1975. In cases where the fee remained unpaid at the time the borrower defaulted, claims by lenders were consistently denied in the face of arguments such as **estoppel** (**B-181432**, May 21, 1979, and **B-181432**, October 20, 1978), “constructive payment” (**B-181432**, July 7, 1978), or inexperience on the part of bank personnel (**B-181432**, August 15, 1977). Since the requirement was explicitly stated in the guarantee agreement, virtually **all** of these cases reiterated the proposition that no government **official** may give away the government’s contractual rights without either statutory authority or adequate legal consideration. The courts reached the same result. See Union Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Weaver, 604 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1979); Union State Bank v. Weaver, 526 F.Supp. 29 (S. D.N.Y. 1981).

Under **SBA's** current regulations, if the fee is not paid within the specified time period, **SBA** will send the lender a written notice. “The guarantee shall be subject to termination if **SBA** does not receive the fee within the time period stated in the notice.” 13 C.F.R. § 120.104-1(b). Implicit in this language is the premise that the guarantee **will** be regarded as in effect until **SBA** terminates it.

A 1953 decision considered similar issues under a different **SBA** program, the Surety Bond Guarantee Program established by 15 U.S.C. § 694a. Since nothing in the legislation or implementing regulations made payment of the guarantee fee a condition precedent to the existence of the guarantee, and since the surety bond guarantee agreement contained no provision comparable to the provision then being used in the business loan guarantee agreement, the decision concluded that nonpayment of the fee prior to default would not void

**SBA's** obligation to honor the guarantee, although **SBA** should deduct the unpaid fee from the surety's claim. **B-206893**, March 18, 1983.

**SBA** has the discretion to reinstate a guarantee which has been terminated for nonpayment of the fee. However, **SBA** will not reinstate a guarantee once the loan goes into default unless the borrower "cures" the default-by bringing the loan into a **fully** paid and current status-within 60 days. 13 C.F.R. § 120.104-1(d); **B-181432**, April 5, 1979.

A 1979 case considered the effect of another provision in the **guarantee** agreement. A bank, conceding that it had not paid the **guarantee** fee prior to default on the loan as originally written, argued that it had effectively modified the agreement by granting the borrower additional time to begin repayment. However, the guarantee agreement explicitly required **SBA's** prior written approval of any change in the terms of the **loan**, which the bank had neither requested nor received. The modification was therefore not legally effective as against **SBA**. **B-193134**, July 27, 1979.

The issue in 58 **Comp. Gen.** 693 (1979) was the effect of a refinancing **loan**. In view of **SBA's** discretion to accept refinancing, GAO concluded that the effect of a bank's failure to timely pay the fee on the original loan was terminated when the original loan was repaid by the refinancing loan. Thus, the fact that the guarantee on the original loan may have been extinguished will not necessarily defeat **an** otherwise valid guarantee on a subsequent refinancing loan.

Cases involving late payment or nonpayment of the guarantee fee may be useful in **analyzing** the treatment and consequences of other terms and conditions of the guarantee agreement, but should not be blindly applied. For **example**, the court in Eastern Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Sanders, 826 **F.2d** 615 (7th Cir. 1987), drew a distinction between provisions expressly declared to be conditions precedent to **SBA's** obligation, such as the fee provision, and those which are not so declared. If a lender violates a provision in the latter category, the issue becomes "whether the violation was a material breach of the agreement, or rather whether [the lender] substantially complied with the agreement." *Id.* at 616. The lender's violation in the cited case, making "side **loans**" to a borrower, was found not to constitute a material breach and therefore did not **justify** repudiation of **SBA's** guarantee. Byway of contrast, a lender who violates a provision in the

“condition precedent” category cannot enforce the guarantee, and you never get to the material breach vs. substantial compliance analysis. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Louisa, Kentucky v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 241 (1984).

(2) Notice of default

Another type of provision an agency may include in its program regulations is a requirement that the lender notify the agency in writing within a specified time period after a default occurs. SBA’s regulations included such a requirement for many years. See 13 C.F.R. §122.10(a) (1980). The provision was dropped in a 1985 revision of the regulations. Under current regulations, SBA’s obligation under a guarantee is extinguished if the lender fails to demand purchase of the unpaid guaranteed portion within one year after maturity of the note. 13 C.F.R. §120.202-5(e) (1991).

Pre-1985 decisions on the notice requirement are no longer applicable to SBA under the current regulations. Nevertheless, we briefly note a few of them because they illustrate the scope of an agency’s authority to implement a guarantee program by regulation and may have relevance by analogy to similar requirements in other programs. Since the requirement itself is a creature of agency regulations, the agency has discretion to determine the consequences of noncompliance, ranging from an interest penalty (B-181432, September 4, 1979) to termination of the guarantee commitment (B-201388, September 23, 1981). The agency may also make the consequences contingent upon the extent to which noncompliance prejudices the interests of the government. See B-187945, March 22, 1977. While the basic requirement may not be waived except to the extent permissible under the regulations (see B-181432, February 19, 1976), the particular form of notice, a matter of procedure, is subject to waiver. B-188741, January 25, 1978 (oral notice accepted and acknowledged by agency held to be substantial compliance). See also B-181432 -O. M., February 19, 1976 (agency may waive requirement in guarantee agreement that lender provide it with a copy of the executed note and settlement sheet).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>For a detailed discussion of waiver of agency regulations in the Context Of Commodity Credit Corporation export assistance guarantees, see B-208610, September 1, 1983.

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## D. Rights and Obligations of Government Upon Default

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### 1. Nature of the Government's Obligation

When a government agency guarantees a loan, it is promising to indemnify someone in case of **default**. The “someone” includes both the lending institution that originated the loan and subsequent purchasers of the guaranteed portion of the **loan**. The default **results** from the borrower’s failure to make payment when due or other breach of a material covenant of the loan. In the simple situation, a borrower borrows money from a lender. The government guarantees the **loan**, with the commitments of the lender **and** the government usually reduced to writing in the form of a guarantee agreement. If the borrower defaults on his or her payments, the lender looks to the government to pay on the guarantee.

In some instances, Congress has explicitly provided in the program legislation that the guarantee will be backed by the “**full faith and credit**” of the United States. Examples are 12 U.S.C. § 635k (guarantees and insurance issued by the Export-Import Bank), 15 U.S.C. § 683(c) (Small Business Investment Act of 1958), and 20 U.S.C. § 1075(b)(4) (Robert T. Stafford Student Loan Program).<sup>20</sup> Language of this type has been held to be “the highest assurance the Government can give, its pledged faith.” Perry v. United States, 294 **U.S.** 330,351 (1935).

There is a long line of opinions of the Attorney General addressing the effect of statutory language pledging the “faith” or “credit” of the United States, or the absence of such language. While the opinions are not limited to loan guarantee commitments, almost **all** of the cases arose under loan guarantee programs. This is understandable because (1) lenders are being asked to extend credit to a somewhat riskier universe of borrowers which they most likely would not accommodate without the guarantee; and (2) at least prior to the Federal Credit

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<sup>20</sup>This and similar language has, and is intended to have, connotations of constitutional significance, although the words “full faith and credit” appear in the Constitution only once, in the requirement that each state recognize the laws, records, and judicial proceedings of other states (Art. IV, sec. 1). In addition, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 2 empowers the Congress to borrow money “on the credit of the United States.”

Reform Act, the government's commitment was not backed by enacted budget authority. To encourage lender participation in a **variety** of programs, the Attorney General was asked, in effect, "Does the government really mean it?"

Perhaps the **leading** case is 41 **Op. Att'y Gen.** 363 (1958), dealing with ship mortgage and loan insurance under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The opinion makes **several** important points. First, what does the language mean? It means that the government's obligation is to be considered on the same footing as the interest-bearing obligations of the United States such as Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. **Id.** at 366 (citing 41 **Op. Att'y Gen.** 138 (1953)).

Second and more important, what is the language's practical significance? None, answered the Attorney General. Although recognizing that Congress can establish such distinctions, the Attorney General stated that, in the absence of such congressional action, there is no "order of solemnity of valid general obligations of the United States," nor does an obligation with the statutory faith and/or credit language have any legal priority over a **valid** general obligation of the United States without the language. 41 **Op. Att'y Gen.** at 369.

**Finally**, the Attorney General addressed the lack of **advance** budget authority:

"If . . . the **existence** of an appropriation **is** not a condition of or limitation on the **authority** of an **officer** to contract on behalf of the United **States**, the need for **appropriations to meet an obligation incurred under the contract does not affect the existence or validity of the obligation.**"

**Id.** at 370. The following year, the Attorney General made the **same points** with respect to Interstate Commerce Commission loan guarantees to rail carriers. 41 **Op. Att'y Gen.** 403 (1959). After emphasizing that the validity of the guarantee "is not affected by the absence from the act of any language expressly pledging the faith or credit of the United States," the opinion states that "**It is enough to create an obligation of the United States if an agency or officer is**



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validly authorized to incur such an obligation on **its** behalf **and** validly exercises that power. ” *Id.* at 405.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, reading **all of** the opinions together, we may state that a loan guarantee is a **valid** obligation of the United States the same as **any** other valid obligation, regardless of the presence or absence of full faith and credit language and regardless of the presence or absence of advance budget authority, provided (1) the program statute **is** constitutional; (2) Congress has not disclaimed **liability** at the time or before the commitment is made; (3) the guarantee is made by a federal agency or official with the legal authority to do so; and (4) the guarantee complies with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

In an opinion concerning guarantees issued by the former **Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation** incident to **its** resolution of failed or failing savings and loan institutions, the Comptroller General expressly adopted the criteria and analysis of the Attorney General opinions. 68 **Comp. Gen.** 14 (1988).

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## **2. Scope of the Government’s Guarantee**

As noted earlier, a loan guarantee statute will typically specify the permissible purpose(s) of the loans to be guaranteed, establish eligibility requirements, and give the administering agency considerable discretion to determine the terms and conditions of the guarantee. Subject to the terms of the program legislation, there is also an element of discretion in determining the **permissible** scope of a guarantee, that is, the types and degree of risk to which the agency may expose **itself**. This section presents a few issues GAO has considered regarding the limits of that discretion.

As with any other payment situation, the government is not expected to close its eyes to indications of fraud or misrepresentation. For example, an agency should not make payment to a lender where it has knowledge of the possibility of fraud, negligence, or misrepresentation on the part of the lender. Making payment in the

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<sup>21</sup> Other opinions in this family are 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 327 (1966); 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 323 (1966); 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (1961); 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 424 (1959); 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 262 (1982). Since the opinions **all** said **basically** the same thing and seemed to arise under every program in sight, the Attorney General stopped issuing **formal opinions** on routine **full** faith and credit questions in this context in 1973. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 262, 262 n.2.

face of such knowledge exposes the certifying officer to potential liability. 51 **Comp.Gen.** 474 (1972); **B-174861**, February 23, 1972. In these two cases, however, GAO advised that the Small Business Administration could, upon default of the borrower, purchase the guaranteed portion of the loan from an innocent holder who had purchased it in the secondary market and who had no knowledge of the possible misconduct by the originating lender. Payment to the innocent holder in these circumstances would not waive any of SBA's rights against the original lender, and, as a **practical** matter, **would** avoid a result adverse to the holder that **could** seriously jeopardize the secondary market. Thus, paying the innocent holder is an acceptable level of risk whereas paying the suspected wrongdoer is not.

It follows that there is no objection to honoring the claim of an innocent lender who is the victim of fraud by the borrower. **B-167329**, October 6, 1969.

Similarly, GAO held in 17 **Comp.Gen.** 604 (1938) that the Federal Housing Administration was not liable to reimburse a lender bank for a loss sustained as a result of a payment made, on the basis of a forged authorization, to an individual other than a bona fide borrower. This situation was distinguished from a case where a lender bank, in the exercise of due care, suffered a loss as a result of a forged note. **A-94717-O. M.**, August 12, 1938. The bank in 17 **Comp.Gen.** 604 already possessed a validly signed note but suffered the loss by accepting a forged authorization for payment. Comparison of the authorization with the note would have disclosed the forgery.

A 1974 decision expanded somewhat on 51 **Comp.Gen.** 474. GAO determined in **B-140673**, December 3, 1974, that the SBA has sufficiently broad statutory authority to repurchase the guaranteed portion of a loan from an innocent secondary-market holder where the borrower is not in default but the primary lender negligently or unlawfully withholds payments. (Under the arrangement in question, the primary lender was to continue servicing the loan and remit payments, minus a servicing fee, to the holder.) This decision clearly enlarged the scope of SBA's guarantee since the "triggering event" could be something other than a default by the borrower in repaying the loan. However, the holding in that case was for the relatively limited purpose of allowing SBA to avoid the security registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. The Securities and Exchange Commission had determined that these requirements **would**

apply to **SBA-guaranteed** loans that were resold in the **secondary** market, unless **SBA's** guarantee was absolute and fully protected the purchaser of the guaranteed portion in all circumstances, including instances where the **lender** did not forward **all** payments received from the borrower.

A few years later, **B-181432**, August 11, 1978, explored what are perhaps the outer limits of the "risk discretion" recognized in **B-140673**. **SBA** proposed to contract with a private entity to serve **as** the centralized fiscal agent in the secondary market for **SBA** guaranteed loans. The **fiscal** agent would have responsibility for receiving payments from borrowers, remitting these payments to the holders, and certifying the amount of the outstanding balance each time a guaranteed loan was transferred. **SBA** further proposed to unconditionally guarantee **all** such actions and representations of the fiscal agent to the holder of the guaranteed portion of a **loan**. **GAO** agreed that **SBA** **could** contract with a fiscal agent and, consistent with **B-140673**, guarantee a holder against the agent's failure to properly forward the borrower's loan payments. However, to unconditionally guarantee holders against certification errors by the fiscal agent would significantly enlarge **SBA's** existing guarantee responsibility, would subject **SBA** to **substantially** new risks, and would therefore require additional legislative authority. The increased risk would include new types of events that could trigger **SBA's** obligation to purchase a guaranteed loan, as well as the maximum amount of **SBA's** liability (should the fiscal agent erroneously certify the outstanding balance of a loan to be larger than it actually was).

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### 3. Amount of Government's Liability

A program statute may not provide guidance on determining the amount the government is obligated to pay under a guarantee or the manner in which a loss is to be computed. If it does not, the agency's discretion again comes into play. As long as they are consistent with whatever statutory guidance does exist, the agency's regulations will generally be controlling.

For example, the computation of claims under Title I of the National Housing Act is prescribed by regulation. See 24 C.F.R. §201.55 (1991). In very simplified form, the claim is a specified percentage of the sum of several elements: the unpaid amount of the **loan** (subject to certain reductions), plus accrued interest, plus uncollected court costs, plus attorney's fees actually paid, plus certain recording

expenses. **Claims** by lenders using unauthorized computations have been disallowed. E.g., **B-133924**, December 4, 1957,

In another **case** involving the Title I loan program, a lender claimed an amount representing partial reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in collecting on a defaulted note. Although the borrower's obligation on the note was discharged and the note did not contain a stipulation for attorney's fees in the event of default (which would have been ineffective under state law), payment of the claim was proper since it was specifically provided for in the regulations. **B-163029**, February 16, 1968.

Validly issued program regulations are controlling even though applying them in a particular case may produce an anomalous result to the lender's advantage, at least where the lender has fully complied. For example, regulations governing defaulted Title I mobile home loans provide that reimbursement is computed by deducting from the unpaid amount of the loan either the actual sales price upon repossession or the appraised value of the mobile home, whichever is greater. GAO has found this formula to be within HUD's statutory authority. 71 **Comp. Gen.** — (**B-245138**, July 7, 1992). At one time, the regulations also prohibited the **filing** of a claim until after default, repossession, and sale of the mobile home. These regulations occasionally produced a situation in which a particular model could not be found in current rating publications (such as the so-called "blue book") and the mobile home was no longer available for appraisal by HUD because, in compliance with the regulations, it had already been sold. Since the impossibility of appraisal was due to the regulations and was through no fault of the lender, the Comptroller General held that the actual sales price could be used in computing the reimbursement, as long as it was administratively determined to be reasonable. 55 **Comp. Gen.** 151 (1975); **B-184016**, September 16, 1975. The solution, of course, was to amend the regulations.

Several early decisions involved the language in 12 U.S.C. §1703(a) which authorizes HUD to insure lending institutions against "losses which they may sustain" in making Title I home improvement loans or other advances of credit, If the loan does not either provide for the automatic acceleration of maturity upon **default** or give the lender the option to accelerate which the lender in fact exercises, the government cannot pay the lender the full unpaid balance of an **unmatured** loan because payments not yet due do not represent a loss

actually sustained by the lending institution. **A-74701**, May 22, 1936. While this result was consistent with the statutory language, it was not practical from an administrative standpoint. It meant that HUD was limited to paying the **lender** the monthly installments as they became due, with what was termed “a corresponding annoyance and dissatisfaction to the insured institution with the program.” Two later decisions effectively modified **A-74701** and established that, if there is no acceleration provision (an event which would be unlikely today), or if exercising an acceleration option would be undesirable because of state law, HUD can nevertheless reimburse a lending institution for the entire unpaid balance of the loan if it is clear that the entire unpaid balance will be a claim of the lending institution against the government and if the lender assigns the note or other evidence of indebtedness to the government. 16 **Comp.Gen.** 723 (1937); 16 **Comp.Gen.** 336 (1936).

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#### 4. Liability of the Borrower

When the government **guarantees** a loan and the borrower defaults, the lender is not required to make special efforts toward collection. Rather, the lender may fall back on the government’s guarantee and leave the entire responsibility for collection to the government. See, e.g., 16 **Comp.Gen.** 336 (1936); **B-134628**, **January** 15, 1958. Naturally, it is invariably to the lender’s advantage to do just that. Payment by the government, however, does not mean that the borrower is off the hook. Unless the program legislation provides otherwise, the government becomes subrogated to the rights of the lender, and the borrower is indebted to the government for the amount it has paid out. The government is not required to collect more than the amount it has actually paid out to the lender, plus interest and collection costs to the extent authorized. See 15 **Comp.Gen.** 256 (1935). A variety of issues relating to borrower liability can be illustrated by an examination of the Veterans’ Home Loan Guarantee Program.

##### a. Veterans’ Home Loan Guarantee Program

Title **III** of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended and codified, 38 U.S.C. §§ 3701—3751 (**Supp. III 1991**),<sup>22</sup> authorizes the Department of Veterans **Affairs** (the former Veterans Administration) to guarantee loans to enable veterans to purchase or

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<sup>22</sup>Section numbers for 38 U.S.C. ch. 37 were redesignated by Pub. L. No. 102-83 § 5, 105 Stat. 378,406 (1991).

construct homes and for other specified purposes. This is the well-known “G.I. loan,” The guarantee is an entitlement in the sense that a loan meeting the statutory requirements and made for one of the statutory purposes is “**automatically guaranteed.**” *Id.* § 3710(a). For certain loans closed after January 1, 1990, the **liability** of the veteran-borrower to the government was considerably restricted by the Veterans Home Loan Indemnity and Restructuring Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-237, Title III, 103 Stat. 2062,2069 (1989). A description of the “old” rules is nevertheless useful to understand what has and has not been changed, and because loans under the old and new programs **will** exist side-by-side for many years into the **future.**<sup>23</sup>

(1) Loans closed prior to 1990

Upon proper payment of a guarantee, the VA acquires both the **right** of subrogation and an independent right of indemnity against the defaulting veteran. *United States v. Shimer*, 367 U.S. 374 (1961); *Vail v. Derwinski*, 946 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1991); *McKnight v. United States*, 259 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1958). As the Supreme Court noted in *Shimer*, a contrary result would convert the guarantee into a grant. 367 U.S. at 387. The right of indemnity is reinforced by the guarantee agreement and by a regulation in effect since the early days of the program which provides that any amount paid out by the VA under a guarantee by reason of default “shall constitute a debt owing to the United States by such veteran.” 38 C.F.R. § 36.4323(e) (1991).

In the simple situation, the veteran defaults, the bank forecloses, the VA pays the bank under the guarantee and then proceeds to attempt recovery from the defaulting veteran. *E.g., McKnight*; B-104273, August 20, 1951.

Sale of the property by the veteran does not automatically exonerate the veteran from liability. Where a veteran who bought a home under a VA-guaranteed loan sells the **property** to a purchaser who assumes the mortgage and subsequently defaults, the veteran may still be liable to the government for the amount VA is required to pay under the guarantee. B-155317, October 21, 1964; B-131 120, July 26, 1957; B-131210, April 9, 1957. This result applies unless the transaction

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<sup>23</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of the program, see Ingold, *The Department of Veterans' Affairs Home Loan Guaranty Program: Friend or Foe?*, 132 *Mil.L. Rev.* 231 (1991).

amounts to a **novation**, that is, unless the mortgagee releases the original mortgagor and extinguishes the old debt. **B-108528**, December 3, 1952. Breach by the lender of an agreement to **notify** the veteran (original borrower) if the subsequent purchaser defaults does not affect the veteran's liability to the United States. **B-154496**, July 9, 1964.

The potential harshness of the result in many of these cases is largely mitigated through statutory release and waiver provisions. When a veteran disposes of residential property securing a guaranteed loan, the veteran may be released at the time of the sale from all further liability to the VA resulting from the loan, including default by the transferee or subsequent purchaser, if (1) the loan is current, (2) the purchaser is obligated by contract to assume the full liability and responsibility of the veteran under the loan, and (3) the purchaser qualifies from a credit standpoint, that is, if the purchaser would qualify for a guarantee if he or she were an eligible veteran. For loan commitments made before March 1, 1988, the veteran must **apply** to the VA for the release, but issuance of the release is mandatory if the statutory conditions are met. 38 U.S.C. § 3713(a). If the veteran fails to obtain a release at the time of the sale and a default subsequently occurs, the VA may issue the release retroactively upon determining that it would have issued the release had it been timely requested. *Id.* § 3713(b). For loan commitments on or after March 1, 1988, the release is issued by the holder of the loan upon receipt of written notification by the veteran, subject to the same conditions and subject to the veteran's right to appeal an adverse determination to the VA. Sale of the property without notifying the holder may result in acceleration of the loan. *Id.* § 3714.

In addition, the VA is required to waive a veteran's indebtedness upon determining that collection would be against equity and good conscience, and that there is no indication of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith on the part of any interested person. Waiver must be requested within one year from receipt of the notification of indebtedness. 38 U.S.C. § 5302(b) and (c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-54, § 5, 105 Stat. 267, 268 (1991).<sup>24</sup> This is a "mandatory" waiver statute, imposing upon the VA a duty to actually exercise its discretion once waiver has been requested. See

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<sup>24</sup>Section numbers for 38 U.S.C. ch. 53 were redesignated by Pub. L. No. 102-40, § 402(b), 105 Stat. 187,238 (1991).

Beauchesne v. Nimmo, 562 F. Supp. 250 (D. Corm. 1983) (discussing mandatory nature of 38 U.S.C. § 5302(a) dealing with waiver of benefit overpayments).

As with many waiver statutes, 38 U.S.C. § 5302 eliminates the potential liability of certifying and disbursing officers with respect to any amounts waived. “**Certifying** officer” in this context means the authorized **certifying** officer of the VA who certified the payment in question, and has no reference to any official of any private institution involved in the transaction. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 430 F. Supp. 551,561 (D. Colo. 1977), **aff’d**, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014.

Adverse waiver determinations may be appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals established by 38 U.S.C. § 7101.38 C.F.R. § 19.2. If waiver is granted, amounts previously paid maybe refunded. Id. §1.967. GAO reviewed these regulations when they were **first issued** and agreed that they were within the VA’s authority. **B-158337**, March 11, 1966.

Absent either release or waiver, the VA may pursue **recovery** against the veteran. See, e.g., Davis v. National Homes Acceptance-Co-w., 523 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala. 1981); **B-188814**, March 8, 1978; **B-172672**, June 22, 1971. In **B-188814**, for example, the veteran had failed to obtain a release, would not have been eligible for it anyway, and VA refused to waive the indebtedness. Therefore, the veteran was held liable even though the purchaser who subsequently defaulted had assured him that he **would** no longer be liable to VA.

Most of the cases cited thus far concern the liability of the original borrower where a subsequent purchaser defaults. The purchaser of property for which VA has guaranteed a loan, whether or not the purchaser **is** a veteran, may also become liable to VA for amounts VA **is** required to pay out upon default. For example, in **B-141888**, July 21, 1960, a veteran purchased a home, obtained a VA guarantee, and later sold the home to a non-veteran who assumed the mortgage. The non-veteran purchaser defaulted. The lender foreclosed and obtained a deficiency judgment against both the veteran and the non-veteran, which VA paid. VA **waived** the veteran’s indebtedness, but was still entitled to collect from the defaulting purchaser. See also **B-155932**, February 23, 1971; **B-155932**, October 13, 1970 (same case).



One of the most contested issues under the program has been the availability of state law **as** a defense to a VA claim. For example, **it is** not uncommon for states to prohibit, or impose various restrictions on, lenders' obtaining deficiency judgments against defaulting purchasers after a **foreclosure** sale. Since VA's rights under subrogation are limited to the rights of lenders, these statutes **would** limit VA'S right to obtain deficiency judgments under a subrogation theory. However, VA'S regulations have been held to "create a uniform system" for administering the guarantee program, a system which displaces state law. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 377. These regulations, as noted earlier, include a provision giving the VA an independent right of indemnity. Thus, to avoid the **possibility** of being hampered by state law, VA has generally proceeded under its independent right of **indemnity** rather than under a subrogation theory. E.g., B-126500, February 3, 1956; B-124724, December 21, 1955.

In one group of cases, the right of indemnity was held to prevail over state laws which **flatly** prohibited VA from obtaining deficiency judgments through subrogation. Jones v. Turnage, 699 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990); cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309; United States v. Rossi, 342 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1965); B-174343, November 17, 1971; B-143844, November 15, 1960; B-124724, October 3, 1955. Other cases applied the same approach to dismiss other aspects of state deficiency laws. E.g., B-173007, June 29, 1971; B-162193, September 1, 1967; B-122929, June 24, 1955.

Several more recent cases have dealt with state statutes that do not flatly prohibit VA from obtaining a deficiency judgment through subrogation, and have reached differing results. In Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1990), a Washington state statute would have allowed the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment if judicial foreclosure procedures were used. However, VA had instructed the lender to use a faster and less expensive **nonjudicial** foreclosure procedure. The statute authorizing the nonjudicial procedure prohibited obtaining a deficiency judgment against the borrower. Id. at 1363. The court acknowledged that cases like McKnight, Jones (which the same court affirmed 3 months after it decided Whitehead), and Rossi correctly held that VA **has** an independent right of indemnity when state law flatly prohibits deficiency judgments. Id. at 1368-69.

However, the court distinguished the Washington statute because it did not flatly prohibit deficiency judgments; they were prohibited only when the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures were used. The court quoted language from Shimer to the effect that the VA regulatory scheme did not displace all state law but only inconsistent state law. Id. at 1367. The court then held that since the Washington statute allowed VA a means to obtain a deficiency judgment, it was not inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and therefore not displaced. Id. at 1369. Thus, according to the court, the state law in question could prohibit VA from seeking a deficiency judgment through its indemnity rights, and did so in this case because VA's inability to obtain a deficiency judgment resulted from its own choice of remedy under that state law. A case following Whitehead is Carter v. Derwinski, 758 F. Supp. 603 (D. Idaho 1991).

The analysis in Whitehead was criticized in Vail v. Derwinski, 946 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1991), involving similar facts under a similar Minnesota statute. Disagreeing with Whitehead, the court held that VA did not forfeit its independent right of indemnity merely because it declined to exercise a means to obtain a deficiency judgment through subrogation. The VA's right of indemnity, said the court, derives from its direct relationship with the borrower of a guaranteed loan. Id. at 592. As such, it is not defeated by a state statute which limits the lender's ability to pursue the borrower. A case that also disagrees with some of the reasoning in Whitehead, but which reached the same result, is United States v. Davis, 756 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Wis. 1991).

The defense of minority has also been raised on occasion. State law generally provides that a contract entered into by a minor is voidable at the minor's option. Several states have statutes which expressly make the defense of infancy inapplicable to contracts under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, and the few cases GAO has considered have involved statutes of this type. See B-126500, February 3, 1956; B-124750, October 3, 1955; B-105429, December 11, 1951. In addition, the United States has sovereign immunity from defenses arising under state statutes of limitations unless expressly waived. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) (FHA claim under National Housing Act); B-134523, March 19, 1958 (Summerlin applied to VA claim).

Another provision of the program legislation makes the "financial transactions" of the VA "incident to, or arising out of" the guarantee

program “final and conclusive upon all officers of the Government.” 38 U.S.C. § 3720(c). Thus, GAO will not review the amount of indebtedness determined by the VA. B-105655, October 10, 1951; B-105551, September 25, 1951. Similarly, apart from advising persons that the options exist, GAO will not review the VA’S exercise of its waiver and release authorities. B-216270, September 25, 1984; B-108528, October 6, 1952.

(2) Loans closed after January 1, 1990

Under 38 U.S.C. 33729, the VA will charge the veteran a loan fee based on a percentage of the loan amount. The fee maybe included in the loan and paid from its proceeds. Payment of the loan fee is a prerequisite to the guarantee. Disabled veterans receiving compensation or their surviving spouses are exempt. Subsequent transferees assuming a loan are also charged a loan fee.

A veteran who pays the loan fee or is exempt from paying it—

“shall have no liability to the Secretary with respect to the loan for any loss resulting from any default of such individual except in the case of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith by such individual in obtaining the loan or in connection with the loan default.”

Id. § 3703(e)(1). This provision was added by the Veterans Home Loan Indemnity and Restructuring Act of 1989. An explanatory statement on the final House-Senate compromise (there was no conference report) emphasizes that “bad faith” is intended to include abandonment of a mortgage by one with the financial ability to make the payments. 135 Cong. Rec. H 9113 (daily ed. November 20, 1989). The limited liability of 38 U.S.C. § 3703(e)(1) does not apply to persons assuming a loan, or to veterans who receive mobile home loans. Id. § 3703(e)(2). Apart from the limited liability of 38 U.S.C. § 3703(e), the VA’S right of subrogation is **preserved**. Id. § 3732(a)(1).

b. Debt Collection Procedures

Debt collection is governed by the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, the Debt Collection Act of 1982, and the Federal Claims Collection Standards. Authorities available to federal agencies in varying degrees include assessment of interest and penalties, offset, collection in installments, compromise, use of commercial collection agencies, and, if none of this works, referral to the Department of

Justice for suit. These authorities are all explored in detail in Chapter 13 and, as a general proposition, are the same for a debt arising from a loan guarantee as for any other debt. We note the topic here to emphasize one point—the **governmentwide** authorities do not apply to the extent an agency has its own debt collection authority, either agency-specific or program-specific. This maybe in the form of positive authority or restrictions. We turn again to the Department of Veterans Affairs for several illustrations.

The VA has the authority to compromise any claim arising from its guarantee or insurance programs, independent of the **governmentwide** compromise authority under the Federal Claims Collection Act. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3720(a)(3), (a)(4). Exercise of this authority is entirely up to the VA. See B-153726, May 4, 1964. See also 71 Comp. Gen. \_\_\_\_ (B-245138, July 7, 1992) (HUD); B-228857, February 22, 1988 (SBA). The HUD decision, B-245138, upheld HUD's policy of charging interest at the lower of the note rate or the Treasury "current value of funds" rate as an authorized exercise of HUD's compromise authority.

Subject to its own implementing regulations and procedures specified in the statute, the VA may offset debts arising from veterans' benefit programs against future payments under any law administered by the VA. 38 U.S.C. §5314. However, offset against a veteran or his or her surviving spouse by any other agency to collect a debt owed to the VA under a guarantee program is prohibited except with the written consent of the debtor or under a judicial determination. Id. § 3726. Under this legislation, for example, the Defense Department may not deduct the amount of indebtedness to VA from the pay of active duty or retired military personnel absent either consent or a court determination. (The statutory definition of veteran includes certain active duty personnel.) B-167880, January 28, 1970. This protection against **setoff** applies only where the veteran (debtor) has incurred the debt through use of his or her VA loan entitlement. Thus, **setoff** is not prohibited where a veteran, upon purchasing a home, assumes a VA loan in the ordinary course of the real estate transaction without involving his or her own loan entitlement. B-167880, December 2, 1969.

The VA also has independent statutory authority to assess interest and reasonable administrative costs on debts arising from its benefit programs, including debts arising from guarantee programs to the

extent not precluded by the terms of the loan instrument. 38 U.S.C. §5315. For debts within the scope of the statute, 38 U.S.C. § 5315, rather than 31 U.S.C. § 3717 (Federal Claims Collection Act), is the controlling provision. 66 Comp. Gen. 512 (1987).

If reasonable administrative collection efforts fail, the VA may use its own attorneys to sue the debtor, subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General. 38 U.S.C. §5316.

The VA legislation cited above deals **with** specific debt collection **tools**. An example of more general authority is 7 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(4) (Supp. III 1991), which authorizes the Farmers Home Administration to “compromise, **adjust**, reduce, or charge-off debts or claims,” and, within certain limits, to release debtors, other than Housing Act debtors, “from personal liability with or without payment of any consideration at the time of the compromise, **adjustment**, reduction, or charge-off.” Under this law, for example, the Farmers Home Administration is authorized to terminate the accrual of interest on the guaranteed portion of defaulted loans. 67 Comp. Gen. 471 (1988) (noting, however, that the agency had restricted its statutory discretion by its own regulations).

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## 5. Collateral Protection

**In** administering a loan guarantee program, it may become desirable for an agency to make expenditures other than merely paying out on the guarantee. From a program or even economical standpoint, it may be desirable, for example, to make expenditures to protect and preserve the government’s interest in the collateral, such as custodial care, insurance costs, or the purchase of prior liens. For purposes of this discussion, we use the term “**collateral** protection” to cover two types of expenditure—preservation of the collateral **itself** and protection of the government’s interest in the collateral.

Whether or not such expenditures are proper is essentially a question of “purpose availability.” The **first** step is to analyze the terms and intent of the agency’s program authority to determine whether the agency’s funds are available for the contemplated expenditure either expressly or by necessary implication. If this does not provide the answer, the next step is to apply the “necessary expense” doctrine.

An example of specific authority is 38 U.S.C. 53727, which authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs to make expenditures to correct

structural defects in certain homes encumbered by a VA-guaranteed mortgage. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has similar authority to use funds available under Title I of the National Housing Act to correct structural defects in FHA-insured housing. 12 U.S.C. §1735b; B-114860-O. M., January 15, 1974. An example of somewhat less specific authority is another provision of the Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1713(k), which authorizes HUD “to take such action and advance such sums as may be necessary to preserve or protect the lien of such mortgage.” In 54 Comp.Gen. 1061 (1975), GAO agreed that this provision authorizes HUD to advance money from its insurance fund to make repairs to multifamily projects covered by insured mortgages assigned to HUD upon default., until either the default is cured or HUD acquires title to the property.

Absent specific authority, collateral protection expenditures may still be permissible under a “necessary expense” theory. As a general proposition, the authority to require collateral implies the authority to make reasonable expenditures to care for and preserve the collateral where administratively determined, to be necessary. 54 Comp.Gen. 1093 (1975).

The limits of the necessary expense approach are illustrated by B-1 70971, January 22, 1976, a case involving the now-defunct New Community Development Program. The Department of Housing and Urban Development questioned whether it could use the revolving fund established by the Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970 to make two types of collateral protection expenditures: (1) expenditures to repair, maintain, and operate the security and (2) payments to senior lienholders. The expenditures were intended to advance program objectives by preventing deterioration of the security pending possible acquisition by HUD, or perhaps in some cases enable a developer to regain financial health and successfully continue with the project.

The Comptroller General reviewed the program legislation and legislative history and concluded that the proposed expenditures would constitute a new and major type of financial assistance entirely beyond the intended scope of the statute, and were not authorized except in cases where HUD had made a bona fide determination to acquire the security. A later decision, B-170971, July 9, 1976, discussed HUD’s specific authority under the program legislation to

make collateral protection expenditures after it had acquired the security.

Where an agency acquires property through a loan or loan guarantee program it administers, it may not transfer the management and disposition of that property to another federal agency without specific statutory authority, nor may it effect such a transfer under the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §1535. **B-156010-O.M.**, March 16, 1965 (concluding that VA could not transfer the management and disposition of acquired property to HUD without **specific** authority).

A similar type of payment is one designed to protect the government's interest in the transaction as opposed to maintaining the particular piece of property. Again, the question is one of purpose availability in light of the agency's statutory authority. Thus, where **FHA** had acquired a second mortgage on real property through payment of a loss to an insured financial institution under Title I of the National Housing Act, it could use Title I funds to redeem the property to protect its junior lien, under a right of redemption conferred by state law, if it determined that redemption was in the best interests of the government and necessary to carry out the provisions of Title I. 36 **Comp. Gen.** 697 (1957). See also 34 **Comp. Gen.** 47 (1954).

Collateral protection may take forms other than direct expenditures. For example, the Small Business Administration could subordinate a senior lien to enable a borrower to obtain necessary surety bonds upon an administrative determination that the action would be consistent with the statutory purposes and would improve the prospects for repayment of the loan. 42 **Comp. Gen.** 451 (1963). (Under the governing legislation, **SBA** had the discretion not to require security at all on loans **sufficiently** sound as to reasonably assure repayment.) Another 1963 case held that a statute authorizing the Maritime Administration to take necessary steps to protect or preserve collateral securing indebtedness authorized it to agree to reschedule payments under an insured ship mortgage to avert impending default. 43 **Comp. Gen.** 98 (1963).

In 63 **Comp. Gen.** 465 (1984), a borrower defaulted on a loan guaranteed by the **SBA**. **SBA** purchased the guaranteed portion of the loan from the lending bank and proceeded to place the loan in liquidation. However, a prior **lienholder** scheduled a foreclosure sale. **SBA was** unable to get a Treasury check in time to submit a protective

bid, and asked the lending bank to advance funds to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale, promising to **reimburse** the bank with interest. Obviously, a government agency does not normally have the authority to borrow money from a commercial **bank to** carry out its programs. Under the particular circumstances involved, however, GAO found that the transaction, including the commitment to pay interest, could be justified under **SBA's** broad **authority**<sup>25</sup> in 15 U.S.C. **§ 634(b)(7)** to “take any and **all** actions” deemed necessary in liquidating or otherwise dealing with authorized loans or guarantees. The decision emphasized that it was nothing more than an interpretation of **SBA's legal** authority under the “unique circumstances of **this** case,” and should not be regarded as establishing a “broad legal precedent.” *Id.* at 469.

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<sup>25</sup>The supreme Court has noted in another context that Congress has given the SBA “extraordinarily broad powers” to accomplish the objectives of the Small **Business Act**. *SBA v. McClellan*, 364 U.S. 446,447 (1960).







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